Showing papers in "Journal of Mathematical Economics in 2000"

TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that when agents have the same convex capacity, the set of Pareto-optima is independent of it and identical to the optimal set of optima of an economy in which agents are expected utility maximizers and had the same probability.

TL;DR: In this paper, the consistency principle is used to identify various classes of consistent rules and correspondences in house allocation problems, and the authors model this property via consistency principle and identify the classes of rules whose predictions are independent of the sequence in which the actual assignments are realized.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the portfolio trading problem for an investor who faces transactions costs and short sales constraints in a continuous time economy with general specifications of ask and bid prices.

TL;DR: In this article, the probability that almost all the voting rules: the Condorcet procedures, the scoring rules and the runoff methods select simultaneously the same winner was investigated for three-candidate elections.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors study the relationship between the set of rational expectations equilibrium allocations and the ex-post core of exchange economies with asymmetric information and show that the latter is the core of the former.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors present results on a stochastically stable state or long-run equilibrium in evolutionary dynamics based on imitation of strategies by firms in a symmetric oligopoly with differentiated goods.

TL;DR: In this article, an explicitly dynamic evolutionary model of Cournot oligopoly in which the behavior of firms is based on imitation of success and experimentation is studied, and it is proved that only (evolutionary) stable sets are selected by the unique invariant measure of the induced Markov chain as the probability of experimentation tends to zero.

TL;DR: In this paper, a necessary and sufficient condition for a strategy distribution to correspond to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in anonymous games is provided. And the proof for sufficiency is an explicit construction of all equilibria for any given equilibrium distribution.

TL;DR: In this article, the use of lexicographic orders to represent preferences is introduced via an example, an order homomorphism from the aggregate of a Pareto dominance relation and a preference relation represented by a utility function to a lexicographical order.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors construct stationary Markov equilibria for an economy with fiat money, one nondurable commodity, countably many time periods, and a continuum of agents, and carry out an equilibrium analysis based on a careful study of Dynamic Programming equations and on properties of the invariant measures for associated optimally controlled Markov chains.

TL;DR: The notion of relative entropy is introduced, which is a natural adaptation of the entropy of a stochastic process to the subjective set-up to determine whether the agent will eventually learn to optimize and is shown that low entropy yields asymptotic optimal behavior.

TL;DR: In this article, a Cournot-Nash equilibrium concept is defined by considering as possible equilibria only the strategy selections for which the aggregate bid matrix is irreducible.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors studied the intertemporal utility maximization problem for Hindy-Huang-Kreps utilities and provided necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality for a large class of utility functions.

TL;DR: In this article, a social choice rule g selects from one up to k alternatives (but not more), and there exists a coalition H of k individuals such that for each profile r, the choice set g ( r ) is the collection of the top-most alternatives in the orderings of the individuals in H.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide a characterization of complete preorders defined on a real cone that admit a representation by means of a utility function which is continuous and homogeneous of degree one.

TL;DR: In this paper, the existence and regularity of rational expectations equilibria for any informational structure derived from prices were proved for an incomplete financial market exchange economy with nominal assets and a finite number of traders, goods, states and signals.

TL;DR: In this paper, an analytical framework and an axiomatic theory of behavior under risk were presented, which constitutes an extension of the theory of von Neumann and Morgenstern.

TL;DR: In this article, the Riesz-Kantorovich formula was used to prove the existence of equilibrium in an ordered topological vector space with topological dual L′ and order dual L~.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors introduce stochastic elements into the Walrasian tâtonnement process to make it more realistic and to ensure its global convergence, with probability 1.

TL;DR: In this article, the equivalence of the fuzzy core, the Edgeworth core, and the set of Walrasian equilibria in economies with a measure space of agents is established.

TL;DR: In this paper, Talman and van der Laan showed that there exists at least one competitive equilibrium in the market with indivisibility under some conditions on the utility functions of the agents.

TL;DR: In this paper, a canonical extensive game form is defined for non-cooperative games in both strategic and normal form, which preserves all symmetries of the former one. But this form is restricted to games to subgames and yields a minimal total rank of the tree involved.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors study continuous time continuous time optimal control problems with incentive compatibility constraints and show that the problem is equivalent to a state constraints problem in an endogenous state region which depends on the data of the problem.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss three principles for eliminating arbitrage opportunities: (i) No Arbitrage, (ii) No Approximate Arbitrage (NAA), and (iii) No Free Lunches (NFL).

TL;DR: In this article, the rationality of two-person bargaining solutions was obtained by imposing usual assumptions in cooperative bargaining theory, and it was proved that the conjunction of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and either Pareto Continuity or Strong Monotonicity implies this rationality.

TL;DR: In this paper, Zhang and Zhang [Zhang, A., Zhang, Y., and Zhang, A. (1996) show via a counterexample that the necessary conditions given in that paper do not necessarily hold, and then their sufficient conditions are extended to adaptive expectations.

TL;DR: In this article, an existence theorem for a class of backward stochastic integral equations is presented, where the information structure is driven by a Levy jump process and the main contribution is a generalization of Duffie and Epstein's [Duffie, D., Epstein, L., 1992] existence theorem.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider a financial market model with convex constraints on portfolios and adopt an axiomatic approach of admissible price functionals which generalizes the familiar linear pricing rules for frictionless markets.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide an axiomatic approach to the problem of ranking opportunity sets with respect to the degree of uncertainty regarding possible consequences of the available actions, where the items that can be selected from a menu of possible choices do not coincide with the consequences they induce (the objects a decision-maker ultimately cares about).

TL;DR: In this paper, a new axiom that completely characterizes the consumer demand behavior generated by homothetic preferences was obtained, and this axiom provides a unified basis for sharpening previous theorems on homophily rationalizations.