Showing papers in "Journal of Mathematical Economics in 2017"

TL;DR: This article introduced a model of decision making under ambiguity by extending the Bayesian approach to uncertain probabilities, where preferences for ambiguity pertain directly to probabilities such that attitude toward ambiguity is defined as attitude toward mean-preserving spreads in probabilities.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors considered the problem of fair two-dimensional division, where the allotted pieces must be of some restricted 2D geometric shape(s), particularly squares and fat rectangles.

TL;DR: The authors developed a general theory of epistemic democracy in large societies, which subsumes the classical Condorcet Jury Theorem, the Wisdom of Crowds, and other similar results, and showed that a suitably chosen voting rule will converge to the correct answer in the large population limit, even if there is significant correlation amongst voters, as long as the average covariance between voters becomes small as the population becomes large.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors develop a notion of subgames and a related subgame-perfect equilibrium for stochastic timing games, possibly in mixed strategies, and provide sufficient conditions for equilibrium existence.

TL;DR: In this article, a coherent inference model is proposed by distorting the prior density in Bayes' rule and replacing the likelihood with a so-called pseudo-likelihood, which implies new models of base-rate neglect and conservatism.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors obtained infinite-dimensional versions of Scarf's theorem for normal-form games with infinitely many players and showed that the weak α-core coincides with the closed-coalition α -core.

TL;DR: If the available number of protected links is limited, then, in equilibrium, there exists a network which contains several protected and non-protected links, and conditions under which the results of the benchmark model are preserved are provided.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider the case of one buyer and two items and derive a revenue-monotonicity theorem which states that stochastically dominated distributions yield less revenue.

TL;DR: It is shown that a quantum-theoretic framework for decision-making under uncertainty recently elaborated by some of us allows faithful modeling of the collected data.

TL;DR: In this article, a continuous-time hidden-action model with persistent observable shocks was studied and the authors developed a method to characterize the optimal contract with history-dependent effort exertion and shirking decisions.

TL;DR: In this paper, the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities where the strategy sets are totally ordered is studied and the results are illustrated with a number of economics-related examples.

TL;DR: In this article, it is shown that the contest organizer prefers fully concealing (disclosing) the information about the number of participating bidders when the cost functions are convex (concave).

TL;DR: This article examined the properties of prediction market prices when risk averse traders have heterogeneous beliefs in state probabilities and showed that the equilibrium state prices equal the mean beliefs of traders about that state if and only if the traders' common utility function is logarithmic.

TL;DR: In this article, a voting rule is said to be stable if it always elects a fixed-size subset of candidates such that there is no outside candidate who is majority preferred to any candidate in this set whenever such a set exists.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors study a dynamic career-concerns environment with an agent who has incentives to appear competent and show that if the agent is sufficiently patient and the time horizon is sufficiently long given the agent's patience, and the quality of the competent expert is high enough given the time-horizon and the discount factor, the beneficial long-term incentives overwhelm any harmful myopic ones, the incentive problem vanishes.

TL;DR: In this paper, the implications of anonymity and unanimity for the Arrovian social choice theory when population is infinite and anonymity axioms can be formulated, and a tension between unanimity and anonymity by providing possibility and impossibility results.

TL;DR: In this article, the existence of a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in nice games with isotone chain-concave best replies and compact strategy sets is proved. But the existence is not guaranteed.

TL;DR: The authors introduced variable markups in a horizontal-differentiation growth model by considering a larger class of preferences that nests the classic "CES" specification usually present in the workhorse love-for-variety models.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider designing a mechanism to allocate objects among agents without monetary transfers, and they show that, if the designer knows that there are at least three responsible agents, even if the identities of the responsible agents are not known, the optimal allocation can be elicited.

TL;DR: In this article, an agent-based framework based on simple piecewise linear time-invariant continuous-time dynamical systems models is proposed for describing efficient financial markets, which can reproduce both statistical and behavioral stylized facts of real markets.

TL;DR: In this paper, a behavioural characterization of an additively separable utility (that includes discounted utility, quasi-hyperbolic discounting, generalized hyperbolic discounteding and liminal discounting as special cases) embedded into Fechner model of random errors and Luce's choice model (also known as strict utility) is presented.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors characterize the nonparametric testable implications of Pareto efficiency and competitive equilibrium in economies with public goods, with and without warm-glow preferences, using mixed integer programming (MIP).

TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that the Aubin bargaining set and the set of competitive allocations coincide in a finite coalition production economy under some standard assumptions, and that the existence of competitive equilibrium implies the nonemptiness of Aubin Bargaining Sets.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors extend the literature on portfolio choice under prospect theory preferences by introducing a two-period life cycle model, where the sufficiently loss averse household decides on optimal consumption and investment in a portfolio with one risk-free and one risky asset.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors study exchange economies in ordered normed spaces, where agents have possibly different consumption sets and define the notion of semi-interior point of the positive cone X + of X, a notion weaker than the one of interior point, and study the existence of equilibrium in the case where X + has semiinterior points.

TL;DR: In this article, two key approaches to the representation of incomplete preferences over lotteries are integrated, and the main result of the expected multi-utility theorem is strengthened by ensuring that all utility indices involved are Aumann utilities (i.e., yield a strictly increasing expectation).

TL;DR: In this paper, the notions of mixed and behavioral Ellsberg strategies for extensive form games were proposed and proved to be outcome-equivalent if and only if mixed strategies satisfy a certain rectangularity condition.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider a campaign competition in which candidates compete for votes among a continuum of voters by engaging in persuasive efforts that are targetable, where each individual voter is persuaded by campaign effort and votes for the candidate who targets more persuasive effort to this voter.

TL;DR: In this article, existence conditions as well as computation methods for Berge equilibrium and two refinements: Berge-Vaisman equilibrium and Berge Nash equilibrium are presented and illustrated on the basis of relevant examples.

TL;DR: In this paper, the iterative and fixed-point definitions of interim correlated rationalizability coincide, and ICR is non-empty-valued and upper hemicontinuous.