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JournalISSN: 0047-2727

Journal of Public Economics

About: Journal of Public Economics is an academic journal. The journal publishes majorly in the area(s): Indirect tax & Tax reform. It has an ISSN identifier of 0047-2727. Over the lifetime, 4124 publication(s) have been published receiving 352278 citation(s). more

Topics: Indirect tax, Tax reform, Value-added tax more

Journal ArticleDOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(73)90013-3
Kenneth J. Arrow1Institutions (1)
Topics: Filter (video) (74%)

5,250 Citations

Open accessJournal ArticleDOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(72)90010-2
Abstract: Theoretical analysis of the connection between taxation and risktaking has mainly been concerned with the effect of taxes on portfolio decisions of consumers, Mossin (1968b) and Stiglitz (1969). However, there are some problems which are not naturally classified under this heading and which, although of considerable practical interest, have been left out of the theoretical discussions. One such problem is tax evasion. This takes many forms, and one can hardly hope to give a completely general analysis of all these. Our objective in this paper is therefore the more limited one of analyzing the individual taxpayer’s decision on whether and to what extent to avoid taxes by deliberate underreporting. On the one hand our approach is related to the studies of economics of criminal activity, as e.g. in the papers by Becker ( 1968) and by Tulkens and Jacquemin (197 1). On the other hand it is related to the analysis of optimal portfolio and insurance policies in the economics of uncertainty, as in the work by Arrow ( 1970), Mossin ( 1968a) and several others. We shall start by considering a simple static model where this decision is the only one with which the individual is concerned, so that we ignore the interrelationships that probably exist with other types of economic choices. After a detailed study of this simple case (sections more

Topics: Double taxation (54%), Taxpayer (54%), Income tax (53%) more

3,772 Citations

Open accessJournal ArticleDOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00092-4
Daniel Treisman1Institutions (1)
Abstract: Why is corruption — the misuse of public office for private gain — perceived to be more widespread in some countries than others? Different theories associate this with particular historical and cultural traditions, levels of economic development, political institutions, and government policies. This article analyzes several indexes of 'perceived corruption' compiled from business risk surveys for the 1980s and 1990s. Six arguments find support. Countries with Protestant traditions, histories of British rule, more developed economies, and (probably) higher imports were less 'corrupt'. Federal states were more 'corrupt'. While the current degree of democracy was not significant, long exposure to democracy predicted lower corruption. © 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved. more

Topics: Corruption Perceptions Index (67%), Corruption (65%), Political corruption (61%) more

3,398 Citations

Open accessJournal ArticleDOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(95)01564-7
Andrew E. Clark1, Andrew J. Oswald2Institutions (2)
Abstract: This paper attempts to test the hypothesis that utility depends on income relative to a ‘comparison’ or reference level. Using data on 5,000 British workers, it provides two findings. First, workers' reported satisfaction levels are shown to be inversely related to their comparison wage rates. Second, holding income constant, satisfaction levels are shown to be strongly declining in the level of education. More generally, the paper tries to help begin the task of constructing an economics of job satisfaction. more

Topics: Job satisfaction (59%), Wage (52%)

2,730 Citations

Open accessJournal ArticleDOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(86)90024-1
Abstract: We consider a general model of the non-cooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assumptions there will always exist a unique Nash equilibrium in our model. A small redistribution of wealth among the contributing consumers will not change the equilibrium amount of the public good. However, larger redistributions of wealth will change the set of contributors and thereby change the equilibrium provision of the public good. We are able to characterize the properties and the comparative statics of the equilibrium in a quite complete way and to analyze the extent to which government provision of a public good ‘crowds out’ private contributions. more

Topics: Public good (59%), Public goods game (59%), Redistribution of income and wealth (56%) more

2,132 Citations

No. of papers from the Journal in previous years

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Journal's top 5 most impactful authors

Helmuth Cremer

18 papers, 909 citations

Joel Slemrod

15 papers, 1.9K citations

Pierre Pestieau

14 papers, 864 citations

Jean-Jacques Laffont

12 papers, 675 citations

Firouz Gahvari

11 papers, 643 citations

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