Showing papers in "Journal of Public Economics in 1988"

TL;DR: In this paper, two prevailing hypotheses for why free riding is seldom observed with single-shot games are discussed. And an experiment is presented that examines both hypotheses and concludes that strategies and learning are the main reasons for free riding.

TL;DR: In this article, the normative implications of competition among local jurisdictions to attract new industry and income are explored within a neoclassical framework, where local officials set two policy variables, a tax (or subsidy) rate on mobile capital and a standard for local environmental quality, to induce more capital to enter the jurisdiction in order to raise wages.

TL;DR: In particular, as the size of the economy grows, the fraction contributing to the public good diminishes to zero as mentioned in this paper, which leads to a very limited model with little, if any, predictive power.

TL;DR: The authors analyzes Nash equilibria in a simple model of an economy with jurisdictions engaging in fiscal competition and finds that small-number Nash equilibrium in which tax rates are the strategic variables do not coincide with Nash equilibrium with public expenditure levels.

TL;DR: In the United States, empirical studies of the enforcement of continuous compliance with environmental regulations, especially air and water pollution regulations, have repeatedly demonstrated the following: (i) For most sources the frequency of surveillance is quite low. (ii) Even when violations are discovered, fines or other penalties are rarely assessed in most states as mentioned in this paper.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors construct a simple but fairly general model of household resource allocation and use the properties of the equilibrium of this model to characterise the effects of tax policy on individual utilities.

TL;DR: In this paper, the problem of efficient good provision is treated as a case of the Prisoner's Dilemma or isolation paradox game form, and the tax evasion decision is embedded within a general model of the allocation of public and private goods.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine government debt and tax-transfer policies that can be improved the allocation of risk between generations, and they provide a non-Keynesian justification for the debt-finance of wars and recessions, as well as an added rationale for Social Security type tax transfer schemes which aid unlucky generations, e.g. the Depression generation, at the expense of luckier generations.

TL;DR: In this article, the effects of US transfer programs on labor supply were studied in the Food Stamp Program. But, this is the first such study of the Food Stamps Program, and it is based on a three- equation, bivariate selection model is estimated on a sample of eligible households.

TL;DR: In contrast to standard social psychological approaches, based on such natural language terms as greed, fear, and trust, the Bayesian approach provides a rigorous mathematical treatment of social participation as discussed by the authors.

TL;DR: In this paper, a model of the spatial distribution of mobile heterogeneous agents is formulated to assess how a price change or program subsidy that is location-specific affects the composition of local residents via selective migration and thus biases evaluations of the effectiveness of the program based on its local consequences.

TL;DR: In this paper, a dynamic model of political competition between two "parties" with different policy preferences is presented, where each party is explicitly modeled as a sequence of overlapping generations of candidates, all of whom face finite decision horizons.

TL;DR: In this paper, a market model of environmental regulation with interdependent production and pollution abatement costs and heterogeneous firms is developed, where firms have private information about costs which have a quadratic form.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine a way of representing merit goods by allowing governments to apply a specific form of correction to consumers' preferences, based on an approach to the analysis of taste and quality change due to Fisher and Shell.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the claim that gubernatorial line item veto power reduces state spending and show that long run budgets are not altered by an item veto and that, in the short run, the item veto's potency is contingent upon the political setting.

TL;DR: In this article, the optimal amount of tax evasion for each firm depends not only on the degree of collusion in the market, but also on the relative market shares of the firms.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigated the practical importance of the functional specification of labour supply equations for the analysis of tax/benefit reform and compared the effects of two reforms to the U.K. income tax system; one involves income effects almost exclusively while the other implies a significant number of large increases in marginal tax rates.

TL;DR: This article investigated the effect of Social Security on retirement decisions and found that even an actuarially fair early retirement benefit could (on average) discourage continued work and that this phenomenon contributes to some of the observed increase in early retirement.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigated the employer and employee tax fraud activity under a withholding system and the system's effect on the amount of tax escaping the tax collector, and found that a single job holder's option of evading taxes through underreporting might give rise to evasion of non-withheld taxes through non-filing of individual returns, as well as induce employers to remit to the government less than the amounts withheld.

TL;DR: In this article, a semi-Markov model is used to characterize the steady state frequency of owner-occupied housing and simulate the impact of changes in housing tax policy, and the effect of household residence times.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the claim that gubernatorial line item veto power reduces state spending and show that long run budgets are not altered by an item veto and that, in the short run, the item veto's potency is contingent upon the political setting.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present an analysis of an important component of the benefits of Federal-aid highway infrastructure investments in the United States, focusing on the effects of those investments since 1950 on costs and productivity of firms in the U.S. road freight transport industry.

TL;DR: The authors examine the nature of individual and collective preferences over alternative tax schedules, in the context of a simple two-sector model, and show that with a purely sociotropic electorate there exists a flat-rate schedule which is a majority equilibrium, and with self-interested voters who seek to minimize their own tax burdens, greater marginal-rate progression may well be preferred by middle-and upper-income voters.

TL;DR: When competitive landowners/developers control incorporation and zoning decisions, efficient patterns of development emerge as mentioned in this paper, and when early arrivals control policy, they may impose zoning restrictions that force later entrants to pay, via the property tax, a disproportionate share of the cost of providing public services.

TL;DR: In this paper, the emphasis is on measuring horizontal inequity within each group of households with the same equity-relevant characteristics, rather than on adjusting incomes and then using the same measure for all households in the population.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined tax policies designed to correct the attendant externalities in the presence of asymmetric information and screening costs, and showed that when projects differ in expected returns it is ambiguous whether costly private screening weakens or strengthens the case for an interest income tax.

TL;DR: In this paper, a somewhat new analytical approach to producer performance evaluation is proposed, which synthesizes existing analytical techniques from three areas, and uses them to look at performance evaluation in a new way.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors developed a theory of the privatization of public enterprises and modelled the relevant decisions as a three-stage process: internal control, internal regulation, and privatization.

TL;DR: In this paper, the over-production associated with bureaucratic production is examined in a general equilibrium environment in which the bureau and its sponsor behave strategically, and the non-equivalence of institutional settings suggests that overproduction or under-production by bureaus can be a result of the institutions governing the decision process as well as the preferences of the bureau for the size of the Bureau.