Journal of Regulatory Economics 

About: Journal of Regulatory Economics is an academic journal published by Springer Science+Business Media. The journal publishes majorly in the area(s): Public finance & Competition (economics). It has an ISSN identifier of 0922-680X. Over the lifetime, 950 publications have been published receiving 31547 citations.

Contract Networks for Electric Power Transmission

Abstract: A contract network extends the concept of a contract path to address the problem of loop flow and congestion in electric power transmission systems. A contract network option provides an internally consistent framework for assigning long-term capacity rights to a complicated electric transmission network. The contract network respects the special conditions induced by Kirchoff's Laws; accommodates thermal, voltage, and contingency constraints on transmission capacity; and can be adopted without disturbing existing methods for achieving an economic power dispatch subject to these constraints. By design, a contract network would maintain short-run efficiency through optimal spot-price determination of transmission prices. Through payment of congestion rentals, the contract network makes a long-term capacity-right holder indifferent between delivery of the power or receipt of payments in a settlement system. to]Everybody talks about the weather, but nobody does anything about it.

Household response to dynamic pricing of electricity: a survey of 15 experiments

Abstract: Since the energy crisis of 2000–2001 in the western United States, much attention has been given to boosting demand response in electricity markets. One of the best ways to let that happen is to pass through wholesale energy costs to retail customers. This can be accomplished by letting retail prices vary dynamically, either entirely or partly. For the overwhelming majority of customers, that requires a change out of the metering infrastructure, which may cost as much as $40 billion for the US as a whole. While a good portion of this investment can be covered by savings in distribution system costs, about 40% may remain uncovered. This investment gap could be covered by reductions in power generation costs that could be brought about through demand response. Thus, state regulators in many states are investigating whether customers will respond to the higher prices by lowering demand and if so, by how much. To help inform this assessment, this paper surveys the evidence from the 15 most recent pilots, experiments and full-scale implementations of dynamic pricing of electricity. It finds conclusive evidence that households respond to higher prices by lowering usage. The magnitude of price response depends on several factors, such as the magnitude of the price increase, the presence of central air conditioning and the availability of enabling technologies such as two-way programmable communicating thermostats and always-on gateway systems that allow multiple end-uses to be controlled remotely. In addition, the design of the studies, the tools used to analyze the data and the geography of the assessment influence demand response. Across the range of experiments studied, time-of-use rates induce a drop in peak demand that ranges between 3 and 6% and critical-peak pricing (CPP) tariffs induce a drop in peak demand that ranges between 13 and 20%. When accompanied with enabling technologies, the latter set of tariffs lead to a reduction in peak demand in the 27–44% range.

A market mechanism for electric power transmission

Abstract: As competition is introduced into the electric power industry, access and pricing policy for transmission will play a pivotal role in shaping future market structure and performance. The externalities associated with the loop flow phenomenon in an electric power network constitute a significant barrier to the formation of efficient markets for electricity and transmission services. In this paper, we present a new approach to the design of an efficient market mechanism for transmission access that resolves these externalities. Under a trading rule that combines the Coasian and the Pigouvian principles to resolution of externalities, property rights are defined so that a competitive market could be established for transmission services and electricity to achieve a social optimum within a power pool. We characterize a dynamic trading process which is Lyapunov stable and always converges to a competitive equilibrium. Finally, we discuss some practical applicability and long-term investment issues.

Theory and Application of Linear Supply Function Equilibrium in Electricity Markets

Abstract: We consider a supply function equilibrium (SFE) model of interaction in an electricity market. We assume a linear demand function and consider a competitive fringe and several strategic players having capacity limits and affine marginal costs. The choice of SFE over Cournot equilibrium and other models and the choice of affine marginal costs is reviewed in the context of the existing literature. We assume that bid rules allow affine or piecewise affine non-decreasing supply functions by firms and extend results of Green and Rudkevitch concerning the linear SFE solution. An incentive compatibility result is proved. We also find that a piecewise affine SFE can be found easily for the case where there are non-negativity limits on generation. Upper capacity limits, however, pose problems and we propose an ad hoc approach. We apply the analysis to the England and Wales electricity market, considering the 1996 and 1999 divestitures. The piecewise affine SFE solutions generally provide better matches to the empirical data than previous analysis.