Showing papers in "Journal of Strategic Studies in 2014"
TL;DR: The use of force in such a conflict is not intended to attain impossible political goals, but a strategy of attrition designed primarily to debilitate the enemy capabilities as discussed by the authors, and after showing much restraint in its military responses does Israel act forcefully to destroy the capabilities of its foes, hoping that occasional large-scale operations also have a temporary deterrent effect in order to create periods of quiet along its borders.
Abstract: ‘Mowing the Grass’, Israel’s strategy in the twenty-first century against hostile non-state groups, reflects the assumption that Israel finds itself in a protracted intractable conflict. The use of force in such a conflict is not intended to attain impossible political goals, but a strategy of attrition designed primarily to debilitate the enemy capabilities. Only after showing much restraint in its military responses does Israel act forcefully to destroy the capabilities of its foes, hoping that occasional large-scale operations also have a temporary deterrent effect in order to create periods of quiet along its borders. The Israeli approach is substantively different from the current Western strategic thinking on dealing with non-state military challenges.
46 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors adopt a social theory of learning in order to examine how both formal and informal learning systems have affected organizational learning within the British Army in relation to the counter-insurgency campaign in Afghanistan.
Abstract: This article – based on data that employs interviews conducted with British Army personnel – adopts a social theory of learning in order to examine how both formal and informal learning systems have affected organizational learning within the Army in relation to the counter-insurgency campaign in Afghanistan. It argues that while the Army has adopted new, or reformed existing, formal learning systems, these have not generated a reconceptualization of how to conduct counter-insurgency warfare. It, furthermore, argues that while informal learning systems have enabled units to improve their pre-deployment preparations, these have created adaptation traps that have acted as barriers to higher-level learning.
36 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a functional conceptualisation of morale is proposed, which focuses its meaning on motivation and the willingness to act rather than mood and group dynamics, and it can be assessed both qualitatively and quantitatively, allowing the interaction between morale and policy in a manner that facilitates insight into the strategic process.
Abstract: A functional conceptualisation of morale is proposed, which focuses its meaning on motivation and the willingness to act rather than mood and group dynamics. Morale, it is argued, emerges from the subtle interrelationships of the many factors known to affect military means. It can be assessed both qualitatively and quantitatively, allowing the interaction between morale and policy to be explored in a manner that facilitates insight into the strategic process. A case study from the North African campaign of World War II is presented to explore in detail the relationship between morale and the art of war – strategy.
29 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the United Nations Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) struggled between 2004 and 2007 to embed the use of force in a larger strategy of state consolidation, and the confrontations between MINUSTAH and unconventional armed groups in Haiti during this period were explored.
Abstract: Confronted by non-conventional non-state military forces enjoying high – but very localized – social legitimacy, the United Nations Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) struggled between 2004 and 2007 to embed the use of force in a larger strategy of state consolidation. The article explores the confrontations between MINUSTAH and unconventional armed groups in Haiti during this period. It traces MINUSTAH’s operations against criminal gangs, and the resulting process of strategic learning. It explores how tactical innovations allowed MINUSTAH to defeat the gangs, but also highlights that the larger political objective – breaking the connection between the gangs and Haiti’s political-business elite – remained unarticulated and elusive – and perhaps ultimately unfeasible, given the necessity of Haitian state consent for continued UN operations in the country. In a final post-script the article reflects on the return of the gangs after the earthquake of 12 January 2010, and what it signals about the limited i...
29 citations
TL;DR: The role of force in United Nations peacekeeping has changed dramatically since the first observer mission in 1948 Once, peacekeepers used force only in the most exceptional circumstances and only in self-defense By the mid-1970s, they were authorized to defend the mandates of their operations, still as a variant of "self-defense" but with greater scope for offensive force as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: The role of force in United Nations peacekeeping has changed dramatically since the first observer mission in 1948 Once, peacekeepers used force only in the most exceptional circumstances and only in self-defense By the mid-1970s, peacekeepers were authorized to defend the mandates of their operations, still as a variant of ‘self-defense’ but with greater scope for offensive force Since the turn of the century, corresponding with the ‘Brahimi Report’, the language of self-defense is no longer in use in peacekeeping mandates Instead, the Security Council routinely finds the existence of threats to international peace and security and vest ‘robust’ peacekeeping operations with the ability to use offensive force The role of the controversial ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine in peacekeeping is examined; however, it is concluded that, as yet, the doctrine has had limited impact on the legal framework relating to peacekeeping
28 citations
TL;DR: The French doctrine towards peace operations has, over the last two decades, reflected the ambivalence of France's position, stretched between on the one hand a military culture that places the use of force at the centre of strategy and on the other hand multidimensional operations that by their nature integrate a large range of activities as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The French doctrine towards peace operations has, over the last two decades, reflected the ambivalence of France’s position, stretched between on the one hand a military culture that places the use of force at the centre of strategy and on the other hand multidimensional operations that by their nature integrate a large range of activities. As a consequence France has evolved as a ‘reluctant peacekeeper’: while it has been significantly involved in peace operations since the end of the Cold War, the military has never felt comfortable with the peacekeeping concept, seen as a dilution of their primary function of fighting wars. This tension has shaped both doctrinal development and operations. Twenty years after the French engagement in former Yugoslavia, lessons have been learnt, and policy-makers have become aware of the evolution of conflict management and the subsequent necessity to integrate the military dimension into a broader framework. Yet France’s policy is still shaped by a certain avers...
27 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the effects of the drone strike campaign in Pakistan is examined and a theoretical model is proposed to explain how the campaign is affecting Al Qaeda's capacity to carry out terrorist attacks in the United States and Western Europe.
Abstract: This article examines the effects the drone strike campaign in Pakistan is having on Al Qaeda Central. To that end, it constructs a theoretical model to explain how the campaign is affecting Al Qaeda’s capacity to carry out terrorist attacks in the United States and Western Europe. Although the results of one single empirical case cannot be generalised, they nonetheless constitute a preliminary element for the construction of a broader theoretical framework concerning the use of armed drones as part of a counterterrorism strategy.
27 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a case study of hard internal Russian balancing against the US's development and deployment of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) systems during the Bush Administration (2001-08) is presented.
Abstract: One of the central debates in contemporary international relations scholarship concerns the issue of whether balancing has occurred in response to US-based unipolarity, and if it has, how this should be characterised. Existing research has seen analysts argue that major power responses to unipolarity can be placed in one of either three categories: an absence of balancing, soft balancing, and hard balancing. This article contributes to the scholarly literature by providing a case study of hard internal Russian balancing against the US’s development and deployment of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) systems during the Bush Administration (2001–08). Russian hard balancing against the US has involved: (1) fielding new strategic nuclear and conventional weapons equipped with BMD countermeasures, and, relatedly, (2) making changes in military doctrine. As a result, security dilemma dynamics are increasingly in evidence in US relations with Russia.
25 citations
TL;DR: Wang et al. as discussed by the authors identified the motives and methods of China's Three Warfares by analyzing its history, logic, and agents, and presented the position of the Three Warfare in China's foreign policy and the warfares' impact on the international security environment involving other major powers and China's neighbors.
Abstract: Entering the twenty-first century, China has demonstrated an assertive foreign policy, not only in employing various types of economic and military leverage but also in conducting the Three Warfares (三战) – psychological warfare, public opinion warfare, and legal warfare. This article attempts to identify the motives and methods of China’s Three Warfares by analyzing its history, logic, and agents. Based on this analysis, the author also presents the position of the Three Warfares in China’s foreign policy and the warfares’ impact on the international security environment involving other major powers and China’s neighbors.
25 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the military remained loyal to the authoritarian civilian leadership throughout the protests as it had repeatedly done in the past, and that defection occurred within the Police and the National Guard, which are mistakenly portrayed as having been loyal to Ben Ali.
Abstract: Scholars have widely adopted the view that the behaviour of the Tunisian military during the ‘Arab Spring’ constitutes a positive case of military defection. This paper argues that, contrary to this dominant interpretation, the military remained loyal to the authoritarian civilian leadership throughout the protests as it had repeatedly done in the past. Defection occurred, however, within the Police and the National Guard, which are mistakenly portrayed as having been loyal to Ben Ali. The paper shows that scholars have sought to explain exactly the opposite of what actually happened and, thus, it questions their conclusions regarding civil-military relations in Tunisia.
23 citations
TL;DR: The authors analyzes the ongoing US response to the 9/11 attacks in historical context, revealing four patterns common to all prolonged wars: means become ends, tactics become strategy, boundaries are blurred, and the search for a perfect peace replaces reality.
Abstract: The war on al-Qaeda and its affiliates appears to be endless but every war must end. Winding down the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq has been difficult, but both were embedded in what was then called the ‘war on terrorism.’ What does ‘success’ in that war mean? With the death of bin Laden and the increase in drone operations, how far is the US from achieving it? Can this war end? The article analyzes the ongoing US response to the 9/11 attacks in historical context, revealing four patterns common to all prolonged wars: means become ends, tactics become strategy, boundaries are blurred, and the search for a perfect peace replaces reality. It concludes by laying out an effective strategy for ending the war.
TL;DR: In fact, the United States won the war as well as the peace by any meaningful definition of the term "won the war but lost the peace" as discussed by the authors, despite abundant evidence that Iraq was becoming desperately weak and no longer a threat to regional security.
Abstract: This article challenges the widely held belief that that the United States ‘won the war but lost the peace’ following the war with Iraq in 1991. Fears of a resurgent Iraq grew throughout the decade, despite abundant evidence that Iraq was becoming desperately weak and was no longer a threat to regional security. In fact, the United States won the war as well as the peace by any meaningful definition of the term. The article also discusses the reasons why US policymakers and observers convinced themselves that they had lost. The final section considers implications for strategy and policy in wars of limited objectives.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons have no defined mission and no deterrence framework has been elaborated for them, and disentangle Russian thoughts and deeds about regional nuclear deterrence and the role of NSNW in it.
Abstract: Russian reliance on its non-strategic nuclear arsenal has been an ongoing concern for security experts. What is the Russian de facto employment doctrine for this arsenal? This article argues that Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) have no defined mission and no deterrence framework has been elaborated for them. This study disentangles Russian thoughts and deeds about regional nuclear deterrence and the role of NSNW in it. Situating the Russian case in the comparative context, the article argues that establishing a coherent theater nuclear posture and streamlining it with the national level deterrence strategy is a demanding and frequently unfulfilled task. It is likely to remain as such for both current and prospective nuclear states that consider an asymmetrical deterrence posture.
TL;DR: A taxonomy of the various ways that national security policy-makers attempt to use history is presented in this paper, which identifies four types of history: experience, memory, tradition, and study.
Abstract: This article constructs a taxonomy of the various ways that national security policy-makers attempt to use history It identifies four types of history: experience, memory, tradition, and study It then defines and describes three categories of how history is used in national security policy: predictive, prescriptive, and existential Each category is distilled further into specific manifestations The article agrees with existing scholarship that policy-makers often misuse history, but argues that nevertheless policy-makers engage with history in more diverse and complex ways than are commonly understood Thus before scholars attempt to critique and improve the manner in which policy-makers use history, we should first employ a more sophisticated understanding of the multiple ways that policy-makers approach history in the first place
TL;DR: In 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali set out his vision for a revitalised UN after the Cold War, he offered a definition of UN 'peacekeeping' in which the insertion of o...
Abstract: When, in An Agenda for Peace of June 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali set out his vision for a revitalised UN after the Cold War, he offered a definition of UN ‘peacekeeping’ in which the insertion of o...
TL;DR: The Japanese Navy is evolving to combine enhanced capabilities to retain sea control in the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea with extended operational reach and flexibility including an expeditionary component to meet alliance and diplomatic commitments in East Asia and beyond its confines.
Abstract: This article draws upon previously unavailable document materials to question views pointing to a degree of stagnation in Japanese maritime thinking. It similarly reviews claims about trends to compensate the decline of national military power with the build-up of projection capabilities. The article’s main argument is that Japanese seapower is not declining. The Japanese Navy is evolving to combine enhanced capabilities to retain sea control in the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea with extended operational reach and flexibility, including an expeditionary component to meet alliance and diplomatic commitments in East Asia and beyond its confines.
TL;DR: In this paper, a regional counter-insurgency framework is developed, using the regional counter insurgency efforts in Afghanistan as an example, which will facilitate the systematic inclusion of regional COIN measures in theory and doctrine.
Abstract: After the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, several thousand Afghan Taliban forces fled across the border to Pakistan, and the area became a safe haven for Afghan insurgents. In 2014, the transnational dimension of the insurgency is still highly prominent. Although regional support for insurgents is not uncommon, how to counter this aspect is mostly ignored in counterinsurgency (COIN) theory and doctrines. In this article, a regional counterinsurgency framework is developed, using the regional counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan as an example. The framework will facilitate the systematic inclusion of regional COIN measures in theory and doctrine.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss the possibility of accommodation between China and the United States on the possession and exercise of American seapower in East Asia, which could significantly lower the risks of unintended escalation and in turn undermine arguments that favor an American retreat from East Asia.
Abstract: Debates about the future of American seapower in East Asia turn on the argument that American seapower presents a risky and costly luxury that undercuts the cooperative potential of US–China relations. This article asks whether accommodation between China and the United States on the possession and exercise of American seapower in East Asia is possible. Accommodation on this front could significantly lower the risks of unintended escalation and in turn undermine arguments that favour an American retreat from East Asia. The article outlines how accommodation can be achieved on the exercise of American seapower in the region.
TL;DR: In this paper, the first academic study of Egyptian foreign policy towards Israel under Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011) is presented, which challenges a deeply entrenched conventional wisdom that Egypt pursued a cold-peace foreign policy toward Israel throughout this period.
Abstract: This article is the first academic study of Egyptian foreign policy towards Israel under Hosni Mubarak (1981–2011). It challenges a deeply entrenched conventional wisdom that Egypt pursued a cold-peace foreign policy towards Israel throughout this period. We demonstrate that Egyptian foreign policy towards Israel was dynamic – comprising cold peace (1981–91), a hybrid foreign policy of cold peace and strategic peace (1991–2003), and a pure strategic peace posture (2003–11). We also use the case of Egyptian foreign policy towards Israel as a heuristic to develop a conception of a new type of peace, strategic peace, as an intermediary analytical category between cold and stable peace.
TL;DR: A database of 1,625 posthumously published biographies of members of two Islamist militant organizations (Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM)), all of whom were killed in the course of carrying out militant attacks is presented in this paper.
Abstract: This article uses a novel database of 1,625 posthumously published biographies of members of two Islamist militant organizations (Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM)), all of whom were killed in the course of carrying out militant attacks. In general, each biography provides data on the militant’s birthplace, education, recruitment, and training. The number of observations in this database is a full order of magnitude larger than those of previous databases assembled from militant biographies. While the sample of militants in this database is the product of multiple selection effects, analysis of the database undermines many common myths about Pakistani militants and casts doubt on current policy approaches to mitigating Islamist militancy in Pakistan.
TL;DR: In late 2012, a rebel force captured Goma, a provincial capital in the eastern Congo, and this event spurred a renewed debate on the use of force by UN peacekeepers as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: In late 2012, a rebel force captured Goma, a provincial capital in the eastern Congo. This event spurred a renewed debate on the use of force by UN peacekeepers. These had begun in the Congo in 1960 with a UN operation led by Ralph Bunche – the UN official who largely defined UN peacekeeping. This article summarizes UN intervention in the Congo and the use of force since then. It traces the main contours of UN engagement and then draws some conclusions about when and where the use of force can be successfully employed – or best avoided – by UN peacekeepers.
TL;DR: This article analyzed polling data from Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan and found that public opinion is less malleable, more of an effect rather than a cause of tactical success, and a poor predictor of strategic victory.
Abstract: Despite all the talk of ‘hearts and minds’ being the key to counterinsurgency, local public opinion is rarely studied and when it is, it often yields surprising conclusions. Through analyzing polling data from Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, this article shows that public opinion is less malleable, more of an effect rather than a cause of tactical success, and a poor predictor of strategic victory. As a result, modern counterinsurgency doctrine’s focus on winning popular support may need to be rethought.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the relation of purpose, aims and means in Clausewitz's theory and highlight that this relation is methodologically comparable to the floating balance of Clausewitzs trinity.
Abstract: The task of coming to a proper appreciation of Clausewitz’s thoughts on war is to combine a hierarchical structure with that of a floating balance. This article examines the relation of purpose, aims and means in Clausewitz’s theory and highlights that this relation is methodologically comparable to the floating balance of Clausewitz’s trinity. Modern strategic thinking is characterised by the ‘ends, ways, means relationship’ and the concept of the ‘way’ as shortest possible direct connection between ends and means. If strategy is nothing else than the direct way of linking the political purpose with the means, understood as combat, this understandings results in ‘battle-centric’ warfare. My thesis is that the aim (goal, way) in warfare is not a direct link between purpose and means, but rather an indirect, intermediary dimension, a mediation (in Hegelian terms) between purpose and aims with its own grammar. This article distinguishes (sometimes going beyond Clausewitz) between the rationality of...
TL;DR: The authors argue that Sadat's command constituted an eccentric combination of military romanticism and politicization of war, whose paradox was reflected in the initial military successes and the achievement of Egypt's strategic objectives despite the military failures by the war's final stage.
Abstract: Extant literature explains Egyptian successes and failures in the October 1973 War by Sadat’s restoration or abolition of ‘objective control’: when restoring ‘objective control’, Sadat succeeded; when abolishing it, he failed. However, Samuel Huntington’s theory cannot account for Sadat’s command performance, not because Sadat zigzagged between this theory’s extremes, but because he never thought or acted according to its recipe. I employ Eliot Cohen’s Supreme Command concepts to argue that Sadat’s command constituted an eccentric combination of military romanticism and politicization of war, whose paradox was reflected in the initial military successes and the achievement of Egypt’s strategic objectives despite the military failures by the war’s final stage.
TL;DR: The authors analyzes the quality of the Egyptian and Israeli intelligence advice and decision-making process in the 1973 War as key factors that determined its course, focusing on the 9-13 October stand-still stage, in which Sadat decided, despite his generals' advice, to renew the Egyptian offensive.
Abstract: This article analyzes the quality of the Egyptian and Israeli intelligence advice and decision-making process in the October 1973 War as key factors that determined its course. Following a background to the subject, we focus on the 9–13 October standstill stage, in which Sadat decided, despite his generals’ advice, to renew the Egyptian offensive. Effective Israeli intelligence collection about the coming attack, which was well used by the decision-makers, saved Israel from accepting an undesired ceasefire. The result was the 14 October failed Egyptian offensive that turned the tide of the war and led to Israeli military achievements at the war’s final stage
TL;DR: The Continental Oil Company as discussed by the authors was established by the Third Reich during World War II to make Europe independent of oil imported from sources controlled by the United Kingdom, the United States, and the USSR.
Abstract: German grand strategy during World War II included making Europe independent of oil imported from sources controlled by the United Kingdom, the United States, and the USSR. The first step was to wrest control of oilfields. Producing and distributing the oil, however, required the creation of a company capable of replacing the evicted British, American, and Soviet suppliers. Therefore, in 1941, the Third Reich established the Continental Oil Company. Analysis of the company’s foundation and operations sheds light on the objectives of the Third Reich, including the postwar economic development of Axis Europe and the extension of German hegemony beyond the USSR into the Middle East.
TL;DR: The state of the German Army's morale in 1918 is central to our understanding not only of the outcome of World War I, but also the German Revolution and, indeed, through the pernicious "stab-in-the-back-myth" on Weimar politics and the rise of the Nazis as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The state of the German Army’s morale in 1918 is central to our understanding not only of the outcome of World War I, but also of the German Revolution and, indeed, through the pernicious ‘stab-in-the-back-myth’, on Weimar politics and the rise of the Nazis, too. This article presents new evidence from the German archives, blended with statistical analysis, to show that the morale of some units held up better than previously thought almost to the end, and thus to suggest three things. First, it proposes that some historians have placed too much reliance on English-language sources alone, such as British Army intelligence reports, which have various flaws as evidence. Second, it argues that, while historians have increasingly moved away from generalisations about German morale, this process has further to run. Third, it suggests that no single tipping point can be identified, and that morale alone does not provide a sufficient explanation for battlefield defeat. Indeed, much of the data can only be...
TL;DR: This paper explored the nature of the American war in Vietnam in an effort to determine whether it was a response to an indigenous uprising or an external effort by the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) to use a wide array of policies and programs to unite North Vietnam and South Vietnam under the party's leadership.
Abstract: This article explores the nature of the American war in Vietnam in an effort to determine whether it was a response to an indigenous uprising or an external effort by the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) to use a wide array of policies and programs to unite North Vietnam and South Vietnam under the party’s leadership. It argues that, although there initially were elements of the South Vietnamese population that rose against the southern leadership, the CPV gained control of their resistance and relegated it to a secondary role in the CPV war effort.
TL;DR: The authors surveys China's current naval forces and considers key dynamics and possible Chinese naval futures to 2020, the projected end of Beijing's "strategic window of opportunity", the idea that a peaceful external environment for economic development, globalization, and integration of China into the global economy allows China to benefit from diversion of US attention to countering terrorism.
Abstract: This article surveys China’s current naval forces and considers key dynamics and possible Chinese naval futures to 2020, the projected end of Beijing’s ‘strategic window of opportunity’, the idea that a peaceful external environment for economic development, globalization, and integration of China into the global economy allows China to benefit from diversion of US attention to countering terrorism. It considers broad possibilities through 2030, the general limit of public US government projections, and by which time multiple factors will likely slow China’s growth and compete for leadership focus and resources.
TL;DR: In this article, a hierarchy of revision among the parts of On War is proposed to bring any part of the theory in line with the most advanced stage of Clausewitz's thinking.
Abstract: On War’s unfinished state has been a source of difficulties for interpretation for 180 years. By establishing a hierarchy of revision among the parts, we propose a criterion that can bring any part of On War in line with the most advanced stage of Clausewitz’s thinking. We exemplify the utility, illustrate the underpinnings and appreciate the potential of this criterion. We argue that the criterion offers the prospect of a shared, coherent, fully consistent and faithful rendering of Clausewitz’s theory of war.