Showing papers in "Journal of The History of The Behavioral Sciences in 1997"

The nature of consciousness : philosophical debates

Abstract: Part 1 Stream of consciousness: the stream of consciousness, William James the Cartesian theatre and "filling in" the stream of consciousness, Daniel C. Dennett the robust phenomenology of the stream of consciousness, Owen Flanagan. Part 2 Consciousness, science and methodology: prospects for a unified theory of consciousness or, what dreams are made of, Owen Flanagan consciousness, folk psychology and cognitive science, Alvin I. Goldman can neurobiology teach us anything about consciousness?, Patricia Smith Churchland time and the observer -the where and when of consciousness in the brain, Daniel C. Dennett and Marcel Kinsbourne begging the question against phenomenal consciousness, Ned Block time for more alternatives, Robert Van Gulick. Part 3 The psychology and neuropsychology of consciousness: contrastive phenomenology - a thoroughly empirical approach to consciousness, Bernard J. Baars visual perception and visual awareness after brain damage - a tutorial overview, Martha J. Farah understanding consciousness - clues from unilateral neglect and related disorders, Edoardo Bisiach modularity and consciousness, Tim Shallice towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness, Francis Crick and Christof Koch. Part 4 Consciousness and content: consciousness and content, Colin McGinn externalism and experience, Martin Davies a representational theory of pains and their phenomenal character, Michael Tye sensation and the content of experience - a distinction, Christopher Peacocke. Part 5 Function of consciousness: conscious inessentialism and the epiphenomenalist suspicion, Owen Flanagan on a confusion about a function of consciousness, Ned Block the path not taken, Daniel C. Dennett availability - the cognitive basis of experience?, David J. Chalmers fallacies or analyses?, Jennifer Church two kinds of consciousness, Tyler Burge understanding the phenomenal mind - are we all just armadillos?, part 2 - the absent qualia argument, Robert Van Gulick. Part 6 Metaphysics of consciousness: the identity thesis, Saul A. Kripke reductionism and the irreducibility of consciousness, John R. Searle a question about consciousness, Georges Rey finding the mind in the neural world, Frank Jackson breaking the hold - silicon brains, conscious robots and other minds, John R. Searle the first-person perspective, Sydney Shoemaker. Part 7 Subjectivity and explanatory gap: what is it like to be a bat?, Thomas Nagel can we solve the mind-body problem?, Colin McGinn on leaving out what it's like, Joseph Levine. Part 8 The knowledge argument: understanding the phenomenal mind - are we all just armadillos?, part 1 - phenomenal knowledge and explanatory gaps, Robert Van Gulick what Mary didn't know, Frank Jackson knowing qualia - a reply to Jackson, Paul M. Churchland what experience teaches, David Lewis phenomenal states, Brian Loar. Part 9 Qualia: quining qualia, Daniel C. Dennett the inverted spectrum, Sydney Shoemkaer the intrinsic qualit

The american “colonization” of northwest European social psychology after World WAR II

Abstract: The term colonization as used in this article does not refer to the suppression of one culture by another, but to a voluntary intellectual submission, eventually resulting in a ''neo-colonial'' relationship in which, in spite of a ''decolonization'' movement, much of the dominant culture has been retained. Contrary to the traditional view, Europe had a rich social psychological literature before the Second World War, and much of this early work still is of interest for contemporary social psychology. The Netherlands is used as an example of the ''colonization'' of Northwest European social psychology after 1945. It is shown that there has been an effort on the part of the older generation to integrate the European heritage and the newer American social psychology. The younger generation, however, according to an analysis of citations, adopted American social psychology, as a guiding model soon after the Second World War. The colonization metaphor draws attention to the power aspects of knowledge transfer. The author concludes that later ''de-colonization'' does not imply a turning away from everything American, but a cross-fertilization of perspectives, leading to a truly international approach. (C) 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

The 1950 Joint Scientific Session: Pavlovians as the accusers and the accused

Abstract: In 1950, Stalin and the Soviet Government prevailed upon the USSR Academy of Sciences and the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences to organize the 1950 Joint Scientific Session for the purpose of formalizing the teachings of I. P. Pavlov. During the Session, some of Pavlov's erstwhile students—the Pavlovians—split into accusers and accused. The more prominent of the latter were denounced for deviating from the orthodox Pavlovian path, and urged to admit their mistakes, to work within the framework of Pavlov's theory of higher nervous activity, and to avoid Western influence. Within this context, the travail of the prominent Pavlovian physiologist L. A. Orbeli is discussed. Contemporary Russian historians and scientists, evaluating the consequences of the 1950 Joint Scientific Session, point out its negative effects; namely, the general moral decline of Soviet physiologists pressured to accept a dogmatic ideology, the lowering of the quality of research in physiology, and the self-imposed exclusion of Soviet physiology from the worldwide scientific community. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Re-reconsidering Burt: beyond a reasonable doubt.

Abstract: The Burt controversy has taken a number of strange twists and turns, leading many observers to conclude that he has been exonerated of the accusation that he fabricated his data on monozygotic twins reared apart. A comparison of his twin sample with that from other well documented studies, however, leaves little doubt that he committed fraud.

The politics of scientific social reform, 1936–1960: Goodwin Watson and the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues

Abstract: This paper explores the development and subsequent transformation of a “radical” professional model in American psychology. Its focal point is Goodwin Watson and the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI), an organization Watson helped found in 1936. During the Depression, he and many of his SPSSI colleagues called upon psychologists to abandon value neutrality and political disinterestedness in favor of an explicit set of social democratic goals and left-wing political alliances. Government service and political persecution during World War II led Watson to conclude that his Depression-era calls for sweeping change in psychology had neglected a number of significant political dimensions. Of particular importance was the problematic interface between psychological expertise and policy formation. In response to this concern, Watson encouraged the development of the now familiar model of the psychologist as a disinterested purveyor of value-neutral expertise. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

“Idiographic” vis‐à‐vis “idiodynamic” in the historical perspective of personality theory: Remembering Gordon Allport, 1897–1997

Abstract: The centenary of Gordon W. Allport provides an occasion for reappraising his special position regarding uniqueness in personality. Allport's theory of personality, as first presented in his 1937 textbook, highlighted the idiographic in conjunction with the nomothetic approach, and the fundamental unit in his formulation was the trait. He described common and unique traits as well as the unique organization of traits. In contradistinction, the idiodynamic orientation, introduced by Saul Rosenzweig in 1951 and, in more detail in 1958, focused on events which over a lifespan constitute an idioverse—a population of phenomenological events. Allport's original emphasis on the idiographic and his later confusion concerning idiodynamics, can, in considerable measure, be understood by recognizing the role of religious spirituality in his conception of the person. That conception, which derived from an early religious indoctrination, asserted itself with renewed vigor in his later years. His scientific conception of personality thus remained unconsummated, subordinated by him to the unsolvable mysteries of ontology which properly belong, he believed, in the domain of faith. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Freud's deshi: The coming of psychoanalysis to Japan

Abstract: This paper presents an account of four Japanese men, three of whom had an audience with Freud and who, with differing experiences and ambitions, returned to Japan to practice and develop psychoanalysis. Only two received any formal training, and two were strongly influenced by Buddhist thought. Freud gave no clear sign as to whom to appoint as leader, leaving the situation unsettled. This may have contributed to the continuing split and rivalry between groups, a split which was not resolved until the formation of the Japanese Psychoanalytic Society for trained analysts and the Association for interested laymen in the 1950s. From the beginning the development of psychoanalysis in Japan was informed by a paradox: the need to get Freud's approval and hence appear orthodox, while assimilating some of the concepts to the dictates of the culture.

Chiarugi and Pinel considered: Soul's brain/person's mind

Abstract: Pinel and Chiarugi enter the standard histories of psychiatry under the rubric of “psychiatric reformers.” True enough, but insufficient in terms of the complexity and breadth of their thought. Despite Pinel's fame for the “moral,” i.e. psychological treatment of the mentally ill, previous scholarship on Chiarugi and his work would lead one to expect a richer humanity and warmer personal investment in the vagaries of the mentally ill under Chiarugi's auspices. A careful study of Chiarugi's Della Pazzia and Pinel's Traitesuggest a different portrait. Though conjoined in their humanitarian ideals, these foundational figures in modern psychiatry voiced disparate ideas on the nature, etiology, and treatment of mental disorders, Chiarugi in the context of a biologic or “organicist” theory, Pinel in a psychosocial framework. Their reasoning in support of their opposing perspectives about the centrality of “biologic vs. psychological” determinants and interventions in psychiatry is remarkably congruent with those expressed today. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.