Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 

About: Manufacturing & Service Operations Management is an academic journal published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. The journal publishes majorly in the area(s): Supply chain & Service (business). It has an ISSN identifier of 1523-4614. Over the lifetime, 1048 publications have been published receiving 66037 citations. The journal is also known as: manufacture & manufacturing industry.

Commissioned Paper: Telephone Call Centers: Tutorial, Review, and Research Prospects

Abstract: Telephone call centers are an integral part of many businesses, and their economic role is significant and growing. They are also fascinating sociotechnical systems in which the behavior of customers and employees is closely intertwined with physical performance measures. In these environments traditional operational models are of great value--and at the same time fundamentally limited--in their ability to characterize system performance.We review the state of research on telephone call centers. We begin with a tutorial on how call centers function and proceed to survey academic research devoted to the management of their operations. We then outline important problems that have not been addressed and identify promising directions for future research.

Selling to the Newsvendor: An Analysis of Price-Only Contracts

Abstract: We consider a simple supply-chain contract in which a manufacturer sells to a retailer facing a newsvendor problem and the lone contract parameter is a wholesale price. We develop a mild restriction satisfied by many common distributions that assures that the manufacturer's problem is readily amenable to analysis. The manufacturer's profit and sales quantity increase with market size, but the resulting wholesale price depends on how the market grows. For the cases we consider, we identify relative variability (i.e., the coefficient of variation) as key: As relative variability decreases, the retailer's price sensitivity decreases, the wholesale price increases, the decentralized system becomes more efficient (i.e., captures a greater share of potential profit), and the manufacturer's share of realized profit increases. Decreasing relative variability, however, may leave the retailer severely disadvantaged as the higher wholesale price reduces his profitability. We explore factors that may lead the manufacturer to set a wholesale price below that which would maximize her profit, concentrating on retailer participation in forecasting and retailer power. As these and other considerations can result in a wholesale price below what we initially suggest, our base model represents a worst-case analysis of supply-chain performance.

Commissioned Paper: An Overview of Pricing Models for Revenue Management

Abstract: In this paper, we examine the research and results of dynamic pricing policies and their relation to revenue management. The survey is based on a generic revenue management problem in which a perishable and nonrenewable set of resources satisfy stochastic price sensitive demand processes over a finite period of time. In this class of problems, the owner (or the seller) of these resources uses them to produce and offer a menu of final products to the end customers. Within this context, we formulate the stochastic control problem of capacity that the seller faces: How to dynamically set the menu and the quantity of products and their corresponding prices to maximize the total revenue over the selling horizon.

Channel Dynamics Under Price and Service Competition

Abstract: This paper studies a distribution system in which a manufacturer supplies a common product to two independent retailers, who in turn use service as well as retail price to directly compete for end customers. We examine the drivers of each firm's strategy, and the consequences for total sales, market share, and profitability. We show that the relative intensity of competition with respect to each competitive dimension plays a key role, as does the degree of cooperation between the retailers. We discover a number of insights concerning the preferences of each party regarding competition. For instance, there will be circumstances under which both retailers would prefer an increase in competitive intensity. Our analysis generalizes existing knowledge about manufacturer wholesale pricing strategies, and rationalizes behaviors that would not be evident without both price and service competition. Finally, we characterize the structure of wholesale pricing mechanisms that can coordinate the system, and show that the most commonly used formats (those that are linear in the order quantity) can achieve coordination only under very limiting conditions.

Optimal Pricing of Seasonal Products in the Presence of Forward-Looking Consumers

Abstract: We study the optimal pricing of a finite quantity of a fashion-like seasonal good in the presence of forward-looking (strategic) customers. We distinguish between two classes of pricing strategies: contingent and announced fixed-discount. In both cases, the seller acts as a Stackelberg leader announcing his pricing strategy, while consumers act as followers taking the seller's strategy as given and determining their purchasing behavior. In each case, we identify a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium and show that given the seller's strategy, the equilibrium in the consumer subgame is unique and consists of symmetric threshold purchasing policies. For both cases, we develop a benchmark model in which customers are nonstrategic (myopic). We conduct a comprehensive numerical study to explore the impact of strategic consumer behavior on pricing policies and expected revenue performance. We show that strategic customer behavior suppresses the benefits of price segmentation, particularly under medium-to-high values of heterogeneity and modest rates of decline in valuations. However, when the level of consumer heterogeneity is small, the rate of decline is medium-to-high, and the seller can optimally choose the time of discount in advance, segmentation can be used quite effectively even with strategic consumers. We find that the seller cannot avoid the adverse impact of strategic consumer behavior even under low levels of initial inventory. We argue that while the seller expects customers to be more concerned about product availability at discount time, he cannot use high-price “betting” strategies as he would in the case of low inventory and myopic customers. Under certain qualifications, announced fixed-discount strategies perform essentially the same as contingent pricing policies in the case of myopic consumers. However, under strategic consumer behavior, announced pricing policies can be advantageous to the seller, compared to contingent pricing schemes. Interestingly, those cases that announced discount strategies offer a significant advantage compared to contingent pricing policies. They appear to offer only a minimal advantage in comparison to fixed-pricing policies. Finally, when the seller incorrectly assumes that strategic customers are myopic in their purchasing decisions, it can be quite costly, reaching potential revenue losses of about 20%.