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Showing papers in "Michigan Law Review in 1995"


Journal ArticleDOI
Ian Ayres1
TL;DR: A 1991 test of new car dealerships in Chicago indicated that dealerships offered significantly lower prices to white male testers than to similarly situated black and-or female testers as discussed by the authors, and black female testers were asked to pay more than three times the markup of white males.
Abstract: A 1991 test of new car dealerships in Chicago indicated that dealerships offered significantly lower prices to white male testers than to similarly situated black and-or female testers: white female testers were asked to pay 40% higher markups than white male testers; black male testers were asked to pay more than twice the markup of white male testers; and black female testers were asked to pay more than three times the markup of white male testers.1 This article extends the results of this initial test by presenting not only more authoritative evidence of discrimination but also a new quantitative method of identifying the causes of discrimination. Although the results of the original study were based on 165 negotiations, the original article emphasized that: [t]he most significant methodological weakness concerns the number of testers per tester type .... Only six testers were hired: one white female, one black female, one black male, and three white males. Thus, for example, the results demonstrating discrimination against black females are based on tests conducted by an individual black female (paired with one of three white males).2 This article presents the results of an expanded audit study that corrects for this weakness. In the expanded audits, 38 testers, including 5 black males, 7 black females, and 8 white females, negotiated for over 400 automobiles. The results are more authoritative than

68 citations





Journal ArticleDOI

25 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Thomas was the sole support and caretaker for two mentally disabled adult children and the guardian and caretaker for her four-year-old grandchild when a U.S. district court judge sentenced her to probation rather than incarceration as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Mattie Lou Thomas was the sole support and caretaker for two mentally disabled adult children and the guardian and caretaker for her four-year-old grandchild. When a U.S. district court judge sentenced her for possession of four kilos of heroin, he thought he should take these family responsibilities into account: As a result, he sentenced her to probation rather than the six years that the prosecution had recommended per 21 U.S.C. ? 841(b)l and that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines seemed to call for.2 The Seventh Circuit reversed.3 The Guidelines, it held, did not permit judges to impose probation rather than incarceration on the basis of even extraordinary family responsibilities.4 Although other courts have rejected the Seventh Circuit's position that family responsibilities never justify a downward departure from incarceration to probation,5 all have recognized that the Guidelines at least narrowly constrain judges' discretion to take such factors into account.6 According to the Guidelines, "Family ties and responsibilities ...

25 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In any criminal case, a person can be "compelled" as mentioned in this paper, which is a form of being "convicted" or "wanted" in a criminal case.
Abstract: INTRODUCTION ... 857 I. THE PU77ZF. 860 A . "Person"? 861 B. "Compelled"? 865 C. "In Any Criminal Case"? 874 D . "W itness"? 883 E. What's the Big Idea? 889 II. THE SOLUTION 898 A . "Person" 901 B. "Compelled" 904 C. "In Any Criminal Case" 909 D . "W itness" . 919 E. The Big Idea(s) 922 CONCLUSION 927

20 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A. Criteria for Effective Enforcement as discussed by the authors 26 1. Enforcement Capability 26 2. Gravity of Violation 27 3. Incentive Compatibility 28 4. Equity Controls and Mechanisms 30 B. Possible Merger Enforcers 34 1. Private Enforcer 35 2. States Suing as Parens Patriae 38
Abstract: A. Criteria for Effective Enforcement . 26 1. Enforcement Capability 26 2. Gravity of Violation 27 3. Incentive Compatibility 28 4. Equity Controls and Mechanisms 30 B. Possible Merger Enforcers 34 1. Private Enforcers 35 2. States Suing as Parens Patriae 38

18 citations



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: LaPiana's client is Christopher Columbus Langdell, who, as dean of Harvard Law School in the 1870s, developed what would become the prototype for modern legal education in the United States: the three-year, postgraduate sequenced curriculum of private-law courses staffed by a faculty of full-time academics teaching by the "case method" the interrogation of students primed with the reading of appellate cases.
Abstract: William LaPianal has for years been one of the most learned and acute scholars of nineteenth-century American legal thought. In his most recent book, he is both scholar and advocate. He has a client and a cause to defend. LaPiana's client is Christopher Columbus Langdell, who, as Dean of Harvard Law School in the 1870s, developed what would become the prototype for modern legal education in the United States: the three-year, postgraduate sequenced curriculum of private-law courses staffed by a faculty of full-time academics teaching by the "case method" the interrogation of students primed with the reading of appellate cases. LaPiana's cause is Langdell and his faculty's larger vision that underlay their reforms: their ideals of legal science, their theory and practice of the case method, and their projects of professional improvement. LaPiana believes that we tend to view Langdell's ideas and practices through the distorting lens of the legal-realist generation that followed. The realists liked to quote Oliver Wendell Holmes's description of Langdell as "the greatest living legal theologian,"2 without realizing how much Holmes actually shared and furthered Langdell's vision of law as science. They scoffed at legal science as empty scholasticism and lumped it under the derogatory label of "formalism" with the conservative constitutional doctrines of the

11 citations







Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The Washington Letter as discussed by the authors is an official letter to Congress, signed by George Washington on behalf of the Philadelphia Convention, which was used to introduce the accompanying document rather than to plumb its meaning.
Abstract: At the end of the summer of 1787, the Philadelphia Convention issued two documents. One was the Constitution itself. The other document, now almost forgotten even by constitutional historians, was an official letter to Congress, signed by George Washington on behalf of the Convention.1 Congress responded with a resolution that the Constitution and "letter accompanying the same" be sent to the state legislatures for submission to conventions in each state.2 The Washington letter lacks the detail and depth of some other evidence of original intent. Being a cover letter, it was designed only to introduce the accompanying document rather than to plumb its meaning. But the letter's official nature gives it a status not shared by Madison's personal notes or newspaper editorials such as the Federalist Papers. As we will see, the Washington letter contains significant clues about the nature of the document that the Convention was placing before the country. Although it cannot supplant other, more traditional sources, it can help to illuminate the original understanding of the Framers.3 Recourse to this source is particularly appropriate now, in a year when we have twice been admonished to return to the "first





Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The right of British subjects to own and carry a firearm has been a legal right since 1689 as mentioned in this paper, when Parliament passed the Six Acts of 1819 to disarm rebels in particular areas, which were limited in geographical scope and expired in two years.
Abstract: pp. 1-3). As detailed by Malcolm, the duty evolved into a formal legal right in 1689, in reaction against oppressive weapons laws imposed by absolutist monarchs (pp. 113-19). The right thrived with little controversy for the next one and a half centuries. After the Peterloo Massacre in 1819, Parliament passed the Six Acts to disarm rebels in particular areas. The Six Acts met with furious opposition, though they were limited in geographical scope, and expired in two years. For the rest of the nineteenth century, Britain had no laws at all regarding the peaceful possession or carrying of firearms.[84] The Whig historian Thomas Macaulay reflected the consensus opinion when he observed that the right of English subjects to arms was "the security without which every other is insufficient."[85] As the twentieth century opened, Britain had essentially no gun laws and no gun crime. The national crime rate was lower than during any period before or since. World War I changed this situation. As Malcolm explains, the British government in the years immediately following World War I no longer trusted the British people. The Cabinet feared, in the words of one member, "Red revolution and blood and war at home and abroad!"[86] Parliament (p.1359)introduced a licensing system for handguns and rifles, and made knowingly false claims about a gun crime wave. Parliament overwhelmingly enacted the Firearms Act of 1920,[87] with little objection from a public that, after the carnage of World War I, had apparently grown weary of firearms and all they had now come to symbolize (p. 172). Parliament adopted shotgun licensing in 1967 and made the entire gun control system significantly more restrictive in 1989.[88] The story of the twentieth-century devolution of the British right to own guns to overthrow the government into a mere privilege to possess "sporting" guns under highly restrictive government controls has been told elsewhere, [89] and Malcolm wisely does not choose to repeat it. The gun-owning public in Britain--about four percent of households legally own guns, and about an equally large number may own unregistered guns[90] --has become almost irrelevant to the gun control debate. With the exception of some writers for British gun magazines, few Britons will assert that they have a right to own firearms as an insurance policy against oppressive government. Few will even assert that they have a right to own guns to protect themselves against criminal attack.




Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In a recent article, the authors, Friedman articulates a modified and generalized version of the conditional relevance, which he calls "conditional probative value."1 This version comes in response to a substantial body of academic criticism of the traditional doctrine.
Abstract: In a recent article, Richard Friedman articulates a modified and generalized version of the doctrine of conditional relevance, which he calls "conditional probative value."1 This version comes in response to a substantial body of academic criticism of the traditional doctrine.2 As one of the critics to whom Professor Friedman responds, I offer this reply with two purposes in mind: (1) to clarify the relationship between Friedman's analysis and my earlier reinterpretation of the conditional relevance doctrine; and (2) to ad- dress Friedman's specific proposals with regard to the Federal Rules of Evidence. I conclude that Friedman's articulation helps clarify the logic of proof in certain contexts, but I take issue with his suggestions for amending the Federal Rules.