Showing papers in "Middle East Journal in 2006"

Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism

Abstract: MODERN HISTORY AND POLITICS Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism, by Daniel Byman. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005, xi + 311 pages. Map. Appendix to p. 333. Bibl. to p. 357. Index to p. 369. $30. Anyone brave or foolish enough to wrestle with the contentious issue of state sponsorship of terrorism is immediately confronted by several obstacles. The first is a problem that has long corrupted research in the terrorism field: the frequently imprecise, partisan, and indeed propagandistic uses of terms such as "terrorism" and "state sponsorship." The second is the question of whether, in an era when transnational terrorist networks operating in far-flung regions are increasingly dominating the headlines, traditional ways of thinking about state sponsorship of terrorism have become outmoded, i.e., an example of "old-think" (p. 2). Although Georgetown University professor Daniel Byman has not managed to resolve all of the thorny issues related to his chosen topic, he deserves credit both for not ignoring these problems and for helping to clarify various matters that have often not been given adequate consideration. Byman's focus herein is on "the nexus between terrorist groups and state sponsors" (p. 8), and he defines state sponsorship as "a government's intentional assistance to a terrorist group to help it use violence, bolster its political activities, or sustain [its] organization" (p. 10). Although this focus on active state support for non-state terrorist groups precludes a consideration of acts of terrorism carried out directly by the security forces of particular states, he later devotes an entire chapter to "passive [state] sponsors" who "deliberately turn a blind eye to the activities of terrorists in their countries but do not provide direct assistance" (p. 13). Indeed, the entire middle portion of his book is devoted to illustrative and intrinsically interesting case studies of state sponsorship of terrorism (Iran, Syria, Pakistan, and the Taliban's Afghanistan). The first and last portions of Deadly Connections are instead more theoretical and/or policy-oriented. In chapter 1, he rightly emphasizes that there are "several types of state sponsorship" of terrorism and offers a typology of four categories of state support: "strong supporters" are states with both the desire and the capacity to support terrorist groups; "weak supporters" are those with the desire but not the capacity to offer significant support; "lukewarm supporters" are those that offer rhetorical but little actual tangible support; and "antagonistic supporters" are those that actually seek to control or even weaken the terrorist groups they appear to be supporting (p. 5). In chapter 2, he correctly notes that "[understanding motivations is vital both for predicting when a state might support a terrorist group and for determining how to end this backing" (p. 21 ), and he goes on to identify three primary motivations that lead states to risk supporting terrorist groups: "strategic" reasons, above all to weaken or destabilize rival regimes; "ideological" reasons, especially to export their doctrines or political systems; and "domestic" reasons, in particular to gain popular support by aiding "oppressed" kinsmen (p. 32). In chapter 3, he argues that states provide six types of support to terrorists: "training and operations; money, arms, and logistics; diplomatic backing; organizational assistance; ideological direction; and (perhaps most importantly) sanctuary" (p. 59). He concludes, perhaps unjustifiably, that terrorist groups that receive significant amounts of state support are far more difficult to counter and destroy than those that do not. Later, Byman addresses the complex issue of how to stop state sponsorship of terrorism. In chapter 9, he argues that states which support terrorism are difficult to deter, either because they have already calculated that the strategic benefits of sponsoring terrorist groups outweigh the potential costs - inasmuch as sponsoring terrorism is often perceived as vital to their own geopolitical or domestic interests but is not usually viewed as an outright act of war by the states that are victimized - or because they are ideologically driven to do so in spite of those costs. …

The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians

Abstract: ARMENIANS The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians, by Donald Bloxham. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005. xiv + 234 pages. Maps. Photos. Notes to p. 285. Bibl. to p. 311. Index to p. 329. $35. Donald Bloxham's The Great Game of Genocide is a uniquely important contribution to a bitterly divided field of historical inquiry, and it is certain to generate controversy in and of itself. Bloxham, presently on the faculty of the University of Edinburgh, has previously written on the Holocaust war crimes trials and has now cast his critical eye on the destruction of the Ottoman Armenians that occurred from 1915 through 1923. His latest effort represents a significant revision to our contemporary understanding of the origins of the Armenian genocide. The book is organized broadly in three parts: the historical evolution of the destruction of the Armenians; the responsibility and reaction of the international community; and the effects of a campaign of denial waged by the modern Turkish Republic. In the first part, Bloxham details the internationalization of the Armenian problem, the rise of Armenian nationalism, the Ottoman reprisals and ethnic cleansing, and defines his view that the Armenian genocide was the product of a cumulative radicalization of the Committee of Union and Progress' (CUP) policies towards the Armenians. One of his major points here is the idea that localized massacres of Armenians led to a generalized policy of extermination as the Armenian insurgency provided the CUP with a tenuous proximate cause for deportation. He builds a case that the CUP engaged in violent population engineering based on a developing Turkish ethnicity and that this continued into the early Republican era. In the second part, Bloxham contradicts the widely held view that the German Empire was a co-conspirator in the destruction of the Armenians and also presents the idea that the Entente used the Armenians, at many levels, for its own ends (thus the allusion to the manipulations of the Great Game). In the third part, he steps into modern geopolitics by addressing America's support of the modern Turkish Republic's position of denial. Bloxham concludes with the point that recognition of the genocide by the Turks and by those who obfuscate the truth would be meaningful for both modern Armenians and for the world. Bloxham's work, then, is not only a history, but also a complex running commentary of how an historical event intersects with the modern world. Parts of The Great Game of Genocide will irritate constituencies that have a vested interest in partisan interpretations of these events. …

Qatar and the World: Branding for a Micro-State

Abstract: There are two factors that have shaped Qatar's integration and place in the international system. The first revolves around the constraints and problems of small states while the second is Qatar's response - a strategy of branding the state for survival. This article discusses Qatar's situation as a micro-state and analyzes the nature and success of its response. Qatar has a short history as an independent state. Nevertheless, the extent of change and development it has undergone is truly dramatic. In recent years, it has emerged as one of the better known and more highly regarded Gulf states, in part because of its immense natural gas reserves (the third largest total in the world) but also, and more importantly, because of recent policy initiatives. These policies seem to have been deliberately designed to put Qatar on the map. Qatar has many accomplishments of which to be proud. It has maintained its sovereignty since independence in 1971 and enhanced it by membership in international organizations. Qatar is a founding member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and has participated fully in GCC economic endeavors and particularly in security concerns, including combat during the 1991 Gulf War. It enjoys increasing name recognition in widening circles in the West and the United States, in large part because of its long history of oil production and rapidly expanding natural gas projects. But there are many other reasons as well. Qatar has become a venue on the international sporting circuit, and it has hosted an impressive number of major conferences. In addition, it agreed to play host to the United States' Central Command regional headquarters before and during the 2003 Iraq War and thus received prominent mention in worldwide reporting. Even before then, Al Jazeera satellite television, which is based in Doha, had won a huge audience in the Arab world for its hardhitting reporting and provocative programming.' Despite charges by some in the

The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law

Abstract: LAW The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, by Wael B. Hallaq. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. x + 206 pages. Maps. Gloss, to p. 210. Short bios, to p. 216. Bibl. to p. 224. Index to p. 234. $70 cloth; $24.99 paper. Professor Wael Hallaq offers both the interested reader and the serious student a comprehensive, engaging introduction to the elements and contours of Islamic law. He covers its origins in the pre-Islamic cultures of the Near East to its final construction as a functioning legal system about three centuries after the Prophet's death. By itself, or coupled with his earlier introduction to Islamic legal thought,1 which might profitably be read subsequent to this book, Hallaq's exploration of the development of Islamic law provides a solid foundation for understanding the major themes of the subject, as well as a starting point for its more detailed and specialized study. Hallaq suggests that the four essential attributes of the Islamic legal system - a fully functional judiciary with a court system and rules of evidence and procedure, the elaboration of a legal doctrine, the emergence of a science of legal methodology and interpretation, and the maturation of the doctrinal legal schools - were in place by the middle of the 10th century C.E., and subsequent developments refined but did not further shape this system. His chapterby-chapter examination of these four attributes revolves around a central process that established the defining characteristics of each one. To cite three examples, the important function of the qadis in restraining the power of the caliphs was made possible by the transformation of the military and bureaucratic office of the proto-qadi into a more narrowly defined but increasingly independent role of the qadi as judge. Regarding legal methodology, the declining influence of the rationalists (ahl al-ra'y) in favor of the traditionalists (ahl al-hadith) culminated in a "great synthesis" of the two approaches to legal reasoning that established the parameters of legal thought in Sunni Islam. In the final stage of development, the Sunni juristic "schools" (maddhab) were established through a process of scholarship that evolved throughout the formative period from scholarly circles to personal schools, culminating in four primary doctrinal schools whose scholarship was then projected back to an eponym, such as Shafi'i. The formation of Islamic law is thus revealed as series of related dynamic processes that built upon existing customs and norms, but rapidly took form as an entirely new and distinctive system of legal thought, institutions, and practices. …

Global Jihadism After the Iraq War

Abstract: How has the invasion of Iraq influenced global jihadist ideology? Based on primary sources in Arabic, this article highlights important ideological changes; Iraq is considered a crossroads in the global jihad against the "Crusaders" New strategic dilemmas have caused divisions among militants, and Iraq's attractiveness has undermined other battlefronts A new "strategic studies" genre has emerged in jihadist literature Countries in Europe and the Gulf are increasingly highlighted as enemies and potential targets There seems to be a broad consensus among terrorism experts that the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 has contributed negatively to the so-called "global war on terror" According to many analysts, the war and the subsequent occupation have increased the level of frustration in the Islamic world over American foreign policy and facilitated recruitment by militant Islamist groups1 Moreover, Iraq seems to have replaced Afghanistan as a training ground where a new generation of Islamist militants can acquire military expertise and build personal relationships through the experience of combat and training camps2 Most analyses, however, seem to stop at the ascertainment of a vague, almost quantitative increase in the level of anti-Americanism or radicalism in Muslim communities since the Iraq War in 2003 This article will try to delve deeper into the matter and explore the qualitative changes in radical Islamist ideology since 2003 The next few pages are therefore devoted to the following research question: How has the invasion and occupation of Iraq influenced the ideological development of the so-called global jihadist movement? This question demands a closer examination of the writings and sayings of leading radical ideologues on the issue of Iraq since the autumn of 2002, when the prospect of war caught the world's attention Basing my analysis on key ideological texts, I will try to answer the following four subquestions: How important is Iraq to the socalled global jihadists? How united are the global jihadists in their view on the struggle for Iraq? How have the war and the occupation influenced their analysis of the overall confrontation with the US and the West? And how has their view of the enemy changed after the multinational invasion of Iraq? It must be emphasized that our focus will be on the militant and internationally-orientated Islamists, which means that moderate Islamist actors and nationalist Iraqi groups will not be considered here The research literature contains relatively few in-depth studies of post-September 11, 2001 ideological developments in radical Islamism3 This study is therefore almost entirely based on primary sources, mainly Arabic texts from radical Islamist Internet sites These sources are often problematic and cannot provide the full answer to our research question, but they represent one of our only windows into the world of militant Islamism The key argument in this article is that the Iraq War gave the global jihadists a welcome focal point in their struggle against the USA, but that Iraq at the same time became so attractive as a battle front that it weakened terrorist campaigns elsewhere Moreover, it is argued that the Iraq conflict contributed to the development of more sophisticated strategic thought in jihadist circles, and to an increase in hostility toward Europe and the Gulf countries The main objective of this analysis is to draw a more accurate picture of the global jihadist movement and to illustrate how armed conflict can generate unexpected ideological changes within radical political movements AL-QA 'IDA AND GLOBAL JIHADISM SINCE 9/11 First of all, it is essential to define the notion of "global jihadism" and clarify its relation to other Islamist movements "Islamism" - in itself a debated and polysemic term - is understood by this author as meaning "Islamic activism" It includes non-violent and violent, progressive as well as reactionary, political movements …

The Middle East: A Cultural Psychology

Abstract: The Middle East: A Cultural Psychology, by Gary S. Gregg. Oxford, UK and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. 472 pages. $45. The book's title immediately attracts the attention of any scholar interested in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and the effort displayed by the author is commendable ("over two-thirds of the psychological studies cited are by MENA researchers"). The author is undoubtedly aware of the complexities and problems plaguing the area, and displays a welcomed sensitivity in writing about it. The book is divided into two main parts. The first part presents the author's interpretation of the cultural context of the MENA: it provides a review of misconceptions (chapter 1 ), a social ecology (chapter 2), and a focus on the value systems of honor and Islam (chapter 3) that the author assumes to shape emotions, traits, and selves across the region. The second part of the book (chapters 4 through 10) displays an incongruous developmental stage approach that paces each of the remaining chapters (e.g., early childhood, adolescence, etc.). Some of the chapters (e.g., chapters 4 through 9) are accompanied by a "sources" section in which the author provides the reader with the main references that were consulted. This transparency is most welcome, as it enables the reader to make his or her own judgment about the assertions made. Some of the book's more interesting reflections are developed in the two closing chapters. The author clearly endorses the indigenous proposition about the need for a deeper investigation of the "psychology of subjugation" (including the impact of autocratic/authoritarian Arab regimes), and the influence of underdevelopment on the cultural psychology of the region. However, the author fails to mention the important impact and consequences of foreign forces of occupation and war (there are no references to the US occupation of Iraq, no discussion of the debilitating effect and repercussions of the Israeli occupation of Palestinian land, or of the many wars that have plagued the region). The book heavily relies on ethnographic studies and psychodynamic interpretations that do not fulfill the expectations set by the book's title. A large bulk of the ethnographic studies cited focus on tribal and/or rural research that bear little ecological validity; qualitative research based on case studies and extended life narratives do not constitute a sufficient source of information to make claims about the "cultural psychology of the Middle East and North Africa" in 2005. …

Iran's Policy Towards Afghanistan

Abstract: Since 1979, Iran's objectives in Afghanistan have changed as Afghanistan's domestic landscape changed. Still, Iran has consistently sought to see a stable and independent Afghanistan, with Herat as a buffer zone and with a Tehran-friendly government in Kabul, a government that reflects the rich ethnic diversity of the country. Toward those and other goals, Iran has created "spheres of influence" inside Afghanistan. During the Soviet occupation (1979-88), Iran created an "ideological sphere of influence" by empowering the Shi'ites. Iran then created a "political sphere of influence" by unifying the Dari/Persian-speaking minorities, who ascended to power. Iranian policies added fuel to the ferocious civil war in the 1990s. Astonishingly slow to recognize the threat posed by the Taliban, Iran helped create a "sphere of resistance" to counter the "Kabul-Islamabad-Riyadh" axis by supporting the Northern Alliance. Since the liberation of Afghanistan, Iran has also established an "economic sphere of influence" by engaging in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Today, Iran's goals are to pressure the Afghan government to distance itself from Washington, and for Iran to become the hub for the transit of goods and services between the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan, Central Asia, India, and China. While Iran has been guilty of extremism and adventurism in some critical aspects of its foreign policy, its overall Afghan policy has contributed more to moderation and stability than to extremism and instability. A here is considerable consensus among experts that Iran has played an important role in the tumultuous events in Afghanistan since the brutal occupation of that country by the Soviet Army in 1979. What is being debated is the exact impact, and consequences, of that role. What follows is a contribution to this lingering debate. Since its founding, the Islamic Republic of Iran has developed a security-centered, two-layered foreign policy to expand and protect its interests as well as to neutralize the perceived threat posed by the United States, a threat Tehran has consistently regarded as existential. The foundation of this foreign policy is based on the pragmatic recognition of the existence of a colossal power differential, particularly in the military arena, between Iran and the US. Iran has persistently sought not to allow hostile bilateral relations to descend into a military confrontation between the two countries. Additionally, in an effort to build an effective deterrent against the US, Iran has developed unconventional and asymmetric strategies in both its military and foreign policy arenas. One such strategy is to create "spheres of influence," buffer zones, as well as a web of both informal and formal, underground and open organizations around Iran's troubled neighborhood, and beyond its borders. This strategy allows Iran to project its power and enhance its interests, support Islamic movements, create a defensive and sometimes invisible wall outside its borders, and position its friendly forces and proxies beyond its borders against those who threaten its own survival. In its policy toward Afghanistan since 1979, Iran has employed the most important elements of this strategy and has created different kinds of "spheres of influence" in that country. CREATING AN IDEOLOGICAL SPHERE OF INFLUENCE, 1979-88 In July of 1973, Afghan King Zaher Shah (1933-73) was overthrown in a coup staged by Muhammad Daud Khan, who then demolished the monarchy, established a republic, and began flirting with Moscow.1 For Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi of Iran (1941-79), the coup was as an ominous sign of Soviet machinations to dominate Afghanistan. At first, he contemplated organizing a rebellion from Western Afghanistan to restore the monarchy.2 He quickly abandoned the plan, however, largely because he viewed Zaher Shah to be disgustingly timid and inept, even though he reportedly provided limited financial support for the exiled king in Italy. …

What Do Egypt's Islamists Want?: Moderate Islam and the Rise of Islamic Constitutionalism

Abstract: What type of political order do Egypt's Islamists seek to create? This question is examined by studying two types of sources: the theoretical works of Egypt's most prominent contemporary Islamic thinkers and the documents issued by the Muslim Brotherhood during its 2005 parliamentary campaign. These sources indicate that a distinctively Islamic conception of constitutionalism has emerged that legitimates many of the key goals of liberal governance, including constraints on state power, governmental accountability, and protection of some civil and political rights. However, the institutions of Islamic constitutionalism support a conception of political order that differs from liberalism in important respects. These differences are most apparent with regard to the purpose of the state, the role of the individual in politics, and the function of law. In response to both external and internal pressures, many Arab regimes have undertaken reforms that allow greater political competition. The primary beneficiaries of these reforms are Islamist groups. Within the past year alone, Islamists have achieved unexpected success at the ballot box in countries as diverse as Morocco, Egypt, Palestine, Iraq, and Lebanon. As Islamist participation in the political process grows, an obvious question arises: what type of political order do these groups seek to create? The Egyptian case provides particular insight into this question. It offers the best-developed discourse on Islamic law and governance of any country in the Arab world. This discourse is led by a vibrant and vocal group of Islamic thinkers whose ideas are influential throughout the region. In addition, Egypt has a popular and well-organized Islamist movement - the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) - that seeks to translate the abstract theoretical principles of Islamic governance into a practical political platform. The MB has shown considerable flexibility and originality in its efforts to develop a viable conception of Islamic governance.1 Thus, a close analysis of the Egyptian experience allows us to study both the theory and the substance of Islamic constitutionalism. This article begins with an assessment of the conception of constitutionalism articulated by Egypt's most influential contemporary Islamic thinkers. It then examines how these ideas are translated into a specific political agenda by the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly during the 2005 parliamentary elections. It concludes with a discussion of the likely impact of Islamic constitutionalism on democratization in Egypt. THE THEORY OF ISLAMIC CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CONTEMPORARY EGYPT For well over a century, Egypt has been an important center for legal thinkers seeking to adapt Islam to the challenges of contemporary governance. This effort began in the late 19th and early 20th centuries with the works of Jamal al-Din alAfghani, Muhammad 'Abduh, and Rashid Rida. It moved forward with 'Abd alRazzaq al-Sanhuri's remarkable synthesis of Islamic and French law in the Egyptian civil code. It continues today with a new generation of Islamic thinkers. The most important figures in this effort are Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Tariq al-Bishri, Kamal Abu al-Majd, and Muhammad Salim al-'Awwa. These writers have varied backgrounds. Al-Qaradawi received formal training in Islamic law at al-Azhar University, where he graduated with a PhD in 1973. He worked briefly at the Egyptian Ministry of Religious Endowments before relocating to Qatar, where he heads an Islamic research center. His many books, tapes, and videos are available throughout the Islamic world. He also hosts a weekly call-in show ("Islamic Law and Life") on the satellite channel al-Jazeera, which has made him a household name throughout much of the Arab world.2 Al-Bishri was trained as a lawyer and embarked on a successful career in the judiciary. He eventually rose to the post of First Deputy President of the State Council, which is among the most senior positions in the administrative judiciary. …

Good for the Shah, Banned for the Mullahs: The West and Iran's Quest for Nuclear Power

Abstract: Iran's nuclear program has become a highly controversial issue in international politics since the August 2002 unveiling of the secretly built uranium enrichment facility in Natanz and the heavy-water production plant in Arak. American officials nnd experts assert that Iran has secret plans to use its nuclear capabilities to develop nuclear weapons. Iranian officials, however, deny such allegations and claim that they will use their capabilities exclusively for peaceful purposes. Notwithstanding the official rhetoric, some Iranian scholars, intellectuals, and even bureaucrats argue that Iran should seriously consider developing nuclear weapons given that they have the necessary skills and capabilities as well as the reasons to do so. The clerical leaders have supposedly not yet decided about weaponizing Iran's nuclear capability. However, the ever-increasing size of Iran's existing nuclear infrastructure, and the achievements of Iranian scientists, who claim to have developed indigenous capabilities, may very well elevate Iran to the status of a nuclear power, even a de facto nuclear-weapons state. The prevailing view among Iranian bureaucrats and scientists who have been for many years involved in nuclear projects and others who are well entrenched in the state structure is that Iran should definitely have nuclear technology and even weapons. Those who are seemingly against nuclear weapons development maintain that the the international situation is not suitable, and they suggest waiting. Statements made by Americans and Israelis about a military strike on Iran's nuclear facilities strengthen the views of those who endorse nuclear weapons development; however, weaponization of Iran's capabilities will depend on the political calculus of the leadership.1 Against this background, the aim of this article is to discuss in detail the implications of Iran's nuclear capabilities for regional and international peace and stability. Let us begin with a reminder of the crisis that erupted in 2002 between Iran and the United States (US) over Iran's nuclear capabilities and intentions. An overview of the crisis, which also involved the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Union (EU) will highlight the positions of these actors. Iran's desire to develop a full-fledged nuclear fuel cycle is not new. Since the mid-1970s, under the leadership of both the Shah and the mullahs, Iran has been developing considerable technological infrastructure and accumulating valuable scientific expertise in the nuclear field. Therefore, Iran's strategic relations with the US and the leading European nations such as France and (West) Germany in the 1960s and 1970s will be discussed with special emphasis on their nuclear cooperation. The achievements of Iran in the nuclear field under the Shah came to a temporary halt with the dramatic changes of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Despite the deterioration of its relations with the West after the Islamic Revolution, Iran soon resumed its efforts to finish its nuclear projects, but there were serious difficulties because of the US policy of denying the transfer of nuclear technology and material. Russia and China entered the picture and helped Iran develop significant nuclear capabilities.2 This article will examine closely the ups and downs in Iran's efforts to advance in the field both technologically and scientifically. Building on this, a discussion will follow about whether Iran intends to develop nuclear weapons with the capabilities that it has now or will acquire in the future. To have a better idea about Iran's motivations and how long it may take it to build nuclear weapons, this article will present the views of Iranian scholars, scientists, bureaucrats, and intellectuals who are involved in the nuclear projects. Given Iran's probable desire to acquire nuclear weapons, this article will discuss the possible consequences of the policy options that are available to the US in its effort to prevent Iran from realizing its ambitions. …

Beyond Chutzpah: On the Misuse of Anti-Semitism and the Abuse of History

Abstract: Beyond Chutzpah: On the Misuse of Anti-Semitism and the Abuse of History, by Norman G. Finkelstein. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press. 2005. xi + 226 pages. Appends, to p. 317. Index to p. 332. $22.50. Norman Finkelstein, of DePaul University, devotes the first section of Beyond Chutzpah to books written by Phyllis Chesler, Gabriel Schoenfeld, and Abraham Foxman about the "New Anti-Semitism." With considerable sarcasm and scorn (e.g., "Poor Elie [Wiesel] is shocked shocked!..." (p. 61), he dismisses these discussions of anti-Semitism as exaggerated, hysterical, paranoid, and cynically calculated to parry and taint any criticism of Israel. There is not a word in this section about the undeniably scurrilous anti-Jewish material emanating in abundance from Arabic circles in Syria, Egypt, and elsewhere in recent years, extensively documented by MEMRI (The Middle East Media Research Institute), which Finkelstein never mentions. Most of the book is a sustained attack on Harvard Law School's Alan Dershowitz, focused especially on his The case for Israel.1 Finkelstein's method is to rebut assertions favorable to Israel with long quotations from the publications of B 'Tselem (The Israel Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories), Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch. Their reports attacking Israeli policy and behavior are presented as sacred authorities that need merely be quoted to establish facts. There is no effort to analyze, to balance, or to contextualize. Not only the "facts" but the judgments in these publications are taken to be self-evidently true: Israel's behavior in Jenin was a "war crime" because "that's exactly how Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch portrayed it" (p. 52). To use an analogy from the US legal system, this book is the brief of a prosecutor whose purpose is to marshal every witness and every piece of evidence useful to establish guilt, and to rebut or dismiss every claim of the defense attorney. Especially useful rhetorically is the material from Israeli sources - B'Tselem, Israel's "New Historians," and its left-wing columnists - although the fact that, alone in the Middle East, Israeli society tolerates and even celebrates such self-criticism remains unacknowledged and its implications unexplored. Much time and energy appears to have gone into this enterprise, and the documentation of his sources is rigorous. Yet Finkelstein not infrequently gets carried away with his rhetoric. The material benefits that (citing the Peel Report) he concedes accrued to the Arabs from Jewish immigration "vanished, as it were, overnight when the Zionist movement ethnically cleansed Palestine in 1948" (p. 191, my emphasis, MS). But the fact is that Palestine was not "ethnically cleansed" of Arabs in 1948; significant populations of Arabs remained on the West Bank, in Gaza, and in the newly declared State of Israel. …

The economic policies of Turkey's AKP government : Rabbits from a hat?

Abstract: How can we account for the priority that Turkey's "Islam-sensitive " government has placed on adhering to the IMF's prescriptions for macroeconomic stability and fiscal restraint in lieu of its electoral promises to pursue a justice-oriented social agenda and aggressively tackle problems of poverty and unemployment? In this article this question is answered by analyzing the challenges posed by international factors (debt sustainability, pressures by the IMF and the EU), as well as domestic factors (the Justice and Development Party's (AKP) own unpreparedness, oppositional tactics by the secularist establishment) that have shaped the AKP government's economic policies. When the Justice and Development Party (AKP, Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi) swept into office in the November 2002 general elections, winning an overwhelming majority of seats in parliament, the immediate question on everyone's mind was what the party planned to do about the economy. The predominant issue throughout the election campaign was the dire state of the Turkish economy. The 2001 economic crisis in Turkey had set the record for the country's worst recession and the deepest decline in economic growth since World War II. The Turkish lira was devalued by nearly 50%, devastating the savings and incomes of, by some estimates, 95% of the population, and the poverty threshold fell below what it had been in 1994.' The major challenge confronting the economy, cautioned an Istanbul securities broker, was that "Turkey needs a government that will produce rabbits from its hat - without rabbits [imaginative and radical reforms] it cannot be done."2 Nevertheless, during its campaign the AKP presented no cogent economic strategy of its own, let alone an alternative to the IMF-steered (International Monetary Fund) program of the ousted Biilent Ecevit government. The AKP faces a dilemma, similar to those faced by left-leaning politicians and political parties in Latin America, in that during election campaigns promises of poverty reduction and greater economic equality are made, but upon taking office, the hard realities of neoliberal free market policy demands weigh in. The usual response to this quandary, in Latin America as well as Turkey, has been to combine neoliberal market reforms with targeted clientelism and other forms of "neo-patrimonialism."3 The AKP's predecessors from the Motherland Party-led (ANAP, Anavatan Partisi) government of Turgut Ozal to the outgoing tripartite coalition government of Bulent Ecevit had all coupled neoliberal market reforms with fiscal populism.4 The appeal of economic populism is undeniable, but it has had the unfortunate track record of not only leading countries into deeper debt crisis, but also ultimately corroding the legitimacy of its practitioners. The practice has been criticized for favoring cronyism by granting privileged access to favored groups, and has led to calls for a greater emphasis on accountability, transparency, as well as less exclusion from and greater pluralism in access to the policy decision-making process. The 2002 general election in Turkey is a case in point, wherein the central voting issue was the economy, with campaigning intensely concentrated on voter concerns over social and distributive injustices and corrupt cronyism stemming from the neo-patrimonial practices of the incumbent political parties (plus those that had once held power). Paradoxically while voters fed up with poverty and political corruption have swung leftward in Brazil and elsewhere in Latin America, and rightward in Turkey, with supporters of political Islam gaining momentum, the decisive electoral victories of leftist trade union leader Luiz Inacio LuIa da Suva in Brazil and pro-Islamist former mayor of Istanbul Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey both resulted in economic policies being steered to the center. During their respective campaigns, LuIa and Erdogan raised popular expectations that they would immediately tackle problems of growing poverty, distorted income distribution, and social inequality, but once in power both leaders remained within the neoliberal framework and conformed to the macroeconomic stabilization agenda of the IMF. …

The Struggle over Political Order in Egypt: The 2005 Elections

Abstract: Although many have dismissed Egypt's first competitive presidential elections and the parliamentary elections of 2005 as a sham, the election campaigns marked a new departure in the Egyptian political sphere, including a shift in the domestic political balance. This article argues that the convergence of developments in the domestic political arena - including the emergence of new movements - the shifting emphasis of US foreign policy towards democratization, and the emergence of the new Arab media space, give the elections real significance despite the predictability of the results. The presidential and parliamentary elections in Egypt (September - December 2005) marked a new peak in the struggle for power in that country's domestic political arena, and also fueled the growing debate about the possibility of establishing genuine political reform in Arab countries. Following Husni Mubarak's overwhelming victory (88%) in the presidential elections, numerous claims were heard, both in and outside of Egypt, that nothing had changed in the Land of the Nile. A New York Times editorial column, headlined "Egypt's Imitation Election" proclaimed: "the election was an elaborate and largely meaningless sham."1 Similar remarks were heard following the parliamentary elections in December. This article examines these elections in three main contexts: the ongoing struggle for power in the domestic Egyptian political arena, the role of US Middle East policy, and the establishment of the new Arab media space. My conclusion is that in all three contexts, the Egyptian elections have reshuffled the deck. In the struggle for domination of the local political arena, the elections are likely not only to instigate a significant change in power relations between the Egyptian regime and its opponents, but could also possibly become a model for reform in other Arab countries. Husni Mubarak entered office under tragic circumstances - following the assassination of President Anwar A1-Sadat (October 6, 1981). In his 11-year administration, Sadat initiated significant reforms in his country's internal, foreign, and security policies. His "Open Door Policy" (al-Infitah) was intended to help Egypt emerge from its calamitous economic state by redefining the national agenda. Sadat's political re-orientation was, first and foremost, based on close cooperation with the United States and resolving the conflict with Israel. His foreign and security policies were derived from this position. In the economic field he initiated a series of steps aimed at creating a market economy in Egypt, expanding activity in the private sector, increasing foreign investments, and minimizing the dominance of the public sector. The social implications of this policy were soon evident. Prices and the cost of living rose steadily, while subsidies on consumer products and fuel were reduced continuously. Unemployment rates reached a new high, especially among the educated. The gap between the affluent and the poor widened, and with it a large segment of the population became increasingly frustrated with its inability to break out of the cycle of poverty and suffering.2 Sadat's assassination occurred against a background of an escalating struggle between the regime and the opposition. Sadat acknowledged his commitment to democracy on many occasions, but any steps implemented were minimal and aimed at ensuring the government's continuing dominance in the political arena. The various opposition movements demanded comprehensive reforms, but the Egyptian leadership was only willing to accept limited reforms that would not substantially upset the existing political order. Egypt's multiple security services enabled the government to effectively keep an eye on the opposition. Still, the government was unable to neutralize its domestic opponents or totally silence their intense criticism. From the beginning of the 1970s, an incipient change was evident in the political arena. …

National Security Decision-Making in Israel: Processes, Pathologies, and Strengths

Abstract: This article presents a first of its kind typology of Israeli national security decision-making processes, focusing on five primary pathologies and a number of strengths. It will demonstrate that these pathologies are the product of an extraordinarily compelling external environment and domestic structural factors: chiefly, the extreme politicization of the decision-making process stemming from the proportional representation electoral system, the consequent need to govern through coalition cabinets, and the absence of effective cabinet-level decision-making support capabilities. Ever since Israel's establishment in 1948, it has confronted an external environment whose primary characteristic has been perceived as one of nearly unremitting and overwhelming hostility. Repeated wars, perpetual hostilities at lower levels, the failed peace processes with the Palestinians and Syria, and even the "cold" peace with Egypt and Jordan have reinforced this image. As a result, national security has been at the forefront of Israeli political life for six decades. Israel has responded to these circumstances on two levels: by building up a disproportionate defense capability to forestall the threats to its security and by developing a "hunkering down" national security decision-making style geared to a "garrison democracy."' Indeed, by the 1970s and 80s, Israel's national security establishment (armed forces, intelligence services, defense and foreign ministries, defense industries) had not only earned a reputation for quality, but had even become one of the world's largest in absolute numbers. In the period since, the defense establishment has developed further, both in size and organizational complexity. The literature on government and politics in Israel is extensive, though skewed in its emphasis. Almost all studies by journalists, practitioners, and even scholars have taken a clearly historical and case-study-oriented approach, with virtually every event, incident, and major development in Israeli history extensively chronicled. A fair amount of attention also has been given to the formal structures and institutions of Israeli governance and politics. Little attention has been devoted, however, to the processes of Israeli national security decision-making and to an attempt to develop an overall typology thereof.2 This article seeks to close the gap and to present a typology of Israeli decisionmaking, focusing on five primary pathologies. It will seek to demonstrate that these pathologies are largely the product of two primary factors and the interplay between them: an extraordinarily compelling external environment and domestic structural factors, chief among them the extreme politicization of the decision-making process (DMP) stemming from the proportional representation (PR) electoral system and consequent need to govern through coalition cabinets. ENVIRONMENTAL SOURCES OF ISRAELI NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION-MAKING DECISIONS ARE CRITICAL AND FATEFUL For nearly 60 years, and in the pre-state days as well, Israeli national security policy has been predicated on a broad national consensus, which holds that Israel faces a realistic threat of genocide, or at a minimum, of politicide. Indeed, the dangers and degree of external threat posed by the hostile security environment over the years are so extreme that they bear little substantive comparison to other countries.3 In recent years, the threat of all-out conventional warfare has receded greatly (despite the 2006 war in Lebanon), and the war in Iraq eliminated the feared Iraqi WMD threat to Israel. Nonetheless, Iran's nuclear program continues to be perceived as an imminent existential threat, and additional threats, severe if not existential, also persist, including Syrian WMD capabilities, Hizbullah's massive rocket arsenal (as amply demonstrated in the recent fighting), and ongoing terrorism. The second Intifada, though not a major military threat in the conventional sense, was perceived by many in Israel as a challenge to the very fabric of its society. …

The One-State Solution: A Breakthrough for Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Deadlock

Abstract: ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT The One-State Solution: A Breakthrough for Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Deadlock, by Virginia Tilley. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2005. xii ?234 pages. Appends, to p. 242. Notes to p. 260. Bibl. to p. 267. Index to p. 276. $24.95. The words "The One-State Solution" seem to strike dread, at the least, or terror, at the most, in any established, institutional, or mainstream discourse having to do with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. (It is telling that even in the subtitle of this book, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is replaced by the Israeli-Palestinian deadlock.) Those supporting the one-state solution are perceived as radicals, undomesticated, Jew-haters, and automatically "on the side" of the Palestinians in that conflict. It is a short step, we are told, from such partiality to the extreme position of abolition of the State of Israel or the more colloquial "throwing us (the Jews) into the sea." In recent times, this progression takes a somewhat less direct path but nevertheless gets to the same point from the one-state solution, via the right of return (of all Palestinian refugees), to a majority of "Arabs" in that one state, to an elimination of the Jews in the area. It therefore takes great courage - and I use the word literally - to title explicitly a book under that infamous label, for the predictable knee-jerk reaction puts it in the waste-bin of radical, extreme, hallucinatory writings now so much with us. Beyond the courage, one needs a formidable stock of sources, data, argument, and conviction to fill in the details of the theoretical and practical roads to be taken in order to arrive at, rather than start from, the one-state solution. In other words, it behooves a writer to delve into historical facts and narratives, political and diplomatic processes, and cultural, psychological, and even intellectual debate in order to ground the hypothesis submitted by this book: that "No Other Plan Will Work." Virginia Tilley is blessed with such courage and complements it with the requisite academic erudition. In short, given the "facts on the ground," i.e., the settlement grid that has been developed by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territories since 1967, it is now impossible to dismantle a significant part of that grid - enough to enable the Palestinians to establish a contiguous, viable state of their own. This empirical note is not enough, however, to anchor the wider proposition: that Zionism from the start (or, at the least, certain elements of it and certain purveyors of its ideology) was not conducive to a reasonable co-existence between Jews and Arabs and is not amenable, even now, to a twostate solution. That this is the solution almost consensually favored by Israelis, Palestinians, and the international forces at large renders it a more challenging position whose validity Tilley attempts to refute. …

Nuclear proliferation : The case of Saudi Arabia

Abstract: Since the 1970s, the world's attention has focused on nuclear proliferation in Iran and Iraq. Very little attention has been given to nuclear proliferation in the third regional power in the Persian Gulf- Saudi Arabia. This article addresses the question of potential Saudi nuclear ambition. Most policymakers and analysts agree that Saudi Arabia does not possess nuclear weapons. Still, some argue that the Kingdom has both strategic incentives and financial resources to pursue a nuclear program. This article examines the security threats to Saudi Arabia from Iran, Iraq, Israel, and Yemen. It also analyzes the impact of domestic economic and political reform on Riyadh's security policy. The article argues that the US' strong commitments to defend Saudi Arabia against external threats have been crucial in reducing incentives to acquire nuclear weapons. Iran and Iraq have dominated analysis of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East since the 1970s. The Shah initiated a nuclear program with some ambiguity regarding his intention (i.e., peaceful purposes or military capability). After some hesitation, the Islamic regime in Iran has reactivated and expanded the nuclear infrastructure and since the first part of this decade, Tehran has been under intense international scrutiny - particularly from the United States, European Union (EU), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) - to become more transparent. In neighboring Iraq, former President Saddam Husayn sought to acquire nuclear capability in the late 1970s, but Israel destroyed his nuclear infrastructure in 1981. A decade later, the Gulf War (1991) and the comprehensive sanctions (1991-2003) foiled Husayn's nuclear ambitions. Very little attention has been given to nuclear proliferation in the third regional power in the Persian Gulf - Saudi Arabia. Does Saudi Arabia seek nuclear weapons capability? This question has not been adequately addressed. Most policymakers and analysts agree that the Kingdom does not have a nuclear weapons program.1 Saudi officials' strong condemnations of nuclear weapons and assertions that their country has no desire to acquire them have further reinforced this consensus. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia, like other Arab countries and Iran, has called for making the entire Middle East a nuclear weapons free zone.2 Despite the fact that no evidence points to Saudi acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, some analysts argue that the Kingdom has both the strategic incentive and the financial capability to pursue a nuclear option.3 Saudi Arabia is an important player in the volatile Persian Gulf and the broader Middle East and powerful neighbors have the capability to threaten Saudi national security. In short, Saudi Arabia is rich and vulnerable. Under these circumstances, nuclear weapons would deter aggression and provide Riyadh with a retaliatory capability if this aggression ultimately materializes. Many analysts have sought to explain why some nations choose to go nuclear, but it is also important to examine why certain nations choose not to.4 Above all, it is easier to explain why something happened than why it did not happen. This article will discuss the different allegations that Saudi Arabia has sought to acquire nuclear weapons capability. The following section will focus on the security environment, particularly the perceived threats from Israel, Iran, Iraq, and Yemen. Then, the decades-long unofficial alliance between Saudi Arabia and the United States will be analyzed. Finally, the potential impact of domestic economic and political reforms on the Kingdom's strategic posture will be examined. This article's analysis of Saudi Arabia's security environment is twofold. First, political and military developments in Iraq since the Gulf War (1991) and particularly in the aftermath of the fall of Saddam Husayn's regime (2003), have abolished the traditional security paradigm (i.e., playing Iran and Iraq against each other). …

Democracy, "Arab Exceptionalism", and Social Science

Abstract: This article deals with a cross-national measurement methodology of democracy as it is applied to Muslim and Arab nations by Freedom House, a major research organization. The results of Freedom House's studies show that Muslim and Arab states prove comparatively to be exceptional in being resistant to democracy. This article briefly examines measurement criteria then highlights the finding that the exceptionalism thesis propagated by the Freedom House project is the product of serious discrepancies in the measurement application. The quantitative measurement of democracy on a global scale may not be a new phenomenon, though in recent years it has come to attract widespread attention in periodical literature and official circles. Of the many interesting discussions resulting from the profusion of measurement studies,1 the ones that revolved around Islam, Arab states, and democracy have received widespread attention in academic and other influential places,2 in addition to being particularly relevant for comparative studies. The issue of whether democracy is inimical to Islam, to Arab culture, or to both is a question that used to be relegated mostly to area specialists as a subject of particular regional character. In recent years the question has been thrown wide open to the mainstream of the comparative study of politics, a step that in principle guards against essentialist tendencies. Yet, in two of the social science measurement enterprises of a global nature,3 more excitement has been generated regarding the political behavior of Muslims and Arabs with respect to democracy than about the soundness of the methodology and research that have produced the results. This article will assess the findings reached by Freedom House (FH), one agency engaged in measurement on a worldwide scale,4 and whose surveys have had the effect of propagating the exceptionalism thesis of the Muslim and Arab worlds.5 As the thesis is briefly rendered by Freedom House, Muslim states in general stand out as having a greater democracy deficit than is the case in any other culture or region of the world. The democracy deficit is shown to be more acute among the subset of Arab countries, where democracy is totally absent in nearly all but a few of them that are considered partially free (4 out of 17).6 No expert on the Middle East would argue that the Arab states are firmly grounded in the democratic club of nations; indeed it is generally held that a small number of them rank amongst the top authoritarian regimes in the world. What is being questioned here is the wholesale indictment of Arab states as failing to meet any democratization standards to speak of,7 thus paving the way to separate them as an exception even within the developing world. Freedom House studies try to show that even under permissive standards set up to accommodate the developing countries of Africa and Asia, only four Arab countries have been found to be partially democratizing.8 It will be argued here that (1) the denial of any democratizing trends in the Arab countries is a function of questionable measurement rather than of facts, and that (2) a more careful reading shows that many of them fall in the FH "Partly Free" category, comparable to a large cohort of developing countries. Not an exception, but much like other developing countries, most Arab states have since the 1970s been taking steps toward democratization in measures that vary in degree and extent from one country to another. METHODOLOGY One of the distinctive features of cross-national analysis on a global scale is its disaggregative nature. According to this method, an observer keeps a scoreboard on which each democratic attribute in a regime is assigned a numerical value. The system's ranking then is determined by taking the average score of all the considered attributes. Studies conducted by Arend Lijphart,9 Vanhanen,10 Freedom House," and Polity IV Project,12 for instance, have a disaggregative methodology in common. …

Stumbling decidedly into the six-day war

Abstract: In the historiography of the 1967 War, the common reading is to portray it as an "inadvertent war." Using recently declassified documents, this article offers an alternative interpretation. In critically examining existing master plan theories, it is shown that the United Arab Republic's (UAR) military actions were limited in size and were without aggressive intentions. The Israeli decision to strike was taken not for military reasons but rather to prevent a diplomatic solution which might have entailed disadvantages for the Israeli side. W hue the historiography of US involvement in the Middle East is not without controversy, no serious scholar would disagree with the notion that the year 1967 represented a watershed in the post-World War II history of the region. The Six-Day War of June 1967' resulted in far-reaching changes, which continue to affect Middle Eastern politics to this day. Israel's overwhelming military victory established it as a major regional power, dramatically changed the strategic setting in the Middle East, and escalated superpower confrontation in the region. The most conspicuous element of the new regional power configuration was Israel's territorial expansion. The new cease-fire lines established Israeli control over all of Mandatory Palestine together with the conquest of Syria's Golan Heights and Egypt's Sinai, thereby more than quadrupling the territory under Israeli control. The conquests also triggered a new debate inside Israel about the territorial aims of Zionism and the emergence of the settlement movement, resulting in a reshaping of the political landscape together with strong repercussions for the political culture inside Israel.2 On the international scene, the Six-Day War brought the Arab-Israeli conflict to the forefront of international politics. A further result of the war was that the hitherto informal alliance between the United States and Israel evolved into a "special relationship," although it was not formalized until 1981.3 In light of these dramatic consequences, it is certainly no exaggeration to regard the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 as the "great seminal catastrophe" of the recent history of the Middle East, to borrow the famous epitaph George F. Kennan coined for the First World War and its effect on European history. Upon examining the historiography of the 1967 War, one finds another parallel to the Great War of 1914-1918. Mimicking the classical topos of the causes of the First World War, many scholars working on the events of 1967 also seemed to adhere to the view that the conflict was "inadvertent," that none of the opponents actually wanted war in the first place.4 Arabs and Israelis "stumbled into war" in the same manner as the European statesmen did in August 1914. A recurring theme in both revisionist and traditionalist accounts of the Six-Day War is the treatment of the war as a classic example of miscalculation and misperception in international politics.5 According to Benny Morris, the different initiatives taken by the conflict parties, which culminated in the war, were "in large part a product of error and mutual miscalculation."6 Another revisionist writer, Avi Shlaim, even approaches the traditionalist viewpoint in describing the war as a "defensive war," fought foremost for reasons of safeguarding Israeli security. Apart from this caveat, Shlaim also reiterates the common view that the 1967 War "was the only one that neither side wanted." The war resulted from a "crisis slide that neither Israel nor her enemies were able to control."7 It would appear that even more traditionalist scholars subscribe to this view. Avraham SeIa, while stressing the responsibility of United Arab Republic (UAR) President Gamal 'Abdel Nasser [Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir] for initiating the crisis, writes of a "rapid escalation to the brink of war and beyond, culminating in a total ArabIsraeli confrontation."8 The claim of an inadvertent war nobody wanted also resurfaces in the latest analysis of the clash of 1967 by Michael B. …

The political economy of Lebanon under Rafiq Hariri : An interpretation

Abstract: International consensus supported Lebanon's effort to rebuild its shattered economy after the civil war and Rafiq Hariri, with Saudi and Western backing, took over as Prime Minister in 1992 to oversee the reconstruction program. Yet persistent Syrian efforts through Lebanese allies, including President Emile Lahoud, to undermine Hariri by blaming him for the country's economic woes raised suspicions that Damascus sought unrivalled influence in Lebanon. Hariri's efforts to privatize the corrupt state sector and attract direct foreign investment proved incompatible with Syrian hegemony. Complex factors were behind Syria's stance, relating to its insecurity in Lebanon, heightened by perceptions of Hariri's association with the West and the personal financial interests of leaders of the Syrian Ba'th regime in Lebanon's economy. The crisis crossed the point of no return with the extension of Lahoud's presidential term in September 2004. The Ta'if National Accord of October 24, 1989 set the parameters of a new Lebanese state following the shattering impact of the 15-year civil war. The most notable consequence of the Ta'if Accord was the balancing of political power between the country's sects, effectively leaving Syria as the main powerbroker in Lebanon. This situation was reinforced by a US green light in 1990 following Syrian participation in the UN-led operation to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. With the establishment of a new political formula, the challenge in the 1990s became economic reconstruction of postwar Lebanon, which was closely associated with Rafiq Hariri. But Hariri's liberal economic policies and long-term goals of modernizing and reforming the corruption-riddled state sector would eventually underscore the weaknesses of the post-Ta'if political order in Lebanon. More strikingly, Hariri's liberal economic vision, which required political stability and moderation, would clash directly with Syria's determination to maintain a strong grip over Lebanon that was aided by the loyal presidency of Emile Lahoud, who considered Lebanon's historic pluralism and dynamism anathema to his pro-Syrian authoritarian tendencies. On September 3, 2004, the on-going political and economic struggle in Lebanon reached its most critical period since the Ta'if Accord. The incident sparking the crisis in September was the Syrian decision to extend the term of President Lahoud beyond his constitutional entitlement, and the heavy-handed methods Syrian security agents and their Lebanese allies used to force an amendment through the country's parliament. Despite the direct threats, 29 MP's from various sects including Sunni Mosbah Ahdab, Druze Akram Shehayeb and Maronite Nassib Lahoud voted against.' While the Syrians and Lahoud ultimately succeeded in parliament, they failed at the UN Security Council, where Resolution 1559 was passed on September 2, 2004. The Resolution called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops in Lebanon and for the Lebanese to be able to select their leaders free from foreign influence. Syrian protestations that the Resolution set a dangerous precedent by interfering in the internal affairs of a member state were rebuffed by the French ambassador, Jean-Marc de la Sabliere, who countered that non-action by the UN would permit Syrian "interference in the internal affairs of another state."2 The French position was significant at the time because it was to herald untypical coordination with the US over a Middle East issue. US Ambassador to the UN John Danforth stated that Syria's continued military presence in Lebanon was "wrong" and more significantly, that "it would be very wrong of Syria to continue to interfere in the presidential electoral process in Lebanon."3 This US-French convergence against Syria nurtured prospects for major changes in the Middle East, not only in the Lebanese context but in terms of a broader regional peace. Isolating Syria would marginalize Iran and eliminate its foothold in Lebanon, disentangle Israeli-Palestinian negotiations from the wider Arab scene and restore democracy to Lebanon. …

Globalization, international finance, and political islam in the Arab World

Abstract: This article looks at one important aspect of globalization in the Arab World, namely the provision of international finance by the US, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank in support of economic liberalization programs. This flow of international finance has been partly determined by geopolitical factors and in some countries has resulted in a decline in state provision of social welfare, increased poverty, and increased inequality. Not only has this form of globalization been increasingly challenged by Islamist groups, but many such groups have moved in to provide social capital and fill the welfare gap created by the gradual withdrawal of the state from socio-economic affairs. Globalization has thus strengthened the hand of political Islam and undermined the political legitimacy of incumbent regimes.

Towards a representative military? The transformation of the lebanese officer corps since 1945

Abstract: This article discusses the transformation of the officer corps of the Lebanese Army since 1945, based on data collected on 4,453 officers who served in this institution over the years. It examines the social makeup, professional careers, and political orientation of these officers, as well as the interplay between the transformation of the officer corps over time and broader political and socioeconomic changes in Lebanon since its independence. Despite the close interplay between the militaries of the Middle East and the political, social, and economic spheres of their respective states, these institutions still represent an understudied topic in the literature on this region. After a surge in the study of the region's militaries in the 1960s and early 1970s, in the wake of the coups witnessed by many of its states,1 interest in this topic waned in later years. Although some works did address the region's militaries, and particularly the transformation of the armies of the "Revolutionary" states from the foremost challenge to the regime into its mainstay, their number was limited.2 Thus, apart from a few works that offer a regional perspective,3 small-N comparisons,4 or detailed case studies (mostly of Egypt,5 Turkey,6 and Israel7 ), Middle Eastern militaries still suffer from neglect, especially when compared to more "attractive" topics like democratization and the rise of political Islam. It is thus not surprising that our acquaintance with the bulk of these institutions is superficial, like our appreciation of the multitude of roles that they have come to play in their respective states. Indeed, these institutions, like the societies in which they are embedded, often appear to be "frozen in time and space,"8 and apart from a few exceptions,9 their study only seldom considers recent advances in the study of military institutions elsewhere.10 One reason for the considerable gaps in the study of Middle Eastern militaries concerns the difficulties in obtaining reliable data on these institutions. Given the sensitivity of all matters pertaining to their national security, most of the region's states - like Third World states in general - withhold information about their security sector. To this, one might add the corporate interests of the military, which considers its monopoly over information in the national-security realm to be one of the sources of its power. Yet, in addition to these "objective" difficulties, the study of Middle Eastern militaries is beset by the research agendas of the region's students. Informed by the experience of Latin America and Eastern Europe, many writers have pondered the question of whether or not civil society groups have in fact emerged in the Middle East, and what this might mean for the prospects of democratization in its states. Similarly, political manifestations of religion, or religious manifestations of politics, and their impact on democratic reforms in the region, have been intensely debated. At the same time, the coercive apparatuses of the region's states, those that often bar both secular and religious groups from participating in the political society,11 do not receive equal attention. That the state and its apparatuses are highly relevant to any discussion of the prospects of democratization in the Middle East is, by now, acknowledged by many.12 But is there indeed such a dearth of data on the region's militaries? As far as issues like military planning and preparedness are concerned, secrecy does play its part. But what about more mundane matters such as the changing social makeup of these institutions and its interplay with broader socioeconomic and political changes in the state? It seems that these topics receive insufficient attention not because of a lack of data, but due to the tremendous efforts needed to collect it, piece it together, and analyze it.13 This article, which discusses the remarkable transformation of the officer corps of the Lebanese Army (LA) from its establishment until the present, has two goals. …

Victory in Tripoli: How America's War with the Barbary Pirates Established the U.S. Navy and Shaped a Nation

Abstract: SOCIAL CONDITIONS Islamic Modernism, Nationalism, and Fundamentalism: Episode and Discourse, by Mansoor Moaddel. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005. x + 343 pages. Notes top. 401. Bibl. to p. 431. Index to p. 448. $24 paper. In this latest attempt to study the rise of Islamic fundamentalism from the vantage point of sociological theory, Mansoor Moaddel follows the usual pattern of seeking to isolate variables and determine causality and correlation. The scope of the book is appropriately broad, beginning with Islamic modernism since the mid 18th century, moving into experiments with secular nationalism, and ending with the contemporary rise of fundamentalism. The comparative case studies that inform the discussion likewise cover a broad territorial span, including India, Egypt, Iran, Syria, Algeria, and Jordan. The author moves through a number of explanatory models, largely borrowed from recent US sociology - with particular references to Robert Wuthnow and Randall Collins but also others. He finally proposes his own model, which focuses on conditions affecting and forming the production of discourse, which is seen to emerge in an episodic, discontinuous fashion. Moaddel's model consists of four possibilities - a matrix formed by, on the one hand, whether the discursive field is pluralistic or monolithic, and on the other whether its target is civil society or the state. A combination of pluralism and civil society gives us Islamic modernism, as in India, Egypt, and Iran until the early 20th century. A state-oriented pluralism, however, gives us liberal nationalism, as in Egypt, Iran, and Syria, until the mid-20th century. A monolithic discursive field within civil society gives rise to sectarian ideological movements, while a statecentered monolithic field provides us, finally, with contemporary fundamentalism. Moaddel traces the evolution of this last outcome not to the nature of religion, and indeed he rejects the reading of primary religious texts as a method of figuring out its social role. Rather, he identifies the main culprit for the emergence of fundamentalism as the secular, ideological state that had already narrowed discursive space, and thereby both posited the state as the motor of social transformation and the site of exclusionary discourses. Hence exclusionary, ideological fundamentalism simply mirrors what the state is already doing. The call for separating religion and state addresses therefore the wrong issue, for the real question concerns separating the state from ideology. That is to say, from the overwhelming force of the special interests of powerful social groups (including the clergy and the military), so that it may represent the universal interests of society. …

Between palestine and lebanon : Seven shi'i villages as a case study of boundaries, identities, and conflict

Abstract: This article follows the fate of the only seven Shi'i villages in Mandatory Palestine, beginning in the time of the border demarcation between Palestine and Lebanon (1919-1924) and concluding with Hizbullah's demand to retrieve their territories back to Lebanon (2000). The article examines the relations of the villages with the Jewish Yishuv and with the Sunni population in Palestine during the British Mandate; their fate as Palestinian refugees in Lebanon; and their status in Lebanon after the 1994 naturalization law that granted them Lebanese citizenship. The story of the seven villages is examined through three prisms: that of the villages themselves, of the Palestinians, and of the Lebanese. The different narratives enlighten themes such as the colonial legacy in the Middle East, border dynamics, identity formation, and internal Lebanese politics. Much of the historical research which deals with political and social aspects of the modern Middle East pays a great deal of attention to the macro side of the subject matter. Thus, for example, the primary focus of works on the Arab-Israeli conflict consists of macro themes such as wars, peace talks, the regional system, the struggle for hegemony, and so on. Studies relating to the drawing of the geopolitical map of the modern Middle East after World War I also tend to focus on the macro side, and deal primarily with British-French rivalry, British commitments to the Zionist and Arab national movements, and the material interests of the parties such as water sources and strategic routes. Very little attention has been devoted to the micro level - to the populations and communities who lived through the monumental events which transpired in the modern Middle East. However, often it is the diminutive local story that can shed light in a way that the broader picture cannot. As I will demonstrate in the following article, the story of a single community, even when it stretches over an entire century, can sharpen our understanding of broader issues such as the construction of national identities, the colonial legacy, and the dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which the research seemingly has exhausted. In this article I propose to take a micro-level approach and examine one border story, which centers on the only seven Shi'i villages in Mandatory Palestine, whose inhabitants became refugees in Lebanon in 1948, together with over 100,000 Palestinian Arabs.1 In 1994, after an extended public struggle, the residents of these villages attained Lebanese citizenship, owing to a highly controversial naturalization law which was passed in the Lebanese Parliament. In May 2000, after the withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon, the villages once again made headlines when Hizbullah followed by the Lebanese government - utilized the villages to make an additional territorial claim from Israel.2 Since 2000 and, in fact, up until the writing of this article, the seven villages have remained in the headlines, either because of territorial claims, or the question of the villagers' entitlement to Lebanese citizenship. This article consists of five sections. First, I will describe the mapping project of the border between the British and French Mandates in 1920-1924 and the place of the Shi'i population in the region in the course of this process. Second, I will examine the fate of the seven villages from 1924 to 1948, with an emphasis on the lives of their inhabitants within the British Mandate and their relations with the Jewish Yishuv (the Jewish community in Palestine) as well as with the neighboring Arab population. Third, I will survey their fate as Palestinian refugees in Lebanon from 1948-1994 and will describe their status in the context of the increasing strength of the Shi'i community in the country. The fourth section will examine the status of residents of the villages in Lebanon subsequent to the passage of the naturalization law of 1994 until after the withdrawal of Israel from south Lebanon in May 2000. …

The Kurds in Turkey: EU Accession and Human Rights

Abstract: TURKEY The Kurds in Turkey: EU Accession and Human Rights, by Kerim Yildiz Foreword by Noam Chomsky London, UK and Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2005 xxvii + 149 pages Notes to 175 Index to 182 $55 Turkish membership in the European Union (EU) holds the potential to democratize Turkey dramatically, along the lines of the Copenhagen Criteria (stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities) and thus help solve Turkey's longstanding Kurdish problem Turkish accession would also put the lie to the clash-of-civilizations thesis of inevitable Armageddon between the Christian West and Islamic East, or, as this study puts it, would "potentially create a 'bridge' between Europe and the wider Muslim World" (p 26) In December 2004, the EU finally granted Turkey the date of October 3, 2005 for the beginning of candidacy talks No state that has achieved this status has ever failed to eventually become an EU member Kerim Yildiz has written an exceptionally useful analysis of the pitfalls along the way for Turkey to achieve these goals (Noam Chomsky has added a rather extraneous foreword critical of US and Turkish policies) Yildiz's main thesis is that although "EU accession offers the Kurds a crucial and unprecedented opportunity finally to shake off Turkish oppression, end the cycle of violence and vilification to which they have been subject for so many years, and live freely as Kurds within the borders of their home state Turkey's extreme reticence in countenancing greater minority rights protection or constitutional reform constitute[s] major obstacles to Turkey's fulfilment of EU standards" (p 133) Piecemeal EU attempts to solve the Kurdish problem through discrete human rights initiatives, fail to get at the root of the problem: "Turkey's [continuing] adherence to ethnic nationalism and her consequent attitude to the Kurds which defines them as 'yet-to-be-assimilated'Turks" (p 113) Therefore, "a pluralist democracy in which the rights of the Kurds are recognized and enshrined cannot be constituted in Turkey without reform to the official ethnic nationalist ideology of the state" (p 145) Unfortunately, the EU has "effectively sidelined" this ultimate issue and "undermined the grave need for constructive political dialogue between the parties" (p 144) In the rush to facilitate Turkish membership, the EU is running the risk of "fudging the Kurdish issue" (p 148) "The Kurdish issue will not go away unless it is addressed fully, openly, and at its ideological roots; and unless this is achieved, the EU will find that it is bringing a volatile, unresolved conflict within its borders" (p …

Israel and the origins of Iran's Arab option : Dissection of a strategy misunderstood

Abstract: This article argues that Iran's "Arab option" - the Arab and pro-Palestinian tilt in Iran's foreign policy - did not emerge out of the ideological musings of Iran's Islamic revolutionaries, but out of Iran's new-found position of preeminence in the later years of the Shah's rule. The sustainability of Iran's regional leadership required Arab acceptance and support, which could only be won through a pro-Arab orientation in Iran's foreign policy. Iran's strategy of wooing the Arab states of the Middle East and pursuing an Islamic framework for state-to-state interaction is often believed to be rooted in the Islamic Republic's ideological worldview. At first glance, the contrast between this foreign policy and that of the late Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi is striking. While the Iranian monarch nurtured strategic ties to strong but remote states, such as the US and Israel, to balance Iran's Arab neighbors, the Islamic Republic has pursued the Arab option to bridge the Arab-Persian divide by promoting a pan-Islamic political order and by adopting a radical pro-Palestinian position. While the more extreme expressions of this policy were tempered during the presidency of Muhammad Khatami (1997-2005), the election of Iran's new conservative President Mahmud Ahmadinejad has reinvigorated Iran's Islamic orientation, which may win Tehran points with the discontented Arab masses but only at the expense of increased tensions with Arab governments. To many of its critics, Iran's policy of tilting towards the Arab and Islamic masses and against the West is ill-advised, defeatist, and incomprehensible, and has as a result been deemed ideological. Indeed, it is viewed by some as an oxymoron that Iran, whose tensions with the Arabs stretch back to the 7th century AD or even earlier, has adopted a pro-Arab policy against Israel, a nation with which Iran has no historical grievances. Some go so far as to argue that Iranian-Arab enmity is an enduring and permanent feature of Iran's security environment.1 As a result, these analysts would conclude that any Iranian foreign policy that does not seek to tie Iran permanently to a strategic partnership with the region's non-Arab states is simply incorrect and counters the region's geo-political equilibrium. This criticism is also shared by Israeli analysts who adhere to David Ben Gurion's doctrine of the periphery.2 According to Eliezer Tsafrir, former head of the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad in Iraq, evidence for the permanent nature of Iran's rivalry with its immediate neighboring Arab states is evident in history: Whatever the name of Iran-Pars, Elam, Media-and whatever the name of Iraq-Babylon, Assyria, Akkad, Sumer-there was always a rivalry and sometimes war [between the two]... Koroush-e Kabir [Cyrus the Great] knew that there is a common interest between the two sides of the Middle East-Iran and Israel. That is why Koroush let Ezra and Nehemia come back and rebuild the temple. It was obviously an interest of his in order to dominate [Iraq]. Iran is Muslim but not Arab, and [to keep this balance] Iran needs another [non-Arab] people [who share that] common interest.3 There are numerous problems with this analysis of Iran's Arab option. First, it assumes a static view of the power balance in the Middle East; it perceives historic, realities as objective laws and fails to recognize the root causes of those conditions. secondly, it fails to take into account systemic changes to Iran's security environment and cyclical shifts in the distribution of power in the region. Third, it fails to recognize how the actualization of Iran's leadership aspirations necessitated a shift in its foreign policy realignments. Finally, and perhaps most noticeably, it neglects the fact that Iran's gravitation towards the Arab states preceded the Islamic Republic. This article argues that Iran's Arab option did not emerge out of the ideological musings of Iran's Islamic revolutionaries, but out of Iran's new-found position as the region's preeminent power under the Shah. …

The Odd Couple: Ending the Jordanian-Syrian "Cold War"

Abstract: Of all the bilateral relationships between Arab states, the Jordanian-Syrian relationship has been among the most tumultuous. Jordanian-Syrian relations have, more often than not, been marked by varying degrees of mutual hostility and even violence. These periods of animosity have been so frequent that they amounted to a local ‘Cold War’ even in the midst of the many other conflicts in the region. But with regime changes in both Amman and Damascus, a marked thaw has emerged in Jordanian-Syrian relations, seemingly ending another long period of acrimony. But this type of event has happened once before: in the late 1970s when Jordan and Syria shifted from antagonism to alliance. This article examines both the historic and current attempts to end the Jordanian-Syrian Cold War, so that the earlier episode may shed some light on the present and future of Jordanian-Syrian relations.

Khatami's Legacy: Dashed Hopes

Abstract: Muhammad Khatami's presidency of Iran's Islamic Republic started with a deafening roar and ended in an unceremonious whisper. Chances are that his crisis-ridden eight-year tenure will be more favorably viewed in the future than is now the case with his disillusioned early supporters. While his administration was a mixture of some successes and certain setbacks - like all previous ones - the country that he left to his successor was in many respects freer, more prosperous, and more diplomatically respected that the one he inherited from his predecessor. The principal reason for his under-appreciated legacy may lie in the unbridgeable gap between his constituents' ever-rising expectations and his limited capacity to fulfill them. In other words, what was asked of him by the electorate was far more than the maximum he could possibly deliver, and what he did deliver was far less than the minimum his supporters were eager to receive. The adage about "coming in with a roar and going out with a whisper" would perhaps find no better example than Muhammad Khatami's presidency in Iran. When this mid-level and little-known Shi'ite cleric was elected Iran's fifth post-revolution President in the spring of 1997, he was greeted as a national hero, and treated like a rock star. A female admirer later portrayed him as "our Napoleon with a book, instead of a sword, in his hand."1 Yet, when he left office on August 4, 2005, no one but a handful of his dwindling supporters shed any tears over his departure. Justified or not, he is now also widely chastised as inadvertently responsible for the recent presidential victory of Mahmud Ahmadinejad - an obscurantist and demagogic technocrat who openly aspires to turn the country back to the early days of the 1979 Revolution. A thorough investigation of Khatami's presidential rise and fall may require several separate analyses. Psycho-historians may focus on his personality as a devout Muslim fascinated with Western democratic ideas; a pacifist teacher advocating patience, moderation, and prudence; and a Utopian dreamer thrown by accident into the vortex of Iran's Byzantine politics. Divinity students and Islamic theocrats may dis sect his novel concept of "Islamic democracy" in relation to both Shi'ite traditional theology as well as Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's non-democratic concept of "velayate faqih" (rule by a jurisconsult). Clash-of-cultures theorists may scrutinize the significance and practicality of his proposed "Dialogue among Civilizations," and peaceful co-existence of East and West under different value systems. This article's limited goal is to examine the Khatami Administration's eight-year record regarding its promised tripartite goals of economic prosperity, pursuit of law and order at home, and establishment of amicable relations with the external world.2 A discussion of Khatami's own personal fate and fortune as a leader and a reformer is offered elsewhere.3 Accordingly, the following evaluation of his administration will be divided into three parts: the economy, internal socio-cultural developments, and relations with the outside world. A LEAP BACKWARD The unexpected victory of Mahmud Ahmadinejad in Iran's presidential elections of June 2005 mystified the world, and caught Middle East pundits by surprise.4 A virtually unknown revolutionary apparatchik, with a near blank resume as an appointed former governor of a fourth-tier province, and a hand-picked mayor of Tehran by a fundamentalist (Ossulgra) City Council, Ahmadinejad was the least known, least experienced, and least personally and professionally attractive of the seven candidates allowed to run by the Council of Guardians (out of a total of 1,014 aspirants). In all national polls taken shortly before the June election, he came out last. And yet, in the run-off election and final count, he beat Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani - a Khomeini comrade-in-arms, a ten-year speaker of the Majlis, a two-time President of the Republic, the incumbent chairman of the powerful Expediency Council, and an all-out icon and stalwart of the regime. …

National Security in Saudi Arabia: Threats, Responses, and Challenges

Abstract: National Security in Saudi Arabia: Threats, Responses, and Challenges, by Anthony H. Cordesman and Nawaf Obeid. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005. xxiv + 402 pages. Notes to p. 426. $54.95. Every so often a book comes along that is definitive - it covers its subject so comprehensively, and with such authority, that there will be nothing further to say on the subject for years to come. Daniel Yergin's The Prize was in that category, as was David Fromkin's A Peace to End all Peace. On a less grand scale, National security in Saudi Arabia approaches that lofty standard. In the end it falls just short because it lacks an index - an astonishing omission - and because, unfortunately for the authors, it was completed just before the critical events of the summer of 2005: the death of King Fahd, the smooth transition to the reign of 'Abdullah and the designation of Prince Sultan as next in line, the shakeup in the intelligence service, and the restructuring of the National security Council under the leadership of Prince Bandar, former ambassador to the United States. Those developments have overtaken some of the book's otherwise shrewd and perceptive analysis. Those problems aside, Anthony Cordesman and Nawaf Obeid, longtime students of Saudi Arabia and its security apparatus, have delivered a thorough, sober (and sobering), and wide-ranging assessment of the threats to Saudi Arabia's security, the Kingdom's ability to respond to those threats, its armed forces and police, and its organizational competence, or lack thereof. Their overall conclusion is that in all aspects of security, from fighting domestic and international terrorism to protecting the country's vital oil installations and reforming the economy to expand the opportunities available to the fast-growing younger generation, Saudi Arabia has made impressive progress but must do more and do it quickly in order to maintain its stability. On the points of most urgent interest to American readers, the authors conclude that the rulers of Saudi Arabia are sincerely opposed to terrorism, have at long last recognized that their own past errors contributed to its spread, and are fighting it with increasing vigor and effectiveness. Inside the Kingdom, the authors argue, the security forces, caught off guard and untrained by the outbreak of terrorism that erupted in 2003, have learned how to confront the extemists effectively and are defeating them because the Saudi populace does not support the terrorists' cause or tactics. Public antipathy has undercut the recruitment efforts of al-Qa'ida in Saudi Arabia and prevented the organization from penetrating any of the security forces, the authors conclude. The authors define national security in the broadest possible terms - not just military and strategic but geographic, political, economic, and even spiritual. In fact, their first 107 pages are not about Saudi Arabia at all but about the military capabilities of its three potentially hostile neighbors, Iran, Iraq, and Yemen. The authors conclude that none of the three is capable of defeating Saudi Arabia through direct attack but that Iran especially could cause havoc with unconventional attacks such as firing missiles into coastal oil facilities or blocking shipping lanes. …

In the Shadow of Democracy

Abstract: In the Shadow of Democracy Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy in the Middle East, ed. by Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005. viii + 267 pages. Bibl. to p. 282. Index to p. 300. Contribs. $50 cloth; $24.95 paper. State Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century, by Francis Fukuyama. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004. xiii +121 pages. Bibl. to p. 132. Index to p. 137. $21. For Arab democrats and their allies, disappointment is too familiar, as political openings have frequently been followed by reversals, setbacks, and renewed repression. Moments of reform are fleeting, their impact elusive. Yet even for grizzled veterans of democracy promotion in the Middle East, 2005 was a year of frustration. Events early in the year - elections in Iraq, Syria's withdrawal of troops from Lebanon, electoral reform in Egypt, local elections in Saudi Arabia, elections in Palestine were eagerly seized on by the Bush Administration as indicators of incipient democratic revolution, an "Arab spring," giving credence to its claims about the demonstration effects that were sure to follow regime change in Iraq. Pressure for reform seemed, finally, to be driving the Arab world toward a point where, finally, it might lose its dubious distinction as the only world region untouched by the wave of democratization that marked the end of the Cold War. Yet, the excitement and promise quickly faded. Egypt's constitutional amendment permitting contested presidential elections was carefully engineered to protect the incumbent from competition. It was, in any case, gutted in practice. Husni Mubarak defeated his main rival Ayman Nur by a mere 80 percentage points. Less than a quarter of registered voters bothered to go to the polls. Electoral outcomes in Lebanon and Palestine did not have catalytic effects, far less so municipal elections in Saudi Arabia that gave male voters the chance to select half the seats on local town councils. Despite the withdrawal of its troops, Syria remains a presence in Lebanon, and its government shows little inclination to reform in the face of sustained external pressure.1 Mahmud 'Abbas' election as President of the Palestinian Authority in January 2005 temporarily improved the tenor of US-Israeli relations, but has not, to date, altered the determination of the government of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to define Israel's borders unilaterally. Nor did it give 'Abbas the political standing to move quickly to implement an assertive program of political reform, or to confront the diffusion of military power in Palestinian society - a crucial prerequisite to the consolidation of a democratic Palestinian state. 'Abbas' "Altalena Moment" has come and gone. As a result, the possibilities for centralizing authority within electoral institutions and consolidating Palestinian democracy are remote.2 And then there's Iraq. Neither doomsayers nor cheerleaders have yet written the final word on Iraq's future. Its trajectory remains too unsettled to dismiss entirely the possibility that something approaching democracy will result from recent constitutional negotiations and parliamentary elections. Nor is it yet possible to conclude that Iraq is locked into a course leading ineluctably to sectarian violence, fragmentation, and a possible return to authoritarian rule - though too many steps down this path have already been taken.3 What is much clearer, however, one year after the "purple revolution" of January 2005, is the collapse of American expectations about what regime change in Iraq would mean for the region as a whole. Combined with daily reminders of the grinding violence that grips much of the country, the chaotic process of constitution building has underscored the fecklessness of Bush Administration claims about a democratic "domino effect" resulting from the invasion. Without question, neighboring states are learning from what they see in Iraq; the lessons they take away, however, are far removed from those imagined by the White House and the Pentagon during the run-up to war. …

SYRIA: Asad in Search of Legitimacy: Message and Rhetoric in the Syrian Press under Hafiz and Bashar

Abstract: SYRIA Asad in Search of Legitimacy: Message and Rhetoric in the Syrian Press under Hafiz and Bashar, by Mordechai Kedar. Brighton, UK: Sussex Academic Press, 2005. xvii + 288 pages. Bibl. to p. 290. Index to p. 302. $79.50. This book, based on a systematic mining of the Syrian press, provides a thorough review of regime discourse. Particularly valuable is that it allows the press to speak for itself in extensive excerpts, some usefully reproduced in Arabic script. The aim is to expose both the regime's legitimacybuilding strategies and legitimacy liabilities. The underlying assumption is that an unelected Alawi regime, in a country where identification with the state was historically contested by other loyalties, must invest heavily in propaganda efforts, including the leader's cult of personality. A second theme is that Syrian foreign policy is driven chiefly by a quest for legitimacy through the use of external threats to justify the national security state at home. The book is most successful in its attempt to show how the regime attempts to construct identity is such a way as to legitimize itself. The media is charged to create a "new nationalist man," by combating "submissive tendencies" and encouraging a "spirit of resistance." Syria is portrayed as the center of Arabism and as a regional power that cannot be ignored, Asad is compared to Salah ad-Din (leading the Arab world's struggle against Zionism and imperialism), and the October War (1973) is celebrated as a war of liberation. Sub-state sectarian (taifi) loyalties are deprecated, and references to terms such as Alawi and Druze systematically eschewed. Islamic identity is also played down, but Asad nevertheless sought legitimacy by portraying himself as a Muslim ruler. However, as perforce must a member of a suspect minority, he insists on a liberal version of Islam, denying that God regards some of Syria's religions as inferior to others and enlisting reformist imams to legitimize liberal over literalist or fundamentalist interpretations of Islam. Much more problematic is Kedar's use of legitimacy to explain Syrian foreign policy. The struggle against Israel, he argues, is what legitimizes Asad's rule and the sacrifices imposed on Syrians and what diverts attention from internal problems. Hence, Asad's insistence on total return of the Occupied Territories is meant to obstruct a peace settlement and shift the blame to Israel in order to continue the state of war that legitimizes the regime. …