Journal•ISSN: 0268-1064
Mind & Language
Wiley-Blackwell
About: Mind & Language is an academic journal published by Wiley-Blackwell. The journal publishes majorly in the area(s): Cognition & Action (philosophy). It has an ISSN identifier of 0268-1064. Over the lifetime, 1054 publications have been published receiving 41039 citations. The journal is also known as: Mind and language.
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TL;DR: The authors discuss la nature of the psychologie populaire (folk psychology) and examine, dans cette optique, le raisonnement hypothetico-deductif, ainsi que sur le probleme de l'attribution des croyances.
Abstract: Discussion sur la nature de la " psychologie populaire " (folk psychology). L'A. se concentre sur le probleme de la prediction d'un comportement (de soi-meme, et des autres) et examine, dans cette optique, le raisonnement hypothetico-deductif, ainsi que sur le probleme de l'attribution des croyances. L'A. soutient que meme si la psychologie populaire n'est pas une theorie mais une capacite de raisonnement pratique, elle demeure une alternative
1,044 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors contrast two accounts of how children understand the mind: one is the view that the child's early understanding of mind is an implicit theory analogous to scientific theories, and changes in that understanding may be understood as theory changes.
Abstract: How do children (and indeed adults) understand the mind? In this paper we contrast two accounts. One is the view that the child's early understanding of mind is an implicit theory analogous to scientific theories, and changes in that understanding may be understood as theory changes. The second is the view that the child need not really understand the mind, in the sense of having some set of beliefs about it. She bypasses conceptual understanding by operating a working model of the mind and reading its
936 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that the interpretation process does not simply consist in applying general mind-reading abilities to a particular (communicative) domain, but involves a dedicated comprehension module, with its own special principles and mechanisms.
Abstract: The central problem for pragmatics is that sentence meaning vastly underdetermines speaker's meaning. The goal of pragmatics is to explain how the gap between sentence meaning and speaker's meaning is bridged. This paper defends the broadly Gricean view that pragmatic interpretation is ultimately an exercise in mind-reading, involving the inferential attribution of intentions. We argue, however, that the interpretation process does not simply consist in applying general mind-reading abilities to a particular (communicative) domain. Rather, it involves a dedicated comprehension module, with its own special principles and mechanisms. We show how such a metacommunicative module might have evolved, and what principles and mechanisms it might contain.
785 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the double effect principle was investigated in the context of moral dilemmas, where each moral dilemma presented a choice between action and inaction, both resulting in lives saved and lives lost.
Abstract: To what extent do moral judgments depend on conscious reasoning from explicitly understood principles? We address this question by investigating one particular moral principle, the principle of the double effect. Using web-based technology, we collected a large data set on individuals ' responses to a series of moral dilemmas, asking when harm to innocent others is permissible. Each moral dilemma presented a choice between action and inaction, both resulting in lives saved and lives lost. Results showed that: (1) patterns of moral judgments were consistent with the principle of double effect and showed little variation across differences in gender, age, educational level, ethnicity, religion or national affi liation (within the limited range of our sample population) and (2) a majority of subjects failed to provide justifi cations that could account for their judgments. These results indicate that the principle of the double effect may be operative in our moral judgments but not open to conscious introspection. We discuss these results in light of current psychological theories of moral cognition, emphasizing the need to consider the unconscious appraisal system that mentally represents the causal and intentional properties of human action.
562 citations
TL;DR: This paper provides a comprehensive survey of the space of possible analyses of the phenomenon of quantifier domain restriction, together with a set of considerations which militate against all but the own proposal.
Abstract: In this paper, we provide a comprehensive survey of the space of possible analyses of the phenomenon of quantifier domain restriction, together with a set of considerations which militate against all but our own proposal. Among the many accounts we consider and reject are the 'explicit' approach to quantifier domain restric- tion discussed, for example, by Stephen Neale, and the pragmatic approach to quantifier domain restriction proposed by Kent Bach. Our hope is that the exhaustive discussion of this special case of context-dependence will provide guidelines for how to decide, for an arbitrary case of context-dependent discourse, whether it should be treated syn- tactically, semantically, or pragmatically.
555 citations