National security and the future 

Abstract: SAŽETAK: Tema ove rasprave je razmatranje koncepta asimetricnog ratovanja i njegovog utjecaja na proces vojne inovacije u posthladnoratovskom razdoblju. Premda asimetricno ratovanje nije nova pojava, nakon zavrsetka Hladnog rata znacajno je intenziviran ovaj oblik ratovanja. Bit asimetricnog ratovanja je i danas nepromijenjena nastojanje slabije strane da postigne pobjedu nad nadmocnijim protivnikom koristenjem nekonvencionalnih nacina djelovanja. Vođenje asimetricnog rata prisiljava vojne organizacije država Zapada da pronađu metode kojima mogu adekvatno odgovoriti ovoj ugrozi. Glavni cilj razmatranja je analiza procesa vojne inovacije na podrucju donosenja vojnih doktrina, odnosno analiziranje nacina na koji vojne organizacije planiraju i pripremaju svoje snage za izvođenje mirnodopskih i ratnih misija u uvjetima asimetricnog ratovanja.

Abstract: In his book, Secrecy and Democracy, the former director of U.S. Central Intelligence Agency raised the issue that is at the heart of a debate over America’s intelligence services. The spy service under his control, he wrote, “strongly resisted my efforts to employ it to take the pulse of foreign countries; first, because semi-covert collection was not in its tradition, and such activity was not considered espionage by the professionals. Second, because the CIA had become too accustomed to living and working in comfortable cities abroad; not enough of its people were out in the remote areas.”1 In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet empire, the CIA finds itself fighting for its institutional life. It stands accused by former top intelligence chiefs of having failed the mission for which it was founded: to provide political leaders with accurate assessments of the political, economic, and military state of the Soviet Union. Writing later about this “enormous failure”, Turner made an extraordinary assertion in a 1991 Foreign Affairs article: “I have never heard a suggestion from the CIA, or the intelligence arms of the departments of defense or state, that numerous Soviets recognized a growing, systemic economic decay.”2 The Agency, another critic wrote, was left “virtually in the dark about the Soviet bloc’s political, economic, and societal decay, as well as the speed with which Communism would collapse in Eastern Europe.” The CIA had kept overestimating the performace of the Soviet economy, “leading many to speculate that the numbers were hyped to fuel the arms race.”3 Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a former vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, made an even more sweeping statement: “For a quarter century,” he said, “the CIA has been

Abstract: The author discusses the fate of the Foreign Intelligence Department of the GDR, which he headed for over thirty years, and of its colleagues and agents since the reunification of Germany ten years ago. There was no transformation of this service after the implosion of socialism; instead, it was liquidated, and criminal prosecutions followed which continue to this day. The author describes how this is connected to the West German leadership goal of the \"de-legitimization\" of the GDR. The operations of the western services are described, as well as the actions of their collaborators, who agree to make available, for a price, their knowledge of sources, files, data and other evidence in order for criminal prosecutions to be launched; i.e. the \"Rosewood\" operation of the CIA, and the decoding of the data carrier \"SIRA\" and its significance are discussed. The author holds the view that the criminal prosecution of the colleagues and agents of his service violates the internationally recognized legal concept of \"equality before the law\". Of the approximately 150,000 political indictments initiated since the reunification, 7,099 were for espionage. The article also addresses other subjects, such as the inhumanely high prison sentences in the United States. The author feels that, after ten years, a political gesture should be made which would remove the last vestiges of the Cold War.

Abstract: The author in this study does not intend to provide a comprehensive account of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in part because the current level of research does not enable this. The only way to understand this conflict is through facts, not prejudices. However, such prejudices are particularly acute amongst Muslim-Bosniac authors. They base their claims on the notion that Serbs and Croats are the destroyers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that both are equally culpable in its destruction. Relying on mainly unpublished and uncited documents from the three constitutive nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the author factually challenges basic and generally accepted claims. The author offers alternative responses to certain claims and draws attention to the complexity of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has been mainly viewed in terms of black or white. The author does, however, suggest that in considering the character of the war it is necessary to examine first the war in Croatia and the inter-relationship between the two. The main focus is on 1992 and the Muslim and Croat differences that developed into open conflict at the beginning of 1993. The role of the international community in the war and the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina are also discussed. At the end of the 20th century in Europe and the eclipse of Communism from the world political scene, it is not easy to trace the indelible marks left behind after the collapse of Yugoslavia and the wars that ensued. Within fifty years Yugoslavia ceased to exist for a second time, this time it appears to be permanent or at least for an indefinite period. The first of these wars, the war in Slovenia, in contrast to the war in Croatia, and even more so the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was a serious maneuver and not NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE FUTURE 1(1) 2000, pp. 153-184 a conflict between nations and ideologies. The intensity and brutality of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina caught the world’s attention, a war taking place in civilized Europe. During the course of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina there were attempts to interpret its nature, which vulgarized the conflict in terms of black and white, good and evil akin to bad literature or B-grade films. For example, Mustafa Imamoviae, professor at the Faculty of Law in Sarajevo, stated: “The aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina was organized and planned in detail and implemented in the spring of 1992 by Serbia and Montenegro (so-called Yugoslavia), with the active support of Bosnian and Herzegovinian Chetniks. At the end of 1992 and the beginning of 1993, as an aggressor Croatia joined in, with the support of the Ustashi elements within the Croatian Defense Council (HVO).” Imamoviaes statement captures the key element in Muslim-Bosniac publications on the subject of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995. This key element is in many ways questionable. The significance of this interpretation, especially in its most “sensitive” aspects, of the Muslim-Croat conflict is the claim that the entire war is understood from the perspective of the second half of 1993. The war from 1991/92 to 1995 in many ways appeared to be the continuation of nothing more than the darkness of World War II, its conclusion determining the history of the socialist (republic) of Bosnia and Herzegovina. During the Second World War each constitutive nation found itself divided along two opposing sides, while the Bosniac-Muslims found themselves divided into three, or four sides as it has recently been asserted. The similarities to the Second World War are visible also in the way in which the conflict has been interpreted. In much the same way as 1941 was viewed as the “defining” year in which everything began and nothing good was occurred before it, except for the “painful” experiences of the victor. Now 1991 and 1992 are taken as starting points. The period before 1991 was “difficult and unjust” for all three constitutive nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Clearly this interpretation is unfounded. During World War II the Serbs were separated into the Chetniks and the Partizans. Their participation grew constantly in the Partizans as the war closed, and in the Bosnia and Herzegovina Partizan contingent they constituted a majority. The Muslims spent the war mainly in the formations of the homeguard/domobrani and the Ustashi forces of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH). They also participated in the local police forces under the auspices of the military formations of the NDH, although today there is an attempt to give them an “independent” character. The participation of the Muslims in the Partizans of Josip Broz Tito was slightly lower, but it began to grow by the end N AT IO N AL S EC U RI TY A N D T H E FU TU RE 1 (1 ) 2 00 0

Abstract: President Bush warned in a 2005 address to the National Endowment for Democracy that one of Islamism's goals is a trans-national Muslim theocra cy, technically a Caliphate - "a radical Islamic empire that spans from Spain to Indonesia." Bosnia and Herzegovina is located at this expansive Caliphate’s frontier, representing a legitimate radical Islamic threat to the region. The ethno-religious nature of the 1990s Bosnian civil war introduced materiel, moral and financial support from oil-rich Islamic Gulf states to sup port the beleaguered Bosnian Muslim government - with it came Saudi and Wahhabi influence. More importantly was the entrance of Islamic foreign fighters, or mujahadeen, bringing radical Islamic ideologies and, according to some sources, the Al Qaeda network into Europe itself. The growth and spread of Bosnia’s radical Islam, although limited, can be seen in activities of Saudi sponsored Islamic institutions, the presence of mujahadeen, and the recent arrests of Bosnians implicated in planning and sponsoring terror ist attacks. Even though the International Community is focused on Iraq and Afghanistan as the US struggles in the Global War on Terror, the Balkans, with its historical linkage to Islam and recent radical Islamic activity merits close scrutiny. This paper investigates the distinct historical and spatial pat tern(s) associated with the growth and phenomena of Bosnia’s radical Islam and concludes with a discussion of the actual threat emanating from Bosnia andHerzegovina.