Showing papers in "Netherlands journal of legal philosophy in 2011"

Transnational Fundamental Rights: Horizontal Effect?

Abstract: As regards fundamental rights, transnational constitutionalism is completely plausible. Who could deny the worldwide validity, higher right and constitutional rank of universal human rights? The alternative would be the hard-to-swallow opposing view of comprehending fundamental rights in nation-state law as higher-ranking constitutional law ‘in accordance with their nature’, but qualifying the same fundamental rights in the various agreements on transnational human rights as ordinary law, with no priority over other legal rules. It would be equally difficult to make the validity of fundamental rights in the various transnational regimes dependant on the contingencies of agreements under public international law.1 Their claim to universality also demands worldwide validity in legal terms. Finally (and particularly interesting in our case), it will be difficult to deny the effects of fundamental rights in non-state areas of the global against private transnational actors. The numerous scandals involving breaches of human rights by transnational corporations that have been brought before national or international courts, have frequently – despite considerable – uncertainty regarding the basis of their validity – seen the courts ruling in favour of protecting fundamental rights against private actors.2

The Normative Turn in Teubner’s Systems Theory of Law

Abstract: Niklas Luhmann once warned of the ‘high entry costs’ that systems theory imposes on the reader, and there can be little doubt that the somewhat cool reception of his work in the Dutch academy has to do with the highly abstract theoretical nature of the theory, its distinctive ‘language game’, and the relentless conceptual distinctions that it deploys. This is what scholars such as Van der Eyden, Wilthagen, Van Twist and Schaap, argue has contributed to the fact that social systems theory, especially in the Luhmannian version, has been less at the centre of the debate here than elsewhere, as for example in Germany and Italy.1 Notably the social systems theoretical approach found its way into Dutch legal academia mainly through the work of Gunther Teubner whose theory of reflexive law, in particular, has been received with interest and appreciation.2 In the tradition of social systems theory but pushing the normative argument a good deal further than more orthodox approaches were prepared to go, and often combining it with quite incongruous theoretical perspectives (Derrida most surprisingly) Teubner, it may be argued, has introduced something of a paradigm shift in social systems theory. This ‘normative turn’ may also account for the renewed and deepened attention to Teubner’s recent work in Dutch legal theory.3

De onschuld voorbij: Jeff McMahans Killing in War

Abstract: Bespreking van: J. McMahan,Killing in War Oxford:Oxford University Press ,2011 9780199603572

Law in the twilight of environmental Armageddon: A response to Han Somsen

Abstract: Han Somsen has written the kind of text that gives food for thought. It is rich in new and daring ideas. Since I am by no means an expert in environmental law, nor in applied ethics, in my response I would like to focus on some legal philosophical issues that are provoked by his paper. I will first address the problem of the relationship between effectiveness and legitimacy. Then, I will briefly look into the issue of regulation by code. Finally, I will make some remarks on geo-engineering and its underlying rationality.

Human Rights, and the Destructive Communications and Actions of Differentiated Society

Abstract: According to Gunther Teubner, the formulation and implementation of human rights in law is a way of realising, through law, law-transcending demands of justice by human beings in danger of being harmed by communications in modern society.1 Modern society, which tends to destroy the integrity of the body and mind of human beings, and thereby at the same time threatens important presuppositions of its own self-reproduction, is described as a set of autonomous communication systems.

Over de klassieke oorsprong van de rechten van de mens

Abstract: In het algemeen wordt aangenomen dat de joods-christelijke traditie een belangrijke bijdrage leverde aan het ontstaan van de notie van mensenrechten.1 Controversieler is de bijdrage die antieke politieke denkers leverden aan de ontwikkeling van die notie. Het lijdt geen twijfel dat in de klassieke oudheid de term ‘recht’ in objectieve zin werd gebruikt, dat is recht als verwijzend naar een juiste of rechtvaardige toestand. Het is veel minder duidelijk of ‘recht’ ook in subjectieve zin werd gebruikt, als een recht dat aan een persoon toekomt, of – zoals hier centraal staat – als een mensenrecht, dat wil zeggen als een recht dat aan een mens als mens toekomt. Door deze kwestie opnieuw aan de orde te stellen hoop ik een bijdrage te kunnen leveren aan een beter begrip van de oorsprong van de notie van mensenrechten, die vandaag de dag zozeer onderdeel is geworden van het juridische discours.2 Meer in het bijzonder zal ik hier verdedigen dat de notie van mensenrechten ook in de traditie van het antieke politieke denken kan worden gereconstrueerd, en dan in het bijzonder bij die auteurs die gebruik maken van elementen uit de Stoicijnse rechtstheorie, waarin de bijzondere plaats van mensen als redelijke wezens wordt geproblematiseerd.

The Destruction and Reconstruction of the Tower of Babel. A Comment to Gunther Teubner's Plea for a 'Common Law Constitution'

Abstract: After the flood, as is said in the Bible, the descendents of Noah were forced to disperse over the face of the earth. ‘And the whole earth was of one language, and of one speech.’ Instead of each going his own way, people stuck together and founded a city in which they started building a tower ‘whose top may reach unto heaven.’ However, the Lord was not pleased with their efforts to ‘make a name’ for themselves. He seemed to fear the power of one people united by one language: ‘Behold, the people is one, and they have all one language; and this they begin to do: and now nothing will be restrained from them, which they have imagined to do.’ Therefore, he decided to ‘confound their language,’ so ‘that they may not understand one another’s speech.’ The people stopped building the tower, left the city and spread all over the earth. The city was named, as is commonly known, ‘Babel’ (which originally meant freedom, but after its breakdown it signified confusion). It became a symbol of human arrogance or hybris, although opinions differ on the exact nature of the sins committed by man.

Techno-regulation and law: rule, exception or state of exception?

Abstract: The exchange of ideas between Somsen and Corrias about the role (and rule) of law in the wake of an impending ecological catastrophe1 resembles the interplay between the good and the bad cop: The good guy does (and says) ‘the right thing,’ that is why he or she is usually seen as being trustworthy. Yet, the mean guy does the bulk of the work, provocative, often aggressive in style and tone, but more often than not successful in making the suspect more willing to cooperate (at least with the good cop). Now, the casting in the case is clear: Corrias seems to do ‘the right thing’ by (legitimately) claiming that legitimacy of law is too important to be sacrificed for the sake of an efficient environmental regulation.2 However, I guess that after these initial words my ‘sympathy for the devil,’ the role model for all bad cops (at least in a Faustian interpretation), comes less as a surprise. In selling his point Somsen has come up with a decent and sincere, as well as thoughtprovoking argument, which deserved the well-argued response Corrias has written. But, in reaction to Corrias, I would say: ‘I am not convinced,’ as Joschka Fischer noted, when responding to American claims about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. At any rate, I am not fully convinced of Corrias’ critique, and for this reason I would like to contribute some points to this discussion.