Showing papers in "North Korean Review in 2015"

Sweden's Engagement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Abstract: (ProQuest: ... denotes non-US-ASCII text omitted.)IntroductionAs a foreign policy, it has become more common to engage in the affairs of other states-especially those exhibiting multiple conditions of fragility-via channels such as political dialogue, peace-building missions, and development aid. This article focus on what keeps an external state engaged in the affairs of another state despite its multiple conditions of fragility. It aims to understand how the concept of engagement is perceived and operationalized in the engaging state from studying the case of Sweden's engagement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).In the first section, this article's theoretical approach-the constructivist approach-is discussed. Section two explores academic literatures on engagement and on state fragility. After briefly introducing the case to be studied, section three provides a historical overview of the Sweden-DPRK relations pre-millennium as contextual background. Analysis of Swedish engagement efforts in view of the DPRK's three gaps are discussed in the section four. Section five concludes by discussing the prospect of Swedish engagement and reflections from this research.Constructivist International Relations ApproachConstructivism has gained theoretical prominence as a complementary critique to the realist logic in explaining a state's approach to international relations (IR). Realists see the state's interest as defined in terms of power. They highlight security and survival as every state's principal concerns, and focus on discovering objective laws to explain state behavior in international politics. Realists believe the anarchic structure of the international system constrains states to either compete for dominance or to balance power or threat.1 Together with liberals, they argue that the basis for such competitive nature of states is the logic of rational choice.2Constructivists provide complementary insights. Their ontological standpoint views that the social world is constructed via "intersubjectively and collectively meaningful structures and processes"; even the realist premise of an anarchic world is viewed as a constructed condition.3 Contrary to the neorealist argument that structures constrain actors and not vice versa, constructivists believe such influence works both ways.4 Actors collectively assign meanings to the structures they belong to, and these meanings constitute and constrain the structures. Based on this reasoning, constructivists claim the international system is shaped by reasons other than the struggle for power. They view ideas, norms, and shared understandings as important drivers of state actions in IR that traditional realists have overlooked. Constructivists have also revisited key realist IR concepts such as anarchy and self-help.5Conceptualizing EngagementThe constructivist IR approach is useful when accounting for complex political changes often overshadowed by broadly defined catch-all terms such as "engagement." The term engagement has frequently appeared in foreign policy and international relations discussions but often without clever conceptualization.6 Some scholars broadly define it as a foreign policy strategy to affect a change in the target state's behaviors (i.e., Johnston and Ross 1999; Haass and O'Sullivan 2000; Kahler and Kastner 2006).7 It is also viewed as a post-Cold War project to integrate an isolated country peacefully into the international order and the global economy (i.e., Shambaugh 1996; Gill 1999).8 Some scholars frame the engagement as a counterconcept to containment or as an effort to shift away from foreign policies that aimed to contain a target state (Lord and Lynch 2010).9 A skeptical version assumes that a target state will not fundamentally change so engagement should aim to offer carrots for compliance while simultaneously pursuing an engaging state's own military build- up.10Lately, the term engagement has been adopted beyond its bilateral foreign policy context. …

Unity, division and ideational "security" on the Korean peninsula. Challenges to overcoming the Korean conflict.

Abstract: Purpose—Inter-Korean relations have long been the subject of IR analysis focused on a traditional conception of security. This article diverges from the traditional approach and applies an identity lens to South Korean unification policy, interpreting security from an ideational perspective in drawing the landscape of South Korean national identity formation in relation to North Korea. Design/methodology—Post-structural analysis of the domestic discourses on unification policy in South Korea, from texts including promotional materials, policy documents, media articles and interviews spanning both progressive and conservative government rule. Findings—The analysis finds two broad categories of identification with North Korea in the South Korean national narrative—negative and positive—with negative identification having increased over time, with clear implications for unification policy formation and change. Practical implications—For the many domestic and international organizations concerned with research and promotion of inter–Korean reconciliation, understanding the national identity dynamics at work and their connection to the policy process is crucial to ensuring informed, useful contribution to the process. Originality/value—Holds important explanatory value in understanding South Korean collective perceptions of the North as manifest in policy and the implications for inter–Korean reconciliation.

Toward a Normal State- To-State Relationship? China and the DPRK in Changing Northeast Asia

Abstract: IntroductionThe most conspicuous phenomenon that characterizes Northeast Asia today is perhaps the entanglement of geo- politics and geo- economics, or, put another way, the interactions between security and economics. On the one hand, the region can by no means resist the dynamic forces of the twin trends of globalization and regionalization, and detach itself from the rest of the world. On the other hand, the relics of the Cold War remain and linger on menacingly in this part of the world. The Korean peninsula continues to be a heavily armed area and there is a worrying trend for further development of nuclear weapon programs.1 The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) carried out a third test in February 2013, which followed its provocative rocket launch in December, ignoring all the wishes and warnings from the international community. The "9/19" joint statement that the Six- Party Talks achieved, in which the parties agreed to take substantive steps for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and other related objectives, remains a good deal, yet the talks have been stalled since the end of 2008. Pyongyang's political relations with Washington and Tokyo are still in limbo and have yet to be normalized. Without doubt, the future of North Korea matters considerably for the region. The current top leader, Kim Jong Un, who inherited political power from his father, has consolidated his power base since December 2011 when he took over. Presumably, he controls the party, the army and the government.2 The nature of the regime is such that the fate of the whole country is largely dependent on its top leader's choice. This is potentially risky.As its key neighbor and nominal ally, China always hopes for the best while preparing for the worst. It has encouraged the DPRK to take a new path of reform and opening- up and to achieve change in a gradual and peaceful way.3In essence, what is expected is a kind of "softlanding" of the DPRK and that would be consistent with Beijing's goal of building a stable and peaceful immediate external environment.4 For China, the peninsula has to be a peaceful and friendly place, divided or reunified. This is all the more so as China strives for a real resurgence of its northeastern provinces. With a turbulent and chaotic North Korea, it would not be possible for the "reviving the northeast" (zhenxingdongbei) drive, a major initiative of the Chinese leadership, to be implemented smoothly.5However, the North's provocative missile test- firings and the third nuclear test in February 2013 greatly disappointed Beijing and highlighted the limits of China's influence on Pyongyang.6 The developments forced Beijing to rethink whether its DPRK policy has worked. The views are divided. There are people who still believe that North Korea is a buffer zone and Pyongyang can "stand sentry" facing the United States and South Korea. This minority view criticized the Chinese government's approval of the UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2094 which "condemns in the strongest terms the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on 12 February 2013,"7 believing it indicated that China's policy was losing balance. A stronger view in this line argues China is essentially abandoning and sacrificing the DPRK for its relations with the U.S., which should have never happened. Yet a different school of thought contends that China must maintain its resolute position of opposing North Korea's provocative and destabilizing acts such as the missile firing and nuclear test, as well as of supporting UNSC resolutions, albeit after some amendments. Obviously, North Korea's acts were a loss of face for China, particularly when the latter was trying so hard to persuade Pyongyang not to do so, for the resumption of six- nation talks, and for a peaceful solution by diplomatic means. It should have come as no surprise that China was very unhappy since North Korean defiance ran counter to China's already strenuous and difficult diplomatic efforts. …

Inevitable Reform? the Politico-Economic Choices Facing North Korea under Kim Jong-Un's Rule

Abstract: (ProQuest: ... denotes non-US-ASCII text omitted.)IntroductionNorth Korea, one of the last surviving communist states in the world, has been plagued by economic difficulties since its creation. According to the Ministry of Unification of the Republic of Korea, the official economy of North Korea is effectively paralyzed, while the unofficial economy is rapidly expanding.1 Moreover, in spite of Kim Jong-Un's (scripted) rise to power in 2012, North Korea's economy has yet to show any significant sign of recovery, even though it has been a key project of his administration. According to the Bank of Korea,2 the annual economic growth rate for the country remained, on average, a mere 1.18 percent between 2001 and 2011, with a recorded growth of 1.3 percent in 2012. Furthermore, there has been little sign of positive change or growth in the industrial sector.Using this issue as a springboard, this paper explores the idea that Kim JongUn's regime will, in all likelihood, be forced to carry out considerable economic reforms. However, the numerous failures of the North Korean regime limit the power and choices open to Kim Jong-Un, which are necessary for reform. Consequently, it is argued that both the potential scope and intensity of the reforms will be limited, ultimately falling short of what the international community expects. In analyzing these dynamics, the paper will investigate both the critical weaknesses of Kim Jong-Un's regime-from a historical and institutional perspective-and the fatal failures of the contemporary North Korean state that have cumulatively served to make these reforms necessary. Indeed, this paper outlines a theoretical basis for economic reform in the country that reflects its deeply entrenched socialist perspective, and which can be practically implemented. However, both the domestic politicoeconomic climate and the seeming immovability of the state's ideological character work to exclude the possibility of full-scale reform.Janos Kornai argues that in a socialist system reform is "any change that permanently and essentially alters at least one basic attribute of the party and its dominant influence over party ideology, position or ownership ... without completely changing the system."3 With Kornai's definition in mind, and by further drawing on the classification of economic systems developed by Gregory and Stuart,4 this paper employs a specific and original definition of economic reform-economic reform is constituted by policies that are specifically directed towards improvements in economic efficiency and productivity by making focused changes to any decisionmaking structure, resource distribution and coordination mechanism, or ownership and incentive system.Even in articulating what economic reform is, the question of why a dictatorship, such as the regime in North Korea, should undertake such changes remains unanswered. Indeed, it seems apparent that a close calculation of gains and losses, rather than politico-economic reform in itself, is a key driver for change. North Korea has, since its formation, both developed and rigorously implemented an idiosyncratic version of Marxist theory, creating numerous politico-economic principles and policy measures that together form the Juche ideology. These principles and policies are themselves supported by a multitude of instructions and prescriptions that serve to idolize the "Supreme Leader," Kim Il-Sung, and the "Dear Leader," Kim Jong-Il. Together, their thoughts, instructions, and guidelines have been issued as Kyo-Shi (...), or what might be thought of as royal declarations. The authority of the numerous Kyo-Shi is justified and strengthened by their inclusion in the doctrine of Suryong (... or ...). This precept (which is hereditary and was last conferred on Kim Il-Sung) bestows on the leader infallibility, thus legitimizing their rule as ordained while simultaneously preventing the possibility that they can commit errors. …

How Beneficial Would the Construction of a Rason-Hunchun Sub-Regional Economic Cooperation Zone in the Northeast Asian Borderlands Be?

Abstract: IntroductionSince the mid-1980s, the internationalization and regionalization of the world economy have become crucial factors for world economic development. Various multilateral economic cooperation efforts such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Union (EU) have considerably influenced the promotion of the internationalization and regionalization of North America and Europe.In Northeast Asia (e.g., China, Japan, Mongolia, North Korea, and South Korea), however, there has existed just one bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA), that between South Korea and China.1 The important constraints on institutional economic integration and agreements in Northeast Asia are not economic factors but non-economic factors such as competing political ideologies, remnants of historic animosities, different political systems and perception of national interests among the economies involved. Given this, the economic integration of subregions, as opposed to nations, may be the way to attain cooperative economic growth in Northeast Asia. The economic integration of subregions based on reciprocal benefits of the local economy and local advantages is a form of economic integration at the regional level, but not at country level.2 Such integration pursues economic development and integration for cooperative benefits and goals by exploiting the areas that join the physical boundaries of participating countries, such as rivers or estuary areas.The Greater Tumen Initiative is such a great example of subregional economic integration in Northeast Asia. This initiative, originally known as the Tumen River Area Development Programme (TRADP), launched by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1991, is a regional cooperation mechanism established in 1995 by five countries: China, North Korea, Mongolia, South Korea and Russia. The TRADP promised to be a good starting point for the establishment and development of Subregional Economic Cooperation (SEC) in Northeast Asia. However, this project is currently suspended. Political discordance, poor infrastructure, and insufficient funds in the area have seriously delayed development. Before the TRADP, advocates for "regional economic circles" in Northeast Asia promoted the Sea of Japan Economic Circle and the Yellow Sea Economic Circle.3 Although these two circles and the TRADP are seen as overlapping, only the latter has emerged as an actual project.4 Two other projects have also been initiated: the "Greater Vladivostok Project" by the Russian Far East and the "Rajin-Sonbong Project" by North Korea.5 However, both projects have received much less attention than the TRADP.6 In response to these results, to support subregional cooperation in Northeast Asia, and to promote other types of cooperation initiatives from a comprehensive perspective, a new subregional cooperation alternative may be set.This article investigates an SEC alternative in Northeast Asia-the RasonHunchun SEC Zone (SECZ) of the Tumen river region. The alternative is very significant for three reasons: it represents current patterns of regional economic cooperation, it has a potentially strong impact on regional security and it may play a role in building a new regional political order in Northeast Asia. In order to comprehend this significant alternative, the reasons for motivating and encouraging subregional cooperation must be analyzed. The analysis that follows discusses the basic conditions for SEC initiatives in order to realize synergetic development objectives, and how this fits within the developmental approach of the Rason-Hunchun SECZ in Northeast Asia.Conceptualizing an SECZAn SECZ is an economic area that serves as a means of economic integration. Such zones are sometimes referred to as subregional economic circles, growth triangles, natural economic territories, or extended metropolitan regions.7 Unlike a FTA, an SECZ includes only parts of the participating countries. …

Overcoming U.S.-DRPK Hostility: The Missing Link between a Northeast Asian Comprehensive Security Settlement and Ending the Korean War 1

Abstract: Introduction"Koreans have a saying: 'Sword to sword: Rice cake to rice cake." It is time to throw away the sword and hold up the rice cake."Thus explained Kim Yong Sun what the DPRK sought from the United States in Pyongyang in 1993.2 At the time, he was head of the International Affairs Department of the Korean Workers' Party, and a key player in North Korean nuclear strategy. Kim continued:The history of nations, as I have told you before, is one of making friends which later become hostile. Now is the time for the U.S. to make a change in our direction. Regardless of the political system and ideas in the U.S., the latter doesn't matter in relations between countries. Perhaps I am too optimistic, that if we deal with these issues in a positive way, that one day our relations with the U.S. will be even better than it has with Britain or France. But it is very important that the U.S. should start to trust us. If they can trust Britain and France, why not North Korea. Perhaps the first and foremost way to establish trust and to ease distrust would be a dialogue.Kim was the first North Korean official to meet a senior American official (then Under Secretary of State Arnold Kanter) since the Korean War, in 1992 in New York. Kanter was very skeptical of Kim's overture to establish better relations between the DPRK and characterized his attempts to align with the United States and even agree to U.S. forces remaining in the DPRK as a buttress against Japanese militarism as "less here than meets the eye."3However, this wasn't a line that was idiosyncratic to Kim Yong Sun. As Bob Carlin, present at many high- level U.S.-DPRK meetings from 1993 onwards, and John Lewis, one of few Americans with good working relations with the DPRK, explained in 2007, the DPRK's "desire for a long- term, strategic relationship with the United States has nothing to do with ideology or political philosophy." Rather, they assert, "It is a cold, hard calculation based on history and the realities of geopolitics as perceived in Pyongyang. The North Koreans believe in their gut that they must buffer the heavy influence their neighbors already have, or could soon gain, over their small, weak country.4In Kim's realist worldview, the hostility or otherwise of states is epiphenomenal. What counts, as Stalin famously said of the Pope, is how many divisions one has. Or, as one North Korean analyst wrote, "History shows that the interests of small countries are infringed upon and that they fall victim whenever world powers struggle to extend their spheres of influence."5It is not surprising given the DPRK's structural location and post-Cold War circumstances that it would seek to change U.S. policy. Assuredly aligning the DPRK with a distant great power such as the United States would be preferable to dependency on one next door, especially a great power that exercised suzerainty over Korea in the past (China) or worse still, occupied Korea as an imperial, colonizing power (Japan).The painful history of U.S.-DPRK relations 1991 will not be covered here. Suffice it to say, both parties sought not so much to deter each other from renewal of war in Korea, for which purpose conventional military forces on both sides of the were sufficient. Rather, each sought to compel change in the other's strategies and policies in fundamental ways.6 Unsurprisingly, both failed. Threat- based extortion almost always leads to bad outcomes. When two sides use threat to coerce each other into com pliance, failure is almost guaranteed. This research essay focuses instead on what over coming U.S. hostility might mean to the DPRK in a cooperative security framework, specifically, by reading carefully what the DPRK has said at various conjunctures.What Does Ending U.S. Hostility Mean to the DPRK?The meaning of this simple phrase is unclear-not least because it has primarily had a context- dependent tactical meaning. Nonetheless, it has figured prominently in various milestone agreements. …

The Survival of North Korea: A Case for Rethinking the U.S.-North Korea Nuclear Standoff 1

Abstract: IntroductionNorth Korea is often the subject of predictions based exclusively on its economic conditions and food problems. After the country lost its traditional trading partners with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries in 1989 to 1991, the debt-ridden Pyongyang regime confronted an economic crisis, food shortages, and a great famine in the late 1990s. Consequently, the leadership began appealing for and accepting humanitarian assistance from the United Nations and other donor countries, establishing a number of capitalist Special Economic Zones to attract foreign investment, allegedly selling narcotics for substantial amounts of cash, extracting economic aid through brinkmanship diplomacy and missile tests, adopting limited market-oriented reforms, and revising its constitution. North Korea, in short, has made numerous small attempts to jumpstart its ailing economy, but these measures have been generally inadequate.As a result, two-decade-old speculation that North Korea will imminently collapse, like East Germany, is frequently repeated among academics, intelligence analysts, politicians, relief workers, and think-tank specialists.2 Significantly, persistence of this belief, especially in the United States and among its allies, is the main reason why these countries have not developed a coherent long-term policy toward North Korea, relying instead on short-term fixes in anticipation of the apocalyptic collapse. As is known, the North Korean economy is 83 percent import-dependent on China, and any economics-oriented predictions must take that reality into account. Certainly, economic conditions are the most decisive factor in the final analysis, but they are not the only factor in determining the present and future course of development of North Korea.Crucially, in combination with economics are the cultural-historical and political- ideological factors of Neo- Confucianism, juche (subjecthood),3 and songun (military-firstism), which have contributed to the survival of the impoverished North Korean state in the post-Soviet era. Despite protracted economic difficulties, the three factors have allowed the state-regime to command public opinion and some degree of popular support in the "eroding totalitarian system."4 As such, it is unlikely that North Korea will collapse in the near future. Since the country can be expected to experience relative longevity, that justifies a strong case for rethinking the U.S.- North Korea nuclear standoff in the interests of multilateral regional peace and stability. Fundamentally, mutual confidence-building initiatives are needed to resolve longstanding security, energy, and economic issues between North Korea, the major powers, and other regional actors.Neo-ConfucianismSince the beginning of Imperial Japanese colonial rule over Korea in 1910, the joint U.S.-Soviet liberation and division of the peninsula in 1945, the Korean War of 1950 to 1953, and the post-Korean War period, the heritage of Neo-Confucianism- the guiding ethical and political philosophy of the Choson dynasty (1392-1910)- has had a continued presence in Korea, influencing education, ceremony, and civil administration. Despite sixty years of nationally adapted Marxism-Leninism (Stalinism), North Korea appropriates the Neo-Confucian traditions of political centralization and obedience to authority.5 Neo-Confucianism, like its predecessor Confucianism, teaches that every person has a definite place in the social order and that the preservation of harmony in society is paramount.Specifically, Confucianism promotes a value system based on harmony in human relations structured around the "three bonds and five relations," namely, ruler-minister, parent-child, and husband-wife. The five relations are ruler-subject, father- son, husband- wife, elder- younger brothers, and friend- friend. These relations are based on ideals of righteousness, affection, respect, faithfulness, and the separation of social functions. …

North Korea Confidential: Private Markets, Fashion Trends, Prison Camps, Issenters and Defectors

Abstract: North Korea Confidential: Private Markets, Fashion Trends, Prison Camps, issenters and Defectors Daniel Tudor and James Pearson. Tokyo: Tuttle Publishing, 2015. 224pp. Hardcover, $16.85, ISBN: 978-0-8048-4458-1The secrecy that shrouds North Korea brings with it intrigue, suspicion, and morbid fascination. From anecdotal accounts to defector autobiographies to scholarly tomes, the subject has been broached from a plethora of perspectives for popular consumption. Secretive a country as it is, the difficulty to extract accurate information and anecdotes has made it a challenging topic to address and discuss in depth. One of the most recent, and arguably reliable attempts, to report the reality of the regime comes in the seven informative yet entertaining chapters and cautiously optimistic epilogue assembled by Daniel Tudor and James Pearson in North Korea Confidential.Tudor has published before, Korea: The Impossible Country, in which he unpacks the phenomenon that was South Korea's meteoric rise out of the ashes of the Korean War. Indeed both countries have been labeled "impossible," as seen in Victor Cha's The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future, which paints a grim and bloody future for the dysfunctional government and the country it supposedly runs.North Korea Confidential begs to differ.The start of definitive social change in North Korea was the devastating famine in the 1990s, when the failure of the state to provide for its people leftdeep scars of distrust. The result: a turn to alternative solutions for survival, the unofficial marketplace. The position Tudor and Pearson take is that the famine was the "tragic necessity" that "sowed seeds of marketization in North Korea"(p. 19). By focusing less on foreign policy than on its people, in particular the personal lives and livelihoods of the almost 25 million who work and, yes, play within its borders, the reader's possible preconceptions of the northerners as "racist dwarfs" (Christopher Hitchens) in a "zombie nation" (John Sweeney) will be indubitably questioned, if not squashed completely.Because official income is pitiful-1,000-6,000 North Korean won a month (U.S.$100- 600) for instance, for its civil servants-the "economic double life" is an attractive one to live, in which, by day, a miner or schoolteacher does "cash-in hands jobs or market activity in their spare time"(p. 24). What makes North Korea Confidential differ from the impregnable tomes are the breaks it takes from being not only informative, but also entertaining; in this particular anecdote, the fact that it is so "dangerous not to be a trader" that "some North Koreans (have been) observed pretending to be engaged in capitalism in order to avoid suspicion" (p. 29) is such an amusingly evocative image that one can be tempted to shake one's head in disbelief.The reader is reminded throughout North Korea Confidential of the journalistic challenge Tudor and Pearson face in reporting on a country whose press freedom betters only Eritrea's according to Reporters Without Borders' Press Freedom Index this year. But the authors, no doubt wary of their journalistic reputation and integrity, are transparent about their limitations, and write with refreshing modesty and common sense. True, they base much upon observations of daily life that can only give an impression, but they are mindful of verifying accounts of defectors and other various sources.The remarkable and perhaps refreshing angles in the observations they make are the similarities between the North and the South. …

The U.S.-North Korea Geneva Agreed Framework: Strategic Choices and Credible Commitments

Abstract: IntroductionMore than 20 years have passed since the signing of the Geneva Agreed Framework between the U.S. and the DPRK. Since the October 1994 agreement, the U.S.- DPRK relationship has at times seemed to improve and at other times rapidly deteriorated. The international community is no closer today to resolving the nuclear issue than it was during the early 1990s, and many observers believe North Korea will never completely abandon its nuclear ambitions.1Yet two decades ago, in the face of overwhelming odds, an incongruous marriage was formed between the U.S. and the DPRK. The Agreed Framework itself is remarkable, given the long-standing mutual enmity and distrust between the U.S. and the DPRK. The Korean nuclear crisis situation in the early 1990s could have developed into a military conflict on the Korean peninsula.2 However, the Agreed Framework provided a diplomatic solution, which temporarily diffused the tension between the U.S. and the DPRK and averted further escalation of the North Korean nuclear crisis. The U.S. elected to implement positive economic sanctions-a package of goods- in exchange for a promise by the DPRK to end its nuclear program. This controversial U.S. decision contradicted the prevailing U.S. foreign policy preference, which favored negative economic sanctions and/or military action when dealing with the nuclear weapons ambitions of rogue nations.Since the Agreed Framework, many scholars have tried to explain the North Korean nuclear issue.3 While many articles describe the agreement's technical aspects and procedures, most of them have not provided a theoretical basis that explains why and how the agreement was reached.4 While a few studies even define North Korea as an irrational state and its nuclear program as terror and coercive diplomacies, North Korea's pursuit of its nuclear program was a rational choice given its domestic and international conditions.5 To understand why and how the U.S. and the DPRK first reached the agreement and then failed to maintain it, research should focus on the DPRK's rational decisions given its domestic and environmental conditions.This paper attempts to provide a theoretical basis for not only the initial success, but also the ultimate failure of the Agreed Framework. The U.S. and the DPRK were bargaining during a conflict situation in the early 1990s. In a bilateral bargaining situation, the ability of one participant to achieve its goals depends, in large part, on the decisions of the other participant.6 Negotiators also had limited choices given their expectations of the other's reaction. While the U.S. could enforce economic sanctions or militarily attack North Korea, these choices could be less beneficial given the United States' expectation of North Korea's reaction. While the DPRK could ignore U.S. demands and continue its nuclear development, the choice could be less favorable given the DPRK's expectation of the United States' reaction. While the Agreed Framework was less than perfect, the agreement was beneficial to both nations as long as neither defected from the agreement.Given the long adversarial relationship between the U.S. and DPRK, it was uncertain whether both countries would continuously and credibly commit to the agreement. To make the commitment "credible," in terms of transaction cost economics, both nations imposed direct and indirect "self-enforcing" restrictions to the agreement-a set of rules and conditions-that could devise "mutual reliance relations" and thus protect the agreement from potential expropriation by the other party.7 By making these credible commitments, the U.S. and the DPRK reached the mutually beneficial Geneva Agreed Framework in 1994.Still, the Agreed Framework failed to achieve its ultimate goal of mutual dependence because of major delays in implementation and lack of negative enforcement mechanisms (against defection from the agreement). Despite its ultimate failure, the Geneva Agreed Framework was the first agreement between the U. …

Sanctions Easing as a Sign of Non- Hostility

Abstract: IntroductionThe DPRK has long sought an easing of U.S. and "U.S.-led" sanctions as a sign that Washington is moving away from what Pyongyang calls the U.S. "hostile policy." Similarly, the DPRK has never sought food or other humanitarian assistance simply for its own sake, but as a sign of non- hostility. As Pyongyang has said many times, its deterrent is not "for sale"-its relationship with Washington is the issue. Relaxation of sanctions would symbolize an easing of enmity, although it would not fully satisfy DPRK demands for fundamental change in its relationship with the United States.Nor would sanctions relief necessarily spur economic growth. First, despite stepped- up sanctions, the DPRK's trade, investment, and GDP have been growing modestly over the past decade. Second, more substantial increases in the DPRK's trade and GDP would require a large infusion of foreign investment to promote production, which depends on outsiders' perceptions of the economic climate in the DPRK, not just a relaxation of sanctions.Some sanctions are easier to relax than others. While all sanctions would be lifted as part of a comprehensive settlement, financial sanctions are likely to be difficult to undo piecemeal.A History of Sanctions Imposed and EasedU.S. sanctions date back to the Korean War when it imposed wide- ranging sanctions on the DPRK under the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA), as well as the Export Administration Act and the Defense Production Act. TWEA sanctions, with some modifications, were later incorporated into National Emergencies Act of 1976 and the International Emergencies Powers Act of 1977, which had to be renewed annually by the president. Congress has enacted additional sanctions on the DPRK and DPRK entities on various grounds-that the DPRK was not only a danger to national security, but also was a Marxist- Leninist state involved in proliferation of weapons technology, was a non- nuclear state that had tested nuclear weapons, was a state sponsor of terrorism, and was engaged in illicit activities. Presidents have used their executive authority to impose still more sanctions.The DPRK has called for an end to U.S. sanctions for many years. It also demanded an easing of sanctions in negotiations. In the Agreed Framework of October 1994, the United States pledged to "move toward full normalization of political and economic relations," specifically to "reduce barriers to trade and investment, including restrictions on telecom services and financial transactions." President Clinton did ease sanctions to permit some financial transactions and telecommunications exports, the importation of magnesite, and participation of U.S. firms in the light- water reactor project. Yet most sanctions remained in place.In 2000, in belated response to a 1999 DPRK moratorium on missile tests, President Clinton further relaxed sanctions under the Trading with the Enemy Act, the Export Administration Act and the Defense Production Act. Some items that had previously required a license then became eligible for export; others that automatically were denied licenses became subject to review on a case- by-case basis.1In 2000 Kim Jong- il himself told a group of South Korean journalists accompanying Kim Dae- jung to Pyongyang for the first ever North- South summit meeting, "We can't put up with the draconian economic sanctions the United States has imposed on us. Our economy is in a state of collapse and many of our people are dying of starvation, you know?"2During talks with Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly in October 2002, Kang Sok- ju listed the lifting of sanctions as a quid pro quo for denuclearization.3 A Foreign Ministry statement later that month disclosed this:[T]he DPRK made itself very clear to the special envoy of the U.S. President that the DPRK was entitled to possess not only nuclear weapon but any type of weapon more powerful than that so as to defend its sovereignty and right to existence from the ever- growing nuclear threat by the U. …

The Kim Dynasty and North-East Asian security: breaking the cycle of crises.

Abstract: Purpose—This article considers North Korea and the notion of crisis, by linking historical development over the Korean peninsula to the conflict resolution literature, and investigates why despite a large number of destabilizing events, a war involving Pyongyang has yet to erupt. Design/methodology—This article uses historical data and a framework developed by Aggarwal et al., in order to highlight patterns of interaction between states such as the United States, North Korea and South Korea, organizations such as the United Nations, as well as processes such as the Six- Party Talks and the Agreed Framework. The article then develops a crisis framework based on conflict resolution and negotiation literature, and applies it to three North Korean administrations. Findings—Findings suggest that an open- ended understanding of time (for all parties involved on the peninsula) leads to an impossibility to reach a threshold where full- scale war would be triggered, thus leaving parties in a stable state of crisis for which escalating moves and de- escalating techniques might become irrelevant. Practical implications—It is hoped that this article will help further endeavors linking conflict resolution theoretical frameworks to the Korean peninsula security situation. In the case of the Korean peninsula, time has been understood as open-ended, leading parties to a lingering state of heightened hostilities that oscillates toward war, but that is controlled enough not to reach it. In-depth analysis of particular security sectors such as nuclear energy, food security, or missile testing would prove particularly useful in understanding the complexity of the Korean peninsula situation to a greater extent. It is hoped that this paper will help further endeavours linking conflict resolution theoretical frameworks to the Korean peninsula security situation. Originality/value—This research suggests that regarding the Korean peninsula, time has been understood as open- ended, leading parties to a lingering state of heightened.