Showing papers in "Notre Dame Law Review in 1979"

Corporate Homicide: A New Assault on Corporate Decision-making

Abstract: Assessment must be made in light of particular crimes. Thus, corporate criminal liability for homicide should be assessed in terms of its effectiveness to deter corporate conduct likely to endanger human life. Moreover, the impact of liability must be analyzed in terms of the particular sphere of the corporate milieu producing the illegal act. In conducting this analysis in the context of the Pinto case, it should be noted that State v. Ford Motor Co. presents issues which transcend those of existing precedents. Prior indictments of corporations for homicide resulted from acts of corporate agents performed within the scope of employment. The engineer recklessly operating the train or a repairman recklessly installing a gas pipe, are examples of the norm. The prosecution of Ford, however, occurs in a completely different setting. Ford's alleged illegal conduct is comprised of three acts: (1) defectively designing the vehicle, (2) defectively manufacturing the vehicle, and (3) allowing the vehicle to remain on the public highways.9' Each of these acts is the product of a complex business decision. Both the design and manufacture of automobiles are subject to extensive federal regulation. 2 Rigorous testing precedes marketing. Defects discovered after sale to the public may involve recalls, either voluntary or compulsory.9" Therefore, the Pinto which exploded on August 10, 1978, was the product of many substantial business decisions occurring at various levels of the corporate hierarchy. The deterrent effect of corporate liability for criminal homicide, therefore, must be assessed by the effect of conviction on this decision-making process. The maximum penalty which can be imposed on a corporation convicted under the Indiana reckless homicide statute is a $10,000 fine.94 The effectiveness 88 See generally Coleman, supra note 15, at 919. 89 Id. 90 Id. 91 State v. Ford Motor Co., No. 5324 (Indictment at 1). 92 See, e.g., National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13811431 (1976). 93 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1420 (1976). 94 IND. CODE § 35-50-2-6 (Supp. 1978). [June 1979]

Social and Economic Goals and Their Impact on the Defense Acquisition Process

Abstract: This article is a reprint from the Notre Dame Law Review, Issue December 1979, Vol. 55 No. 2, pp 254-263. In this article, written over 40 years ago but still relevant today, the author addresses problems created in attempting to utilize the Defense Acquisition Process to further nonprocurement social and economic goals.