Showing papers in "Noûs in 1989"

On the Plurality of Worlds

Abstract: David Lewis is one of the most influential philosophers of our age, and On the Plurality of Worlds is his magnum opus. OPW offers an extended development and defense of the hypothesis that there are many universes, things of the same kind as the universe in which we all live, move, and have our being. Lewis calls these universes ―worlds‖, deliberately recalling the notion of a ―possible world‖ familiar from modal logic and the metaphysics of modality. The title invokes the thesis of the book: there are pluralities of worlds, things of the same kind as the world we inhabit, differing only with respect to what goes on in them. Lewis sought in earlier work (Lewis, 1973, pp. 84–86) to offer a direct argument from common sense modal commitments to the existence of a plurality of worlds. OPW offers a less direct argument. Here, Lewis supports the hypothesis by arguing that, if we accept it, we have the material to offer a wide range of analyses of hitherto puzzling and problematic notions. We thereby effect a theoretical unification and simplification: with a small stock of primitives, we can analyze a number of important philosophical notions with a broad range of applications. But the analyses Lewis proposes are adequate only if we accept the thesis that there are a plurality of worlds. Lewis claims that this is a reason to accept the thesis. In his words, «the hypothesis is serviceable, and that is a reason to think that it is true» (p. 3).

Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory

Abstract: In recent years serious attempts have been made to systematize and develop the moral and political themes of great philosophers of the past. Kant, Locke, Marx, and the classical utilitarians all have their current defenders and arc taken seriously as expositors of sound moral and political views. It is the aim of this book to introduce Hobbes into this select group by presenting a plausible moral and political theory inspired by Leviathan. Using the techniques of analytic philosophy and elementary game theory, the author develops a Hobbesian argument that justifies the liberal State and reconciles the rights and interests of rational individuals with their obligations.Hobbes's case against anarchy, based on his notorious claim that life outside the political State would be a "war of all against all," is analyzed in detail, while his endorsement of the absolutist State is traced to certain false hypotheses about political sociology. With these eliminated, Hobbes's principles support a liberal redistributive (or "satisfactory") State and a limited right of revolution. Turning to normative issues, the book explains Hobbes's account of morality based on enlightened self-interest and shows how the Hobbesian version of social contract theory justifies the political obligations of citizens of satisfactory States.

Should the baby live? The problem of handicapped infants

Abstract: Few subjects have generated so many newspaper headlines and such heated controversy as the treatment, or non-treatment, of handicapped newborns. In 1982, the case of Baby Doe, a child born with Down's syndrome, stirred up a national debate in the United States, while in Britain a year earlier, Dr. Leonard Arthur stood trial for his decision to allow a baby with Down's syndrome to die. Government intervention and these recent legal battles accentuate the need for a reassessment of the complex issues involved. This volume--by two authorities on medical ethics--presents a philosophical analysis of the subject based on particular case studies. Addressing the doctrine of the absolute sanctity of life, Singer and Kuhse examine some actual cases where decisions have been reached; consider the criteria for making these decisions; investigate the differences between killing and letting die; compare Western attitudes and practices with those of other cultures; and conclude by proposing a decision-making framework that offers a rational alternative to the polemics and confusion generated by this highly controversial topic.

Metaphor and Religious Language.

Abstract: 'I have little but praise for this study. The crisp insights of the conclusion are symptomatic of its lucidity and sophistication.' British Journal of Aesthetics

Pain and pleasure: An evidential problem for theists

Abstract: I will argue in this paper that our knowledge about pain and pleasure creates an epistemic problem for theists. The problem is not that some proposition about pain and pleasure can be shown to be both true and logically inconsistent with theism. Rather, the problem is evidential. A statement reporting the observations and testimony upon which our knowledge about pain and pleasure is based bears a certain significant negative evidential relation to theism.' And because of this, we have a prima facie good epistemic reason to reject theism-that is, a reason that is sufficient for rejecting theism unless overridden by other reasons for not rejecting theism.

Semantics and Social Science.

Abstract: Originally published in 1980, this book examines the major issues in the philosophy of social science, paying specific attention to cross-cultural understanding, humanism versus scientism, individualism versus collectivism, and the shaping of theory by evaluative commitment. Arguing for a cross-cultural conception of human beings, the authors defend humanism and individualism, and reject the notion that social inquiry is necessarily vitiated by an adherence to values.

Cognitive theories of emotion

Abstract: L'A. oppose deux types de theories des emotions : 1) les theories cognitives pures qui analysent les emotions en termes d'etats intentionnels| 2) les theories cognitives hybrides qui prennent en compte les sensations. L'A. propose une nouvelle theorie cognitive qui permet de rendre compte de l'intensite des etats emotionnels

The problem of weakness of will

Abstract: Philosophical discussions of akrasia over the last fifteen years have focused on certain skeptical arguments which purport to question the possibility of a kind of akratic action which, following Pears, I call 'last ditch akrasia' (Pears [38]). An agent, succumbing to last ditch akrasia, freely, knowingly, and intentionally performs an action A against his better judgment that an incompatible action B is the better thing to do. (See Audi [1] for a detailed analysis.) Last ditch akrasia is not the only kind that has been discussed. Some philosophers (Mele [32], Scaltas [48]) have been concerned with a more extreme form of akratic action, viz. one in which the agent not only judges that action B is best, but in addition intends (chooses, decides) to B. Some have even questioned whether freely acting against one's better judgment is sufficient for akratic action (Schiffer [49]: 201-3).1 Weaker types of akratic action have been discussed, though to a much lesser extent, since they are thought less problematic. Pears distinguishes last ditch akrasia from what he calls, "motivated irrational action" ([38]: 160). In cases of the latter, the akrates' rebellious desire infects his prior reasoning and thinking in such a way that his contemplated action seems to him warranted, and he acts accordingly. (For a taxonomy of cases of akratic action, see Rorty ([44])). Nor has the discussion of akrasia been restricted to akratic action. Philosophers have discussed whether akrasia can be exhibited in the formation of intentions, wants (See Audi [1]: 181-185), and beliefs (Mele [32]: ch. 8; Heil [19]). The primary focus in this paper is on last ditch akratic action. Skeptical arguments about last ditch akrasia take several different forms. When a person akratically As, he acts on a desire to A which runs counter to his better judgment to B. One kind of skeptical argument, "The Enslavement Argument," argues that the agent's akratic desire to A is irresistible, and therefore that his

Extending: The structure of metaphor

Abstract: Extended metaphors are as common in everyday discourse as they are in literature. On a 1984 CBS late report on "Super Tuesday's" democratic primaries, Dan Rather did not just say that Gary Hart's campaign was "moving like a fast train," he added that Mondale's was still "chugging along" and that McGovern's was "a cut-loose caboose" .2 In this same report, Walter Mondale gloated about his wins in Georgia and Alabama, saying

A New Typology of Temporal and Atemporal Permanence

Abstract: La typologie standard de la permanence est imprecise et incomplete. L'A. propose une nouvelle typologie dont l'element unificateur est une definition generale de la permanence en termes de non-separabilite de l'existence de l'objet permanent a un moment donne " t " d'avec un nombre fini d'intervalles de temps de longueurs egales

A Note On An Impossibility Theorem of Gardenfors

Abstract: Suppose that it makes sense to talk about theory addition: If a proposition A is added to a theory T the result is again a theory, T + A. While some philosophers may query the usefulness of a notion as abstract as that, logicians have already begun to ask what logical properties it might have; see [Alchourron, Girdenfors and Makinson 1985] and the references mentioned there. One noteworthy result in this area is an impossibility theorem due to Girdenfors [1986]. Assuming his underlying logic to be at least as strong as classical propositional logic, Girdenfors in effect proves that the following three conditions cannot be satisfied by any concept of theory addition: the Postulate of Addition Monotonicity,

On Viewing Pain As A Secondary Quality

Abstract: Let us imagine the following: the surfaces of the things around us (stones, plants, etc.) have patches and regions which produce pain in our skin when we touch them. (Perhaps through the chemical composition of these surfaces. But we need not know that.) In this case we should speak of pain-patches on the leaf of a particular plant just as at present we speak of red patches. I am supposing that it is useful to us to notice these patches and their shapes; that we can infer important properties of the objects from them. (Ludwig Wittgenstein 1953, p. 312)

Imagining Oneself To Be Another

Abstract: The imaginative activity naturally described as imagining oneself to be another"2 suggests a difficult question. When one engages in this activity, what exactly does one imagine? I shall argue that the difficulties that lie in the way of an answer to this question require us to say that, in spite of appearances, in some cases of such imagining, one is not imagining anything about oneself. Instead one imagines someone else in a first personal way. My question about what one imagines should not be confused with the semantic question about what kinds of things can be values of the variable 'y' in 'x imagines y'. Possible answers to that question include propositions, property objects (Lewis, 1979), states of affairs, events, or perhaps, in some cases, the things named in the report, such as Napoleon. I want to know which propositions, which property-objects, or which states of affairs are imagined in a given episode of transference imagining. Whether the entities imagined are propositions, property objects, or states of affairs does not concern me. The question as to the exact content that is imagined in transference imagining has some broad philosophical interest, for philosophical thought experiments often invoke transference imagination. For example, when discussing personal identity, Sydney Shoemaker asks us to adopt the first person point of view on his brain transplant example. We are asked to imagine ourselves waking up as a person who has Robinson's body and Brown's brain. (Shoemaker 1963) In defending his version of utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill asks us, by implication, to imagine ourselves as satisfied pigs, and to compare that sort of life tp our present lives. (Mill 1861, 11-14.) These imaginative exercises are expected to produce

Temporal Becoming Minus The Moving-Now

Abstract: Being later than is an order relation which, ranging over moments and events, generates the common static time series. This much is, I think, generally accepted, the only open question being whether this series is all there is to time. J. M. E. McTaggart (cf. 1927, ch. 33) thought it was not. He believed that each moment is not just later than, or simultaneous with, or earlier than some other moments, but also absolutely and objectively past, present or future. Absolutely yet not permanently, for the future necessarily becomes first present and then past. It is this "movement", the dynamic aspect of time, the phenomenon of temporal becoming, which, if real, is not accounted for by the static time series. In order to correct this failure McTaggart introduced the (in)famous moving (upon the ordered points of the static series)-NOW and, with it, the need to explain, inter alia, the strange meaning of the movement of what is involved in the definition of 'movement'. And how, indeed, can the event of the NOW reaching t be a member of the same series t belongs to ? This has led C.D. Broad (cf. 1938, pp. 277-8; 1959) to consider the rather wild possibility of two-dimensional time. The idea was to have the NOW of common time move by occupying different common moments at different meta-moments. But, according to McTaggart, meta-time would not be full time unless it possessed a moving-(meta-) NOW of its own. Hence the charge of infinite vicious regress in time dimensions (see J.J. C. Smart 1963, p. 136).

Integrity and Agent Centered Restrictions

Abstract: Consequentialism is the view that an agent has the obligation to always act in such a way as to bring about-either directly or indirectly-the state of affairs judged from an impersonal point of view to be the best. A moral theory that employs an agent centered prerogative is one that under certain conditions allows but does not require an agent to perform an act that is not impersonally optimific. And a theory that employs agent centered restrictions is one according to which it is sometimes wrong for an agent to act in a way designed to bring about the state of affairs ranked highest on impersonal moral criteria. In what follows, I will argue that only the latter kind of theoryone that employs agent centered restrictions-can account for what Bernard Williams (1973) has called the "integrity" of persons. Limiting myself to act versions of consequentialism, I will try to show in the first section of the paper what the integrity issue is and why consequentialism has such a difficult time with it. In the second section, I will discuss prerogative attempts to solve for the integrity issue and argue that they fail. Finally, in the third section, I will formulate two agent centered restrictions and argue that they are necessary to preserve forms of personal integrity that must be recognized by any plausible moral theory, thus providing such restrictions with what has proven to be an elusive rationale.

Narrow Content Functionalism and the Mind-Body Problem

Abstract: In this essay, I examine narrow content functionalism. Narrow content functionalism is a view about the interrelations between opaque and narrow taxonomies of beliefs. To taxonomize a collection of belief tokens is to segregate those tokens by type. A narrow taxonomy segregates belief tokens by narrow causal types. Two tokens are narrow causal type-identical if and only if they bear type-identical causal and counterfactual relations to type-identical sensory inputs, further states, and behavioral outputs, where these further states, inputs and outputs are abstractly characterized, but without presupposing any individuals (or natural kinds) except the individual (and kinds generable from the existence of that individual) whose states, inputs, and outputs they are and without attributing to them any semantic properties.' On the other hand, an opaque taxonomy segregates belief tokens into de dicto semantic types. The notion of a de dicto semantic type is developed more fully below. Here I will just say that my distinction between de dicto and de re semantic types is meant to express somewhat more clearly and sharply what is traditionally expressed, somewhat misleadingly, in terms of a distinction between de re and de dicto beliefs (or somewhat less misleading in terms of a distinction between de re and de dicto belief attributions). The central claim of the narrow content functionalist is that the system of de dicto semantic types is supervenient upon the system of narrow causal types. He holds that if belief tokens b and b' are

Modality, Morality, and God

Abstract: Does God love what is right because it is right, or is what is right right because God loves it? Socrates's question, first asked in the Euthyphro, has received no completely satisfactory answer. It is, in fact, the beginning of an unpleasant dilemma for theists. For if a theist says that God loves right actions because they are right, then it seems to follow that they are right independently of God's loving them. Were he not to exist, right actions would still be right (and wrong actions would still be wrong). In that case the foundations of ethics do not lie in God but elsewhere. But if they lie elsewhere, why not eliminate the middleman and go directly to the source? On the other hand, if a theist says that right actions are right because God loves them, then it seems as though he believes that just anything that God loves is right, in virtue solely of God's loving it. Theists who grasp the first horn of the dilemma are fond of heaping abuse on those who choose the second. On the second alternative it is alleged to follow that if God were to love injustice, then his loving it would make the practice of injustice morally obligatory. That consequence is scarcely credible, but no more incredible than the further assertion, also an integral part of the second alternative, that God's loving something is supposed to provide sufficient moral reason for our loving it. Defenders of the second horn are quick to repay the compliment. They accuse their opposite numbers of reducing God to the role of dispensable moral mouthpiece, at best a vade mecum in our quest for moral truth. There is a position from which a theist can slip between the horns of the dilemma, preserving what should be preserved on both sides and discarding what should be discarded. It is useful to consider the dilemma in tandem with another theistic conundrum-