Showing papers in "Noûs in 2001"

The Context-Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions

Abstract: othis view strikes many as implausible, 7 it does seem to square with the relevant data. Thus, e.g., in terms of the Bank Case, it’s DeRose’s contention that most of us will find both of the following claims compelling: ~1! when I claim to know that the bank will be open on Saturday in Case A, I am saying something true;~2! I am also saying something true in Case B when I concede that I don’t know that the bank will be open on Saturday. Granted, “I seem to be in no better position to know in Case A than in Case B” ~DeRose 1992, p. 914!. Still, DeRose thinks, one can perfectly consistently maintain both ~1! and~2!: @I#n Bank Case B...when, in the face of my wife’s doubt, I admit that I don’t know that the bank will be open on Saturday, I don’t contradict an earlier claim to know that I might have made before the doubt was raised and before the issue was so important because, in an important sense, I don’t mean the same thing by “know” as I meant in the earlier claim. ~Ibid., p. 921; italics added ! According to DeRose, then, the meaning of “know ~s!” varies with certain features of the context in which it is used in making knowledge attributions. And so too for Cohen; for while there are important differences between the views of Cohen and DeRose ~more on this presently !, both believe that context enters into epistemology in virtue of the contribution it makes to the meanings of key epistemic terms, and thus in virtue of the role it plays in the determination of the conditions to be satisfied by knowledge-attributing sentences. So, according to the contextualist, knowledge attributions are context-sensitive because context affects what knowledge-attributing sentences literally express . While it promises to account for “what we want to say” with regard ~e.g.! to the Bank Case, contextualists make much of the fact that their view provides what is alleged to be a novel and quite plausible resolution of sceptical puzzles~DeRose 1992, 1995; Cohen 1988; Lewis 1979, 1996; Unger 1986 !. Taking his cue from Cohen~1988, pp. 93–94 ! the sceptical argument DeRose ~1995! focuses on is the following: ~SA! P1. I don’t know that I’m not a BIV@that is, a bodiless brain in a vat being electrochemically stimulated to have just those sensory experiences I’m having #. P2. If I don’t know that I’m not a BIV, then I don’t know that I have hands. So, C. I don’t know that I have hands. Of course, unlike the Bank Case, SA isn’t an example of merely pedestrian knowledge attributions. The basic strategy of the contextualist, however, is the same with respect to both sorts of case. In particular, it is the contextualist’s 480 NOÛS

Truthmaking and Difference-Making'

Abstract: and so on, for all the propositions there are. Not for all the "that"-clauses there are. Some "that"-clauses fail to name propositions: for instance because of ungroundedness, or because the embedded sentence is a mere expression of feeling in the syntactic guise of a declarative sentence. Further, some propositions cannot be named by "that"-clauses. First, because there is an uncountable infinity of propositions, whereas there are only countably many "that"-clauses. Second, because some of the propositions, in fact most of them, cannot be named by "that"-clauses of finite length. Third, because some propositions cannot be named at all, not even at infinite length, since we lack names for alien properties that are nowhere to be found in our

Skeptical Theism and Rowe's New Evidential Argument from Evil

Abstract: Evaluation de la nouvelle version de l'argument evidentialiste du mal developpe par W. Rowe dans le cadre du debat sur le theisme sceptique. Examinant les objections de M. Tooley et B. Russell concernant la representation des biens possibles, l'A. montre que l'argumentation de Rowe n'opere pas une critique significiative du theisme.

Nominalism through de-nominalization

Abstract: Etude de la critique du consensus entre semantique du premier ordre, semantique du second ordre et theorie des ensembles chez Quine, developpee par G. Boolos a partir d'un scheme distinguant les quantificateurs monadiques et les quantificateurs polyadiques.

Criteria of Personal Identity and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis

Abstract: It is easy to become battle-weary in metaphysics. In the face of seemingly unresolvable disputes and unanswerable questions, it is tempting to cast aside one’s sword, proclaiming: “there is no fact of the matter who is right!” Sometimes that is the right thing to do. As a case study, consider the search for the criterion of personal identity over time. I say there is no fact of the matter whether the correct criterion is bodily or psychological continuity.1 There exist two candidate meanings for talk of persisting persons, one corresponding to each criterion, and there is simply no fact of the matter which candidate we mean. An argument schema for this sort of “no fact of the matter” thesis will be constructed. An instance of the schema will be defended in the case of personal identity. But scrutiny of this instance will reveal limits of the schema. Questions not settled by conceptual analysis—in particular, some very dif cult questions of fundamental ontology—have answers. So do certain questions that can be settled by conceptual analysis, namely those that would be answered de nitively by ideal philosophical inquiry. Whether there is a fact of the matter is not easily ascertained merely by looking to see whether disputes seem unresolvable or questions unanswerable: sometimes the truth is out there, however hard (or even impossible) it may be to discover.

What Is Pornography

Abstract: The October 1996 issue of Life magazine included, among other things, a photograph of Marilyn Monroe naked.' Most people will agree that had the same picture appeared in the pages of Hustler, it would have been pornographic. Furthermore, the picture was considered pornographic when it originally appeared in a calendar in the late 1940's, and it was banned in two states. But is it pornography in the pages of Life? Should Life have warned its readers that the October 1996 issue was an "adults only" issue, to be sold only from the top shelf of the magazine rack? Perhaps one will say that the difference is that in Hustler and in the calendar in which it originally appeared, but not in Life, the picture would have been treated primarily as a source of sexual arousal. But that can't be the whole story. It is a common joke that generations of American boys have treated the Sears catalog and National Geographic primarily as sources of sexual arousal without thereby making them pornographic. Or perhaps one will say that the difference is that the producers of the calendar and of Hustler but not the producers of Life (or of the Sears catalog and National Geographic) intend for the pictures they publish to be treated primarily as sources of arousal. But, again, this can't be the whole story. A woman who has a sexually explicit photo taken of herself for the private viewing pleasure of her husband can't reasonably be said to be a producer of pornography, despite the fact that she may intend the picture to be treated primarily as a source of arousal. In light of these remarks, it is easy to see why it is often lamented that the definition of 'pornography' is as elusive as the referent is pervasive. Of course, the same lament could be raised with respect to almost every other philosophically interesting term. But in the literature on pornography (as opposed to the literature on knowledge, analysis, identity, art, and so on) the lament often comes as part of an excuse for setting aside the project of offering a definition, or for providing an admittedly inadequate definition and moving on to more important business-such as the question of whether it is morally wrong to produce,

The Purpose of Tractarian Nonsense

Abstract: Face a l'enigme de la proposition de non-sens qui clot le «Tractacus logico-philosophicus», l'A. rejette les interpretations resolues du texte et defend l'idee selon laquelle Wittgenstein propose une theorie ethique de la signfication, du sens et du non sens.

A Set of Solutions to Parfit's Problems

Abstract: L'A. presente une theorie hedoniste du bien-etre en reponse a l'ouvrage de D. Parfit intitule «Reasons and persons» (1984). Examinant la theorie de la quasi-maximisation, ainsi que les objections formulees par J. Ryberg a l'encontre d'une theorie similaire, l'A. defend la validite des principes de transitivite et lexicalite pour resoudre les paradoxes de Parfit.

Situated Inference versus Conversational Implicature

Abstract: As Grice defined it, a speaker conversationally implicates that p only if the speaker expects the hearer to recognize that the speaker thinks that p. This paper argues that in the sorts of cases that Grice took as paradigmatic examples of conversational implicature there is in fact no need for the hearer to consider what the speaker might thus have in mind. Instead, the hearer might simply make an inference from what the speaker literally says and the situation in which the utterance takes place. In addition, a number of sources of the illusion of conversational implicatures in Grice's sense are identified and diagnosed.

Critical Studies: Wayne A. Davis, Implicature: Intention, Convention, and Principle in the Failure of Gricean Theory

Abstract: [First Paragraph] In his recent book, Implicature: Intention, Convention, and Principle in the Failure of Gricean Theory (1998), Wayne Davis argues that the Gricean approach to conversational implicature is bankrupt and offers a new approach of his own. Although I disagree with Davis both in general and in detail, I think nonetheless that the problems he raises'or close relatives of them-- are serious and important problems which should give any Gricean pause. This is an extremely worthwhile book, even for those who disagree with it.

Skeptical Theism: A Response to Bergmann

Abstract: Bergmann suggests that STI is reasonable-or at least not unreasonableowing to our "awareness of our cognitive limitations and the vastness and complexity of reality." And he notes that I seem to have some sympathy with STI. He then considers my "new evidential argument from evil" and argues that it depends on "a rejection of this skeptical thesis and, therefore, suffers from the same problem that afflicts his [Rowe's] original argument." In what follows, after a preliminary comment, I will respond to Bergmann's discussion of my 1996 argument from evil. The constant theme in my discussions of the problem of evil is our awareness that no good within our ken can reasonably be thought to justify an allpowerful, all-knowing, perfectly good being in permitting any particular instance of the vast number of instances of horrific suffering (both animal and human) that occurs daily in our world. Skeptical theists like Bergmann do not directly dispute this point, although they think my claim exceeds what we are fully justified in asserting.3 Rather, they contend that given the disparity between our knowledge of goods and the conditions of their realization and the knowledge of these matters possessed by God, if he exists, we simply aren't epistemically qualified to make any reasonable judgments whatever about the amount of seemingly pointless, horrific evil such a being would need to allow in the world. For all we know, they say, the world could contain a great deal more seemingly point-

Three conceptions of action in moral theory

Abstract: Mesurant la valeur de l'action a son impact sur le monde, l'A. distingue trois conceptions morales de l'action comme production, affirmation et participation, qui s'inscrivent respectivement dans le cadre de l'utilitarisme, de l'intuitionnisme rationnel et du constructivisme kantien.

Fregean Senses, Modes of Presentation, and Concepts

Abstract: Ever since Frege postulated senses in [1892] and conceived of them as (containing) modes of presentation, serious studies in the philosophy of language have often appealed to these entities. In the recent philosophy of language and mind, however, the notions of ‘mode of presentation’ and ‘concept’ have become more important. It seems fair to say that much of the theorizing involving senses, modes of presentation, and concepts has taken place at a very general level. Frege never told us what senses are; they were simply stipulated to be entities that play certain roles in his philosophy of language. Philosophers today still work with both senses and modes of presentation without having a systematic and viable theory of them. And although the notion of a concept has been employed in various ways, there are not all that many precise theories of concepts. In this paper, I try to clear away some of the mystery surrounding these three kinds of entities by offering a precise theory of them. The theory of Fregean senses developed in my previous work will be extended to yield a more general theory of modes of presentation and concepts. Modes of presentation and concepts will be identified, therefore, in terms

Rigidity in the Scope of Russell's Theory

Abstract: In Naming and Necessity Saul Kripke argues for a series of interconnected conclusions about the semantics of names and about the modal and epistemic status of sentences involving names. Many take him to have displaced the previously dominant so-called Frege-Russell theory. Kripke uses a battery of arguments against the theories he rejects. Here I will focus on one of those arguments. In the preface Kripke briefly describes the genesis of some of the leading ideas of his monograph. In particular he gives some further explanation concerning modality and rigid designation. Of course a thorough discussion cannot be expected within the bounds of a preface. His remarks are meant only to amplify, in a limited way, the main text. Still, the preface contains, in broad outlines but perhaps more clearly than anywhere else in the text, an important argument against the thesis that names are disguised (or abbreviated) definite descriptions. It is this argument-the modal argument-and Kripke's reply to a possible objection to the argument that I will resist here. Kripke's argument, though by his own admission not stated thoroughly or in detail, has been widely influential. Many today take this work (together with that of Donnellan and Putnam and others) to have refuted a Russellian view of names. The argument on which I will focus may seem to be the most decisive. It is interesting too because of its connection with Kripke's thesis of names as "rigid designators"-a thesis for which he is responsible and celebrated. But the so-called Frege-Russell view' contains, it seems to me, deep insights into the nature of the referential or intentional relation, insights which are less well appreciated today. Only by dispelling the widespread feeling that the theory is inadequate to actual linguistic data can we begin to understand again some of its philosophical depth. This is not the first attempt to defend Russell along the lines to be pursued below.2 I do, however, present a new and more detailed defense, one that takes full account of Kripke's position.

How to be an eleatic monist

Abstract: For convenience, I will use the label ‘Eleatic monism’ to refer to the conjunction of a–d. Eleatic monism flies in the face of common sense. Scholars of pre Socratic thought rarely have anything to say in its defense beyond what the Eleatic philosophers said themselves, and virtually no one treats it as a serious option in metaphysics today. Jonathan Barnes declares that a by itself (never mind the remaining doctrines) is “at best absurd and at worst unintelligible.” (1979a, p. 2) It is not hard to see why. How could anyone possibly look at a sandy beach, witness the birth of a child or the death of a loved one, or gaze into the far reaches of space and believe that there exists exactly one thing that is neither generated nor destroyed, unchanging, and undivided? The problem is not just that Eleatic monism seems to be false. Rather, the problem is that it seems to be so incredibly wide of the mark, so vastly out of touch with the truth, that it is hard to see what sorts of considerations could have led someone even to take it seriously, much less embrace it. What I offer in this paper is a way into the monist’s frame of mind—a model, if you will, for understanding this otherwise apparently unintelligible world view. I will not argue that we should find Eleatic monism plausible; but I will show that, contrary to what many of us might initially have expected, the doctrine does have a legitimate place on the landscape of contemporary metaphysics. I will argue that the doctrines of Eleatic monism ought to be accepted by anyone who accepts the following four theses: PHIL 15-7

Naturalism: Friends and Foes

Abstract: The goal of this paper is to sketch a distinctive version of naturalism in the philosophy of science, both by tracing historical antecedents and by addressing contemporary objections.

Inequality: A Complex, Individualistic, and Comparative Notion

Abstract: Equality has long been among the most potent of human ideals, and it continues to play a prominent role in political argument. Views about equality inform much of the debates about such wideranging issues as racism, sexism, obligations to the poor or handicapped, relations between developed and developing countries, and the justification of competing political, economic, and ideological systems. Unfortunately, these debates have been shrouded in error and confusion, for few ideals have been more widely discussed, yet less well understood, than the ideal of equality. This essay is divided into two main parts. In part I, I distinguish between different kinds of egalitarian positions. I show that numerous so-called egalitarian positions are compatible with the central tenet of non-egalitarianism, and suggest a core notion that would distinguish egalitarians from non-egalitarians. In addition, I claim that there is an intimate connection between equality and fairness, and suggest that egalitarians should be pluralists both in terms of other ideals and in terms of the kinds of equality that PI 11-13

Virtue and Emotion

Abstract: L'A. mesure le role et l'unite de l'emotion dans la motivation vertueuse. A travers l'exemple du courage chez Aristote, l'A. examine la these du holisme des raisons chez J. Dancy, ainsi que la distinction entre vertu et continence chez M. Smith. Soulevant la question de la chance morale chez McDowell, l'A. montre que l'emotion vertueuse peut provenir d'emotions confictuelles au regard de l'action.

Criminal Justice and Legal Reparations as an Alternative to Punishment

Abstract: Geoffrey Sayre-McCord boldly proposes to substitute for crimi­ nal punishment a scheme of legally enforced non-punitive repa­ rations. Punishment, he says, essentially involves intentional in­ fliction of pain or suffering, and so what is non-punitive about reparations is that even though they might be burdensome. the burden is, he argues, no part of the aim of the institution. Reparations, as Geoffrey Sayre-McCord conceives them. are not only a matter of perpetrators compensating victims. bm also, perhaps even mainly, reparations consist in what Geoffrey Sayre-McCord calls \"making amends\", or perpetrators acting so as to warrant a reinstatement of the bond between the perpetra­ tor and society generally. a bond that is legitimately suspended

The Ins and Outs of Counterfactual Switching

Abstract: Yet it seems to a number of us that problems connected with quantum statistics and with the interpretation of space-time give powerful reasons to revisit this evaluation of the qualitative way of counting possibilities. The present paper reviews these problems, reviews our understanding of the referential apparatus needed for discussing these issues, clarifies the close similarity and important differences between the two problems, and then sorts through the available ways for dealing with the problems and their implications for Kripke's claim. The result will be a broad comparative survey of these issues which will, along the way, also provide a strong conclusion about the labels used in virtually all presentations of conventional many-particle quantum mechanics: There is nothing remotely label-like about the way these "labels" can be interpreted in the theory.

Blame for traits

Abstract: Soulevant la question de la relation entre caractere et culpabilite dans le cadre de la philosophie morale, l'A. defend la these selon laquelle une personne peut etre condamnee pour ses traits de caractere. Distinguant les notions de responsabilite et punition, l'A. montre que sa theorie eclaire l'origine emotionnelle de la peur d'etre juge en tant qu'individu mauvais, d'une part, et releve de l'ethique du devoir et de la vertu, d'autre part.

Are Moral Qualities Response-Dependent?

Abstract: Some fifteen years ago, John McDowell suggested that moral realists ought to exploit the analogy between moral qualities and secondary qualities. Rather than think of moral qualities as brutely there without any internal relation to some exercise of human sensibility, McDowell proposed that moral realists should claim that moral qualities are dispositions of a sort-dispositions to elicit merited responses in appropriate agents. 1 In the intervening years, McDowell's suggestion has been widely discussed and criticized. 2 My aim in this essay is to consider afresh the claim that moral qualities are secondary qualities-or as I shall call them, response-dependent qualities.3 I will argue that some of the more prominent objections to this position are inconclusive, but that there are other good reasons for rejecting it. If the overall argument of this essay is correct, then we shall have further grounds for thinking that the moral realist ought to defend what I will call a primary account of moral qualities.

Emotions and Practical Reason: Rethinking Evaluation and Motivation

Abstract: L'A. propose ici de repenser le probleme de la volonte et de la raison pratique en revisant la connexion conceptuelle entre l'evaluation et la motivation d'une action. Distinguant les raisons normatives et le jugement evaluatif, l'A. montre que l'evaluation implique a la fois le jugement et les emotions.