Showing papers in "Open Journal of Philosophy in 2012"
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explained the role of source credibility in advertising, politics and religion, and pointed out that the most difficult form of management is human and mind management and that the key is to be seen as a credible source.
Abstract: It is one thing to catch someone’s attention and another thing to hold it for as long as the speaker desires. There must be something about those leaders and speakers who have been able to achieve this feat. The secret is source credibility which arises from how the public view or perceive a speaker. This research paper explained the role of this important virtue in relation to advertisements, politics and religion. This paper is timely and significant because the most difficult form of management is human and mind management. The key is to be seen as a credible source. How is that possible?
47 citations
TL;DR: In this article, Chung and McGonigal proposed a theory that the inner and physical self correspond to the "I Will" and "I Want" self, respectively, and the inner self, the true self, controlled the physical self, a false self, interacting with the prefrontal cortex of the human brain.
Abstract: A relationship among self, mind and body in humans is still not clearly known in philosophy and science because of lack of human data that would enable to objectively explain it Teachings related to their relationship in religions have been given to humanity in general in terms of subjective words Consequently, philosophers and scientists have been investigating to find objective proofs related to their relationship The author proposed a theory in his book (2009) that there are in a human individual two selves, one, the inner self (the true self) and one, the physical self (the false self) that coexist in one individual person McGonigal (2012) published her book in which she described two minds or two selves in one human individual, naming them “I Will” and “I WANT” self on the basis of extensive studies on adult subjects More recent researches in neuroscience using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) discovered that the prefrontal cortex of the human brain performs self-control, emotion regulation and guiding behaviors with morality, future goals and rules The author compared characteristic aspects of the inner and physical selves of Chung with the “I Will” and “I Want” selves of McGonigal There is a remarkable good agreement between the inner and physical selves of Chung and the “I Will” and “I WANT” selves of McGonigal The author proposes a theory in this study that the inner and physical selves correspond to the “I WILL” and “I WANT” selves, respectively, and that the inner self, the true self, controls the physical self, the false self, interacting with the prefrontal cortex ofthe human brain
15 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the fundamental argument against free will, so called reductionism, and why the choice for dualism against monism, follows logically is considered, and the results from recent discoveries in cognitive science are summarized.
Abstract: Freedom of will is fundamental to morality, intuition of self, and normal functioning of society. However, science does not provide a clear logical foundation for this idea. This paper considers the fundamental argument against free will, so called reductionism, and why the choice for dualism against monism, follows logically. Then, the paper summarizes unexpected conclusions from recent discoveries in cognitive science. Classical logic turns out not to be a fundamental mechanism of the mind. It is replaced by dynamic logic. Mathematical and experimental evidence are considered conceptually. Dynamic logic counters logical arguments for reductionism. Contemporary science of mind is not reducible; free will can be scientifically accepted along with scientific monism.
13 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider the interrelation between consciousness and time in the light of Hegel and Heidegger's concepts of Sein (Being) and Zeit (Time) and suggest that consciousness can be defined in terms of a succession of psychological moments where we realize that we exist in, and are part of, a present moment in time.
Abstract: th , 2011; revised December 28 th , 2011; accepted January 5 th , 2012 While some are currently debating whether time may or may not be an illusion, others keep devoting their time to the science of consciousness. Time as such may be seen as a physical or a subjective variable, and the limitations in our capacity of perceiving and analyzing temporal order and change in physical events definitely constrain our understanding of consciousness which, in return, constrains our conceptual understanding of time. Temporal codes generated in the brain have been considered as the key to insight into neural function and, ultimately, as potential neural substrates of consciousness itself. On the basis of current evidence and opinion from neuroscience and philosophy, we consider the interrelation between consciousness and time in the light of Hegel and Heidegger’s concepts of Sein (Being) and Zeit (Time). We suggest that consciousness can be defined in terms of a succession of psychological moments where we realize that we exist in, and are part of, a present moment in time. This definition places all other perceptual or sensorial processes which may characterize phenomenal experience at a different level of analysis and centers the debate around consciousness on the fundamental identity link between awareness of the Ich (I) and awareness of what Heidegger termed Ursprungliche Zeit (original time). We argue that human consciousness has evolved from the ability to be aware of, to remember, and to predict temporal order and change in nature, and that the limits of this capacity are determined by limits in the functional plasticity of resonant brain mechanisms. Although the conscious state of the Self is the ultimate expression of this evolution, it is devoid of any adaptive function as such.
12 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, it is argued that comparison of misleading truths with telling truths or lies is inconclusive, and instead, comparison with telling of leading truths is appropriate, meaning that telling misleading truths is not consistent with the Categorical Imperative, and therefore they are not morally permissible from a Kantian perspective.
Abstract: Sandel (2009) has recently revisited the issue of the moral permissibility of telling misleading truths in a Kantian ethical framework. His defense of its permissibility relies on assimilating it to simple truth telling, and discounting its relationship with simple lying. This article presents a refutation of Sandel’s case. It is argued that comparison of misleading truths with telling truths or lies is inconclusive. Instead, comparison with telling of leading truths is appropriate. With this comparison in view, it is clear that telling misleading truths is not consistent with the Categorical Imperative, meaning that they are not morally permissible from a Kantian perspective.
9 citations
TL;DR: The electronic colonialism theory was used to explain that this dominance by one culture is the modern form of colonialism and has far reaching catastrophic consequences for the dependents and needs to be checked to avoid disaster as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Every independent country always celebrates or mark the day they were free from colonial rule in the form of “independence day celebrations”. The impression was that they were no longer slaves working under a colonial master. A fleeting glance at cultural markets reveals that despite other competing countries like India, China and Mexico, American culture dominates. This dependency on American products for arts, entertainment, dressing, and lifestyle changes in general is the major thrust of this paper. When a people’s way of life is dictated by the life of another, is it not a form of colonialism? The electronic colonialism theory was used to explain that this dominance by one culture is the modern form of colonialism and has far reaching catastrophic consequences for the dependents and needs to be checked to avoid disaster.
7 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a methodological discrepancy between the sciences and psychology is explained, which centers on the measurement procedure: in psychology, measurement units similar to those in physics have not been discovered, and it is suggested that these two kinds of science generate two different classes of technologies.
Abstract: Unlike the sciences (physics), psychology has not developed in any of its areas (such as perception, learning, cognition) a top-theory like Newtonian theory, the theory of relativity, or quantum theory in physics. This difference is explained by a methodological discrepancy between the sciences and psychology, which centers on the measurement procedure: in psychology, measurement units similar to those in physics have not been discovered. Based on the arguments supporting this claim, a methodological distinction is made between the sciences and psychology as an associational science. It is suggested that that these two kinds of science generate two different classes of technologies. The possibility that in psychology there is a connection between the issue of measurement and the unsolved consciousness/brain problem is discussed.
7 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors look at the African scenario which seems to be facing more environmental degradation in the contemporary times and suggest a crusade against these damaging effects of modernism for a better preservation of the environment.
Abstract: The history of the environmental philosophy carries with it the effort to overcome the medieval anthropocentric morality. Here, nature is seen from the instrumental value which they give. The instrumental value here shows the existence of things as important only as they are useful to man. The contemporary environmental ethics bring a novelty showing these environmental bodies as possessing an intrinsic value showing that they have an ethical value. The medieval ethical system which denies intrinsic value to the environment and thus posits man as being at the center of any moral system leads to the over possession of the environment by man. This over possession by man has led to the destruction of environment by man who exploits the environment in his service. This work looks at the African scenario which seems to be facing more environmental degradation in the contemporary times. The reason for this is surmised by this paper as a damaging evolution of the African history from traditionalism which seems to respect the environment to modernism which demystifies the mysteries accorded the environment and hence putting the environment into excessive use through some actions like deforestation, burning of fossil fuels and so on. This paper suggests a crusade against these damaging effects of modernism for a better preservation of the environment.
7 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the ontological and epistemological status of homosexuality is discussed and a structural problem that cannot be solved with an elaboration of new models and theories that are no longer suited as an explanans of human nature in general, and homosexuality in particular.
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to revisit an ongoing controversy within the so called “Science Wars”; more specifically, I will address a particular topic within the “human nature” debate: the ontological and epistemological status of homosexuality. I claim that, in this particular chapter of the “Science Wars”, we are continually left in an explanatory impasse even when more data are collected, more rigorous experimental techniques are developed, more subtle arguments are offered and more pluralistic narratives are told. My diagnosis of the source of this impasse leads me to the conclusion that here we are dealing with a structural problem that cannot be solved with an elaboration of new models and theories that maintain an on- tology and an epistemology that are no longer suited as an explanans of human nature in general, and homosexuality in particular. Nevertheless, my analysis of the structural features of the biological explanations and the constructivist counter-explanations also leads me to the belief that, although biologists do not fully understand the intricacies of subjects, neither constructivists understand the facticity of evolution and the challenge that it implies. If so, then the subject might be the right target of explanation. And, if so, constructivists might be right about the uniqueness of human homosexuality as a modern, western phenomenon explainable in terms of subjectivities and identities that mold and are molded by desires and institutions. But, if they are, evolution is not expendable because now we are facing a most intriguing question: How is that we humans became subjects?
6 citations
TL;DR: This article present an argument against the feasibility of the Imitation game as a test for thinking or language understanding, which is different from the five objections presented by Turing in his original paper, although it tries to maintain his original intention.
Abstract: In this paper I present an argument against the feasibility of the Imitation Game as a test for thinking or language understanding. The argument is different from the five objections presented by Turing in his original paper, although it tries to maintain his original intention. I therefore call it “the Sixth Argument” or “the Argument from Context”. I show that – although the argument works against the original version of the imitation game – it may suggest a new version of the Turing Test, still coherent with the idea of thinking and understanding as symbol manipulation. In a new form, the main idea which lies behind the original Imitation Game remains untouched by the criticism of Searle’s Chinese room argument and suggest a possible implementation which avoids some of the shortcomings of the original Turing Test.
6 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a new, original conceptualization of religion as one of finite provinces of meaning within one paramount reality of the life-world, as defined by Alfred Schutz, is presented.
Abstract: Referring to basic Weberian notions of rationalization and secularization, I try to find a more accurate sense of the term “secularization”, intending to describe adequately the position of religion in modernity. The result of this query is—or at least should be—a new, original conceptualization of religion as one of finite provinces of meaning within one paramount reality of the life-world, as defined by Alfred Schutz. I proceed by exposing a well known, major oversimplification of the Weberian concept of secularization, very well outlined in Peter Berger’s The sacred canopy, in order to point to the genuine, much more differentiated position of Max Weber in this matter (especially from the period of Foundations of social economic and Economy and society), and, consequently, to return to the roots of Berger’s thought: phenomenological sociology of Alfred Schutz, an attempt to assure the philosophical foundations of Weber’s sociological theory. At a closer glimpse, transformation of religion in the modern process of rationalization does not consist—according to Weber—in eliminating religion and thus depriving society of the religious source of meaning, but in parallel emancipation of many different domains of rationality, including religion itself. Using Schutz’s analysis of the social world as a complex structure of many different final provinces of meaning, I describe religion as such a province and show what does the process of rationalization of this province consist and what it should consist in: a complex, ongoing exchange of cognitive relevances and contents, combined with growing autonomy of many different sub-worlds. Schutz’s theory of symbol, rooted in Edmund Husserl’s description of constitution of complex objects in mono- and polythetic acts of consciousness, moves the analysis to the epistemological level, pointing to a chance of intensifying our cognitive relation to reality through increasing interpenetration of various sub-universes of meaning.
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TL;DR: The notion of "solidity" was introduced by as mentioned in this paper as a condition for the existence of a person's identity in the sense that it prevents other things from occupying a spatial location.
Abstract: John Locke holds that matter is solid, the soul thinks, and for all we know the soul may be a material substance divinely endowed with a power to think. Though he openly admits to nothing stronger than the bare possibility of thinking matter, Locke grants that what thinks in us occupies a definite spatial location to the exclusion of other souls. Solidity is the quality that prevents other things from occupying a spatial location. Locke’s general criterion for identity is spatiotemporal exclusion of other things of the same kind. To meet these conditions for identity, souls must be solid. Although Locke refuses to declare that souls really are material things, taking the solidity of souls to be a condition for their identity is consistent with the following of Locke’s other important commitments: (1) nominalism about the essences by which substances are classified, (2) agnosticism about the underlying reality of what supports such “nominal essences,” and (3) the identity of persons is distinct from the identity of any substance. Locke ignores the implication that souls are solid because the solidity of souls is irrelevant to those three aims. Nevertheless he could allow for the solidity of souls without giving up on any of his other important and explicitly held commitments. There is therefore no need for Locke’s commentators to refrain from employing solidity in their accounts of Locke’s general criterion for identity from fear of attributing to Locke the position that souls would be solid.
TL;DR: The authors maintains that there are variables which influence the construction and decoding of meaning with the resultant effect that no two individuals construct meanings in uniform way, and that there is nothing as an innocent word because every word no matter how simple it sounds is loaded with meaning.
Abstract: There is nothing as an innocent word because every word no matter how simple it sounds is loaded with meaning. For communication to have taken place, the meaning of a word or symbol is grasped and understood by the receiver. This paper maintains that there are variables which influence the construction and decoding of meaning with the resultant effect that no two individuals construct meanings in uniform way.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors look at the concept of equilibrium in some early Confucian texts and its possible implications in economic activities and propose an alternative approach to social welfare and economic prosperity creating universal harmony and better living for humans.
Abstract: In a modern economy, “equilibrium” means that supply and demand is equal. It is at this point that the allocation of goods and services is at its most efficient, this being because the amount of goods and the amount of goods in demand are equally balanced. The market equilibrium therefore is determined by supply and demand. This paper looks at the concept of “equilibrium” in some of the early Confucian texts and its possible implications in economic activities. In the Confucian context equilibrium, or what can be termed as the ultimate equilibrium, is to be understood in a broader sense where balances and harmony at different levels (e.g. individual and society) need to be sought in order to achieve a model of sustainable development. The ultimate equilibrium may provide an alternative approach to social welfare and economic prosperity creating universal harmony and better living for humans. In Confucian ideology, governing for the welfare of the people is not merely a question of increasing personal income and wealth; it requires implementation on a priority basis, taking into consideration the formation of an orderly society based on the enforcement of moral and ethical standards with the existence of a benevolent government which appropriates things according to the principles of harmony and order to achieve what can be termed as the “great equilibrium”—equilibrium that is not simply defined by balanced economic forces as in modern economic theory; but rather is used to suggest an ideal state of harmony in self fulfilment and socio-political order through incentives and by appropriate means.
TL;DR: Oguejiofor as mentioned in this paper argues that the African predicament is as a result of geography, biogeography and history, but his advancement of these factors as being solely responsible for the African underdevelopment completely ignores the human agency in development and lands him in determinism.
Abstract: This paper dwells on the debate on the question of what is/are responsible for African underdevelopment and, by extension, what will influence African development. The debate currently dwells on how much of development is human and how much is environmental, extraneous and beyond human control. Joseph Agbakoba thinks that development involves both nature and human agency, acknowledges the effect of nature, equally sees philosophy as a critique of worldview and ideology, and African philosophy as saddled with the critique of the African worldview and ideology, which he sees as malfunctioning in the context of the modern African civic society imported from Europe and needs certain adjustments. In other words, he sees development in Africa as not beyond human control. J. Obi Oguejiofor attempts to refute Agbakoba’s claim that worldview has anything to do with the African predicament, and concludes that the African predicament is as a result of geography, biogeography and history, but his advancement of these factors as being solely responsible for the African predicament completely ignores the human agency in development and lands him in determinism raising the question of the very relevance of African philosophy to African development. Conceptual analysis informs the dominant method of the paper.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors re-invokes the roles religion played in the ‘Antebellum’ America, with a view of applying the same in the modern era, in terms of oppression, though not in its magnitude.
Abstract: Religion: a socio-spiritual phenomenon that pervades and influences human actions in all realms of human existences plays diverse and divergent roles in the society. Therefore, it is difficult to define with a simply and a single category. Hence, on the one hand, Karl Marx saw it as an instrument that supports the status quo and oppresses the less privileged and the powerless and as such a vital force in the legitimization of social ills in the society. On the other hand, Marx Webber and other functional theorists maintain that religion as a social fact is a force in mobilizing social solidarity and unified actions against the social order. In this direction religion therefore plays revolutionary roles in any given society. Against the backdrop of the seeming contradicting and conflicting positions of these two main schools of thought in the field of sociology of religion, this paper is poised to reassess the divergent roles religion has played in history among the oppressed people of the world, using the both Marxian and Webberian paradigms as a matrix. This paper considers oppressive society as a society that maintains a social and economic classification of its members as a norm. It is also noted that it is through such classification of its members in their nexus that social injustice, discriminations, dehumanization are maintained. This situation is the defining paradigm of the global village (the new World Order), governed strictly by economic dictum. To this end therefore, this paper re-invokes the roles religion played in the ‘Antebellum’ America, with a view of applying the same in the modern era, which has great resemblance with the Antebellum America, in terms of oppression, though not in its magnitude.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that there is a need to understand the metaphysical and epistemological issues that undergird human behaviour and ipso facto human nature in formulating development theories.
Abstract: This paper in its contribution argues that there is the need to understand the metaphysical and epistemological issues that undergird human behaviour and ipso facto human nature in formulating development theories. This will enhance appropriate evaluation and application of these theories for the betterment of any society. It establishes the relevance of human nature to social theories. Accordingly, social theories spur the explanation, nature, function, institutions, and prediction of social patterns of development. Since society is primarily an amalgam of people in social intercourse, human nature impinges on human behaveiour. Thus, just as the nature of molecular behaviour enhances the understanding of the behaviour of gases, proper understanding of social theories and those things that spur them enhance the understanding of human societies. Thus the understanding of the coherence and workability of any social theory is therefore predicated on the perspective gained on human nature. The critical, analytical and evaluative methods of philosophy will be dominant in the work.
TL;DR: In this article, the universality of disembodyied thinking is paralleled with Chinese body thinking, and the basic body thinking is to disembodied thinking, showing how body thinking in China elucidates bodily matters, time, contingency, and bodily death, what Western disembodied cannot handle.
Abstract: This essay is devoted to calling global attention to body thinking neglected yet routinely practiced by us all, especially in China for millennia. This essay, one, responds to the feature, universality, of disembodyied thinking, by paralleling it with Chinese body thinking, two, shows how basic body thinking is to disembodied thinking, and three, shows how body thinking in China elucidates bodily matters, time, contingency, and bodily death, what Western disembodied cannot handle.
TL;DR: In this article, a primary objective is to describe postmodern global interrelations of science mentoring policies and life quality, and also, global programs are proposed that will aid in the timely achievement of optimal real-life science goals.
Abstract: The optimum science benefits to routine life have insufficiently been proved. Science progress is not merely reflected in machinery and technological breakthroughs. Subordinate impacts of science and scientists on global interactions are an evidence for the major deficiencies and futility of the many current science designations. A primary objective is to describe postmodern global interrelations of science mentoring policies and life quality. Also, global programs are proposed that will aid in the timely achievement of optimal real-life science goals. The global wholeness of science pictures should be visible, acknowledged, and educated. The wholeness of science, no matter how exposed or sophisticated, should never change. Definitive paths should be developed to bestow science with sufficiently empowered authorities to lead and optimize economics, politics, and international relations. Mentoring rather than teaching of science will be a main frontier for quality lives. Postmodern mentors will be cognizant of the science entirety. Mentors will create and designate definitive shapes from discoveries and findings that will grant human life with ongoing peace and ultimate satisfaction.
TL;DR: Physicalism can never be true in worlds where things of these kinds exist as discussed by the authors, which is not the case in our own world, since we would still live in a physical world even if these kinds of things did not exist.
Abstract: Physicalism, if it is to be a significant thesis, should differentiate itself from key metaphysical contenders which endorse the existence of platonic entities, emergent properties, Cartesian souls, angels, and God. Physicalism can never be true in worlds where things of these kinds exist. David Papineau, David Spurrett, and Barbara Montero have recently developed and defended two influential conceptions of physicalism. One is derived from a conception of the physical as the non-mentally-and-non-biologically identifiable. The other is derived from a conception of the physical as the non-sui-generis-mental. The paper looks at the resources available to those conceptions, but argues that each is insufficient to yield a conception of physicalism that differentiates it from key anti-physicalist positions. According to these conceptions, if we lived in a world full of things that clearly cannot be physical, we would still live in a physical world. Thus, such conceptions of physicalism are of little theoretical interest.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors focus on two prominent arguments claiming that physicalism entails reductionism: Kim's causal exclusion argument (CEA) and Papineau's causal argument (PEA).
Abstract: This paper focuses on two prominent arguments claiming that physicalism entails reductionism One is Kim’s causal exclusion argument (CEA), and the other is Papineau’s causal argument The paper argues that Kim’s CEA is not logically valid and that it is driven by two implausible justifications One is “Edward’s dictum”, which is alien to non-reductive physicalism and should be rejected The other is by endorsement of Papineau’s conception of the physical, immanent in Papineau’s causal argument This argument only arrives at the physical property-property identities by using a conception of the physical that licenses anything to be reductively physical, including putative core anti-physical entities; thus, leaving Papineau’s causal argument and Kim’s CEA without a reductive physicalist conclusion of philosophical interest
TL;DR: The authors restate Libet-ology's basic tenets in plain English so that only nature's inherent puzzle is left on the table, free of certain peculiarities of the existing technical literature.
Abstract: With certain topics the general reader experiences a double-whammy wherein one must peer through a curtain of needlessly obscure jargon to try glimpsing something that is inherently weird in nature. Bell’s nonlocality was once such a topic, but authors have had considerable success over the years in showing where the line is between the enigma itself (in nature) and the human-made oddities surrounding it (in physics). Libet-ology has yet to undergo that de-mystifying process. Accordingly, our first order of business here is to restate its basic tenets in plain English so that only nature’s inherent puzzle is left on the table, free of certain peculiarities of the existing technical literature. We also address the question of the central topic versus its byways, as alluded to by ‘left turn into veto-as-volition’ in our title. (On the final page of Libet’s landmark paper, there is an effort to resurrect free will in the same breath that implicitly just killed it. In this way, the founder of the field placed it into perennial disarray and left its true message in obscurity for decades.) In the ensuing parts of the paper, we look outside the field to see how hypnotherapy and Hinduism might shed light on it.
TL;DR: This paper argued that the standard interpretation of On Certainty leads to a distorted view of Wittgenstein's contribution in On certainty, and pointed out that the primary goal of the standard reading was not to provide an answer to scepticism, but to find new and illuminating ways to interpret his late contribution.
Abstract: Ostensibly, Wittgenstein’s last remarks published in 1969 under the title On Certainty are about epistemology, more precisely about the problem of scepticism. This is the standard interpretation of On Certainty. But I contend, in this paper, that we will get closer to Wittgenstein’s intentions and perhaps find new and illuminating ways to interpret his late contribution if we keep in mind that his primary goal was not to provide an answer to scepticism. In fact, I think that the standard reading (independently of its fruitfulness with dealing with scepticism) leads to a distorted view of Wittgenstein’s contribution in On Certainty. In order to see that, scepticism will first be briefly characterised, and then I will attempt to circumscribe more precisely the standard reading of On Certainty. In section 4, three exegetical arguments against the standard reading are offered – the hope being that the weight of these three arguments, taken together, instils doubt in the reader’s mind about the correctness of the standard reading. The paper concludes with an attempt to gesture at the philosophical significance of On Certainty once we set aside the standard reading.
TL;DR: The authors identifies the difficulties in confronting novel history from both a rigorous scientific and artistic literary perspectives and suggests a practical reconciliation between the two apparent poles of historical understanding and their accompanying genres, types, and tropes.
Abstract: This paper identifies the difficulties in confronting novel history from both a rigorous scientific and artistic literary perspectives and suggests a practical reconciliation—in the form of a discussion and metaphorical opening space—between the two apparent poles of historical understanding and their accompanying genres, types, and tropes.
TL;DR: The Igbo people had their own legal system which though might look different in form from the western law but have the same purpose of guiding man into the state of oughtness as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Law is a body of rules whether formal, written, informal or unwritten that are used to maintain relative peace and order in any given society. Before the advent of civilization, the Igbo people had their own legal system which though might look different in form from the western law but have the same purpose of guiding man into the state of oughtness. This research paper mirrored the legal and justice system of the Igbo people.
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors take the term "my" in the phrase "my body" to be typically used to refer to the self or person whose body it is, and argue that this raises a problem for materialism over how a body can own or have itself.
Abstract: In this paper I will take the term “my” in the phrase “my body” to be typically used to refer to the self or person whose body it is. This raises a problem for materialism over how a body can own or have itself. I will articulate some ways in which we are and are not related to our bodies, and try to undo the linquistic knot of a body owning itself.
TL;DR: The authors defend an instrumental connection between the intellectual virtues and the epistemic end of true belief, and defend truth-conduciveness as a tenable criterion for identifying the intellectual virtue.
Abstract: Within contemporary epistemology, notions of intellectual virtue have come to fulfill a prominent role in attempts to provide an account of knowledge. Notions of such virtue can vary, and one particular aspect of this variance concerns how to construe the relationship between the intellectual virtues and particular epistemic ends. The goal of this article is to defend an instrumental connection between the intellectual virtues and the epistemic end of true belief. One type of skeptical argument that attempts to sever this connection, a Cartesian Demon argument, is considered. This Cartesian Demon argument will be summarized, as well as three responses to it. The claim that truth-conduciveness is a tenable criterion for identifying the intellectual virtues is then defended. It is acknowledged that the possibility of a Cartesian Demon does initiate scepticism, but that this scepticism is directed toward identifying specific intellectual virtues and not toward the instrumental connection between intellectual virtue and true belief.
TL;DR: The authors gave a short description of basic features of the dominating mindset in the Western world between the 1970s and today, often called post-modern, through a re-reading of John Ashbery's poem "Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror" (1975).
Abstract: This paper gives a short description of basic features of the dominating mindset in the Western world between the 1970s and today, often called “post-modern”, through a re-reading of John Ashbery’s poem “Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror” (1975). In doing so, it applies the viewpoint of an interdisciplinary history of ideas. Since collective mindsets have become the most important contextual political factors, the implications are multiple.
TL;DR: In this article, it is shown how formal criteria of rationality provide at least a partial solution to the problem of providing adequate principles for moral opinion pooling, and that these results can be seen as formal preliminaries to contractualist ethics.
Abstract: This paper discusses one of the advantages of applying formal methods in ethics. First, an approach from democratic morality—which is a special case of contractualist ethics that brings together theories of legal and moral philosophy—will be adopted, in order to argue for the non-trivial thesis that moral norms are increasingly democratically motivated. To accept this thesis also as a desired way of justifying ethical principles raises some issues, such as the problem of providing adequate principles for moral opinion pooling. Secondly, it is therefore shown how formal criteria of rationality provide at least a partial solution to such problems. In a broad context this results can be seen as formal preliminaries to contractualist ethics.
TL;DR: In this paper, a comparative look at Descartes' and Pascal's epistemology is presented, focusing on the philosophers' engagement with skepticism, which, for each, had different functions and motivations.
Abstract: The essay is a comparative look at Descartes’ and Pascal’s epistemology. For so vast a topic, I shall confine myself to comparing three crucial epistemological topics, through which I hope to evince Descartes’ and Pascal’s differences and points of contact. Firstly, I will concentrate on the philosophers’ engagement with skepticism, which, for each, had different functions and motivations. Secondly, the thinkers’ relation to Reason shall be examined, since it is the fulcrum of their thought—and the main aspect that separates them. Lastly, I will examine each philosopher’s theist epistemology; this section, of course, will focus on how and by what means Descartes and Pascal set out to prove God’s existence. The latter aspect shall take us back to each philosopher’s relationship to Doubt: the title, “The Giants of Doubt”, in fact, implies a fundamental link between Descartes and Pascal through Doubt. In addition, and most importantly, the contrast between the two thinkers’ epistemology inaugurates a decisive scission in modern thought of enormous repercussion: Descartes’ sturdy rationalism initiated the great branch of modern scientific enquiry, while Pascal’s appeal to the power of intuition and feelings would eventually be the precursor of the reaction to the enlightenment that invested Europe by the second half of the eighteenth century. This departure of thought, which in my view may be traced back to them, has not been the common conceit of the history of philosophy: the reaction to the enlightenment has customarily been regarded as stemming from its internal contradictions or at best from its more radical doctrines. The essay shall show that these strands of thought were both parallel and born out of the antithetical epistemologies of Descartes and Pascal.