Pacific-basin Finance Journal 

About: Pacific-basin Finance Journal is an academic journal published by Elsevier BV. The journal publishes majorly in the area(s): Stock market & Business. It has an ISSN identifier of 0927-538X. Over the lifetime, 1804 publications have been published receiving 51827 citations.

Initial public offerings: International insights

Abstract: This paper discusses evidence on the short-run and long-run performance of companies going public in many countries. Differences in average initial returns are analyzed in terms of binding regulations, contractual mechanisms, and the characteristics of the firms going public. The evidence suggests that the move in recent years by most East Asian countries to reduce regulatory interference in the setting of offering prices should result in less short-run underpricing in the 1990s than in the 1980s. Evidence is presented that companies successfully time their offerings for periods when valuations are high, with investors receiving low returns in the long-run. Implications for investors, issuers, and regulators are discussed.

Herding behavior in Chinese stock markets: An examination of A and B shares

Abstract: This study examines herding behavior in dual-listed Chinese A-share and B-share stocks. We find evidence of herding within both the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets that are dominated by domestic individual investors, and also within both B-share markets, in which foreign institutional investors are the main participants. Herding occurs in both rising and falling market conditions. Herding behavior by A-share investors in the Shanghai market is more pronounced under conditions of rising markets, high trading volume, and high volatility, while no asymmetry is apparent in the B-share market.

Islamic banking: Interest-free or interest-based?

Abstract: A unique feature of Islamic banking, in theory, is its profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) paradigm. In practice, however, we find that Islamic banking is not very different from conventional banking. Our study on Malaysia shows that only a negligible portion of Islamic bank financing is strictly PLS based and that Islamic deposits are not interest-free, but are closely pegged to conventional deposits. Our findings suggest that the rapid growth in Islamic banking is largely driven by the Islamic resurgence worldwide rather than by the advantages of the PLS paradigm and that Islamic banks should be subject to regulations similar to those of their western counterparts.

Size really matters: Further evidence on the negative relationship between board size and firm value

Abstract: This study examines the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the firm value of Singapore and Malaysia firms (as measured by Tobin's Q ) We find little evidence of relationships between most corporate governance mechanisms and Tobin's Q However, consistent with Yermack [Higher market valuation of firms with a small board of directors J Financ Econ 40 (1996), 185–211] and Eisenberg et al [Larger board size and decreasing firm value in small firms J Financ Econ 48 (1998), 35–54], we find that there is an inverse relationship between board size and firm value in both countries This suggests that the negative relationship between board size and firm value transcends different corporate governance systems

Controlling shareholders and corporate value: Evidence from Thailand

Abstract: This study investigates the effects of controlling shareholders on corporate performance. The empirical results, based on a unique database of Thai firms, do not support the hypothesis that controlling shareholders expropriate corporate assets. In fact, the presence of controlling shareholders is associated with higher performance, when measured by accounting measures such as the ROA and the sales–asset ratio. Since most of the firms do not implement control mechanisms to separate voting and cash flow rights, the controlling shareholders might be self-constrained not to extract private benefits. Otherwise, they would internalize higher costs of expropriation from holding high stakes. The controlling shareholders’ involvement in the management, however, has a negative effect on the performance. The negative effect is more pronounced when the controlling shareholderand-manager’s ownership is at the 25–50%. The evidence also reveals that family-controlled firms display significantly higher performance. Foreign controlled firms as well as firms with more than one controlling shareholder also have higher ROA, relative to firms with no controlling shareholder. q 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.