Showing papers in "Pacific Historical Review in 1984"
76 citations
TL;DR: It is shown how cultural lag can be remedied by developing a new perspective on the historian's enterprise, one that will make us Darwinians at last.
Abstract: CHARLES DARWIN has been moldering in his grave now for a full century. But it is not death with which we associate his name; it is life, in all its abundance and variety. In particular, the argument he made for the natural origin of life, including humans, has been one of the most influential ideas in the world over that century's span. It was accepted a long while back by almost everyone within the reach of modern science, despite the persistent opposition of a raggletaggle band of creationists. But for all that general acceptance, Darwin's ideas have not yet become working principles among several large groups of scholars. Take history, for example: reading the journals and dissertations in this field reveals the profound, continuing influence of Adam Smith, Karl Marx, and Sigmund Freud, but still there is no Darwin in our history, at least not as a tradition of historical theory. Evolution and history remain, after a hundred years, separate realms of discourse. There is little history in the study of nature, and there is little nature in the study of history. I want to show how we can remedy that cultural lag by developing a new perspective on the historian's enterprise, one that will make us Darwinians at last. It will require us to step back now and then from parliamentary debates, social mobility data, and the biographies of illustrious figures in order to examine more elemental questions that concern the long-running human dialogue with the earth.
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TL;DR: This author found himself engaged in an exchange of letters with Gore Vidal and others in the New York Review of Books over how many Filipinos had died in the Philippine-American War, the exchange having been prompted by Vidal's preposterous statement that "some three million Filipinos" had been "slaughtered."
Abstract: AT THE END of 1981, this author found himself engaged in an exchange of letters with Gore Vidal and others in the New York Review of Books. At issue was the question of how many Filipinos had died in the Philippine-American War, the exchange having been prompted by Vidal's preposterous statement that "some three million Filipinos" had been "slaughtered." Vidal had insufficient knowledge of Philippine history to recognize that the 3,000,000 figure he had found was a misprint. His source had intended to place the number of Filipino deaths at 300,000.1 Finding that figure too low to sustain his contention that "our policy in the Philippines was genocide,"2 Vidal turned to a 1901 statement attributed to GeneralJ. Franklin Bell to argue that the Americans had killed at least 600,000 Filipinos. Another participant in the New York Review exchange alleged that "over the course of the Philippine-American War, perhaps 10 percent of the population died" (a total of approximately 700,000 deaths if one uses the population estimate for 1898 provided in the 1903 census).S
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TL;DR: In the last twenty years public attitudes and policy toward predatory mammals have changed drastically as discussed by the authors, and this abrupt reversal of public sentiment and policy (marked most conveniently by President Richard Nixon's ban in 1972 on poisoning predators) is visible evidence of a long and largely hidden process of social and intellectual change.
Abstract: IN THE last twenty years public attitudes and policy toward predatory mammals have changed drastically. The wildlife biologist's notebook and binoculars have replaced the hunter's traps, guns, and poison; federal grants for wildlife preservation have taken the place of bounty payments; and species which were hated, feared, and hunted are now cherished, studied, and encouraged. This abrupt reversal of public sentiment and policy (marked most conveniently by President Richard Nixon's ban in 1972 on poisoning predators) is the visible evidence of a long and largely hidden process of social and intellectual change.' As Americans
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TL;DR: This article pointed out that although the United States reputedly had an anticolonial tradition, it failed to identify with Asian and African aspirations and ordinarily sided with its European allies, thus, while Indonesian nationalists did receive some moral and other support from United States, Washington until mid-1948 was more pro-Dutch than supportive of the regime in Djokja.
Abstract: AMONG THE MOST difficult foreign policy problems facing the United States in the post-World War II era was the issue of colonialism, or imperialism as it was often referred to. Although the United States reputedly had an anticolonial tradition, it failed to identify with Asian and African aspirations and ordinarily sided with its European allies. Thus, while Indonesian nationalists did receive some moral and other support from the United States, Washington until mid-1948 was more pro-Dutch than supportive of the regime in Djokja. Historians and other scholars have noted the absence of a
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TL;DR: For example, it is possible that the pioneers moving along the Oregon Trail would have done better to turn their wagons toward Cleveland as discussed by the authors, since a rapidly developing region had both "unexploited natural resources" and a fluid society, an individual with the necessary ambition and valued skills would find the "road to the top open." But other, older, more established areas of the country also grew rapidly during the great days of western settlement.
Abstract: qualified, scholars continue to acknowledge that central to the pioneer impulse lay the belief that a new and better life awaited the migrants in "a new country." Indeed, Ray Allen Billington included "exceptional" and "unusual" opportunity for individual betterment as part of his definition of frontier. Since a rapidly developing region had both "unexploited natural resources" and a fluid society, an individual with the necessary ambition and valued skills would find the "road to the top open."2 But other, older, more established areas of the country also grew rapidly during the great days of western settlement; is it possible that the pioneers moving along the Oregon Trail would have done better to turn their wagons toward Cleveland? Until recently, there were few systematic attempts to gauge how much the various frontiers really offered to potential settlers. The question of personal success was methodologically intractable for the traditional scholar, working alone. But during
Abstract: HISTORIANS OF WESTERN America are preoccupied with their fate and the future of their field.' The phenomenon is not new, just more acute. In 1962, W. N. Davis queried historians of the West about their field and found them uneasy but, overall, optimistic.2 Twenty years later, Richard Van Orman probed the consciousness of western historians and uncovered more pessimism, but essentially comparable anxieties.3 The scripture remains the same, often down to the verses: insecurity of western historians, parochialism of the field, lack of sophisticated methodology, overemphasis of the popular, lack of research in the twentieth-century West--all upset the previous generation as they do us. What are the answers? To borrow a metaphor of our times, and other times, which seems to have reached new popularity there are no quick fixes! There is little doubt that the field is in trouble. Declining enrollments, inadequate research and teaching, lack of administrative support and the respect of our colleagues in other fields of our discipline are all symptoms of a malaise. As one after another of our senior colleagues retire, and either are not replaced or their positions usurped by another field, we continue our steady decline. How do we stop this erosion, or at least brake it? We
TL;DR: The authors investigated how the federal government implemented the exclusionary legislation and Delber L. McKee investigated how it was implemented and why the anti-Chinese movement culminated in Chinese exclusion in 1882.
Abstract: THE HISTORICAL literature on Chinese Americans is quite uneven in the topics covered, in the geographic focus of the studies, and in scholarly quality. Since American reaction to Chinese immigration was negative, much scholarly effort has been devoted to explaining the causes of the anti-Chinese movement, which culminated in Chinese exclusion in 1882. Major monographs by Mary Roberts Coolidge, Elmer Clarence Sandmeyer, Gunther Barth, Stuart Creighton Miller, Robert McClellan, and Alexander Saxton have offered different explanations for the antiChinese movement.' Delber L. McKee investigated how the federal government implemented the exclusionary legislation and
TL;DR: Although Boldt's decision was favorable to the Indians, it represented only one development in a conflict that has ranged from the territorial period of Oregon and Washington to the present.
Abstract: Judge George Boldt's controversial decision in United States v. Washington in 1974.1 Though that decision was favorable to the Indians, it represented only one development in a conflict that has ranged from the territorial period of Oregon and Washington to the present. The more recent controversies have been essentially a fight over remnants since Indians lost many of the most valuable fisheries in previous decades. Although Indian fishing
TL;DR: Guamanians finally broke down this opposition by 1950, thanks to their own political agitation, the intervention of President Harry S. Truman, and the favorable opinion in the United States of Guam's wartime resistance to the Japanese as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: SHORTLY AFTER the Second World War, the United States Navy attempted to reestablish a colonial government on the island of Guam. This effort met considerable resistance from the local populace, resulting in a powerful citizenship movement. Because of defense priorities and a long tradition of naval administration, the island's military rulers opposed all attempts to upset the status quo. Arguing on behalf of democratic rights, the Guamanians finally broke down this opposition by 1950, thanks to their own political agitation, the intervention of President Harry S. Truman, and the favorable opinion in the United States of Guam's wartime resistance to the Japanese. Hardly an isolated case, the struggle for citizenship on Guam was part of the postwar crusade against colonialism.
TL;DR: The Pacific Historical Review was launched in 1932 as mentioned in this paper with the goal of "covering the topics that the new journal would cover, previous studies on the subject had dealt with the opening of Japan, extraterritoriality in China, or the open door doctrine -episodes of American "expansion" that were tame in comparison with what was to come".
Abstract: WHEN the Pacific Historical Review was launched in 1932, much of American expansion into Asia and the Pacific remained in the future. Although this was one of the topics that the new journal would cover, previous studies on the subject had dealt with the opening of Japan, extraterritoriality in China, or the open door doctrine -episodes of American "expansion" that were tame in comparison with what was to come. The last fifty-odd years, in contrast, have seen America's military, political, economic, and cultural involvement in the Asia-Pacific region that has fundamentally altered Asian history, American society, and international affairs in general. In the early 1930s it would have seemed quixotic to talk of America's "Pacific destiny" or to describe the United States as an Asian power; today these are commonplace expressions, and the concept of a Pacific community, comparable
TL;DR: The essence of the American belligerency commitment was first uncovered during a congressional investigation of 1945-1946 as discussed by the authors, concluding that FDR did in fact give an explicit pledge during the first week of December 1941 and that this capped a period of gradually increased verbal assurance beginning in late July.
Abstract: WHEN A FLIGHT of dive bombers struck Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7, 1941, few were aware that President Franklin D Roosevelt had already vouchsafed American belligerency in the event that Thai, Dutch, or British territory should come under attack by Japan Partial evidence for such a commitment was first uncovered during a congressional investigation of 1945-1946 Since then, scholars have agreed that FDR did in fact give an explicit pledge during the first week of December 1941 and that this capped a period of gradually increased verbal assurance beginning in late July' This article will endeavor to show that the essence of the Amer-
TL;DR: The most successful peacetime foreign policies launched by the United States in this century were the Marshall Plan as mentioned in this paper, which is generally regarded as one of the most successful foreign policies in history.
Abstract: THE MARSHALL PLAN is generally regarded as among the most successful peacetime foreign policies launched by the United States in this century. Yet thirty-five years after its inception, we still lack a comprehensive account of this celebrated American initiative. Much of the existing literature is based on limited research in archival and manuscript collections which have only recently become available; and most of the rest focuses narrowly on the developments preceding Secretary of State George C. Marshall's famous proposal, at Harvard University in June 1947; on the Soviet Union's refusal to cooperate in European recovery; and on the anti-Communist motives that infused American policy. But as John Gimbel has pointed out, American leaders had not devised a concrete "plan" for rebuilding Europe at the time of Marshall's speech. Nor had their planning proceeded very far when Soviet officials withdrew from the Foreign Ministers Conference that met in Paris to consider Marshall's proposal in late June and early July. As a result, we know little about the planning process itself or about the negotiations between the United States and its
TL;DR: This article argued that the United States became China's friend and Japan's case was never very convincingly argued before the American people, whereas China's was, and argued that war was the only way of resolving their differences.
Abstract: DESPITE THE PASSAGE of forty years, the Pacific War still poses many questions for historians. One is that of the paradox behind Pearl Harbor. Why did two countries with so much in common, as Akira Iriye has recently argued, become such implacable enemies that war was the only way of resolving their differences? A partial answer lies in America's prewar image of Japan. Japan's case was never very convincingly argued before the American people, whereas China's was. The United States became China's friend and