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Showing papers in "Philosophical Books in 1990"


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593 citations



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109 citations



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54 citations


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46 citations



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32 citations



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that Schopenhauer does not have any good arguments for holding that the subject of knowing and the object known must be distinct cognitive states, whereas the two states that he cites can perfectly well be regarded as distinct, so the claim that we can have selfknowledge does not fall foul of the general assumption.
Abstract: ion we arccapable of, hut it is identical with the proposition 'There are objects for me', and this is identical with 'I am a subject', which contains no more than ' I ' .The suggestion is that the attempt to set up an instance of knowledge of oneself as a knower collapses. What Schopenhauer says about the 'abstracted' proposition 'I have cognition' carries conviction. To know this about myself is ultimately to know only that I am a subject, which presumably I already know in knowing that I am. But it cannot be right, surely, to say that my knowing that I have a particular cognition (c) is not distinct from my having c. For here we have two cognitive states with different prepositional contents, which surely ought to make them distinct cognitive states, even if it is true that I cannot have c without knowing that I do so (which is by no means uncontestable). And if it is perfectly legitimate to say that I know that: I have a particular cognition (at a particular time), then in one sense I can have knowledge of myself as a knower. The general assumption that Schopenhauer makes is that if I know about a state I am in, then the state known about and the state of knowing must be distinct. However, the two states that he cites can perfectly well be regarded as distinct, so the claim that we can have selfknowledge does not fall foul of the general assumption. It begins to look as if Schopenhauer does not have any good arguments for holding that the subject of knowing and the object known must be distinct. As I said earlier, he usually proceeds on the basis that this is a self-evident, truth—in at least one place he says quite tersely that the knowing subject is completely unknowable because it is thai which knows}'' To all intents and purposes, he treats as an assumption the following proposition: necessarily, if x is an object for y, then x andj are

22 citations




Journal ArticleDOI
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