Showing papers in "Philosophical Investigations in 1991"
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TL;DR: In this article it is shown that the notion of a composite soul is a monstrosity, and that the composite soul would no longer be a soul if it were composed of composite objects.
Abstract: 5.542 I t is clear, however, that ‘A believes that p’, ‘A thinks p’, ‘A says p’ are of the form ‘ “p” says p’: and this does not involve a correlation o f a fact with an object, but rather the correlation of facts by means of the correlation of their objects . 5.5421 This shows too that the soul2 the subject, etc. as it is conceived in the superficial psychology of the present day is a monstrosity. For a composite soul would no longer be a soul.
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