Showing papers in "Philosophical Investigations in 2012"
TL;DR: This article showed that Wittgenstein's conception of grammar and the role he allocated to grammar in philosophy did not change between the Big Typescript and the Philosophical Investigations, and that grammatical propositions (e.g. the meaning of a word is its use; a sample in an ostensive definition belongs to the means of representation; belief is not a mental state) are no more theses, doctrines, opinions or opinions than is “a bachelor is an unmarried man.” Nor are they in any way dogmatic.
Abstract: It is sometimes argued that Wittgenstein's conception of grammar and the role he allocated to grammar (in his sense of the term) in philosophy changed between the Big Typescript and the Philosophical Investigations. It is also held that some of the grammatical propositions Wittgenstein asserted prior to his writing of the Philosophical Investigations are theses, doctrines, opinions or dogmatism, which he abandoned by 1936/37. The purpose of this paper is to show these claims to be misunderstandings and misinterpretations. On all important matters, his conception of grammar and of grammatical investigations, of grammatical statements or propositions and of grammatical clarification did not change between the Big Typescript and the Investigations. Grammatical propositions (e.g. the meaning of a word is its use; a sample in an ostensive definition belongs to the means of representation; belief is not a mental state) are no more theses, doctrines or opinions than is “a bachelor is an unmarried man.” Nor are they in any way dogmatic.
22 citations
TL;DR: Iris Murdoch is against the separation of the forms not as a correction of Plato but in order to keep faith with him as mentioned in this paper, which is not a source book of accurately targeted self-refutation but a catalogue of student errors.
Abstract: I develop Iris Murdoch's argument that “there is no Platonic ‘elsewhere,’ similar to the Christian ‘elsewhere.’ ” Thus: Iris Murdoch is against the Separation of the Forms not as a correction of Plato but in order to keep faith with him; Plato's Parmenides is not a source book of accurately targeted self-refutation but a catalogue of student errors; the testimony of Aristotle and Gilbert Ryle about Plato's motivations in the Theory of Forms is not an indubitable foundation from which to denounce Iris Murdoch's treatment of Plato as inaccurate but a rival reading of dubious charity. If Iris Murdoch's version of the Theory of Forms strikes Newton Garver as an incoherent mix of influences from Wittgenstein and Plato, this is not because Iris Murdoch is herself confused, but because in important respects the orthodoxy has Plato wrong.
12 citations
TL;DR: This article argued that the feared circularity is not a mark of Brandom's explanatory strategy, but a feature of social practice of which we theorists partake, and argued that there is no dilemma, because the fear of circularity was not vicious, while normative claims do exhibit their respective authors' practical attitudes and contribute towards establishing the normative statuses they are about.
Abstract: According to a standard criticism, Robert Brandom's “normative pragmatics”, ie his attempt to explain normative statuses in terms of practical attitudes, faces a dilemma If practical attitudes and their interactions are specified in purely non-normative terms, then they underdetermine normative statuses; but if normative terms are allowed into the account, then the account becomes viciously circular This paper argues that there is no dilemma, because the feared circularity is not vicious While normative claims do exhibit their respective authors' practical attitudes and thereby contribute towards establishing the normative statuses they are about, this circularity is not a mark of Brandom's explanatory strategy but a feature of social practice of which we theorists partake
8 citations
TL;DR: In this article, an alternative account of the relation between medieval beliefs about the heavens and our astronomical beliefs, and the disagreement between the two accounts, are discussed, and discussed in detail in detail.
Abstract: The philosophical image of a “universe of discourse” can be misleading in the suggestions it carries about how to read Wittgenstein and how to approach the topic of the relation between language and reality. That is what I try to show by examining Ilham Dilman's discussion of medieval cosmology. I sketch an alternative account of the relation between medieval beliefs about the heavens and our astronomical beliefs, and I consider in detail the disagreement between the two accounts.
5 citations
TL;DR: In a remark written sometime between 1933 and 1943, Wittgenstein suggests that philosophy ought really to be written as one 'writes a poem' as discussed by the authors, and also talks of simile as the 'best thing' in philosophy.
Abstract: In a remark written sometime between 1933 and 1943, Wittgenstein suggests that philosophy ought really to be written as one 'writes a poem.' Around this time he also talks of simile as the 'best thing' in philosophy. In this paper I consider what it would mean to take such claims seriously. Through examining newly discovered material from the (unpublished) Skinner manuscripts (MSS), I offer an analysis of Wittgenstein's approach to literary techniques (broadly conceived) and see how this impacts on his conception of philosophy. ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR
4 citations
TL;DR: Wittgenstein this article argued that the grammar of religious utterances and the logic of religious beliefs is often complex, in that individual utterance and beliefs will often be mixed between, indeterminate between, or fluid between being scientific and being non-scientific.
Abstract: The predominant interpretation of Wittgenstein's later remarks on religion takes him to hold that all religious utterances are non-scientific, and to hold that the way to show that religious utterances are non-scientific is to identify and characterise the grammatical rules governing their use. This paper claims that though this does capture one strand of Wittgenstein's later thought on religion, there is an alternative strand of that thought which is quite different and more nuanced. In this alternative strand Wittgenstein stresses that religious utterances and beliefs can come in both scientific and non-scientific varieties. More than that, he claims that the grammar of religious utterances, and the logic of religious beliefs, is often complex – in that individual utterances and beliefs will often be mixed between, indeterminate between, or fluid between being scientific and being non-scientific. This complexity means that it will often be unhelpful to try to pin down one particular grammar or logic for a given utterance or belief. Wittgenstein therefore suggests a new method of grammatical and logical investigation, which is less likely to distort complex grammars or logics by being overly simplistic or rigid. This method is to use simple examples of utterances and beliefs as objects of comparison, so as to illuminate the different aspects of the more complex actual utterances and beliefs under examination. This alternative strand in Wittgenstein's later remarks on religion is a manifestation of a broader strand of Wittgenstein's later thought as a whole, which was first described by Friedrich Waismann, and later developed by Gordon Baker and Oskari Kuusela. The paper concludes by providing examples of religious beliefs which are logically mixed, indeterminate, and fluid, and showing how simple objects of comparison can be used to illuminate them.
4 citations
Journal Article•
TL;DR: In this article, it is shown that it is by means of connective linguistic analysis that Strawson was able to unify epistemology, ontology, and logic, and that we can understand this unity through considering the fundamental operation of our language.
Abstract: Strawson’s conception of analysis as a ‘connective linguistic analysis’ makes it possible for him to achieve an indefinitely large range of ideas or concepts among them are certain numbers of fundamental, general and pervasive concepts or concept-types which not only are pre-theoretical or ahistorical, but also together constitute a structural framework only within which logic, ontology and epistemology is possible. He takes it as a foundation for this conclusion that logic, ontology and epistemology are three aspects of one unified enquiry (or trio) and strengthens it by this assertion that we can understand this unity through considering the fundamental operation of our language. In this paper, after tracing the line of development of Strawson’s philosophical idea of the trio and specifying the fundamental operation of our language (or the common thread which makes this unity possible), we stipulate that it is by means of ‘connective linguistic analysis’ that Strawson was able to unify epistemology, ontology and logic.
4 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that this view on selfhood is inattentive to the kind of personal and moral reflection inherent in asking who I am and that there is a temptation in love to deceive myself and you by renouncing responsibility.
Abstract: Sartre's conception of bad faith suggests that every desire to be someone in love is self-deceptive in the attempt to define my factual being. Departing from Ilham Dilman's discussion of personal identity, I argue that this view on selfhood is inattentive to the kind of personal and moral reflection inherent in asking who I am. There is a temptation in love to deceive myself and you by renouncing responsibility. Yet the concept also embodies demands that allow me to continuously shape myself into a loving subject by scrutinising my responses and by asking whether they are expressive of love or not.
3 citations
TL;DR: The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God by D. Z. Phillips as mentioned in this paper is a classic work on the problem of good and evil, and it has been used extensively in the literature.
Abstract: This paper notes and discusses some key arguments in Part One of The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God by D. Z. Phillips. With an eye on some texts of Thomas Aquinas, I reject Phillips's view that belief in divine omnipotence leads to absurd claims concerning God, but I defend his rejection of anthropomorphism when it comes to talk of God, and, with qualifications, I defend and elaborate on his suggestion that God is not a moral agent. I also commend his critique of certain well-known theodicies (e.g. that provided by Richard Swinburne), although I challenge his appeal to what he calls “the grammar of God.”
3 citations
TL;DR: The idea of the unity of language appears to have both an anthropological and an ethical aspect as mentioned in this paper, and the latter is illustrated with the help of a Hemingway story.
Abstract: Rush Rhees held Wittgenstein's work in high esteem but considered it in need of deepening. He was critical of Wittgenstein's idea that the builders' game might be the whole language of a tribe and that human language could be thought of as simply a range of language games. Rhees thought that Wittgenstein failed to do justice to the unity of language. The idea of the unity of language appears to have both an anthropological and an ethical aspect. The latter is illustrated with the help of a Hemingway story.
2 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore some of the conceptual features of martyrdom by virtue of which it has its role and to show, using those very features and using Simone Weil's observations, that martyrdom cannot mark the logical climax of the believer's love of God.
Abstract: Martyrdom has played and continues to play a dominant role in the religious imagination of many. Jews and Christians alike conceive of their martyrs as exceptional people of faith who express exceptional love and devotion to God. The purpose of this paper is to explore some of the conceptual features of martyrdom by virtue of which it has its role and to show, using those very features and using Simone Weil's observations, that martyrdom cannot mark the logical climax of the believer's love of God.
TL;DR: In this paper, the concepts of practice and language-game are considered in connection with magic-related activities among the Azande of north-central Africa, and Mounce's contention that the whole way of speaking about magic and witchcraft is "hardly intelligible" is examined.
Abstract: Howard Mounce and Peter Winch both made novel and illuminating contributions to discussions about how, or whether, we can understand societies very different from our own – societies that would, these days, be referred to as “indigenous,”“tribal,”“traditional” or “small-scale.” This paper aims to elucidate some disagreements between Mounce and Winch while also critically engaging in the debate. The concepts of “practice” and “language-game” are considered in connection with magic-related activities among the Azande of north-central Africa, and Mounce's contention that the Azande's whole way of speaking about magic and witchcraft is “hardly intelligible” is examined. I challenge Mounce's interpretations of certain analogies that he uses, and propose that his argument relies on what is probably an underestimation of the degree to which magic and witchcraft are integral to Azande culture as a whole.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors defend an Aquinas-inspired, anti-anthropomorphic natural theology that emphasises the mysterious distance between the Creator and his creation, which is at odds with their reluctance to give up on a metaphysical argument to establish the reality of God from outside religious faith and practice.
Abstract: Herbert McCabe and Brian Davies defend an Aquinas-inspired, anti-anthropomorphic natural theology that emphasises the mysterious distance between the Creator and his creation. This theology gives rise to a powerful response to the problem of evil, powerful enough to scuttle the academic problem of evil that is based on a confused anthropomorphic understanding of God. But that does not dispose of the problem of evil per se. The McCabe–Davies natural theology can succeed only by appropriating a personal understanding of “the ultimate question” (why is there something rather than nothing?), which is at odds with their reluctance to give up on a metaphysical argument to establish the reality of God from outside religious faith and practice. But if that same personal understanding is applied to the problem of evil we find it generates “the unprecedented charge,” a form of the problem that does not depend on an anthropomorphic conception of God. The way forward for the McCabe–Davies natural theology is to follow Dewi Phillips in his rejection of philosophy's aspiration to find “external justifications” for our religious lives.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors suggest that it is the metaphors we rely on in order to conceptualize time that provide an illusory space for time-travel-talk, and that the unaware projection of fragments of our time-talk - taken from powerful conceptual metaphors - onto the nature of reality itself dissolves away the charm and attractions of such talk.
Abstract: Extending work of Wittgenstein, Lakoff and Johnson I suggest that it is the (spatial) metaphors we rely on in order to conceptualise time that provide an illusory space for time-travel-talk. For example, in the “Moving Time” spatialisation of time, “objects” move past the agent from the future to the past. The objects all move in the same direction – this is mapped to time always moving in the same direction. But then it is easy to imagine suspending this rule, and asking why the objects should not start moving in the opposite direction. This is one way of generating the idea of time-travel “back” into the past. Time-travel-talk essentially involves the unaware projection of fragments of our time-talk – taken from powerful conceptual metaphors – onto the nature of reality itself. Understanding this dissolves away the charm and attractions of such talk.
TL;DR: This paper explored Rhees's analogy between everyday conversation and literature, and suggested a conception of form that encourages us to see literary works as contributions to conversation in virtue of their concern.
Abstract: Exploring Rhees's analogy between everyday conversation and literature, the paper suggests a conception of form that encourages us to see literary works as contributions to conversation in virtue of their concern. How we might read for the concern of a literary work is exemplified by readings of Ibsen's Ghosts and The Wild Duck. These readings suggest that Rhees's analogy not only throws light on the communicative powers of literature: viewing everyday talk in the light of works of literature also gives us a better grasp of what goes on in conversation.
TL;DR: In the 1990s, Peter Winch was increasingly inclined to emphasise disagreement, which was related to his developing views on understanding, logic and reasoning as mentioned in this paper, and this development is traced, in part, on the basis of unpublished lecture notes.
Abstract: Peter Winch, in his political philosophy, wanted to rethink the concepts of political authority, legitimacy and political culture, with a starting point in Wittgensteinian ideas. This essay brings together Winch's thoughts on political authority. Developing insights from Wittgenstein's work on certainty, Winch emphasised the unstated background behind any normative stand concerning authority. Ideas of legitimacy and civil society are formed within historically specific political cultures. In the 1990s, Winch was increasingly inclined to emphasise disagreement, which was related to his developing views on understanding, logic and reasoning. This development is traced, in part, on the basis of unpublished lecture notes.