Showing papers in "Philosophical Investigations in 2017"
TL;DR: The authors argue that Brandhorst does not recognize this because his conception of objectivity is distorted by a Platonist picture, and that he misinterprets the passage which he takes to support a Wittgensteinian case against objectivity.
Abstract: In ‘Correspondence to Reality in Ethics’, Mario Brandhorst examines the view of ethics that Wittgenstein took in his later years. According to Brandhorst, Wittgenstein leaves room for truth and falsity, facts, correspondence and reality in ethics. Wittgenstein’s target, argues Brandhorst, is objectivity. I argue (1) that Brandhorst’s arguments in favour of truth, facts, reality and correspondence in ethics invite similar arguments in favour of objectivity, (2) that Brandhorst does not recognize this because his conception of objectivity is distorted by a Platonist picture, and (3) that he misinterprets the passage which he takes to support a Wittgensteinian case against objectivity.
17 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present an interpretation of Wittgenstein's remarks on private language, revealing their inadequacies, and then present their own interpretation based on the notes for lectures on private sensations.
Abstract: In this paper, I first review previous interpretations of Wittgenstein's remarks on private language, revealing their inadequacies, and then present my own interpretation. Basing mainly on Wittgenstein's notes for lectures on private sensations, I establish the following points: (i) ‘remembering the connection right’ means ‘reidentifying sensation-types’; (ii) the reason for ‘no criterion of correctness’ is that nothing, especially no inner mechanisms nor external devices, can be utilised by the private speaker to tell whether some sensations are of one type or different types; and (iii) private names are not really names, private language is not really a language, therefore, private language is a grammatical illusion. My interpretation has the advantage of being able to reconcile Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy, which is to dissolve philosophical problems by rearranging grammatical facts, with his actual philosophical practice, at least in the case of private language.
11 citations
TL;DR: In a fragmentary treatise by Rhees as discussed by the authors, the author gives an account of the problem of continuity that he had started elaborating before he became acquainted with Wittgenstein.
Abstract: This article presents an edited excerpt from a hitherto unknown fragmentary treatise by Rush Rhees. In the treatise, Rhees gives his account of the problem of continuity that he had started elaborating before he became acquainted with Wittgenstein. The excerpt, which contains Rhees' original distinction between outer and inner surfaces of bodies, builds on Brentano's theory of the continuum and his doctrine of plerosis. This treatment of continuity sheds light on Rhees' early philosophical development and confirms that even though he and Wittgenstein discussed the problem of continuity, Rhees' own approach remained distinct from that of Wittgenstein.
8 citations
TL;DR: De Mesel as discussed by the authors argued that the later Wittgenstein did not endorse a realist account of ethics and that there are uses for expressions such as "objectivity" that do not involve a deeper realist commitment.
Abstract: In a previous paper, I argued that the later Wittgenstein did not endorse a realist account of ethics, where a realist account is understood to involve a claim to truth as well as objectivity. In this paper, I respond to a number of critical questions that Benjamin De Mesel raises about that interpretation. I agree with him that just as there are uses for expressions such as “truth”, “fact” and “reality” in ethics, there are uses for expressions such as “objectivity” that do not involve a deeper realist commitment. But I uphold and reinforce my claim that objectivity in ethics as the realist conceives it is ruled out by Wittgenstein, who describes the correspondence between ethical expressions and reality in an entirely different way.
5 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that there is no philosophically interesting distinction to be made between inference-rules and premises, and that the possibility of infinite regress illustrated by the story of Achilles and the tortoise provides no motivation to abandon the traditional logical separation of arguments into their premises and conclusions.
Abstract: There is no philosophically interesting distinction to be made between inference-rules and premises. That there is such a distinction is often held to follow from the possibility of infinite regress illustrated by Carroll's story of Achilles and the tortoise. I will argue that this is wrong on three separate grounds. Consequently, Carroll's fable provides no motivation to abandon the traditional logical separation of arguments into their premises and conclusions. There is no proposition that must be taken to be a rule and must not be taken as a premise.
5 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors focus on how a person can forge a stable ethical identity over time by adapting to one's ethical context in a way that allows one to be recognized as the same practical agent.
Abstract: How can a person forge a stable ethical identity over time? On one view, ethical constancy means reapplying the same moral rules. On a rival view, it means continually adapting to one's ethical context in a way that allows one to be recognized as the same practical agent. Focusing on his thinking about repetition, I show how Kierkegaard offers a critical perspective on both these views. From this perspective, neither view can do justice to our vulnerability to certain kinds of crisis, in which our ethical self-understanding is radically undermined. I further examine his alternative account of ethical constancy, by clarifying Kierkegaard's idea of a ‘second ethics’, as addressed to those who feel ethically powerless and as requiring an ongoing process of self-transformation.
4 citations
TL;DR: The Editors' Preface to the fourth edition of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is disparaging of the earlier editorial efforts of G. E. M. Anscombe and Rush Rhees as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: The Editors’ Preface to the fourth edition of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is disparaging of the earlier editorial efforts of G. E. M. Anscombe and Rush Rhees and in particular of their inclusion and titling of the material in “Part II”. I argue, on both historical and philosophical grounds, that the Editors have failed to refute the editorial decisions of Rhees and Anscombe – a failure born both of a neglect of the historical circumstances and Wittgenstein's own expressed hopes and intentions for his writings, and of a myopic understanding of his philosophy. Wittgenstein's legacy has not been well served by their interventions, which should be undone in future editions.
3 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that cross-temporal relations on cross-spatial relations in this way obscures how earlier groups become the later ones, and that future generations should not be thought of as distinct groups living at a different temporal "location", but as who we will become.
Abstract: Distributive justice relies on metaphors about spatial distribution. Modelling cross-temporal relations on cross-spatial relations in this way obscures how earlier groups become the later ones. Procedural justice metaphors rely on metaphors of (contemporaneous) contract and thereby on impartial reasoning. Their dominance is already problematic in the case of contemporary relations, but is even more so in the case of relations across time, where the conditions for later parties are controlled and created by earlier ones. Future generations should not be thought of as a distinct group living at a different temporal “location,” but as who we will become. Thus, the frame of “justice” is much less appropriate for our relations to them than the frame of “care”.
3 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that the builders' game of the Philosophical Investigations is closer in kind to animal forms of communication than human language, and suggest that the learning of language is crucially dependent on forms of communications that are animal in nature.
Abstract: Wittgenstein's notorious sample of a ‘complete primitive language’ (viz. the builders’ game of the Philosophical Investigations) is often thought to be closer in kind to animal forms of communication than human language. Indeed, it has been criticised on precisely these grounds. But such debates make little sense if we take seriously Wittgenstein's idea that language is a family resemblance concept. So, rather than argue that the builders’ game ‘really is a language’ (or not), I propose to turn the debate on its head and welcome the comparison. By changing our perspective in this way, I suggest that we can see that the learning of language is crucially dependent on forms of communication that are animal in nature. I then discuss how these lessons might shed light on empirical research into both the ontogenetic and phylogenetic origins of linguistic communication.
2 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that the New Atheists appear to think that their rejection of religion, except for the removal of fundamentalist distortions, changes nothing and that this is because they have not thought things through.
Abstract: When it comes to morality, the New Atheists appear to think that their rejection of religion, except for the removal of fundamentalist distortions, changes nothing. We think that this is because they have not thought things through. Atheism might not be a threat to shame morality, but it is certainly a threat to guilt morality. Given that there are reasons to doubt the viability today of shame morality, we face a far greater problem if atheism triumphs than the New Atheists admit.
2 citations
TL;DR: This paper argued that having a capacity to make self-directed moral judgements is at the core of being within morality, while a lack of disposition on the part of a mature individual to judge others is indicative of the corresponding lack with regard to the selfdirected evaluations.
Abstract: An other-directed moral judgement is contrasted with a moral evaluation of one's own behaviour; it is argued that having a capacity to make self-directed moral judgements is at the core of being within morality, while a lack of disposition on the part of a mature individual to judge others is indicative of the corresponding lack with regard to the self-directed evaluations. Our readiness to evaluate the behaviour of others measures the level of our commitment to a system of morality. Consistent nonjudgementalism subverts the interpersonal nature of moral values and points to a deeper issue – an unwillingness of a nonjudgementalist to apply moral categories to her own choices.
Journal Article•
TL;DR: The Wittgenstein of the Tractatus as mentioned in this paper is committed to four central and interlocking claims: a limit to sense and nonsense can be drawn in logic; whether nonsense is meaningful is shown in its use rather than its form.
Abstract: The Wittgenstein of the Tractatus is committed to four central and interlocking claims: a limit to sense and nonsense can be drawn in logic; a limit to meaningful and meaningless language – to meaningful and meaningless nonsense – cannot be drawn in logic; whether nonsense is meaningful is shown in its use rather than its form; the Tractatus consists largely of meaningful nonsense. Undergirding these commitments is an account of language-to-world picturing in which shared “mathematical multiplicities” play a key role. Picturing as a global phenomenon – language-to-world, rather than proposition-to-fact – has not been well understood. The Tractatus is not a textbook. No doctrines are developed in it. No problems solved. Instead, it is a kind of Baedeker, a guidebook for those who want “to see the world aright.”
Journal Article•
TL;DR: The authors identify the philosophical roots of this attraction and the points at which Mounce's account departs from the elucidatory and non-explanatory path established by Wittgenstein.
Abstract: Wittgenstein's scant remarks on the roots of language in instinctive behaviour have been both difficult to interpret and controversial, not least because they may seem to incline towards forms of explanation that elsewhere he eschewed. Nevertheless, they are of importance in philosophy, not least because they bear upon age-old questions of foundationalism and concept-formation. In a recent Discussion Note in this journal (Mounce, Philosophical Investigations, 2016, 39: 385–390), H. O. Mounce is not only attracted by but also champions such explanation – though he finds Wittgenstein's own “explanations” inadequate in important respects, as evidenced in his misguided criticisms of Moore in On Certainty and in his behaviouristic remarks on the roots of the “cause and effect” language-game. In this response, I try to identify the philosophical roots of this attraction and the points at which Mounce's account departs from the elucidatory and non-explanatory path established by Wittgenstein.
Journal Article•
TL;DR: The destructive and constructive nature of love, towards development of self-awareness and mental growth, is further determined by re-explaining the proposed theory of ego as a complex by Carl Jung, the theory of network of intentionality by John Searle, and theory of emotional processing by Edna Foa and Michael Kozak in this context as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Love, this eminent humane experience, has been explored not only by writers and poets, but also by philosophers, psychologists and even experimental scientists. This paper aims to discuss a novel aspect in phenomenology of love, as the concept of destructive and constructive nature of love, which is to the best of our knowledge, presented for the first time. The fundamental idea of this paper was obtained from verses of Hafiz, then polished by theories of Robert Cloninger and several other thinkers in the field of human emotions. Many verses of Hafiz display love experience as a necessary step towards growth, in a way that could be evinced further by the development of the "self-aware psych" introduced by Cloninger. He introduces the "self-aware psych" as one of the three constituting domains of human mind and personality, the intuitive essence bringing integrity for personality. If self-aware psych flourishes by favorable growth and development, it would prepare the ground for creativity, wisdom and well-being, otherwise, personality disorders would be contingent. The destructive and constructive nature of love, towards development of self-awareness and mental growth, is further determined by re-explaining the proposed theory of "ego as a complex" by Carl Jung, the theory of "network of intentionality" by John Searle, and the theory of "emotional processing" by Edna Foa and Michael Kozak in this context.