Philosophical Perspectives 

About: Philosophical Perspectives is an academic journal published by Wiley-Blackwell. The journal publishes majorly in the area(s): Metaphysics & Argument. It has an ISSN identifier of 1520-8583. Over the lifetime, 539 publications have been published receiving 20764 citations.

The intrinsic quality of experience

Abstract: There are three familiar and related arguments against psychophysical functionalism and the computer model of the mind. The first is that we are directly aware of intrinsic features of our experience and argues that there is no way to account for this awareness in a functional view. The second claims that a person blind from birth can know all about the functional role of visual experience without knowing what it is like to see something red. The third claims that functionalism cannot account for the possibility of an inverted spectrum. All three arguments can be defused by distinguishing properties of the object of experience from properties of the experience of an object.

What are natural kinds

Abstract: 1 Two Questions Distinguish two questions about natural kinds First, the naturalness question: what, if anything, makes a natural kind natural? Perhaps the members of a natural kind, unlike the members of an arbitrary group, stand in some natural similarity relation to one another Perhaps they share an essence or some other natural feature Or perhaps, as conventionalists argue, the boundaries of natural kinds do not correspond to distinctions in nature

How to be a fallibilist

Abstract: The acceptance of fallibilism in epistemology is virtually universal. Any theory of knowledge that endorses the principle that S knows q on the basis of reason r only if r entails q, is doomed to a skeptical conclusion. Fallibilist theories reject this entailment principle thereby avoiding this immediate skeptical result. The acceptance of fallibilism derives from the widely held view that what we seek in constructing a theory of knowledge is an account that squares with our strong intuition that we know many things. Of course, few believe that skepticism is to be avoided at all costs. But while the entailment principle may look attractive in the abstract, it does not command the kind of assent sufficient to withstand the overwhelming case against it provided by our everyday intuitions concerning what we know. Any residual worry associated with denying the principle is far outweighed by our common sense rejection of its skeptical consequences. Thus, a fallibilist theory allows that S can know q on the basis of r where r only makes q probable. Unfortunately, skepticism is not so easily dispatched. Other principles that look very difficult to reject threaten to reinstate skepticism-principles that lead to skeptical paradoxes for fallibilist theories. Thus, even fallibilist theories of knowledge are forced to confront skepticism, albeit in the form of a stubborn paradox rather than as a seemingly inescapable result. The theory of relevant alternatives can be viewed as providing fallibilist theories with a way out of skeptical paradoxes.' However, while the theory looks promising in its broad outline, many believe

What is "naturalized epistemology?"

Abstract: In this section, Kim argues that “Epistemology is a normative discipline as much as, and in the same sense as, normative ethics.” In particular, he argues that epistemology is dominated by the concept of justification, and that justification is a strongly normative notion, i.e. a justified belief is good or right in some way. “But justification manifestly is normative. If a belief is justified for us, then it is permissible and reasonable, from the epistemic point of view, for us to hold it, and it would be epistemically irresponsible to hold beliefs that contradict it. ... It probably is only an historical accident that we standardly speak of “normative ethics” but not of “normative epistemology”.