Showing papers in "Philosophical Studies in 1959"

Singular terms and truth

Abstract: A DICTUM fundamental in the Quinian theory of singular terms is the following: 1 (1) No singular term which permits a true statement including it to be turned into a falsehood (via existential generalization with respect to that term) can be a substituend of a variable. Following (1), for example, "Pegasus" cannot be taken as a substituend of the variable "x" because the inference (2) There is no such thing as Pegasus, Therefore, (Ox) (there is no such thing as x), is invalid. Hence, no statement in which "Pegasus" occurs can be a premise in a valid inference where a premise is (a) an instance of a logical formula or is (b) an instance of a sentential part of a logical formula.2 For example, (3) Pegasus is a horse, which, after Quine, is false because it applies a simple predicate to 1

It's actual, so it's possible

Abstract: to reject (3) both (1) and (2) are available to us. But since (2) is not a serious alternative to (1), it cannot be a serious alternative to (3). As these remarks indicate, I am not questioning Putnam's account of the "core"~ meanings of 'true' and 'false.' Nor can I legitimately claim to have proven that three-valued logic has no future as a replacement for two-valued logic within the framework of Putnam's account of these core meanings. However, if I am correct in maintaining that the truth value concepts of a language embedded in three-valued logic must be translatable into a language with a two-valued logic and still meet Putnam's requirements, a consideration of the kinds of translations available would indicate a dim future for three-valued logic.

Another look at Fact, FIction, and Forecast

Abstract: EVER since the revolutionary results of Hume's examinations were developed, that area of modern philosophy known as induction or confirmation theory has had a notorious and frustrating history.1 In Goodman's recent book, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast,2 new and fruitful insights into the matter are presented by way of developing solutions to problems which he discovers to be closely associated with it. However, some misunderstandings and misapprehensions regarding this work have arisen, which warrant consideration because of the importance of the issues at stake. A convenient way of dealing with such concerns is to examine carefully the strenuous objections of one particular critic,3 and, in so doing, call attention to the more significant parts of the book. In his lengthy review Pap presents an array of arguments of which he apparently considers the first to be the most crucial. It is concerned with refuting Goodman's claim that we can explain dispositional terms without