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Showing papers in "Philosophy and Phenomenological Research in 1987"



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A comprehensive introduction to the major philosophical theories attempting to explain the workings of language can be found in this paper, where the authors present a survey of the major theories and their applications.
Abstract: Provides a comprehensive introduction to the major philosophical theories attempting to explain the workings of language.

189 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider the value of friendship from an Aristotelian point of view and strengthen the challenge articulated in Aristotle's systematic defense of friendship and the shared life.
Abstract: In this paper I want to consider the value of friendship from an Aristotelian point of view. The issue is of current interest given recent challenges to impartialist ethics to take more seriously the commitments and attachments of a person.' In what follows I want to enter that debate in only a restricted way by strengthening the challenge articulated in Aristotle's systematic defense of friendship and the shared life. After some introductory remarks, I begin by considering Aristotle's notion that good living or happiness (eudaimonia)2 for an individual necessarily includes the happiness of others. Shared happiness entails the rational capacity for jointly promoting common ends as well as the capacity to identify with and coordinate separate ends. This extended notion of happiness presupposes the extension of self through friends, and next I

117 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a new characterization of strong supervenience, which is particularly perspicuous, and a discussion of the adequacy of global superveniency as a determination relation is presented.
Abstract: In an earlier paper, "Concepts of Supervenience,"' I characterized two distinct concepts of supervenience, "strong" and "weak," and compared them with each other and with a third concept, "global supervenience." In this paper I wish to correct an error in the earlier paper and present further material on supervenience, including a new characterization of strong supervenience, which I believe is particularly perspicuous, and a discussion of the adequacy of global supervenience as a determination relation. I shall also present a strengthened relation of global supervenience based on similarity rather than indiscernibility between worlds, which may well be a more useful concept than the currently popular conception of global

117 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors define friendship as a practical and emotional relationship of mutual and equal goodwill, affection, and pleasure, and present an analysis of end love in friendship, distinguishing it from means love, as well as from other notions of endlove I regard as unjustifiable.
Abstract: I define friendship as a practical and emotional relationship of mutual and equal goodwill, affection and pleasure.' In a general discussion of friendship I would unpack and defend this broadly Aristotelian definition. But my concerns in this paper can be addressed without doing so. My chief concern is to give an analysis of end love in friendship, distinguishing it from means love, as well as from other notions of end love I regard as unjustifiable. I discuss love outside of friendship only insofar as it has a bearing on love in friendship. I shall give a preliminary sketch of my topic by invoking widely-held intuitions about end friendship as that in which the friend is loved for her essential, not incidental, features; as an intrinsic, not instrumental, value; and as a unique and irreplaceable individual; and by showing how these intuitions fit in or not with the common but ill-understood distinction between conditional and unconditional love. The explication of these intuitions will follow in later sections as part of the analysis of end friendship.

83 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The electromagnetic and micromechanical properties out there in the objective world, are genuine phenomenal properties as discussed by the authors, and despite widespread ignorance of their dynamic and microphysical details, it is these objective properties to which everyone's perceptual mechanisms are keyed.
Abstract: Redness, an objective phenomenal property of apples, is identical with a certain wavelength triplet of electromagnetic reflection efficiencies. Warmth, an objective phenomenal property of objects, is identical with the mean level of the objects' microscopically embodied energies. Pitch, an objective phenomenal property of a sound, is identical with its oscillatory frequency. The electromagnetic and micromechanical properties out there in the objective world, are genuine phenomenal properties. Despite widespread ignorance of their dynamic and microphysical details, it is these objective properties to which everyone's perceptual mechanisms are keyed.

45 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors argued that global supervenience is not equivalent to Kim's strong super-venience and that it does not entail the type or token reducibility of the supervenient properties to the properties upon which they supervene.
Abstract: Global supervenience defines a manner in which two groups of properties may be related to one another. Several of the features which distinguish this notion from related ones suggest that it is especially well suited to characterizing the minimal relationship that may hold between physical properties and those non-physical properties which are compatible with physicalism.' In "Concepts of Supervenience" Jaegwon Kim argues that global supervenience is equivalent to an apparently narrower notion he calls "strong supervenience."' He has also argued, there and elsewhere, that strong supervenience entails the existence of lawlike biconditionals between supervenient properties and the properties upon which they supervene.3 I argue here that global supervenience is not equivalent to Kim's strong supervenience and that it does not entail the type or token reducibility of the supervenient properties to the properties upon which they supervene. I then turn to an examination of the argument that global supervenience is equivalent to implicit definability which according to Beth's theorem entails explicit definability. I hope to show that global supervenience is a distinct and especially interesting relation which captures aspects of the relationship between physical properties and those properties which are determined by them that other relations do not do justice to.

37 citations




Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors examine the attempts of logicians such as Belnap or Aqvist to specify what precisely a question is, or what it is to ask or raise a question, then what we are offered is somewhat less illuminating.
Abstract: A number of logicians and philosophers have turned their attention in recent years to the problem of developing a logic of interrogatives. Their work has thrown a great deal of light on the formal properties of questions and question-sentences and has led also to interesting innovations in our understanding of the structures of performatives in general and, for example, in the theory of presuppositions. When, however, we examine the attempts of logicians such as Belnap or Aqvist to specify what, precisely, a question is, or what it is to ask or raise a question, then what we are offered is somewhat less illuminating. Two alternative reductionist accounts seem in particular to have gained most favor: questions are identified either as special sorts of statements,' or as special sorts of

25 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In the Metaphysical Elements of Virtue (MEV) as discussed by the authors, the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties is replaced by a distinction between juridical duties and duties of virtue, thereby threatening to thwart anyone endeavoring to classify systematically and coherently the moral duties catalogued by Kant in the METAPHysics of Morals.
Abstract: In the Groundwork Kant supplements his discussion of the Principles of Universality and Humanity by presenting four examples, each of which illustrates a particular kind of duty. As is well-known, two are examples of duties to oneself, and two exemplify duties to others. Cutting across that dichotomy is a second distinction between perfect (or narrow) duties and imperfect (or wide) duties. In a footnote he explains that a perfect duty is "one which allows no exception in the interests of inclination."' Imperfect duties, by implication, do allow such exceptions. In the Metaphysical Elements of Virtue (MEV) another distinction appears, that between juridical duties (Rechtspflicht) and duties of virtue (Tugendpflicht). Although it may appear initially that Kant has simply given a new name to the earlier distinction between perfect and imperfect duties, a closer look reveals that the classification of the duties in the MEV is far more complex than the relatively simple one advanced in the Groundwork. The contrast between perfect and imperfect duties does not so much get replaced by the distinction between juridical duties and duties of virtue as supplement it, thereby threatening to thwart anyone endeavoring to classify systematically and coherently the moral duties catalogued by Kant in the Metaphysics of Morals. The question whether Kant's schema of duties reflects some single, underlying principle is not of merely academic interest. The problems raised by the attempt to explain the distinction between juridical duties and duties of virtue, or to find a characteristic common to all of the latter, bear on the proper interpretation of those duties themselves. In particular, a symbiotic relationship exists between the effort to explain what it means to adopt an end (such as the happiness of others), on the one hand, and, on the other, the attempt to explain what is required by, e.g., the duties of respect (forbidding mockery, pride, and calumny) and how they qualify as

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Gadamer's work has been both acclaimed and denounced by post-modern textualists as discussed by the authors, who argued the inapropriateness of such an identification and, similarly, have praised or blamed on this account.
Abstract: A significant feature of the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer is the attempt to articulate a non-foundationalist and radically historical philosophical position without losing the distinction between the empirical and the a priori, the distinction between non-philosophical and philosophical discourse. The defense of such a distinction is not a prominent feature of Gadamer's work. He never argues for it. But we shall see below how it is presupposed throughout his work. Insofar as such a distinction can be maintained in a non-foundational, historical, and hermeneutical context, the commonly invoked dilemma current both in mainstream Anglo-American and so-called "Continental" philosophy can be avoided, i.e., the dilemma between dogmatic and foundationalist metaphysics and Rortian conversation (or Derridean playful deconstruction). It is this dilemma and the lack of any treatment by Gadamer of some of his own most important philosophical presuppositions that account for the mixed reception of his work. By "mixed" I do not mean merely praise and blame but that those who praise or blame him often do so for contradictory reasons. His work has sometimes been identified with post-modern textualism and, in that light, has been both acclaimed and denounced. Others have argued the inapropriateness of such an identification and, similarly, have praised or blamed on this account. Here I shall examine some of the fundamental difficulties inherent in such a position. A look at Gadamer's most recently published essays will help illuminate these considerations.' We find him, for example, in his

Journal ArticleDOI
Steven Luper1
TL;DR: This paper wants to describe and motivate an approach to knowledge that is called the Causal Indicator Analysis, and argue that it has the features an account of knowledge should have.
Abstract: In this paper I want to describe and motivate an approach to knowledge that I call the Causal Indicator Analysis. My strategy will be to sketch (in Part I) the main features of an adequate account of knowledge, then use my sketch (in Part II) to reveal some of the faults of some of the main analyses defended today. I will be particularly interested in discussing the work of Fred Dretske, whose views have significantly influenced my own. With these tasks behind me, I will offer my own account in Part III, and argue that it has the features an account of knowledge should have.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The meaning of global anti-realism: meaning and truth the interpretation of realism, meaning theory, meaning and coherence, truth and knowledge purported problems with coherentism as mentioned in this paper, and the consequences of global realism: specifying the specified system of beliefs the myth of an ideal system what truth is "sic transit veritas" relatively speaking a few comments on logic the refutation of scepticism the end of philosophy.
Abstract: What is global anti-realism?: what is truth? how to answer the question the deflation of truth how to be a global anti-realist the metaphysics of anti-realism. Correspondence and coherence: reference and correspondence what is not wrong with the correspondence theory how to refute the correspondence theory coherence, truth and knowledge purported problems with coherentism. The meaning of global anti-realism: meaning and truth the interpretation of realism the interpretation of anti-realism a new look for meaning theories replies to realist objections meaning and holism objections to holism confuted. Consequences of global anti-realism: specifying the specified system of beliefs the myth of an ideal system what truth is "sic transit veritas" relatively speaking a few comments on logic the refutation of scepticism the end of philosophy.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Nietzsche operated with two theories of truth, a correspondence theory and a pragmatic theory, the pragmatic theory of truth being derivative from a more fundamental pragmatic theory as mentioned in this paper, and the correspondence theory is presupposed in Nietzsche's claim that his conception of the world as a matrix of forces and powers is a true account of how the world really is.
Abstract: The thesis of this paper is that, on the whole, Nietzsche operated with two theories of truth, a correspondence and a pragmatic theory, the pragmatic theory of truth being derivative from a more fundamental pragmatic theory of belief. A version of the correspondence theory is presupposed in Nietzsche's claim that his conception of the world as a matrix of forces and powers is a true account of how the world really is. It is also presupposed in his claim that our quite ordinary beliefs that there are enduring things, objects or bits of matter or material is an illusion or error, i.e., these ordinary beliefs are false. Since the world is just a matrix of forces and powers there can be no such items. However Nietzsche alleges that since we are creatures that have evolved with certain sensory organs and intellectual capacities that enable us to form beliefs, then there must have been some life-preserving utility in having beliefs that such items exist (despite the alleged falsity of such beliefs). Beliefs in such items, Nietzsche claims, can have pragmatic value but they are no guide to how the world really is. Since most pragmatists do not openly admit that pragmatically held beliefs are false, Nietzsche is not so much a pragmatist about truth as a pragmatist about belief. Nietzsche does not normally tell us which theory of truth he is using when he employs words such as "true," "false" (and their cognates) or such words as "error," and "illusion." In particular, he talks of truths in the context of his pragmatic theory of truth and/or belief when these "truths" are often regarded by him as false claims (in the correspondence sense of the theory of truth). This can lead to much ambiguity and paradox. Consider the remark: "Truth is the kind of error without which a certain species of life could not live. The value for life is ultimately decisive" (WP ?493).' The first word "truth" occurs with reference to the pragmatic theory and means something like "those beliefs we normally

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, Scheler's ethics, set forth provisionally in Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materials Wertethik (I9I3-I9i6), rests on a critical distinction between moral and non-moral values.
Abstract: Scheler's ethics, set forth provisionally in Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materials Wertethik (I9I3-I9i6),' rests on a critical distinction between moral and nonmoral values. Moral values (moral good and evil) are defined in terms of the nonmoral value that is brought into being, as in teleological theories generally.' Accordingly, Scheler rejects the purely formalist approach to determining the morality of an action found in deontological theories such as Kant's. But he accepts the Kantian critique of consequentialist theories, conceding that ethics cannot be rigorously grounded in anything as uncertain as the anticipated realization of contingent, empirical goods or ends. The trick, then, is to furnish a teleological theory that avoids the empirical contingencies of consequentialist theories. Scheler claims to accomplish precisely this by founding his ethics upon a phenomenological theory of nonmoral values. According to this theory, nonmoral values exhibit phenomenologically an order of rank based on their relative duration, simplicity, and other such criteria, and range from such values as sensible pleasure and pain (at the lower end of the scale) to cultural, aesthetic, and religious values (at the upper end). Such values not only are regarded as exhibiting a priori interconnections, but are themselves regarded as intentional objects, as essences, as distinguishable apart from their possible empirical instantiation in mundane reality. As such, they furnish a rigorous foundation, in Scheler's view, for establishing the moral values of good and evil, which

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: One of the striking features of Martin Heidegger's magnum opus, Sein und Zeit, is that, while it explicitly claims to be carrying out a version of transcendental phenomenology (SZ, H38/E6z), there is scarcely a mention of perhaps the key notion of Husserlian phenomenology, the fact and phenomenon of human intentionality as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: One of the striking features of Martin Heidegger's magnum opus, Sein und Zeit,' is that, while it explicitly claims to be carrying out a version of transcendental phenomenology (SZ, H38/E6z), there is scarcely a mention of perhaps the key notion of Husserlian phenomenology, the fact and phenomenon of human intentionality.' This seemingly glaring omission is, of course, striking even on the reasonable historical hypothesis that Heidegger wanted to break radically with his former teacher and mentor at the time of the writing of SZ.3 For, surely his break would be at its sharpest if it was explicitly set in contrast to its immediate predecessor. Moreover, one may well ask why did he overtly label his work "transcendental phenomenology" at all, only apparently to ignore what traditionally had been its primary phenomenon for analysis? Part of this puzzle can be solved by recalling Heidegger's opening call in SZ to recover the ancient question of the (manifold) meaning of Being (rather than, say, Cartesian consciousness) as the primary focus for philosophical activity.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In "Propositions about Images" as mentioned in this paper, Cam accurately analyzes and criticizes the grounds I gave, in the works he cites, for my denial that we have privileged access (of any sort) to anything deserving to be called a mental image.
Abstract: In "Propositions about Images" Philip Cam accurately analyzes and criticizes the grounds I gave, in the works he cites, for my denial that we have privileged access (of any sort) to anything deserving to be called a mental image. He shows that I did not deal properly with the question of how I would interpret the ostensive force of "this" and "that" in an introspective judgment of the sort: "Now it looks like this and now it looks like that." What can one be ostending or referring to in such a case, if not to an image (or some feature of an image)?

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors recast some of those arguments in a new, uniform way, avoiding what they take to be Parfit's failure to distinguish between a genuine (e.g., Schlick-like) no-ownership model of mental life, where there is no substance which is oneself; and a framework which has an enduring subject of experiences, oneself, albeit to a higher or lower degree.
Abstract: More often than not, people try to achieve a state which they believe will be good for them. Our society is based on the belief that prudential, or egoistic, action is rational and almost self-justifying; an action should benefit its agent. For this belief to be justified, there must be a clear distinction between what is, and what is not, that very same agent. In a number of articles published over the last twenty years' I have argued, however, that no such distinction exists. The very conceptual framework necessary for formulating such claims is flawed what survives is (by the egoist's lights) valueless, and what is valuable cannot possibly survive. In the present article I recast some of those arguments in a new, uniform way, avoiding what I take to be Parfit's failure to distinguish between (i) a genuine (e.g., Schlick-like) no-ownership model of mental life, where there is no substance which is oneself; and (z) a framework which has an enduring subject of experiences, oneself, albeit to a higher or lower degree. It is one thing to reject the concept of self-regarding interest altogether, and quite another to say that it is open-textured, because in some far-out and recherche cases the identity conditions of persons are not clearly defined.'

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A recent defense of Kant from the charge that he adhered to something like "degrees" of being or "existence" argued very much in the spirit of Kant's general position but regrettably weakened its case by perpetuating a most awkward terminological ambiguity, with a proposed solution that can hardly serve Kant's cause as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Since its appearance, and up to the present, Kant's table of categories has met, by and large, with a take-it or leave-it attitude. A recent defense of Kant in this journal' trying to exonerate him from the charge that he adhered to something like "degrees" of being or "existence" argued very much in the spirit of Kant's general position but regrettably weakened its case by perpetuating a most awkward terminological ambiguity, with a proposed solution that can hardly serve Kant's cause. What is the meaning of his distinction between reality and existence? Kant's first category of Quality is Realitdt, reality; his second category of Modality is Dasein-Nichtsein, existence/non-existence.2 The latter has a propositional spin-off in the second "cardinal proposition" of the Postulates of Empirical Thought Generatim.4 This postulate runs: "What is

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In The Rigbt and the Good Ross drew a distinction between "the adjunctive or attributive use of the word ['good'], as when we speak of a good runner or a good poem, and the predicative use of it, as when it is said that knowledge is good or that pleasure is good." He adds that "in ordinary usage the first meaning that of 'good of its kind'is much the commoner; it appears to be the earlier" as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: In The Rigbt and the Good Ross drew a distinction between "the adjunctive or attributive use of the word ['good'], as when we speak of a good runner or a good poem, and the predicative use of it, as when it is said that knowledge is good or that pleasure is good."' He adds that "in ordinary usage the first meaning that of 'good of its kind'is much the commoner; it appears to be the earlier." This distinction corresponds to a marked difference in the directions that philosophers of the last century have taken in their study of good and evil. Thus, in the last few decades we have found linguistic philosophers examining various syntactic details and logical features of the adjunctive use, as when Vendler points out that whereas 'S is a good cook' derives from 'S's cooking is good', 'X is a good meal' derives from 'X is good to eat.'3 In contrast, in keeping with Ross' claim that, when predicatively used, "'good' [often] means 'intrinsically good',"' some philosophers argued over the possibility, knowledge, and nature of intrinsic goodness existentialists denying it in their insistence that values are created in the subject's act of choice, phenomenologists on the continent discussing its relation to various affective experiences in which values were allegedly "presented," non-naturalists in Britain

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The Critical Legal Studies Movement (CLS) is composed of (mostly academic) lawyers who share a dissatisfaction with the current status of liberal legal theory and who aspire to reconstruct the political order along more egalitarian bases as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The Critical Legal Studies Movement (CLS) is composed of (mostly academic) lawyers who share a dissatisfaction with the current status of liberal legal theory and who aspire to reconstruct the political order along more egalitarian bases. I will here (I) explain CLS' view of judicial decision-making and its political agenda; (II) criticize aspects of CLS' attack on liberal political and legal theory; and (III) show how the terms of the debate between CLS and liberals are mired in a familiar dichotomy: objectivism and relativism, which dichotomy CLS must transcend if it is to realize its radical project. Finally, I suggest a notion of the "self" which may be helpful to CLS in constructing its alternative legal and political vision.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: For instance, the mind, which is always delighted with its own discoveries, only takes the hint from the poet, and seems to work out the rest by the strength of its own faculties.
Abstract: Virgil [. . .1 loves to suggest a truth indirectly, and without giving us a full and open view of it, to let us see just so much as will naturally lead the imagination into all the parts that lie concealed. This is wonderfully diverting to the understanding [. . .1. For here the mind, which is always delighted with its own discoveries, only takes the hint from the poet, and seems to work out the rest by the strength of its own faculties. (Joseph Addison, "An Essay on Virgil's Georgics," in Works, edited by G. W. Greene, vol. z [New York: Putnam, I854], p. 38z)

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, Tye has argued that neither of these adverbial approaches is successful and provided further support for the more general thesis that there presently exists no viable alternative to the sense-datum theory.
Abstract: In recent years, the sense-datum account of visual experience has fallen into disfavor. The primary reason for its demise is the widespread belief that the adverbial approach provides an alternative theory which accommodates the data of visual experience as well as the sense-datum theory but has the advantages of being a simpler theory and one which avoids some puzzling problems faced by its competitor. It is only recently, however, that the adverbial approach has been developed in sufficient detail so that its claim to superiority can be evaluated. The two philosophers who are primarily responsible for articulating the theory are R. M. Chisholm and Wilfrid Sellars. A careful examination of their views, however, reveals serious deficiencies.' Michael Tye has recently attempted to elaborate the adverbial approach in a manner which remedies the shortcomings of his predecessors.2 One of the chief virtues of Tye's paper is that it recognizes that the adverbial approach can be elaborated in a number of different ways. Tye goes on to distinguish a number of-different adverbial approaches and argues that two of them provide viable alternatives to the sense-datum theory. My primary purpose is to show that neither of these adverbial approaches is successful. The argument of this paper provides further support for the more general thesis that there presently exists no viable alternative to the sense-datum theory.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a phenomenological analysis of the empirical sciences was seen by the founders of the phenomenological movement as part of the attempt to uncover the significance of man's relation to the modern world, its main concern has focused on the transition from ancient (Greek to the beginnings of modern science in the seventeenth century.
Abstract: Because the phenomenological analysis of the empirical sciences was seen by the founders of the phenomenological movement as part of the attempt to uncover the significance of man's relation to the modern world, its main concern has focused on the transition from ancient (Greek) to the beginnings of modern science in the seventeenth century. Heidegger said it with peculiar clarity in Die Frage nach dem Ding: the essential task of this research lies in spelling out the foundations of the new thematization, by which the seventeenth century philosophers and scientists appraised the thingness of things as a consequence of the mathematical projection of nature. And Heidegger thought the real innovation of twentieth century science was mainly the rise of statistical procedures used in quantum mechanics.' In contrast, Einstein's new theory of relativity does not seem to have met with a very sophisticated response from the phenomenologists. Speaking of this theory in his celebrated Vienna lecture "Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man" on 7 May I93 5, Husserl accounted for the revolutionary change brought about by Einstein's conceptions of space and time in terms of the formulas applied to an already idealized and naively objectivized nature, thus sending us straight back to the seventeenth century source of that idealization. "Einstein," he said, "does nothing to reformulate the space and time in which our actual life takes place."2 Not surprisingly Husserl devoted his most insightful work on the

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that it is always at least as likely that a report of a single historical event cannot by itself falsify a principle believed to be a law of nature.
Abstract: Believers in miracles are frequently criticized on the ground that they give credence to claims that are too extraordinary to be believed. Thus, for example, in his celebrated essay "Of Miracles," the most noteworthy argument of this sort, David Hume writes: "A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined."' And from this he concludes that it can never be reasonable to believe in a miracle on the basis of testimony, because in principle it is always at least as likely and in practice it is far more likely that a miracle report is false as that it is true and the alleged miracle actually has taken place. Similarly, in our time Antony Flew has argued to the same conclusion on the ground that a report of a single historical event cannot by itself falsify a principle believed to be a law of nature. For a law can be verified by future testing, while a singular past-tense proposition cannot be, and so we should not accept the occurrence of-vents in conflict with supposed laws unless they can be established by repeatable experiments.' And of course,

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the problem of belief formation is defined as the question of whether any such belief that qualifies as both true and justified/certain can also be formed in one's mind.
Abstract: Berkeley wants to say something about scepticism and the 'principles of human knowledge' in his main works, as if he were an epistemologist by inclination. When one reads the actual texts this opinion may well change: not much is said about knowledge and belief. However, the problems of evidence and epistemic justification are considered, mainly in connection with the problems of the external world. What is matter and whether we have any contact with spatiotemporal bodies are the problems which drove Berkeley to write his Principles and Three Dialogues.' My purpose is to focus on such epistemic issues as the justification of our beliefs concerning the various types of entities in Berkeley's philosophical universe. I suggest that we explicate 'knowledge' according to the so called 'classical definition' and pay attention to the possibility of belief formation concerning different types of epistemic objects. The 'classical definition of knowledge' is this: Knowledge is true and justified belief. The problem of belief formation is here understood, firstly, to be roughly the question of whether any such belief that qualifies as both true and justified/certain can also be formed in one's mind. It is the question about a reliable connection between the mind and the world. Sec-

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The notion of linguistic implication was introduced by H. P. Grice as discussed by the authors, who pointed out that it might not necessarily constitute part of the meaning of an expression, i.e., it might just be a general feature or principle of the use of language.
Abstract: When I speak about Kierkegaard's notion of indirect communication, I find that it is often mistaken for something like a "Gricean implicature" types of implications involved in language which are characterized by H. P. Grice. The two ideas are quite distinct and I intend to show that Grice offers us something that slightly touches on, but in no way portrays what Kierkegaard meant by indirect communication. Beginning with Grice's account of linguistic implication, I will examine the two doctrines separately and then discuss the lack of identity between them. I do not intend to analyze, defend, or apply either of them; my purpose is to get clear on them so that the difference between them will be apparent. H. P. Grice' develops a notion of implication in his analysis of an objection to sense-data theories which employ "looks to me" idioms. The target objection holds that such statements purportedly sense-data statements carry the implication Qf actual or potential doubt or denial with regard to that which "looks to x" and therefore cannot be used for normal straightforward perceptual situations (which are, purportedly, not subject to doubt or controversy). Sense-data theorists want their perceptual statements to be true so that such statements can be analyzed in terms of the notion of sense-data. If "looks to me" statements cannot address straightforward perceptual situations, using them in such situations would corrupt the causal theory of perception. Grice believes that such an objection has serious problems. He suggests that implication may not necessarily constitute part of the meaning of an expression, i.e., that it might just be a "general feature or principle of the use of language."' If implication can be shown to be distinct from something that is stated, then the objection to "looks to me" statements would


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the persuasiveness of the paradoxes can be explained more plausibly by appealing to the conceptual difficulties inherent in them. But they do not explain why people find the arguments "persuasive".
Abstract: Why are Zeno's paradoxes of motion persuasive? Of course, very few people today are inclined to accept the proposition that motion is actually impossible. Very few people find the arguments "persuasive" in this sense. Nevertheless, the arguments are persuasive in the sense that it is difficult to spot precisely where and why they go wrong. Even writers thoroughly familiar with the present day mathematical resolution of the paradoxes express doubts about its ultimate satisfactoriness. Why is this? Adolf Grunbaum has attempted to account for the persuasive power of the paradoxes by appeal to an alleged discrepancy between how time in fact is or how it is thought to be on the basis of modern physics and how we experience it. In part I of this paper I offer arguments against Grunbaum's phenomenological account of why we find Zeno's paradoxes persuasive. In part II, I suggest that the persuasiveness of the paradoxes can be explained more plausibly by appeal to the conceptual difficulties inherent in them.