Showing papers in "Phronesis in 1968"
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TL;DR: The usual reading of this passage takes Aristotle to be making one of two claims, depending upon whether the categories are viewed as classifying types of entity or types of predicate: (a) items in all categories have good predicated of them, or good can be predicated in all the categories of predication as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: e'Tt 8E'ZL 'r'C(MO' Ta':aov Z0 t5 XCYSO y Tac OT ot (t yaXp eV rTZ 7L )4yerrxt tOV 'o Os64 Xat o 0VOuq, XOCL EV TCO) 7QL&) OAL apSeat, xcat eV To 7rOaCO) ,Q rpLov, xOc eV TC 7tpo6 Tt 'r yp-yL.OV, >XCL EV CM(p6 ZX LpOq, Xw ?V T67m) aLaXLro xcdL 9repa rotcxao) What does Aristotle mean by the claim that good is said in as many senses as being, and how are we to understand the explanatory clause which follows? The usual reading of this passage takes Aristotle to be making one of two claims, depending upon whether the categories are viewed as classifying types of entity or types of predicate: (a) items in all categories have good predicated of them, or (b) good can be predicated in all the categories of predication. In either case, what follow are understood as subjects of exemplary predications. Thus "olov 4o Oek xac o voi5" is elliptical for "olov 6o Oe6 xoXt 4 voiu &yCXO6q ?arLIv," in which good is (a) predicated of a substance, God and intelligence, or (b) predicated in the first category of some entity, namely God and intelligence. (I am throughout understanding "God and intelligence" as a hendiadys). Similarly, "occ aiperot" is elliptical for "oML aperoL MyYOodL da[v,' in which good is (a) predicated of a quality, or (b) predicated in the category of quality of some entity, and so on. It is such a reading which is found in most translations of the passage in question. I quote here only two: Further, since 'good' has as many senses as 'being' (for it is predicated both in the category of substance, as of God and of reason, and in quality, i.e. of the virtues, and in quantity, i.e. of that which is moderate, and in relation, i.e. of the useful, and in time, i.e. of the right opportunity, and in place, i.e. of the right locality and the like), . . 1
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TL;DR: Tuyyxvoui as discussed by the authors showed that the traditional interpretation of Plato's doctrine rests upon an insecure basis, and with it the traditional viewpoint, depends on an interpretation of the word 'eL as used by Plato with regard to the being of the Forms.
Abstract: A re the Platonic Forms eternal in the sense that they endure everlastingly, or is their eternity such that it transcends duration? The latter alternative is defended by H. Cherniss' and is in fact the traditional interpretation of Plato's doctrine, whereas the former view was held by F. M. Cornford2. My present purpose is to show that the traditional interpretation rests upon an insecure basis. In fact, Professor Cherniss' case, and with it the traditional viewpoint, depends on an interpretation of the word 'eL as used by Plato with regard to the being of the Forms. Cherniss3 supposes that i , f N I/ % Iro 0 oE Ln OOi XpOVOU UV?X-TLVO?LCVOV XOCL 7trLpOV, .0 pLv ?V -rcp V5V, 0'r Or VV LocXa-TCUCL, Tq gTz(,)q &Xmx?OxtouCxl) Tuyyxvoui-a xOL ae yLyVO?V-jq. (In Tim. 73C-D (I. 239. 2-6 Diehl).)
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors defend Block's hypothesis concerning the order of Aristotle's psychological writings against a criticism which arises from Lulofs' interpretation of Insomn, which results in the discovery of possible purely physiological senses of words heretofore thought essentially psychological.
Abstract: Block's hypothesis concerning the order of Aristotle's psychological writings can be defended against a criticism which arises from Lulofs' interpretation of Insomn. 2, 459b24-460a33. Such a defence results in the discovery of possible purely physiological senses of words heretofore thought essentially psychological.
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TL;DR: Zellers' Bemerkung is also darum interessant, weil sie am SchiuB einer Abhandlung fiber die Darstellung der platonischen Philosophie bei Aristoteles steht as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: I n der Platonforschung geht wieder ein Gespenst um: das Gespenst des Esoterismus.l Das ist nicht neu, aber der Zeitpunkt ist erstaunlich. Denn vor anderthalb Jahrhunderten war die Meinung derer, die die moderne Platonforschung begriindeten, in der Konfrontation mit der neuen Wissenschaft lose sich die Vorstellung einer esoterischen Philosophie Platons in nichts auf. So beendete Eduard Zeiler seine 'Platonischen Studien' mit dem Satz: "Sollte (die gegenwartige Untersuchung) dazu beigetragen haben, das Gespenst eines esoterischen Platonismus zu verscheuchen, so wiirde dies nicht zu verachtender Gewinn sein." Diese Bemerkung Zellers ist auch darum interessant, weil sie am SchiuB einer Abhandlung fiber die Darstellung der platonischen Philosophie bei Aristoteles steht. Die Rekonstruktion des aristotelischen Platonbildes, die heutzutage Platons esoterische Philosophie freilegen soll, diente den Begriindern der modemen Platonforschung zur Widerlegung der Meinung, Platons "eigentliche" Philosophie sei eine Geheimlehre gewesen. A. Brandis hat mit seiner Schrift 'De perditis Aristotelis libris de ideis et de bono s. philosophia' (1823) die Voraussetzung zu einer Analyse des aristotelischen Platonbildes geschaffen. Heute ist nicht mehr zweifelhaft: Wenn man verstehen will, wie Aristoteles zu seiner jeden Platonleser iiberraschenden Darsteilung gekommen ist, so muB man zunachst auf diese beiden aristotelischen Friihschriften zuriickgehen. Mit seiner Berliner Dissertation 'Platonis de ideis et numeris
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TL;DR: The problem of reconciling the relation between the virtues of the individual and those of the state has been discussed in the context of the analysis of the Republic IV of Plato as discussed by the authors, where the author argues that there are inconsistencies or "tensions" in the account of the virtues in the tripartite state and individual (Republic IV).
Abstract: It has long been recognised that there are inconsistencies or 'tensions' in Plato's account of the virtues in the tripartite state and individual (Republic IV) and scholars have settled for an interpretation of this passage which would most easily fit most of the evidence. This traditional version has recently come under attacks which have been formidable but, I hope to show, misplaced.' The problem arises from the fact that Plato holds two different views of the relation between the virtues of the individual and those of the state. In the first place, state and individual are related by analogy; the respective virtues of each are formed by parallel arrangements and dispositions among their three parts. Thus, for example, a state is wise if its ruling class possesses the knowledge which will enable it to take thought for the best possible conduct of the state as a whole in its internal and external relations (428d 1-3); analogously, the individual is wise if his ruling part rules with wisdom and foresight on behalf of the entire soul (44le 4-5). Secondly, the character which the state possesses is directly derived from the character of its individual members or citizens. 'Is it not impossible for us to avoid admitting this much, that the same forms and characters are to be found in each one of us that are in the state? They could not get there from any other source.' (435e 1-3). Thus, if Egypt is a money-loving state, it is because individual Egyptians are money-lovers (436a 1-3). The difficulty is in reconciling the second 'derivative' relation with the first, analogous one. The traditional explanation has been to say that the character of the state is derived from the existence of parallel virtues in certain of the classes. While all classes are just and temperate and thus give the state its justice and temperance,2 the collective wisdom of the state is derived from the personal wisdom of the guardians and its collective courage from the personal courage of the auxilaries.