Showing papers in "Phronesis in 1969"

Aristotle's Definition of Motion

Abstract: It 4T otion," says Aristotle, "is the actualization of what potentially is, as such 'ro5 8uvu4a Ovroq E'vreXiXec, a 'rTOLi:irov."' If we are to believe Aristotle, this definition speaks to a problem which was perplexing and refractory to his predecessors, and it is itself complex and subtle, employing concepts which are, as he says, "difficult to grasp."2 Given the intricacy of many of Aristotle's technical concepts, this claim might seem outrageous; for on the usual understanding, his definition of motion is straightforward and pellucid. I shall try to show that that understanding is wrong, and that Aristotle's definition is more subtle than it is usually taken to be.

Aristotle's philosopher-God

Abstract: I shall therefore refer to it as the Syllogistic Proof. What I want to suggest is that Aristotle does not use the Syllogistic Proof that he does not say what Ross and others attribute to him, and that it is not the meaning he intended to convey. There is one point at which he is sometimes regarded as saying it; at 1074b34 there occurs the sentence: "If it is best, it thinks itself, and the thinking is a thinking of thinking." But I hope to show that, in order to regard this as a simple statement of the Syllogistic Proof, one has to isolate it from its context; and to do so is to make nonsense of, and render superfluous, the whole chain of reasoning that leads up to it. Indeed, I think that in general one is entitled to ask why, if Aristotle meant what Ross and others have understood him to mean, he chose such a long and complicated way of saying it. A further point I wish to make is that this interpretation lends an air of unnecessary absurdity to the whole account. It suggests that the Prime Mover is a sort of heavenly Narcissus, who looks around for the perfection which he wishes to contemplate, finds nothing to rival his own self, and settles into a posture of permanent self-ad-

Aristotle on Practical Inference, the Explanation of Action, and Akrasia

Abstract: In his edition of the Nicomachean Ethics John Burnet added two appendices as particularly relevant to Aristotle's discussion of akrasia (weakness). The first appendix, De Anima, III, 10, contains Aristotle's discussion of how practical reason and want combine to cause movement for the sake of something and how explanations of action can be constructed in terms of these two elements; in the other appendix, De Motu 7, Aristotle casts explanations of actions in the form of practical inferences. The relevance of these passages to Aristotle's discussion of akrasia is beyond dispute: Aristotle explicitly employs practical inferences to represent the motivations of the akrates (weak man), and he clearly regards the behavior of the akrates as a case of movement for the sake of something, a case of action. Burnet's appendices suggest what seems to me the only sound strategy for unraveling and understanding Aristotle's explanation of akrasia. We must place this explanation within Aristotle's general theory of the explanation of action and the role of practical inference in such explanation. Akrasia is a difficult case with problems peculiar to it, but all the same it is a case of movement for the sake of something, and in explaining it Aristotle follows his paradigm of the explanation of action. In this paper I wish to take full advantage of this strategy in an attempt to reconstruct in detail and take a fresh look at Aristotle's account of akrasia. The dividends of this strategy will show themselves, I hope, as I try along the way to resolve some of the textual and philosophical difficulties in Aristotle's account, difficulties traditionally and recently raised by commentators.'

Individual Properties in Aristotle's Categories

Abstract: 1. At Categories 1 a 23-29,1 Aristotle marks off a set of items which are present in but not predicable of a subject. Thus, for example, a certain knowledge of grammar (7 't ypo Cp-,urtxJ) is present in a subject, the soul, and a certain white (-ro4 i Xeux6v) present in a subject, the body; but neither is predicable of a subject. Such items are not predicable of a subject because they are particular or individual: ' -q ypOC[Lrxvnx and ro' rt ??ux6'v parallel o -d' A and Aristotle, after remarking that nothing prevents what is individual and one in number from being present in a subject (lb 7-8), cites as his example a certain knowledge of grammar. But what is individual and one in number is not predicable of a subject (lb6-7). However, not everything present in a subject is individual and one in number, for some things present in a subject are also predicable of a subject (la29-lb3); thus for example knowledge is in a subject, the soul, and predicable of a subject, knowledge of grammar. These two sets of items, what is both predicable of and present in a subject, and what is present in but not predicable of a subject, correspond, respectively, to the genera or species of individuals in categories other than substance,2 and to the individuals themselves.3 What is present in a subject as individual and one in number is incapable of existing apart from the particular subject it is in; for at 1 a 24-25, Aristotle defines presence as follows: "By present in a subject I mean what is in something, not as a part, but as incapable of existing separately from what it is in." It would seem to follow from this that an item present in an individual subject is itself individual, and numerically distinct from items present in other individual subjects. Suppose this is so. Then if there are two pieces of chalk, A and B,

Meno's Paradox ?

Abstract: I. Consider what some representative commentators tell us about the crucial passage, 80A-81 A. We are told that Meno "tries to runi off on an irrelevant puzzle",' and that according to this puzzle, "'inquiry' is impossible"2 or "seeking is impossible".3 We are told that Meno "expresses some doubt about the possibility of knowledge"4 and even that he "doubts whether any criterion of truth exists".5 Commentators seem to have agreed that Meno's comment is "a lazy and eristic argument",6 a "convenient dodge" or "eristic trick".7 It seems agreed also that Meno's doubt was quite general. Typically, commentators believe his comment posed

Perception, True Opinion and Knowledge in Plato's Theaetetus

Abstract: Several years ago Mr. J. Xenakis proposed an interpretation of some aspects of the passage in the Theaetetus in which the thesis that sLa 'tFc is cx'L0atOLq receives its final refutation (184B4186E12).1 Although I agree in the main with his interpretation, I believe that it can be supported more strongly. Thus an analysis of this passage is the first task of this paper. But on the basis of that analysis, I want to show also how this passage is related to what follows in the dialogue, the long discussion beginning with the thesis that knowledge is true opinion but turning almost immediately to a discussion of the nature and possibility of false opinion and ending with the wax block and aviary models (187A1-200D4).2 The criticism of the thesis that enL r'pn is aOt-aLa begins with the distinction between what the soul apprehends through the senseorgans and what it apprehends "by itself". Whatever Plato's views about the soul might be at his writing of the Theaetetus, he wants to distinguish between those characteristics which the soul apprehends through the sense-organs and those characteristics which are called "common to everything" (&rl 7raaL xoLvov -184C4-5). In spite of his expressed desire to be precise (184 C 1-7), Plato has some difficulties and ambiguities in his terminology. His general point is to show that knowledge cannot be equated with aX'LaOcGL4. But he does speak, on the one hand, of what the soul "perceives" (odaO&voXuCXL -184E8-185A2) when he talks about the particular objects of the various senses, e.g. colors, tastes, sounds, etc. On the other hand he also speaks of what the soul "perceives" (again xLaOCXVO[LCXL -185 C8) when he talks about the XOLVa, characteristics which are somehow different from those apprehended via the individual sense-organs. The ambiguity in aLsaO%vo[LaL leaves two questions to be answered.

Forms of individuals in the Enneads

Abstract: In a recent article' Mr. H. J. Blumenthal argued that Plotinus held inconsistent views about forms of individuals. He claims that no clear answer can be given to the question "Did Plotinus believe in such forms?" because there are passages where their existence is affirmed and others where it is denied. Nor can we suppose that Plotinus changed his mind, for no pattern of development can be discerned. Perhaps, though this is unlikely, he changed his mind several times, since affirmations and denials alternate. Further, it is argued, neither the positive nor the negative texts can be explained away or dismissed as inauthentic. Hence we are left with a very grave inconsistency. It is clear that, if this is the case, a major revision of our interpretation of Plotinus is in order since he has always been understood as positing such forms. However, I do not think that Blumenthal has succeeded in showing that there is a real inconsistency and I wish to defend the traditional interpretation by examining the controversial texts together with Blumenthal's comments.