Showing papers in "Phronesis in 1972"
55 citations
24 citations
TL;DR: The principle of individuation was accepted without question by Lukasiewicz, G. E. Lloyd and K. R. Popper in the symposium 'The principle for individuations', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume for 1953, and has recently been defended by A. M. Lloyd (Mind 1970).
Abstract: M atter' says Zeller in his account of Aristotle's metaphysics 'is the source of individual existence, in all those things at least which are formed of the union of Matter and Form.... Between the Individuals into which the in/imae species resolve themselves no difference of kind or Form any longer exists, and consequently they must be distinguished from one another by their Matter.'" Zeller is here only restating an interpretation which had always been orthodox and which still holds the field today. It was accepted without question by Lukasiewicz, G. E. M. Anscombe and K. R. Popper, in the symposium 'The principle of individuation', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume for 1953, and has recently been defended by A. C. Lloyd (Mind 1970). In this paper I shall try to cast doubt on it.
19 citations
16 citations
15 citations
12 citations
TL;DR: A dispute has arisen over what Aristotle means in that work by an individual where the individuals in question are not prime substances as mentioned in this paper, and the bulk of published opinion has favoured Ackrill's account of the matter, an account which is also found in the writings of W. D. Ross and Miss Anscombe.
Abstract: W ith the publication of J. L. Ackrill's translation of the Categories' and G. E. L. Owen's paper "Inherence"2 a dispute has arisen over what Aristotle means in that work by an individual where the individuals in question are not prime substances. The bulk of published opinion has favoured Ackrill's account of the matter,3 an account which is also found in the writings of W. D. Ross and Miss Anscombe.4 However, this account involves certain difficulties. The major difficulty is an internal one, the question of the interpretation of 2 a 34-b 6. This passage is described by Ackrill as "compressed and careless,"5 while Owen claims that the matter "is put beyond question" in favour of his own view by the lines, and that "by themselves they settle the issue."6 A second immediate difficulty is that such non-substantial individuals do not seem to reappear elsewhere in the Aristotelian corpus and are absent even from his discussion of the various categories in theCategories itself. Modern philosophers may have been inured to entities of this type by the centuries of phenomenalist writing that have intervened, but it is extremely difficult to see why Aristotle, at a time when 'sense-data' and 'qualia' had yet to be postulated, should have been lead to claim that there are non-recurrent and individual non-substantial entities in the world. Indeed, it is noticable that one of the most sympathetic and sensitive of Aristotle's modern commentators, Miss Anscombe, while agreeing with this line of interpretation should write that Aristotle's own examples are "slightly obscure to us" and should proceed to discuss, not Aristotle's own examples, but her own one, that of an object's
12 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a new interpretation of Plato's reason for adopting the theory of the separation of forms from particulars is proposed. But it is not yet clear how to interpret the reason for this.
Abstract: In this paper I shall offer a new interpretation of Plato's reason for adopting the theory of the separation of forms from particulars. There is a clear inadequacy in the standard account of Plato's reason,' first given by Aristotle in Bk. I of the Metaphysics.2 According to the Aristotelian passage the motive which led Plato to conceive of forms and particulars as separate was his belief that particulars are in flUX.3 Holding that the objects of knowledge (and logos) could not change,
11 citations
9 citations
TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that all of the steps of the TMA can be derived from a single assumption, which is the same assumption used by Vlastos and Sellars.
Abstract: Gregory Vlastos claims that Plato's Third Man Argument (TMA), Parmenides 132 a 1-b 2, is inconsistent. Wilfred Sellars counterclaims that the TMA is consistent.1 Plato's argument cannot bear both interpretations. We will show that Vlastos is mistaken in thinking that the TMA is inconsistent. Moreover both Vlastos and Sellars are mistaken in supplying suppressed premises which they claim are necessary for the generation of the second and succeeding steps of the argument. In contrast to both Vlastos and Sellars we show that all of the steps of the TMA can be derived from a single assumption. This characterization of the argument better represents the text. Finally we offer a diagnosis of the problems which the TMA presents for a Theory of Forms. The text of the first version of the TMA, the only version we consider, is as follows:2
TL;DR: The theory of a cosmic cycle in four periods containing two distinct worlds has almost undisputedly dominated the field of cosmology for a respectable number of years as discussed by the authors, and the theory has been questioned by several scholars.
Abstract: 8OL' 3 8& VJTCV Ye"VCCL5, aOL' 8' =O'M',L+L rv t LV yop 7wasVr)V CVO0Oo TELXTEL T O??XEL 1?, a 78craOLV 8tL0CYU[4eoVWV bpCpbTeCa &7r7r7. (5) "Double is the coming-to-be of mortal things, double their passingaway . . ." How crucially important these three lines have been for the interpretation of Empedocles' cosmic system need not, I trust, be expounded here. As a matter of fact, for a respectable number of years the theory of a cosmic cycle in four periods containing two distinct worlds, i.e. two opposite cosmogonies and two equally opposite zoogonies, has almost undisputedly dominated the field. In recent years this theory has been questioned (quite successfully, as I believe) by several scholars,2 though it has also been defended against such attacks by D. O'Brien, who proposed an ingenious and wellargued revision.3 I may perhaps be excused from extensively quoting
TL;DR: In this article, the authors give an account of the nature of knowledge, which is not, by any means, to be despised, but is the same that was given by Protagoras, though he stated it in a somewhat different way.
Abstract: 151 e "SOCRATES: Perception, you say is knowledge? THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCR.: The account you give of the nature of knowledge is not, by any means, to be despised. It is the same that was given by Protagoras, though he stated it in a somewhat different way. He says, you will remember, that 'man is the measure of all things alike of the being of things that are and of the not-being of things that are not.' No doubt you have read that. THEAET.: Yes, often. SOCR.: He puts it in this sort of way, doesn't he? that any given thing 'is to me such as it appears to me, and is to you such as it appears to you,' you and I being men. THEAET.: Yes, that is how he puts it. SOCR.: Well, what a wise man says is not likely to be nonsense. So let us follow up his meaning. Sometimes, when the same wind is blowing, one of us feels chilly, the other does not; or one may feel slightly chilly, the other quite cold. THEAET.: Certainly. SOCR.: Well, in that case are we to say that the wind in itself is cold or not cold? Or shall we agree with Protagoras that it is cold to the one who feels chilly, and not to the other? THEAET.: That seems reasonable. SOCR.: And further that it so 'appears' to each of us? THEAET.: Yes. SOCR.: And 'appears' means that he 'perceives' it so? THEAET.: True. SOCR.: 'Appearing,' then, is the same thing as 'perceiving,' in the case of what is hot or anything or that kind. They are to each man such as he perceives them. THEAET.: So it seems. SOCR.: Perception, then, is always of something that is, and, as being knowledge, it is infallible.""
TL;DR: In the Theaetetus, a number of philosophic problems remain latently present, explicitly discussed only in a passing way; they arise from theories that are assumed and used without being examined, being more fully treated in other dialogues.
Abstract: Plato often gives the philosophic problems that concern him a dramatic presentation; the details of the drama provide touchstones for the analysis to follow. By representing our actual practices, relatively direct examples of the phenomena to be explained, they carry the reader safely through the undercurrents of the arguments. Sometimes when the arguments lead to negative conclusions, especially of a reductio sort, the dramatic by-play preserves good sense: it anchors views that, if left unrepresented, might be shipwrecked by the dialogue. In the Theaetetus there are a number of philosophic problems that remain latently present, explicitly discussed only in a passing way; they arise from theories that are assumed and used without being examined, being more fully treated in other dialogues. Some of these problems are the backwash of previous hypotheses, whose status has, for various reasons, become suspect. The outcome of the investigation will determine how far earlier views will have to be revised, or whether they must be abandoned altogether. Among the philosophic themes that are dramatically presented in the by-play that precedes and opens the dialogue (142 a 145 b, especially 144 c 145 b), and in the section introducing Socrates' dream (201 a 202 a), are:
TL;DR: The second category, poia, is the most puzzling of the four Stoic categories as mentioned in this paper, and it is even more difficult to see how they were connected with the idia poiotes (particular quality) and the koine poiotis (common quality).
Abstract: The second category, poia, is the most puzzling of the four Stoic categories.' The general term poion (qualified) included the koinos poion (generically qualified) and the idios poion (individually qualified), but the relationship between these two concepts is by no means clear. It is even more difficult to see how they were connected with the idia poiotes (particular quality) and the koine poiotis (common quality). In order to explain how the four terms were related, I shall undertake in this paper as thorough an investigation as possible of a diaeresis described by Boethius in his Commentary on Aristotle's De Interpretatione. Boethius outlines a diaeresis of possible and necessary propositions in Stoic philosophy. He writes: "They (the Stoics) divide propositions in this way: of propositions, they say, some are possible, others impossible, of the possible, some are necessary, others non-necessary, again of the non-necessary, some are possible and others impossible, foolishly and recklesssly deciding that the possible is both a genus and a species of the non-necessary."2 In the chart below I have reconstructed this diaeresis, using the definitions of the terms and the examples given by Diogenes Laertius.3