Showing papers in "Phronesis in 1973"

Aristotle's Account of Incidental Perception

Abstract: A lthough there has been renewed interest in Aristotle's theory of perception, not much attention has been paid to his treatment of perception of the incidental sense-objects.' It is the primary purpose of this paper to draw a clearer account of his thought on this matter. Commentators on De Anima have usually believed that Aristotle does not hold that incidental perception is a case of pure aisthesis but rather a complex sort of psychic functioning involving thought or memory or both, as well as perception.2 Moreover, whatever faculties are thought to contribute to incidental perception, it is generally believed that this process is the cognition (or recognition) of particular things or persons (viz. individual substances) alone.3 In addition, the general lack of interest in this topic has perhaps been responsible for the apparent further view I assume this from silence on the matter that incidental perception is not of central importance in Aristotle's psychology.4 I shall dispute the first two of these positions. I believe it can be shown that Aristotle (1) does hold that incidental perception is a case of aisthesis alone and (2) that possible incidental sense-objects include more than particular substances. But I shall conclude with the further claim that incidental perception is of no less importance than perception of special and common objects in Aristotle's psychology and thought in general.

The good man and the good citizen in Aristotle's "Politics"

Abstract: The distinction between the good man and the good citizen is of some importance for the understanding of Aristotle's political theory. This distinction, however, does not seem to have been fully understood. This paper will attempt to throw a little light upon the subject, essentially by means of an examination of the words used in the text. Aristotle begins, in chapter 4 of Book 3,1 discussing the excellence of the citizen. Just as each man in a ship's company has his own excellence (ope-r a term to be discussed later) which is peculiar to him, while each contributes to the same end the safe passage of the sea -, so citizens,

Aristotle on the Transcendentals

Abstract: n this paper, I want to examine two claims found in Aristotle's Metaphysics: (A) the claim that notions like being and unity do not constitute genera and (B) the claim that such notions are not univocally predicable of all things. I want, in particular, to consider the view (expressed by Porphyry, William of Ockham, and J. L. Ackrill) that (A) entails (B). I shall argue that the alleged entailment cannot hold since while (A) is true, (B) is false.

Protagoras - or Plato?

Abstract: In an earlier article,' I argued that Plato had manipulated the discussion in Republic I to move Thrasymachus from a political position he may in fact have held2 to the un-Thrasymachean moral position he himself wanted to consider in the rest of Republic.3 The move is made in 343 c 3 by linguistic bridging; i.e., by juxtaposing (1) "advantage of the stronger" and (3) "another's good" as if they were synonymous,4 though (1)as interpreted by (2) "obedience to the ruler's law" is in fact quite incompatible with (3); and it is only with (3) that the moral discussion can be opened. The reason is that it alone can apply to everyone, ruler as well as subject, and in it alone "justice" means something like "acceptance of equality" rather than simply "obedience to (any) law", which is called "justice" -by the ruler. In the light of this apparently cavalier attitude by Plato toward historical accuracy in using for his own purposes the doctrine of the Sophist, Thrasymachus, it seems worthwhile to ask whether he is similarly cavalier in using the doctrines of other historical personages; and if he is, whether he employs a similar method of bridging. Specifically, does he do this with, e.g., Protagoras in Theaetetus?

Self-Predication and Linguistic Reference in Plato's Theory of the Forms

Abstract: xcept for the paradoxes of Parmenides's pupil, Zeno, the most controversial and intensively studied argument in the whole of ancient philosophy is the "Third Man" an argument Parmenides presents himself in the dialogue Plato titled in his honor. There is little agreement on what the argument proves or what view of its importance Plato took. There is a consensus however that it identifies as a key problem in his theory of the Forms their ostensive self-predication. If, so Parmenides's argument seems to run, many apparently large things are large by virtue of some one character the Form The Large Itself and if both the many particular things and the one Form are large, then largeness cannot be a single thing after all. A second unity must make its appearance to account for The Large Itself and other large things being large (Parmenides 132 A-B). In this way Parmenides generates an embarrassing regress of Forms from the joint membership of Forms and particulars in a class, for by Plato's hypothesis a Form is a single thing. Some commentators have pronounced this argument a decisive and honest objection to the theory of the Forms, citing as the basic factor the impossibility Plato faces of ever allowing his Forms to be anything but self-predicating.1 Other commentators have pronounced the argument faulty, holding that Plato faces no such impossibility and that, in fact, he always refers to Forms and particulars in ways which preclude their being classed together.2 Still others have combined

Thrasymachus and Legalism

Abstract: Concerning Thrasymachus' position in Plato's Republic I scholars are divided into two groups: Those who believe that Thrasymachus' position is self-consistent, and those who argue that it isn't. Among those who belong to the first group are Kerferd and Hourani.1 In the second group we have Maguire.2 Those who belong to the first group disagree as to Thrasymachus' true position. Kerferd argues that the true Thrasymachean position concerning justice is that justice is another's good, while Hourani argues that justice is obedience to the laws. The problem arises because Thrasymachus makes the following three statements about justice: (1) Justice is the interest of the stronger. (2) Justice is obedience to the laws. (3) Justice is the good of another.3 Kerferd argues against (2) and finds (3) to be continuous to (1), but broader. Hourani argues against (1), and thus against (3), since he agrees with Kerferd that (3) does not introduce a new concept, but represents a broadening of (1). What I propose to do in this paper is not to discuss Thrasymachus' true position, nor whether his position concerning justice makes up a self-consistent whole or not. I want only to supply further evidence in order to show that Kerferd's view that Thrasymachus was not a legalist is correct.4 Hourani writes:

Pure Form in Aristotle

Abstract: Cherniss for one has imputed this paradoxical doctrine of pure form to Aristotle.3 In commenting on Metaphysics Z 11 Cherniss asserts that Aristotle, in trying both to attack the theory of ideas and to perfect and argue in favor of his own theory of definition, differentiated the materiate universal from the essential form of true (i.e. natural) substances. He continues: "Yet, apart from the epistemological difficulty introduced by this differentiation, if the so-called pure form be identified with the soul and the soul is the essence of a certain kind of body... this form itself cannot be defined without reference to the

The concept of two intellects: A Footnote to the History of Platonism

Abstract: "Haecine est anima docta illa quam dicitis, immortalis perfecta divina, post deum principem rerum et post mentes geminas locum optinens quartum et afluens ex crateribus vivis?" "Is this that 'educated' soul that you talk about, immortal, perfect and divine, occupying the fourth rank, after God the first principle of the Universe and the two intellects, and flowing out from the living mixingbowls?"

Aristotle's distinction between substance and universal

Abstract: Strawson in Individuals (London2 1965) isolates a 'traditional doctrine' according to which particulars and universals are distinguished in terms of predicability. Universals, the doctrine runs, are capable of occurring in discourse as either subjects or predicates, while particulars are capable of appearing as subjects only. In this article I wish to examine Aristotle's way of developing the distinction. It has been questioned whether the distinction goes back to Aristotle. Moravcsik, for instance, in his valuable discussion of Aristotle's theory of predication, says: 'Thus, as we have it, Aristotle's view is fragmentary. It recognises the difference between name and general term and between subject and predicate position, but it does not regard these differences as sufficient grounds for assigning dissimilar ontological correlates, thus contradicting such recent views as those of Frege and Quine." This is a somewhat surprising statement. It will, I think, be clear from what follows that Aristotle did regard the differences between types of expressions that can occur in subject and predicate position in a certain kind of statement as grounds for asserting an irreducible ontological distinction. There are, indeed, fairly marked affinities between Aristotle's way of making and developing the distinction and Frege's. Both hold that the universal (Aristotle) or the concept (Frege) is essentially predicative, whereas the substance (Aristotle) or object (Frege) is characteristically a subject; both, further, while recognising that general terms or concept-words can occur as subjects, insist that the name of an object or substance can never occur as predicate in a predicative statement; and both, up to a point, consider the same counter-examples and dispose of them in the same way. Aristotle would doubtless have quarrelled with assigning, as Frege does, a reference, as well as a sense, to predicates; but their accounts are, I suggest, in their salient features quite comparable.

Hippolytus' Elenchos as a Source for Empedocles Re-examined II

Abstract: he eclectic nature of Hippolytus' account of Empedocles' doxai seems clear. Some of his interpretations, notably the distinction between sensible and intelligible worlds, were probably drawn from or influenced by the Platonic tradition. Some of his account, perhaps the greater portion of it, was influenced by the Aristotelian or Peripatetic tradition; some of it seems derived from the Stoics, and even possibly the Homeric allegorists. In any case, the reports cannot always be supported by the extant fragments; in fact, some seem inconsistent with them, e.g. Empedocles on the cosmic conflagration and marriage. But more important, the main purpose of Hippolytus' discussion is to show that the heresy of Marcion and his followers was anticipated by, and many of the tenets borrowed from, Empedocles. In view of these and other considerations to be considered later, it seems unlikely that Hippolytus derived his knowledge of Empedocles from the original poems. He does, of course, seem to know the Katharmoi by title. In VII, 30, 4, questioning the Marcionites, he remarks roijq 'Et7re8ox?cou4 Xov1,ve &8M(a'xV x p others probably belong to On Nature. But Hippolytus' manner of introducing them, e.g. Xe,'ov (Lae 7nw4 (VII, 31, 4) or ?eye troLouov -nva -po7ov (VII, 29, 13), suggests that he was not acquainted with the original poems. There is, for example, little doubt that the account of Empedocles in Bk. I where he is confused with Heraclitus is taken from a poor compendium, including probably the verses of Empedocles quoted by Hippolytus. The account in Bk. VII, however, especially because of the number of quotations, seems to be from another and better source. Diels was probably the first to suggest that Hippolytus' source was a lost work of Plutarch.' He was followed by Gilbert, O'Brien, and

The Present Progressive Periphrasis and the Metaphysics of Aristotle

Abstract: The thesis' which I wish to argue in this paper is that Aristotle introduces for the first time in the history of the Greek language the progressive sense for the present periphrasis in order to establish a new metaphysical theory, and furthermore, that this grammatical innovation was indeed necessary in order to express this theory in a plausible fashion as it applies to crucial examples. The theory is that what a thing is, or more accurately what a thing is in itself, is determined by members of all ten categories, but only in a primary way in relation to the category of substance (ouiaLa) and in secondary ways in relation to the other categories. In other words, in answer to the question "What is it (in itself)?", one may correctly say "a man" or "an animal" and thus say what it is (in itself) primarily, but in addition, one may say that it is white, three feet high, or walking, and thus say what it is (in itself) secondarily. (The crucial examples in question are those of the continuous action of an agent going on at the time of the assertion.) This equivocation of being-in-itself is virtually the same as the famous equivocation of being explained in Metaphysics Z 1. To establish this historical point about the Greek language and the philosophical interpretation of Aristotle's metaphysics which parallels it, I shall focus my interpretation upon a difficult but crucial passage in Metaphysics A 7 1017 a 22-30, and especially 11. 27-30 where Aristotle asserts that "A man is walking" does not differ from "A man walks". However, before entering upon a discussion of Aristotle's text, it is necessary (1) to clarify the grammatical notion of a periphrasis and the logical notion of the progressive sense, (2) to establish the historical