Showing papers in "Phronesis in 1976"

The Principle that the Cause is greater than its Effect

Abstract: 1. La theorie de la causation-transmission (l'effet ressemble a la cause parce que ce qui est cause transmet sa qualite). 2. Superiorite de la cause par rapport a l'effet. 3. Le principe chez Aristote. 4. La preuve donnee par Proclus. 5. Le principe applique a la causalite physique.

Neoplatonic Elements in the De Anima Commentaries1

Abstract: ost scholars who refer to the Greek commentators for help in the understanding of difficult Aristotelian texts seem to expect straightforward scholarly treatment of their problems.2 Not infrequently they are disappointed and complain about the irrelevance of the commentary they read, or inveigh against the incompetence of the commentators.3 Only Alexander is generally exempt from such censure, and that in itself is significant. For he is the only major commentator whose work survives in any considerable quantity who wrote before Neoplatonism. Shortly after Alexander the kind of thought that is conveniently described by this label came to dominate Greek philosophy, and nearly all pagan philosophy and philosophical scholarship was pursued under its influence, if not by its active adherents. It is the purpose of this paper to argue that these facts are not trivial items of background interest, but are fundamental to a proper assessment of the later commentators' opinions on points of Aristotelian scholarship. It is necessary to take account of the ideas and purpose of these commentators if one is to make any serious critical use of their work, and this cannot be done if one merely dips into their voluminous works in the hope of occasional enlightenment. That these men were swayed by their own opinions and preconceptions is perhaps obvious once stated. Even Simplicius, notwithstanding his reputation for careful scholarship, is no exception. Simplicius may have done us a great service by preserving fragments

Heraclitus and the Identity of Opposites

Abstract: T he purpose of this paper is to discuss the relationship between opposites which Heraclitus appears to describe in terms of identity or unity. In particular an attempt will be made to determine firstly what Heraclitus means when he says that opposites are so auro or ev, and secondly, how far it is correct to interpret this relationship in terms of other elements in Heraclitus' philosophical outlook. The identity of opposites as such was not influenitial on the subsequent history of Greek philosophy. Parmenides, in emphasizing the separateness of opposites (albeit as the 'opinion of mortals'), explicitly rejected any idea of their identity and incidentally foreshadowed the separation of opposites in formal logic, from which such notions as the identity of opposites were, by definition, excluded.1 Anaxagoras based his assertion of the inseparability and, in a sense, the identity of opposites,2 upon a belief in the infinite divisibility of matter; no piece of matter containing one opposite would entirely exclude others. What Heraclitus appeared to represent as a contradiction was shown by Anaxagoras to be literally true, but, at the same time, explicable on the basis of an original theory of matter.3 At Theaetetus 152 c-e, Plato considered the doctrine that objects simultaneously possess opposite attributes, and linked this doctrine very closely with the doctrine of flux; if everything is always in a process of change

Forms and Explanation in the Phaedo

Abstract: In a well-known passage at Phaedo 100 c Socrates declares that "if anything else is beautiful besides Beauty itself, it is beautiful for no other reason than because it partakes of that Beauty". With that statement he advances the hypothesis of Forms in an effort to prove that the soul is immortal but also, apparently incidentally to that central theme, to expound his own view of "causation" (r'v .t'VLav w ehLuLe)J1 The section of the dialogue in which the Platonic Socrates is made to recount his early inquiries into natural philosophy, and which provides the context of the quotation, contains Plato's most explicit statement of the explanatory role of the Forms. It is that function of the Platonic Form, as set forth at Phaedo 95 e-106 e, which I propose to examine in this paper. More specifically my question will be: What is the force of the claim that the eidos is aitia? The method I follow in trying to answer that question is dictated by the observation that the hypothesis of Forms is presented in that context as a solution to certain vexing problems. My inquiry therefore falls into two main sections in which I pose the following questions: What is the nature of the problems set forth in relevant passages of the Phaedo, and how

True and False Names in the "Cratylus"

Abstract: Recent commentators on the Cratylus have typically passed one of the following (equally condemnatory) judgments on the passage 385 B-C, in which Plato asserts that words can be true or false: Plato has given us a patently bad argument, Plato is confused, or Plato does not mean what he says.' I think that an examination of the text will vindicate Plato of all of these charges. In this paper I shall attempt to show that the charges are unfounded by arguing that only if one supposes that Plato means by 'logos' in the passage in question something like what contemporary philosophers mean by 'statement' can orne advance the arguments used by the aforementioned commentators in support of their verdicts, and, further, that it is most unlikely that the text can support such an interpretation. The major burden of this paper will be to try to give a reasonable analysis of the passage in question without imposing on it the contemporary philosophical use of the word 'statement'. Let us begin by examining the context in which the passage appears. Cratylus and Hermogenes have been arguing about the correctness of names.2 Both hold that there is such a thing as the correctness of names, but Cratylus has been defending the thesis that things have correct names by nature, while Hermogenes holds that the correctness of names is a matter of convention. One gets the impression, from Hermogenes' complaint that he has been asking Cratylus to explain his position and can extract from him no explanation or even discussion of the matter, that Cratylus and Hermogenes have been merely exchanging the slogans, 'Correct naming is a matter of convention', and 'Correct naming is a matter of nature', without attempting to spell out the positions or trying to construct arguments for or against

Aristotle's 'Princile of Individuation'

Abstract: Il n'existe absolument pas de principe d'individuation chez Aristote. Pour lui, une entite est d'emblee individuelle| elle n'est individualisee (= singularisee, rendue unique) ni par la matiere, ni par la forme, ni par quoi que ce soit.

Unsterblichkeit und Trichotomie der Seele im zehnten Buch der Politeia1

Abstract: Sur l'interpretation de l'immortalite de l'âme telle que la concoit Platon dans le livre X de la Republique: cette immortalite s'applique-t-elle a l'âme tout entiere ou faut-il distinguer entre les parties (au nombre de trois) qui ont ete decrites au livre IV?.

The Unmoved Mover in early Aristotle

Abstract: It is still worth discussing whether the Unmoved Mover is present in the early stages of the development of Aristotle's thought. Jaeger thought that the doctrine of the Unmoved Mover was formulated by Aristotle at the beginning of his independent career and that it was to be seen as the successor to the Theory of Forms'. Perhaps few scholars would subscribe to this extreme version of the thesis today, but there is currently considerable support for the belief that the doctrine was an early one and that it appeared in de Philosophia2. There has been a good deal of interest in the subject recently3, but no account has been taken in recent discussions of the references to the Unmoved Mover (or to an unmoved mover) in the earlier books of the Physics, which I wish to consider here. To anticipate my conclusions, I intend to argue that the passages containing these references, which occur in Physics B and F, are later additions and that the doctrine of the Unmoved Mover did not figure in the original version of these books. As there can be no doubt about the presence of the Unmoved Mover as a central topic in Physics (, the intention to treat the early books separately may need some justification. Though it is hard to be dogmatic about the structure of the Physics, it is perhaps safe to say that the proof of the Unmoved Mover's existence, which occupies 0), forms the culmination of the discussion of change that begins in E and

Being in Numenius and Plotinus Some Points of Comparison

Abstract: In his Vita Plotini (17,1-6), Porphyry tells us that "when the people from Greece began to say that Plotinus was appropriating the ideas of Numenius, and Trypho the Stoic and Platonist told Amelius, the latter wrote a book to which we gave the title 'On the Difference between the Doctrines of Plotinus and Numenius' "(trans. Armstrong). Whilst this evidence cautions us against making rapprochements between Plotinus and Numenius which overlook the differences between their respective doctrines, it also encourages us to compare these doctrines, and research has in fact brought to light Numenian material in the Enneads of Plotinus. Without going into a discussion of the results of this research1, this article will propose further possible points of comparison, with respect in particular to certain accounts of true Being in Plotinus and Numenius, and suggest that these might provide additional indications of Numenian influence in Plotinus' thought. The accouilt of Being given by Plotinus in Enneads VI 4, ch. 2 and VI 5, ch. 3 will first be examined, in relation in particular to the use made in these texts of Plato's Parmenides. A comparison will then be proposed between an aspect of the Plotinian account and Being as described by Numenius, this leading to a brief discussion of the possibility that Numenius may not only have influenced the account of Being given in Enneads VI 4 and 5, but may also have provided a precedent to Plotinus' use of the Parmenides in these works.

A Proof from the Peri Ideon revisited

Abstract: In Book A of the Metaphysics Aristotle asserts that none of the ways in which "we prove" the existence of Forms is really convincing, for some of them are simply invalid and others prove the existence of Forms "for things of which we do not think that there are Forms" (990 b 8-11). As an example of failure in the latter case, Aristotle cites the argument which produces Ideas of relatives. This argument fails, says Aristotle, because "we don't want to say that relatives are a class of things existing by themselves" (990 b 15-17), i.e. we ought not to assert that there are Ideas of relatives. In the AMetaphysics we have only the mention of an argument concerning relatives and its rather curt dismissal by Aristotle. It has been clear to scholars for a long time, however, that in chapter 9 of Book A, Aristotle is simply passing in review the statement and criticism of a number of Academic arguments for the existence of Forms which he had treated at length and refuted in a lost essay entitled Peri Ideon. And fortunately fragments of this essay have been preserved in Alexander's commentary on the Metaphysics, where we find a statement of the argument concerning relatives and Aristotle's refutation of it.' In this paper I would like to approach this argument from tlhree points of view: 1) what T believe is the correct analysis and interpretation of the argument; 2) a comparison of my view with those of G. E. L. Owen and H. Cherniss;2 and 3) a brief discussion of one of Aristotle's criticisms of the argument. An extended treatment of this argument is called for, since it raises important questions on the nature

The Definition of the 'Predicables' in Aristotle

Abstract: But in 1970, Jonathan Barnes published a paper', where he defended the view that per se accidents are not properties. A consequence of this was that the 'predicables' were not well defined by Aristotle. In this paper, I will try to show that Barnes is mistaken. The argument he offers in support of his view seems to be a very good one, but it involves a faulty move. Let us quote Barnes' argument in full:

Critical and Explanatory Notes on some passages assigned to Aristotle's Protrepticus

Abstract: 1. Rose, Arist. fr. 57, Ross, Protr. fr. 3. As is well known, this passage is quoted by Stobaeus, who assigns it to Aristotle, and by Maximus Monachus in his Gnomologium. A papyrus probably of the 2nd. century A.D. preserves the same text, giving also a few lines before the part quoted by Stobaeus, and a sentence in the middle which he has omitted (CopL 8i LaXLa-roV, Ross fr. 3 lines 13-16). There are critical notes in Walzer's Aristotelis Dialogorunt Fragmenta (1934) 24-26 and During's Aristotle's Protrepticus (1961). The papyrus text was edited by Grenfell and Hunt, Oxyrhynchus Papyri IV no. 666. Bernays (Die Dialoge des Arist. 161-64) accepted the attribution of the passage to Aristotle, while leaving it uncertain to which of his lost works it belonged. Subsequently the discovery of the papyrus, which includes itg YLXoaopTYeov, made it probable that the Protrepticus is the work in question. If so, the papyrus, which is now in the Bodleian Library, is the only surviving manuscript of any part of that work. I believe that we can add a little to the reconstruction by editors of the fragmentary opening sentence. And the sentence in the middle which, as said above, is preserved by the papyrus alone, has in my opinion been wrongly emended and falsely translated. I propose to discuss these two matters and consider tentatively the position which this passage occupied in the whole work. The papyrus is written in three narrow columns each of 57 lines, but of the first (left-hand) column nothing remains except the ends of lines at the top and bottom. Here is what is preserved according to Grenfell and Hunt:

Protasis and Problema in the Topics

Abstract: The purpose of this discussion is to show that Mrs Martha Kneale has misunderstood Aristotle's distinction between protasis and problema in the Topics. She writes that, according to Aristotle, protasis and problema are "both questions and the difference between them ... is merely one of form, ..."'t Then, she goes on to state what, according to her, this distinction may amount to: the distinction is perhaps that between the thesis proposed for discussion, i.e. the starting-point of the argument, and a question put later to keep it going. We may suppose that the question for discussion is 'Is animal the genus of man?' This is the protasis, the starting-point. In the course of the argument, the questioner asks 'Is it or is it not a property of animals to be self-moving?' This would be a problema.2 After this, she contrasts the use of thse words in the Topics with that found in the Prior Analytics. She writes that there the word 'protasis' "always means a statement and in chapters 26 to 28 of the first book of that work ... problemna also seems to mean a statement."3 Kneale thinks that Aristotle has changed his point of view. In the Prior Analytics he is concerned to find out how a given proposition can be proved rather than how a given question can be answered either in the affirmative or negative. In the Topics he has always the two disputants in mind.4 Then, she brings etymological considerations in support of her view that the two words have undergone changes in meaning: Protasis is from 7pOw?tvw ('to hold forth or offer') and is therefore something offered for consideration at the beginning of the dispute, while problema is from 7pop3&XXo ('to throw forward or down')