Showing papers in "Phronesis in 1978"
TL;DR: Among the arguments presented by Socrates as proofs for the everlastingness of the human soul, the last one has greatly puzzled philosophers because it seems that, in opposition to the earlier arguments, Plato considered this last argument conclusive as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Among the arguments presented by Socrates as proofs for the everlastingness of the human soul the last one has greatly puzzled philosophers because it seems that, in opposition to the earlier arguments,' Plato considered this last argument conclusive. For, whereas earlier in the discussion the partners of the dialogue, Simmias and Cebes, raise objections and Socrates tries to meet their criticism, at the end of the last argument he claims: "Then this is most certain that the soul is immortal and imperishable and that our souls will really exist in Hades" (106e). And at this point Socrates obtains his partners' final consent. For, though Simmias admits that he still entertains doubts, it seems that Plato wants to attribute this to the natural difficulties we encounter when arguments have to overcome fears, not to shortcomings of the argument itself (cf. 107 a/b). For with Socrates' calm reassurance that further scrutiny of its presuppositions would finally lead to a state of conviction as far as this is humanly possible, the argumentative part of the dialogue ends (107 b9) .2 What follows is Socrates' mythical description of the soul's afterlife and, finally, the narrative of Socrates' peaceful death among his friends. Because of Socrates'/Plato's apparent confidence in this last argument it has always attracted special attention. And in recent years there have been various attempts to expose the flaw or flaws in the proof. For, ever since Kant pointed out the unavoidable difficulties that human reason encounters when it tries to transcend the boundaries of sense-experience, the interest of philosophers in arguments of this kind has been mainly a critical one. It is a challenge to a philosopher's skill to expose weaknesses of such arguments, steps which do not follow necessarily or assumptions which one does not have to accept. Furthermore, especially in the case of a philosopher as great as Plato, such a critical investigation promises to be a rewarding task, since one may hope that, if the argument under investigation turns out not to be clearly invalid, one may learn something about those philosophical presuppositions which are not explicitly stated in the argument but tacitly assumed (or argued for earlier in the dialogue), but which are, nevertheless, needed to make the argument go through. In this paper, then, I shall try to defend Plato's argument against those critics who claim that its conclusion is reached by invalid inference and point out
41 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a survey of the particular ethical virtues and vices and decide in what way each of them is a mean between extremes, in the sense that a virtue is concerned with ranges of passions and actions.
Abstract: At the beginning of his survey of the particular ethical virtues and vices (EN III 6 to the end of V) Aristotle says that his purpose is to show what they are ('rives) and also what sort of things they are concerned with and the manner of this concern (srepi srota xai rrCs). He adds a claim that the survey will also make clear that the list of virtues is exhaustive (xai r6uxL) (1115 a 4-5). In hs general account of ethical virtue (lI-Ill 5) it has been shown that a virtue is concerned with ranges of passions (Trai) and actions (spA&ls) and is a mean between extremes (1106 b 16-24). Thus his further programme is (1) to assign to each virtue its proper sphere or range of passions and/or actions and (2) to decide in what way each is a mean. The hint that not all ethical virtues are means in the same way is confirmed at least in the case of justice which is found not to be a mean "in the same way as the other virtues" (1133 b 32-3). In another passage Aristotle adds (3) as a further reason for making an exhaustive survey of ethical virtues and ethical vices (for some of which ordinary language does not have names) that, in addition to confirming the doctrine of the mean, it will enable us to know better "the facts about character", T'r Ti O iTOos (1127 a 15-17).
41 citations
TL;DR: Aristotle is sometimes held to the thesis [Ti] that singular affirmative sentences imply the existence of a bearer for the grammatical subject of the sentence as discussed by the authors, thus the truth of "Socrates is sick" requires that something exist which is identical with Socrates.
Abstract: Aristotle is sometimes held to the thesis [Ti] that singular affirmative sentences imply the existence of a bearer for the grammatical subject of the sentence. Thus the truth of "Socrates is sick" requires that something exist which is identical with Socrates. Attribution of TI to Aristotle can be justified by appeal to Categories 13 b 27-33 which seems to contain a straightforward statement of the thesis. Unfortunately, T I's status becomes problematic in light of On Interpretation 21 a 24-28, for here Aristotle seems to deny TI explicitly. This, at least, is the consensus among his commentators.1 We are thus faced with a serious inconsistency in Aristotle's account of singular sentences, an inconsistency most interpreters are content merely to mention, if they notice it at all.2 The first part of this paper advances some suggestions for reconciling the troublesome passages. In the second part I draw out certain related features of Aristotle's theory of singular sentences.
24 citations
TL;DR: Aristotle notes with approval that Socrates did not separate the forms and implies that Socrates either did not admit forms into his ontology at all, or ceded them only the shadowy status of Aristotelian forms as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Aristotle notes with approval that Socrates did not separate the forms.2 By this he means, at least, that Socrates did not subscribe to the existence of forms separate from their particular instances, and implies that Socrates either did not admit forms into his ontology at all, or ceded them only the shadowy status of Aristotelian forms. Aristotle's testimony in this regard fits neatly with the evidence of Plato's earlier dialogues, which of all Plato's work seem most accurately to represent the historical Socrates.3 The Socrates we have from the early dialogues does not develop a theory of forms, though he talks frequently about forms, and evidently uses an unstated theory of forms in his dialectic.4 Unlike the Socrates of the middle dialogues, our Socrates does not argue explicitly for the separation of the forms,5 and does not obviously presuppose their separate existence in the process of his dialectic.6 The consensus of recent scholars writing in English on the matter is that the early dialogues treat forms as immanent in particular things.7 R. E. Allen has challenged this orthodoxy:
22 citations
TL;DR: In this article it was shown that if it is seen to be better and makes the thing defined clearer it is obvious that the definition in force will have been abandoned, since there are not several definitions of the same thing.
Abstract: Just as in public assemblies they are accustomed to newly introduce a law and if the law newly introduced is better they abandon the previous law, so ought one to proceed in the case of definitions as well and to propose, oneself, an alternate definition. For if it is seen to be better and makes the thing defined clearer it is obvious that the definition in force will have been abandoned, since there are not several definitions of the same thing, Topics 151 b 12-17
22 citations
TL;DR: The meaning of the questions which Socrates sets forth at Philebus 1 5B 1-8 has been a matter of heated debate in the last two centuries as mentioned in this paper, and it seems to me that the translations and explications of the text have been unsatisfactory, and I shall try to show where scholars have gone astray and why.
Abstract: The meaning of the questions which Socrates sets forth at Philebus 1 5B 1-8 has been a matter of heated debate in the last two centuries. It seems to me that the translations and explications of the text have been unsatisfactory, and I shall try to show where scholars have gone astray and why. The problem concerns the nature of Unity, Being, and the relation between the One and Many. Let us now consider the passage. 29. Hp&,rov pV ?'; TLVOS 6 TOLMaTag eTvLaL ovVs axv TavOTas, piacv 2 ixOTI1v ovyav ELT?T yEVEOLV I1TE 6XEipOV 3 iTpoa8UXoRuEvYsv, OIws EIVXL i3eIa3cLOTca RiaLV TOXVTqV; iET& 4 8e TOVT 'EV TOLS YLYVOILEVOLS aUv Xvi 'aELpOLS E'LTE 8LEaaVXV 5 XaL 'roXXa yeyovvtav rTtOV, E'CO' 8X'qV av %o0XXOLS yy?VEa&XL. 8
17 citations
TL;DR: It has been widely held that Epicurus had a pathological unwillingness to admit that he was indebted to any teacher or predecessor, and that this extended even to Democritus, from whom he had taken the greater part of his own physical theory as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: It has been widely, though not universally, held that Epicurus had a pathological unwillingness to admit that he was indebted to any teacher or predecessor, and that this extended even to Democritus, from whom he had taken the greater part of his own physical theory.' The evidence is, however, flimsy, and I hope to show that it can be explained better on the supposition that Epicurus departed from Democritus' views on one or two specific points, and, like any other philosopher, criticised him where he thought he was mistaken, but seldom went beyond what was, and is, permissible in philosophical arguments.2 Since nearly every piece of evidence we have can be interpreted in more than one way, I shall consider each in turn. 1) Diogenes Laertius (X 8) in the course of a survey of the attacks that have been made on Epicurus, covering his life, his philosophy, and his relations with other people, cites, from Timocrates, a list of abusive epithets applied by him to other philosophers. Among these is 'Lerocritus' for Democritus. Timocrates was a renegade disciple of Epicurus who gathered together a mass of picturesque calumny to discredit his former master, and such a source is automatically suspect.3 Indeed Diogenes himself devalues the evidence by saying at the end of his survey, 'But these calumniators are mad.' But we may accept that Epicurus did indeed once call Democritus 'Lerocritus' and that this word, which means something like 'Judge of Nonsense', was regarded as pejorative. Beyond that we know nothing, though I shall make a suggestion about its context later on.4 2) Cicero touches on this subject in three places: a) De Nat. Deor, I 33 93. This book contains a discussion on the gods between the Epicurean Velleius and the sceptical Academic Cotta. Velleius is presented as a typical member of his school, who uses forceful language about other philosophers, including Democritus. Cotta in reply praises his clarity and elegance of style, and opposes him in a similarly outspoken vein. The passage that interests us is a digression with little connexion with the main argument. It serves to discredit the Epicureans by listing the attacks made by them on their opponents in both earlier and modern periods, including here Velleius himself. Epicurus is accused of a number of such unworthy pieces of behaviour, among which it is claimed that in
16 citations
TL;DR: In a controversial passage in the Meno, Socrates argues that virtue cannot be taught (89 c-96 c) as mentioned in this paper, which is hard to square with the thesis that virtue is knowledge, and for this reason there is a longstanding debate over whether Socrates' argument is meant seriously.
Abstract: In a controversial passage in the Meno, Socrates argues that virtue cannot be taught (89 c-96 c).1 Such a view is hard to square with the thesis that virtue is knowledge, and for this reason there is a longstanding debate over whether Socrates' argument is meant seriously.2 In this paper I shall try to determine exactly where Socrates stands on the question whether virtue can be taught, as well as on the more general question of how men come to possess virtue. What I shall contribute to the debate is not a new answer, but fresh evidence. I believe Socrates' argument cannot be properly understood without seeing its connections with other parts of the dialogue. In the first two sections of the paper I examine Socrates' discussion of the theory of recollection as it relates to the concept of teaching. I argue that one of the purposes of Socrates' discussion is to draw a contrast between two conceptions of teaching. In the final section of the paper I show how the contrast between the two conceptions of teaching is essential to understanding Socrates' claim that virtue cannot be taught.
16 citations
TL;DR: In the Ennead treatise on Well-Being, Plotinus as mentioned in this paper argued that it is not a necessary condition of our spiritual well-being that we be aware of our higher self.
Abstract: According to Plotinus, when a man enters the physical world a second man or self attaches itself to the primary man, the higher self. We tend to direct all our attention to this second self and lose sight of the higher self which, nevertheless, continues to operate as nous without ceasing. It is the philosopher's duty to rediscover this higher self which lies within and to return to it through contemplation. Plotinus has two general approaches to the problem of our relationship to our higher self. Sometimes he sees the aim of contemplation to be the turning of the lower man towards the higher self. In this case the lower self is aware of the higher self, is turned towards it and away from the material world. This spiritual direction is described in terms of awareness or consciousness and the seat of consciousness seems to be identified with what we might term our normal empirical consciousness. Most of these ideas may be found in Ennead v. 3. But in the same treatise their inadequacy is also expressed. If we wish to rediscover and truly know our higher self it is not sufficient merely to direct the attention of our empirical self towards it since in this way we stand outside the object of knowledge and know it only by image. True knowledge comes only when we are identical with the object of knowledge. True self-knowledge comes, then, only when we become identified with our higher self, when we transcend our empirical self and live at the level of the higher self. If the higher self never ceases thinking, why, Plotinus frequently asks, are we not aware of it? Usually he answers that although we may all possess a higher self we do not all turn towards it. In an important passage (ch. 4) of Ennead i 4., the treatise on Well-Being, he again poses this question but surprisingly declares that it is not a necessary condition of our spiritual well-being that we be aware of our higher self. Even in v. 3., where Plotinus rejects as inadequate the simple turning of the empirical self towards the higher self and advocates a higher stage of contemplation, he does not go so far as to say that the empirical self need not be aware of this contemplation. Now in other passages what we are asked to turn towards is our higher self considered as a permanently active nous. Our spiritual improvement depends on our becoming aware of its presence. In i. 4, however, Plotinus is concerned with the stage of contemplation which, as stated in v. 3,
15 citations
TL;DR: The unity of the five virtues of the Protagoras has been investigated in the work of as mentioned in this paper, where the question of whether the virtue of courage is a virtue or not is investigated.
Abstract: The Protagoras, as is well known, depicts Socrates pitted against the famous sophist in a dispute about "the unity of the virtues," among other things. If Socrates has some difficulty proving the unity of the five virtues, commentators and readers of this dialogue have had as much trouble about the unity of the work, or the connections beween the five or so topics appearing in it.' Particularly it has been hard to see just why Socrates introduces the question of the unity of the virtues when he does, and what is going on in the hedonism passage where Socrates apparently secures agreement to a principle by the odd means of deriving it from a premise Protagoras says he does not accept, and which we hardly expect Socrates to believe, and which is not necessary to establish what he wants. I believe that we can make good sense of all this and more if, remembering that the guiding question of the dialogue is whether Protagoras will really be able to deliver the goods he publicly offers, to Hippocrates or anyone else, we follow the question, What about the virtue of courage (&v8pEia) for Protagoras? Is it a virtue, can he teach it, do his presuppositions allow him to give it its due? The question is important because, as I shall explain, there is an inconsistency in believing that "Man is the measure of all things" as Plato interprets that maxim in the Theaetetus, and believing that there is anything worth dying for, i.e., that courage in the paradigm case is a valuable trait to the one possessing it. But to follow this thread through the dialogue, we have to see that Plato has laid it down as far back as Protagoras' long speech.
TL;DR: The problem of paraphrasing first-order sentences in the Sophist dialogues has been studied in this paper. But the problem is not limited to paraphrases of first-and second-order predicates.
Abstract: While a great deal of progress has been made in recent years in bringing to light the philosophical sense of the Sophist one problem, or cluster of problems, has resisted analysis.' The problem is that Plato seems to use a particular form of sentence ambiguously; the fact that he does so seems to reveal a fundamental confusion on Plato's part. It will be easier for me to describe the problem as well as my strategy in attempting to solve it, if I first introduce some terminology. In the Sophist, particularly 251-260, Plato frequently appeals to the fact that one Form participates in another Form to explain or justify other claims.2 For example, "Change is, because it partakes of Being" (256A 1) and "Motion is different because it partakes of the Different" (256B2-3). I will call those sentences which are either explicitly or implicitly justified by an appeal to participation "first-order sentences." Further, we find throughout the dialogues sentences of the form "the F (is) . . ." where "the F" is (1) an abstract noun with or without the definite article or (2) the definite article followed by a common noun, mass term, adjective or participle.3 Some such sentences can be paraphrased without loss of sense as "the Form, the F (is) .... ," while the vast majority of them cannot. "Beauty is eternal" can be so paraphrased. "The sophist is a wage earner" cannot. I will call those sentences which can be so paraphrased "Form-predications." Now it is argued that Plato uses sentences of the form "the F (is) .. sometimes to express a Form-predication and sometimes to say something about the nature of the F or perhaps about the nature of particular F's. The fact Plato vacillates between these two types of predication not only obscures whatever philosophical point he may be making but also shows that Plato was confused about the nature of Forms. I think, however, that there is a plausible reading of the Sophist which shows Plato to be in no way confused as to the meaning of such sentences. None of the first-order sentences of the Sophist, I will argue, are Formpredications. After arguing that the text forces this conclusion on us (Part I), I will try to make the conclusion plausible (Part II) by describing a type of predication, different from Form-predication, in terms of which all of the first-order sentences of the Sophist can be consistently understood. A consequence of my interpretation is the rather surprising thesis that no-
TL;DR: In this article, an account of Democritus' teaching on the perception of black and white, written under the conviction that his teaching here was basically consistent, concrete, and ostensibly workable, is presented.
Abstract: In spite of the amount of information about Democritus' teaching on perception and colors in Theophrastus' De Sensibus, there still is much vagueness about this teaching. Many commentators provide nothing more than mere summaries or paraphrases of Theophrastus' account without an attempt to coordinate all the information available into a coherent system.2 Few also attempt to take into consideration the role of light and air in the process of vision and the sensations of color, although both seem to Theophrastus to be essential parts of Democritus' explanations. Besides, too little has been done with the information which can be gleaned from Theophrastus' criticisms of Democritus' teaching, from those very passages in which he takes issue with what seem to him important parts of Democritean atomism. Neglect of these passages, as well as a reluctance to coordinate all the information available, seems to result in vagueness in accounts of Democritus' teaching; and that fails to satisfy. What is proposed here is an account of Democritus' teaching on the perception of black and white, written under the conviction that his teaching here was basically consistent, concrete, and ostensibly workable. Such an account is, of necessity, speculative at certain points, for Theophrastus' own account is incomplete. Where speculation is necessary, it will be consistent with the text of Theophrastus and with the more explicit doctrines of later atomism apparently derived from Democritus. While this account of Democritus represents a break at certain points from the traditional interpretation, it does, unlike the traditional interpretation, have the advantage of concreteness, clarity, and consistency. In order to lay a more proper foundation for an account of Democritus' theory of sensations of black and white, and in order to clear up any prior misunderstandings, it will be best first to survey what we know of Democritus' teaching on the mechanics of visual perception (50-5 1).
TL;DR: The authors examined the view of H. J. Drossart Lulofs, according to which Aristotle's De Somno contains two roughly equal parts, constituting a complete older version of the treatise preceded by an interrupted revision.
Abstract: The following paper begins by examining the view of H. J. Drossart Lulofs, according to which Aristotle's De Somno contains two roughly equal parts, constituting a complete older version of the treatise preceded by an interrupted revision. It will be shown that the De Somno is rather a single notably well-organised treatise, into which a surviving fragment of an older version has been inserted, probably out of editorial piety. Comparison of this fragment with the main treatise reveals a significant development (not without a modem relevance) in Aristotle's well-known theory of the four causes. That such a development indeed took place is independently (and conclusively) confirmed by a laconic passage in Aristotle's Metaphysics. The paper also points out some acute limitations to the celebrated theory of F. Nuyens concerning Aristotle's psychology.
TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that time is not composed of indivisible nows, any more than any other magnitude is composed of infinite time-elements whose nature, as extended or extensionless, is not specified.
Abstract: If we accept the textual emendations favoured by W. D. Ross in his edition of the Physics, Aristotle, we must believe, reported an argument of Zeno's and gave a reply to it in the following words (or something very like them) inZ,ch.9(239b5-9): 'Zeno's argument is unsound. For he says that if (1) everything is always at rest when it is over against what is equal to it, and (2) the moving object is always in this condition in the now, then (3) the moving arrow is motionless. But this is false, since (4) time is not composed of indivisible nows, any more than any other magnitude is composed of indivisibles.' Aristotle briefly recapitulates both argument and reply later in the chapter (239 b 30-33), where he says: 'The third argument is the one I have just mentioned, that the moving arrow is at rest. This conclusion follows from the assumption that time is composed of nows. If this is not granted, the argument will not go through.' What exactly did Aristotle think Zeno's argument consisted in? And what was his reply? I shall try to determine the answers to these questions. To do this is not to determine what Zeno's argument was, but it is intimately related to it. The answer one gives to these questions depends in part on the way in which one interprets the expressions 'in the now' (6v Tup vvv) and 'of indivisible nows' (kx Tr&v vvv rCv &8LaLp&Frwv) that occur in the main passage, and the expression 'of nows' (ix 'rCv viv) that occurs in the recapitulation. Are they intended to refer to extensionless points in time, time-instants, or to atomic periods of time, or are they vaguer, referring to indivisible time-elements whose nature, as extended or extensionless, is not specified? Professor Vlastos supports the second interpretation. (See 'A Note on Zeno's Arrow' in Studies in Presocratic Philosophy, vol 2, edd. R. E. Allen and D. J. Furley, p. 187 and notes 13 and 21 on pp. 196-7). In favour of this view he argues that there is at least one other passage in the Physics (Z, ch. 1, 231 b 18-232 a 24) where it is reasonable to suppose that Aristotle uses the expression 'rO VVV' to refer to an atomic period of time. If we accept Vlastos' interpretation, our answers to the two questions that
TL;DR: In this article, a commentaire philosophique du passage d'Empedocle a partir des mots et expressions grecques que l'on s'efforce de rapprocher d'expressions comparables chez Homere, Hesiode, et d'autres auteurs de la periode archaique.
Abstract: Commentaire philosophique du passage d'Empedocle a partir des mots et expressions grecques que l'on s'efforce de rapprocher d'expressions comparables chez Homere, Hesiode, et d'autres auteurs de la periode archaique.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that there are good reasons for rejecting both interpretations, and offer an alternative which does not encounter the problems of either of the usual interpretations, which is based on the work of Professor D. J. Furley and turns on the unusual properties of the number zero.
Abstract: Two interpretations have dominated discussion of Zeno's paradox of the Moving Rows ("the Stadium"). According to one of these interpretations the paradox concerns relative motion, and according to the other it concerns indivisible magnitudes. In what follows I will argue that there are good reasons for rejecting both interpretations, and I offer an alternative which does not encounter the problems of either of the usual interpretations. According to this interpretation, which is based on the work of Professor D. J. Furley, the paradox of the Moving Rows turns on the unusual properties of the number zero. The paradox of the Moving Rows concerns three sets of rows, one stationary and the other two moving past the first in opposite directions. For simplicity I will discuss the paradox in terms of three single blocks (A, B and C) of equal size. Block A is stationary, and blocks B and C move past A in opposite directions at the same speed. According to Aristotle the conclusion of the paradox is that "one half the time is equal to the double."'