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Showing papers in "Phronesis in 1981"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors discuss two sets of passages where Plato uses the verb rIvcu (and its nominal forms ov and ovcaia) in a philosophically loaded way, in connection with the notion of truth.
Abstract: I here discuss two sets of passages where Plato uses the verb rIvcu (and its nominal forms ov and ovcaia) in a philosophically loaded way, in connection with the notion of truth. I suggest that the systematic nature of this connection has not been recognized and hence its philosophical significance has not been properly understood. Syntactically, the passages in question are a mixed bag. In a few cases we have what I call the veridical construction with a subject of sentential rather than nominal form: the verb is construed absolutely (no further predicate is expressed or understood), and it is syntactically linked to a clause of thinking or saying.' In other cases where the subject (or implied subject) is a noun phrase, an absolute construction of the verb may bear an existential sense. Most often, however, EIvaL will function as copula with predicate adjective, noun, or prepositional phrase. In cases where no predicate is expressed, there has been a tendency of late to describe the use of the verb as "incomplete" and to construe it as an elliptical copula, i.e. to interpret an expression of the form X is as elliptical for X is Y, where the value of Y is either specified by the context or left quite general.2 I do not want to deny the appropriateness of such an interpretation in many cases, perhaps in most. But I want to insist that the uses of EdVaL in Plato (as in Greek generally) are often overdetermined: several grammatical readings of a single occurrence are not only possible but sometimes required for the full understanding of the text. (Whether or not fallacy arises from such ambiguity is a question that must be considered separately for each case.) Even where the syntax is unambiguous, a copula use of the verb may bear a veridical value, that is to say, it may serve to call attention to the truth claim that is implicit in every declarative sentence. This function of the verb, which I have elsewhere called the veridical nuance or veridical lexical value, is not so clearly defined a notion as the veridical construction. It is unmistakable in those cases where a use of ErvaL is naturally translated as "is true", "is so", or "is the case"; but these are typically not copula constructions. In the copula use a veridical nuance emerges whenever there is any contrast between being so and seeming so, between being really such-and-such and being only called such-and-such or believed to be such-

63 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
Jonathan Lear1
TL;DR: In the present instant, a moving arrow is at rest as mentioned in this paper, whereas in the past the arrow is occupied by a space of its own size, and in the future the arrow will be at rest.
Abstract: The paradox, I conjecture, had the following form: (1) Anything that is occupying a space just its own size is at rest. (2) A moving arrow, while it is moving, is moving in the present. (3) But in the present the arrow is occupying a space just its own size. (4) Therefore, in the present the arrow is at rest. (5) Therefore a moving arrow, while it is moving, is at rest. Two items about the reconstruction deserve mention. First, I have interpreted the phrase 'is against what is equal' (xtTo T61L'oov) as 'is occupying a space just its own size'. The Greeks notoriously had difficulty working out a conception of space and the interpretation, I think, preserves the sense of the Greek while sparing us its artificial ring. Second, the phrase, 'in the now' (EV -v viv) is probably Aristotelian.2 But it does, I shall argue, capture a concept crucial to Zeno's argument which has been overlooked by modem commentators: the concept of the present instant. Commentators tend to interpret Zeno as saying that in a moment the arrow occupies a space its own size.3 And yet much of the strength of the paradox and of Aristotle's response depends on the fact that the moment of travel with which Zeno is concerned is the present moment.4

28 citations



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In the Theaetetus, Plato argues against the thesis that knowledge is perception as discussed by the authors, and a full-scale reconstruction of the theory of perception which Plato subscribes to in the Theatetus remains to be undertaken.
Abstract: In the Theaetetus, Plato argues against the thesis that knowledge is perception. At various points in the discussion, one glimpses a background theory of perception which, if fully articulated, would make the course of the argument more intelligible. This is particularly true of the final argument against this thesis at 184-186, for in making this argument Plato seems to speak in his own voice and to make claims about perception that stand in need of further elucidation. Certain features of the argument at 184-186 that bear on the question of what Plato thinks perception is have been discussed by Cooper and Burnyeat with considerable insight.' A full-scale reconstruction of the theory of perception which Plato subscribes to in the Theaetetus remains to be undertaken. Since the Theaetetus is an important source of information about Plato's views on perception in the later period, an attempt at such a reconstruction appears in order. The object of this paper is to carry out this project, i.e., to elucidate the theory of perception found in the Theaetetus. In the first section, a general characterization of perception will be given that meets the requirement that the claims made about perception in the course of the argument at 184-6 are entailed by it. This requirement, it will be argued, would be met by a modified version of the secret doctrine account of perception. The objective of the second section will be to decide whether, on the theory of perception at work in the Theaetetus, human percipients are able to make simple judgments through perception. The third section seeks to give an account of the mind's inability to grasp ousia (being) through perception which is compatible with the position that some simple judgments are made through perception.

25 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The traditional interpretation of non-substantial individuals is based on the notion of individual qualities, quantities, etc. as mentioned in this paper, which is not supported by the textual evidence that is available.
Abstract: There is a dispute as to what sort of entity non-substantial individuals are in Aristotle's Categories. The traditional interpretation holds that non-substantial individuals are individual qualities, quantities, etc. For example, Socrates' white is an individual quality belonging to him alone, numerically distinct from (though possibly specifically identical with) other individual colors. I will refer to these sorts of entities as 'individual instances.' The new interpretation1 suggests instead that non-substantial individuals are atomic species such as a specific shade of white that is indivisible into more specific shades. On this view, non-substantial individuals are what we would call universals2 which can be present in different individual substances, but are labelled 'individuals' by Aristotle because, like individual substances, there is nothing they are said of.3 In this paper I will defend the traditional account by attempting to show that it is supported by the slender textual evidence that is available. I will begin by stating three serious objections to the traditional interpretation. Next I will show that in works later than the Categories Aristotle accepted individual instances of properties of the sort found in the Categories by the traditional interpretation. Finally, I will set out the evidence that supports the traditional interpretation and answer the three objections.

23 citations


Journal ArticleDOI

21 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The Skeptizismus scheint in letter Zeit unter den Philosophen eine Art of Renaissance zu erleben: abgesehen von den ublichen Kapiteln uber den skeptischen Zweifel in allgemeinen Darstellungen der Erkenntnistheonie gibt es eine ganze Reihe von Biichern and Abhandlungen, in denen ein skeptisch genannter Standpunkt analysiert and entweder verteidigt oder wider
Abstract: Der Skeptizismus scheint in letzter Zeit unter den Philosophen eine Art von Renaissance zu erleben: abgesehen von den ublichen Kapiteln uber den skeptischen Zweifel in allgemeinen Darstellungen der Erkenntnistheonie gibt es eine ganze Reihe von Biichern und Abhandlungen, in denen ein skeptisch genannter Standpunkt analysiert und entweder verteidigt oder widerlegt werden soll So ist es verstandlich, daB sich auch die Historiker der Philosophie mit groBerem Eifer um die Interpretation der antiken Berichte uber die griechischen Skeptiker bemuht haben Mir scheint, daB unser Bild der antiken Skepsis durch die Untersuchungen der letzten zw6lf Jahre (seit dem Erscheinen von Charlotte Stough's Buch "Greek Skepticism", 1969) praziser und differenzierter geworden ist, so daf3 es sich lohnen mag, die "alte und von vielen griechischen Schriftstellern behandelte Frage" (Gellius XI v 6) nach dem Unterschied zwischen den beiden skeptischen Richtungen der Antike wieder aufzugreifen Wenn man sich um ein Verstandnis der Grunde ftir den skeptischen Zweifel an der M6glichkeit der Erkenntnis bemuht, so wird es allemal von Interesse sein, zu fragen, ob es verschiedene Formen der Skepsis gab und wie diese ausgesehen haben konnten Der Titel dieses Aufsatzes gehort zu einem Traktat des Plutarch', der leider verloren ist Er beschaftigte sich ohne Zweifel mit dem Unterschied zwischen den beiden skeptischen Schulen, denn wenngleich natUirlich jeder Philosoph aus der Schule Platons als Akademiker bezeichet werden konnte, so bezog man sich doch in der Spatantike mit diesem Titel gewohnlich auf die Vertreter der oft so genannten Neuen Akademie, deren

21 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a formal redefinition of self-predication is proposed, which is meant to be a fourth way of reading such sentences in Plato, distinct from each of the three I have just set forth.
Abstract: How shall we read those perplexing sentences "Justice is just," "Beauty is beautiful," and the like which have occasioned so much controversy in discussions of Plato's metaphysics in recent decades? Shall we assume that they are ordinary predications, asserting their predicate-term of the Form named by the subject-term?" Or shall we hold, more charitably, that they are identities?2 Or should we, as charitably, opt for a third reading which understands them to assert their predicate not of the Form but of its instances, if any?3 In an important paper,4 remarkable for the boldness of its attack on fundamental problems of Platonic ontology, Professor Alexander Nehamas puts forward a formal redefinition of "self-predication" which is meant to be a fourth way of reading such sentences in Plato, distinct from each of the three I have just set forth.5 He proposes "the following analysis of self-predication:

17 citations



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A passage in De Anima III which has commonly been treated as echoing these sketchily indicated ideas has been shown to make no general claims about the nature of Xoyos at all, and none about O'La'O1OL considered as a faculty; that it deals only with instances of actualised perception, and those only of one specific kind; and that the variety of X6-yo; with which it is concerned is radically different as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: At several points in the argument beginning at De A nima 424a 17, Aristotle describes (x&'la00aLS as a Xoyos. This description has generally, and I think rightly, been taken to involve the sense of Xoyos as 'ratio', and it has been understood as being related to his earlier thesis (424a2 ff.) that O'Lrj ats is a prao6rls, a mean between sensible extremes. A'CoqLYs, in this context, is the faculty or capacity of perception, rather than the activity that goes on when we actually perceive: it is that by which we judge LaOw,r6t, not the act of judging or apprehending them (424a5-6); it is given a description jointly with ToL OTqTLXC4 E?Lvct, 'what it is to be capable of perceiving' (26-28); and the description itself is comprised in the words X6yos TLS Xxi MVXLLS. Two kinds of object, according to these passages, escape our perception, for quite distinct reasons. We do not perceive (ov'x acdaOotv6[Ox) what is Opws OEpFOV xot' vyXpov, fi oxXiqpo xai [taXaxoi (424a2-3): that is, apparently, we do not perceive e.g. the hotness or coldness of something that is itself at the same temperature as our sense-organ. Secondly, our aLOx) and pitch (6vos) of the strings is destroyed when they are struck too vigorously' (28-32). The first of these remarks suggests that we perceive through comparison or contrast: we judge or measure the relation between the condition of our sense-organ and the condition presented to us. The second, though its details are controversial, indicates that the properly balanced condition of our sense organs (ala ri ptx) may be disturbed by an excessive stimulus, to such an extent that they cease to function. There are many difficulties in these doctrines and their elaborations elsewhere, but it is not my intention to pursue them. My much more limited aim is to consider, against the background of these sketchily indicated ideas, a passage in De Anima III which has commonly been treated as echoing them. I shall try to show that it does nothing of the sort: that unlike the passages I have cited it makes no general claims about the nature of XaO'lOiav at all, and none about O'La'O1OL considered as a faculty; that it deals only with instances of actualised perception, and those only of one very specific kind; and that the variety of X6-yo; with which it is concerned is radically different.

17 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
Joan Kung1
TL;DR: A distinction between questions concerning the basic framework within which a science proceeds are radically different from questions about the nature, existence and attributes of various kinds within a science as mentioned in this paper, since the former are pre-scientific and can only be dealt with dialectically.
Abstract: According to Aristotle, questions concerning the basic framework within which a science proceeds are radically different from questions concerning the nature, existence and attributes of various kinds within a science. The former are pre-scientific and can only be dealt with dialectically. Dialectic is not itself a science, yet it provides the "path to the principles of all inquiries" (Top. 10lb4). These principles cannot be discussed within the sciences on pain of regress or petitio principii, since they are the protai, the "firsts," of everything within them (Top. 101 a36101 b4). Thus, it could only be the business of dialectic and not of any science to consider whether we should speak of "thises" (tode ti) and "suches" (toionde) and whether there are substances and qualities and quantities (Phys. 185a27-8). In a science, on the other hand, we ask such questions as: "Does the sun suffer eclipse?" "What causes an earthquake?" "Are there centaurs?" and "What is man?" (,4n. Post. B.l). Quine has pointed out that a radical distinction between framework questions and questions within the sciences is "of little concern ... apart from the adoption of something like the (Russellian) theory of types."' Without some such theory, there will be no distinction in principle between such questions as "Are there properties?" and "Are there substances" on the one hand, and "Are there centaurs?" on the other. With the adoption of some such type theory, however, although we can't know in advance, for example, what particular species there are, we can know that whatever we come across in the world will be assignable to one of an antecedently determined number of categories, so the division will make sense. There will be fundamental segregations of expression and entities, and attempts to violate type distinctions will lead to absurdity and paradox. In light of Quine's insight, it is perhaps not surprising to discover that a type distinction emerges early and remains fundamental throughout Aristotle's work. I owe notice of it to Terry Penner.2 It is the distinction between a this (tode ti) and a such (toionde or sometimespoion), as Aristotle sometimes puts it. I shall assume that it is the same distinction he has in mind in charging Plato with trying to turn universals (katholou) into particulars (e.g. Met. 1038b34-1039a2, 1040b23-31, 1041a4, 1053b9-24,

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Platonic love may be culturally dead, but it has come to life again through the vigour and acumen of a well-known discussion by Gregory Vlastos, 'The Individual as Object of Love in Plato', in his Platonic Studies as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Platonic love may be culturally dead. Academically it has come to life again, above all through the vigour and acumen of a well-known discussion by Gregory Vlastos, 'The Individual as Object of Love in Plato', in his Platonic Studies (Princeton University Press, 1973). Vlastos pays Plato the tribute not of faded reverence, but of lively disparagement. He casts Plato as the champion of a 'spiritualized egocentricism' (30), a man 'scarcely aware of kindness, tenderness, compassion, concern for the freedom, respect for the integrity of the beloved, as essential ingredients of the highest type of interpersonal love' (ib.), who could not allow 'that the ultimate purpose of the creative act should be to enrich the lives of persons who are themselves worthy of love for their own sake' (31). Even as a lover, it appears, Plato was a fascist. One might take this response to be a straightforward revaluation of a familiar story. In the Symposium ascent, the lover advances from a single beautiful body to all beautiful bodies, to the beauty of practices, to the beauty of the sciences, and so to the Form of Beauty itself (21 Ic). If these are successive objects of love, it would seem at once to follow that 'personal affection ranks ... low in Plato's scala amoris' (31), a ranking that might well tell against Plato, not personal affection. We may suggest, however, that moral disapproval is rather a mild response to a doctrine which, for all its superficial familiarity, would be largely bizarre. Loving Beauty itself is perhaps alright because a mystery (illumined by a heterosexual metaphor in 212a). And loving a single beautiful body, which sounds wrong to us (what one loves, however physically, are persons, not mindless bodies), becomes alright once we bear in mind that the Platonic body is not unconscious and Cartesian: it is not only a sine qua non (Phaedo 65a), but also a subject (83d, 94b-e), of pleasures, passions, even opinions, of a kind. But then loving all beautiful bodies, not just one, is Don Juanism. To quote da Ponte: 'It's all love. Who is faithful to one is cruel to the others; I, who have an overabundance of sentiment, love them all.' While loving practices and sciences seems utterly not on. In illustration, consider the erotic symptoms of Phaedrus 251 (inevitably compared to Sappho at the wedding-feast). Are these to be discarded (which would be a loss)? Or are they to be transferred, by a kind of abstract fetishism, to the contemplation of, say, the Lycurgan

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Turner and Jowett's idealist Plato and Pater's aesthetical Plato strike us as travesties but what, then, of our own analytical Plato? Such doleful reflexions are occasioned by two recent books, one by Richard Jenkyns' the other by Frank M. Turner on the Greeks and the Victorians as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Studies in the history of scholarship first encourage self-congratulation and then instil self-doubt. Contemplating the egregious misinterpretations of our predecessors, we preen ourselves and complacently boast of progress. Then, observing how the scholarship of the past has been distorted by the explicit beliefs and underlying preconceptions of past scholars, we properly wonder whether the scholarship of the present is not similarly vitiated by present beliefs and present preconceptions. All that is true of philosophy no less than of other branches of scholarship: Jowett's idealist Plato and Pater's aesthetical Plato strike us as travesties but what, then, of our own analytical Plato? Such doleful reflexions are occasioned by two recent books, one by Richard Jenkyns' the other by Frank M. Turner,2 on the Greeks and the Victorians. Turner remarks that 'the Victorian study of the Greek heritage occurred in an arena of thoroughly engaged scholarship and writing. Disinterested or dispassionate criticism was simply not the order of the day. Historians and commentators openly and avowedly used discussions of Greek art, religion, literature, philosophy, and history as vehicles to address contemporary issues far removed from the classics. ... This rootedness of Greek studies in modern questions was the obvious source of polemical distortion of knowledge about Greece'.3 That general judgement receives countless specific illustrations in the pages of both authors. But if Jenkyns and Turner convey a depressing moral, their books are, for all that, stimulating, exciting, and wholly engrossing works. Jenkyns is brilliant, erudite, elegant; his subject is the influence of Greece on Victorian England, and he is primarily concerned with the arts; philosophy occupies only one of his thirteen chapters. Turner's book is a solid and thorough piece of scholarship; his subject is the influence of Greece on Victorian intellectual life; and philosophy provides the matter for three of his chapters and for more than a third of his weighty volume. There is some overlap between the two books; but they are, on the whole, complementary to one another.4

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors argue that the answer to this question must be "no" because the self-predication assumption is still present in the Sophist. But they do not discuss the question of whether the Third Man Argument in the Parmenides can be viewed as a form of self-supervision.
Abstract: A major problem in the interpretation of Plato's metaphysics is the question of whether he abandoned self-predication as a result of the Third Man Argument in the Parmenides. In this paper I will argue that the answer to this question must be 'no' because the self-predication assumption is still present in the Sophist.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a set of criteria which would have to be satisfied by a correct interpretation of the disputed passage, which is unsatisfactory, thus vitiating Waletzki's specific claims.
Abstract: In "Platons ldeenlehre und Dialektik im Sophistes 253d" (Phronesis 24 (1979) 241-252) Wolfgang Waletzki has criticized an earlier article of mine on that passage (Phronesis 22 (1977) 29-47). Although I have benefitted from a number of his observations, I am not in a position to accept his interpretation as a whole. Instead of arguing piecemeal against each of his claims, I would here like to embark first on a task which I believe to be more rewarding: the working out of criteria which would have to be satisfied by a correct interpretation of the disputed passage. In the light of these criteria I hope to show that Waletzki's approach is unsatisfactory, thus vitiating his specific claims. In order to avoid unnecessary printing costs, I would ask the reader to turn either to p. 30 of my article or to p. 242 of Waletzki's where the text and the system of references appear. Waletzki however does not print the lines which I originally called "The Epilogue" (253d9-e2), a detail of some importance, as I shall try to show. Sophist 253d is a rather confusing passage due to the fact that it contains references to Ideas both in the singular and the plural and it is not at first clear what sort of Ideas the Eleatic Visitor has in mind. The several instances in which the term "Idea" occurs (253 d 5) or is implied (cf. 'noXX4is 253 d 7 and 9, viro IILs if it is not, then they can introduce further confusion. Hence, the nature of dialectic as described in 253 d has to be determined prior to any appeal to material from other dialogues. Our first attempt must be to illustrate Sophista ex Sophista. If we appeal to the evidence provided by the Sophist itself, we seem to have a choice between the next two alternatives: (2) One can relate 253 d to those passages at the beginning and at the end of the dialogue which illustrate the actual practice of the dialectic of Division. On this assumption one is led to consider 253 d as a description of the method of Division, a

Journal ArticleDOI

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore some difficulties that arise in the interpretation of this passage and of the related passage at An. Post. I, 2, 72 a 8ff, and give a description of the kinds of premisses that can occur in a demonstration.
Abstract: In An. Post. I, 2, 72 a 8ff., Aristotle gives a description of the kinds of premisses that can occur in a demonstration. It is the purpose of this paper to explore some difficulties that arise in the interpretation of this passage and of the related passage at An. Post. I, 10, 76b 33 ff.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The interpretation of Z 3 has been divided grossly between those who would make of it, in Dermot O'Donoghue's words, a "material principle of change,"' and others who would consider it a (kind of) "thing" "a very real, if enigmatic, matter which underlies the elements" as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The interpretation of Aristotle on matter can be seen as divided grossly between those who would make of it, in Dermot O'Donoghue's words, a "material principle of change,"' and those who would make of it a (kind of) "thing" "a very real, if enigmatic, matter which underlies the elements."2 I say divided grossly because the exact nature of the difference between a principle and a thing could be clearer. The issue is heightened though not clarified by putting it in terms of whether or not Aristotle had a doctrine of (believed in) "prime matter."3 Proponents of the former approach (the "principle") tend to cite the Physics, De Generatione et Corruptione, and the De A nima Proponents of the latter put great stress on the Metaphysics, especially Z 3. Most recently the former approach appears to have been gaining ground,4 but the interpretation of Z 3 has remained unsatisfactory; due, I think, to insufficiently close analytical attention. The aim of this paper is to supply that attention, in the interest of the non-"thing" interpretation, and in the hope that a correct understanding will obviate the whole principle-thing dichotomy. 1029a20-26 is no doubt responsible for the contemporary, and not only contemporary, use of 'characterless' to characterize prime matter. Cook puts it this way: ". . . prime matter is taken to be characterless, eternal, unchanging, and unable to exist on its own."5 But it should not be too difficult to absolve Aristotle of the charge of believing in something "characterless," since the notion of something "characterless" is absurd. 'Characterless' is indeed half as absurd as 'heterological'. If 'heterological' applies to itself, then it doesn't, and if it doesn't, then it does. Whereas, if'characterless' applies to a thing, then it doesn't, and if it doesn't, then it doesn't. Cook in effect points out that such an interpretation ignores the force of the crucial (Greek corresponding to) 'itself in the passage.6 Let us see what this comes to. In the Appendix to his edition of Aristotle's Physics I and II,7 entitled "Did Aristotle Believe in Prime Matter?" W. C. Charlton suggests that lines "a 10-26 are all a statement of an opponent's line of thought .. . His principal reason for holding this view, which is peculiar to him, is that "If we say (as Aristotle himself does) that the bronze is less of a reality than what it constitutes ... then we ought surely to say that the length, breadth, and depth are the length, breadth, and depth of the statue: 'what these delimit' will be the statue, not some indeterminate stuff." According to this suggestion, the force of a 10-26 is: "If we say that bronze has more claim to the title of reality than what it constitutes, we shall then be forced to posit some completely indeterminate matter." Note that it is the bugaboo of "some completely indeterminate matter" which drives the argument, and the interpretation which sees that argument in the passage. Were it possible that this "completely indeterminate matter" does not figure at all in what Aristotle wishes to convey here, then there would be no reason to suppose Aristotle to be speaking otherwise than in his proper person. "And how," a simple-minded person might ask, "could the length, breadth, and depth delimit anything but the statue? How could

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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, it is argued that the use of eponymy and homonymy is not sufficient to disallow self-predication in the theory of forms and hence the evidence for or against the latter must be sought elsewhere.
Abstract: It is crucial to the notorious Third Man argument (Parmenides 132a 1 -b2, 132d 1I 33a6), where an infinite regress is alleged to ensue from the adoption of Plato's Theory of Forms, that the Form and its instances be grouped together in the same class and this by virtue of the so-called Self-Predication of the Forms. In other words, a given Form, e.g., Beauty, or the Beautiful, is itself beautiful and this fact allows this Form to be included along with the beautiful particulars in the class of beautiful things. In general, not only is a certain predicate "F" true of a group of particulars, but the Form, F-ness, in virtue of which this is so, is F as well assuring the truth of the formulation "F-ness is F." Some scholars have convinced themselves that an examination of Plato's concepts of eponymy and homonymy is sufficient to disallow self-predication' and so free Plato from the questionable clutches of the Third Man. I propose to challenge this contention and shall maintain that Plato's use of eponymy and homonymy is inconclusive as regards selfpredication and hence the evidence for or against the latter must be sought elsewhere. I hope, in passing, to cast new light on an interesting passage in Plato (Parmenides 133d) and, finally, to offer some considerations on the relation between predicate adjectives and Platonic Forms. Let me begin with eponymy. Plato's account of the eponymous relation between particulars and Forms, whereby the particulars get their name from the Form, is given at Parmenides 130e13 la. The passage reads: "'There seem to you, as you say, to be certain Forms from which the other things that partake of them get their names ('ras E'nWvv1ics ... LoXeLv). For example, those partaking of Likeness (6Iot6T-q-Tos) become like (bou[ot), of Greatness great, of Beauty and Justice beautiful and just." (One may compare Phaedo 102b and 102c.) Eponymy, here, is the relation of a particular to a Form. Socrates, for example, gets the derivative designation "just" by partaking of the Form named "Justice." But these passages have been taken to give us much more. Bestor (PS, pp. 38-40; CPE, p. 190) assumes that, by virtue of the eponymous relation as it is presented by Plato, the same general word "F" has a primary referent, or Form, of which it is the proper name and also secondary referents, the many particulars, which are named after the Form.2 Since the application of the term "F" to the Form is not of the secondary or "named after" variety, we do not require another Form for a corresponding primary referent and hence the infinite regress proposed by the Third Man does not obtain. Allen, PP, p. 170, distinguishes "F" as a common name, when applied to particulars, from "F" as a proper name when applied to the Form. With respect to the use of "F" as the proper name of a Form, he maintains, p. 170, "When 'F' is used in primary designation it is a synonym of 'the F itself' and 'F-ness,' therefore to say that F-ness is F is to state an identity. It follows that it is invalid to infer self-predication from Plato's apparently self-predicative language." For both thinkers self-predication is blocked because "F" when applied to a Form is a proper name ( = "the F") and so "F-ness is F" is really equivalent to "F-ness is the F" or, indeed, "The F is the F" (cf. Bestor, PS, p. 58) and this gives us no license to