Showing papers in "Phronesis in 1989"
TL;DR: Aristotle claimed that the happiest life for a human being is the life of moral virtue as discussed by the authors, and he did not take it as a major task of his moral theory to reconcile private interest and the common good.
Abstract: Aristotle claimed that the happiest life for a human being is the life of moral virtue.' The life of courage, temperance, justice, and the other virtues of character is better for the person living that life than a life that lacks those virtues. Having the sort of character which leads in a predictable way to actions which are, on the whole, socially beneficial ones, is in the best interest of any individual. This is not, and indeed was not thought even by Aristotle to be, a claim so compellingly true that it commands the immediate assent of every human being. Nevertheless, he does not take it as a major task of his moral theory to reconcile private interest and the common good. What for us are familiar questions about the relation between egoism and altruism, and prudence and morality, are simply not questions for Aristotle.2 This is not because he had never met any selfish people, or persons who saw their own good as distinct from, and in conflict with, that of others. He does not, however, recognize the possibility of any genuine conflict between the rational pursuit of one's own happiness and the promotion of the happiness of others. Those who see a conflict are, in his eyes, simply mistaken about the nature of their own good. The attempt to reconcile the rational pursuit of one's own happiness with the equally rational pursuit of the happiness of others led the great modern moral philosophers Kant and Sidgwick to God and to despair, respectively. Aristotle confidently asserts their identity. This is deeply puzzling.
65 citations
TL;DR: In fact, there is only one Sophist, Protagoras, whom we have reason to regard as a relativist in any deep or interesting sense as discussed by the authors. But if he does, it is solely on the basis of his famous doctrine that "Man is the measure of all things" (DK 80B1), a doctrine which he is never said to have shared with any of the other Sophists.
Abstract: It is frequently alleged that the Sophists were relativists. Claims to this effect can be found in general histories of philosophy, in histories of Greek philosophy, in studies of the Sophists, in studies of relativism, and elsewhere. Sometimes it is moral or ethical relativism specifically that is ascribed to them, at other times a broader relativism concerning knowledge, truth or reality in general; but that the Sophists were some species of relativists is something of a commonplace.' In fact, I am not aware that it has ever been explicitly contested in print. My contention, however, is that this view of the Sophists is largely erroneous. There is but one Sophist, Protagoras, whom we have reason to regard as a relativist in any deep or interesting sense. It is not entirely clear whether even he deserves this label. But if he does, it is solely on the basis of his famous doctrine that "Man is the measure of all things" (DK 80B1) a doctrine which he is never said to have shared with any of the other Sophists. The tendency to describe the Sophists as a group as relativists derives, I think, from at least two sources; first, from a tendency to regard Protagoras as representative of, and indeed authoritative for, the whole movement, and second, from a too hasty examination of the relation between the Sophists and Plato. On the first point, it is no doubt true that
56 citations
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TL;DR: Aristotle's inference of the definition of eudaimonia in the N.E. has been commonly understood in a way which commits him to some form of fallacious naturalism or inference from fact to value as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Aristotle's inference of the definition of eudaimonia in the N.E. has been commonly understood in a way which commits him to some form of fallacious naturalism or inference from fact to value. This view of the ergon inference is prompted to some extend by the fact that commentators rarely make an effort to identify the premises of the argument and also by the fact that, as I shall try to show, some key terms employed therein have been misunderstood. The purpose of the present paper is to show by means of a detailed analysis of Aristotle's text that the most commonly held view of the argument cannot be right and that he does not infer the notion of the human good from facts about human nature.1
47 citations
TL;DR: In the Lysis, the central concem is the identificatory question: who or what is a friend to whom or what? Lover to loved? Loved to lover? Like to like? Unlike to unlike? The good to the good? The morally neutral to the Good?.
Abstract: Are these closing words of the Lysis a serious application of the so-called 'Socratic fallacy', that until you can define something you cannot know how to predicate it truly of anything, or anything truly of it (cf. Euthyphro 15d, Meno 71b, Rep. 354b)? Or are they more in the nature of a humorous parting shot, not intended to be squeezed too hard for precise philosophical content? The latter seems to me in principle the preferable answer, on the ground that (contrary to what appears to be the prevailing view of the dialogue)' the topic addressed throughout the Lysis is not the definitional question 'What is a friend?' (or 'What is friendship?' or 'What is the friendly?'). No question with the definitional form 't' oL (a 6 4(XLov;' is framed. Rather, the central concem is the identificatory question: who or what is a friend to whom or what? Lover to loved? Loved to lover? Like to like? Unlike to unlike? The good to the good? The morally neutral to the good? This cluster of questions is well exemplified at 214d8-el:
45 citations
TL;DR: This chapter argues that Chrysippus reference to this disagreement shows that he knew and used a predecessor of the Placita of Aetius reconstructed by Diels, and presents a study of the material available through Soranus.
Abstract: Books II and III of Galens De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis (PHP) are devoted to a critique of the Stoic view that the seat of the regent part is in the heart, and a defence of the Hippocratic and Platonic doctrine that it is in the head, or brain. In the course of his argument Galen quotes numerous passages from great Stoics such as Posidonius and Chrysippus. Galen goes out of his way to indicate precisely where, in book I of Chrysippus On the Soul, the long verbatim quotation was to be found. This chapter argues that Chrysippus reference to this disagreement shows that he knew and used a predecessor of the Placita of Aetius reconstructed by Diels. First, it analyzes the structure of the chapter in Aetius. The chapter then presents a study of the material available through Soranus. A short account of the material preserved by Cicero follows.Keywords: Aetius; Chrysippus; Cicero; Placita; Soranus
24 citations
TL;DR: Aetius as mentioned in this paper argued that from the viewpoint of the systematic structure the majority reading νέφοϛ ππνϱωμένον must be preferred.
Abstract: The subject of this article, Xenophanes' reported views on the nature or substance of the moon, can hardly be considered of great importance for the history of Greek philosophy. The focal point of this article will be precisely on the area of doxography. We have already cited the text of Hermann Diels' reconstructed edition containing the lemma which in the chapter records the view of Xenocrates. Because of the complexity of the material, and also because the author is using this chapter as a kind of exemplum of the difficulties and pitfalls awaiting users of the doxographical tradition, he shall quote the relevant passages in full. He concludes against Diels, therefore, that from the viewpoint of the systematic structure the majority reading νέφοϛ πeπνϱωμένον must be preferred. The most important finding on the nature of ancient doxography that was reached in the article concerns the structure of the analyzed chapter.Keywords: Aetius; Doxographicum; Hermann Diels; Moon; substance of the moon; Xenocrates; Xenophanes
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TL;DR: In this paper, Sedley describes Diodorus Cronus and Hellenistic Philosophy as falsch zu erweisen und dahingehend zu korrigieren versucht, and den Megarikern, sondern einer mit ihnen konkurrierenden Schule, namlich der Dialektiker, zuzuordnen sei.
Abstract: Bis vor wenigen Jahren galt unter denen, die sich mit antiker Philosophie befaBten, als ausgemacht, daB der Philosoph Diodoros Kronos, von dessen philosophischen Anschauungen wir vor allem durch Sextus Empiricus wissen, zu der von dem Sokratesschuler Eukleides aus Megara begrundeten Megarischen Schule zu rechnen sei. Diese Ansicht hat David Sedley im Jahre 1977 in einem Aufsatz mit dem Titel "Diodorus Cronus and Hellenistic Philosophy" als falsch zu erweisen und dahingehend zu korrigieren versucht, daB Diodor nicht den Megarikern, sondern einer mit ihnen konkurrierenden Schule, namlich der der Dialektiker, zuzuordnen sei.1 Nun ist es in der Tat so, daB Diodor in unseren Quellen nie als Megariker, wohl aber haufig als Dialektiker bezeichnet wird. Diese seit langem bekannte Tatsache pflegte man mit einer bei Diogenes Laertios und in der Suda zu findenden, im wesentlichen gleichlautenden Notiz in Zusammenhang zu bringen, die besagt, daB die sich von dem Sokratesschuler Eukleides aus Megara herleitenden Philosophen zunachst Megariker, dann Eristiker und spater Dialektiker genannt worden seien (T 31.33 = SR II A 22).2
TL;DR: The authors employ the dilemma presented by the Apology and the Crito as a point of departure into an investigation of Socrates' understanding of the allegiance he owes to his polity, and reveal needed light on Socrates' puzzling relationship with the Athenian polis.
Abstract: Though many scholars have attempted to resolve the apparent inconsistency between Apology 29C-D and Crito 51A-C,I I do not think that any has done an adequate job. As ingenious as some of these attempts have been, they either leave crucial parts of the Socratic puzzle unsolved or they complicate the puzzle still further. The cause of this widespread failure, I shall argue, has been almost universal inattention to the full text of the Laws' speech in the Crito.2 My intent, however, is not so much to identify the shortcomings of my predecessors as to focus attention on that speech, for, when carefully read, it not only helps us solve the traditional dilemma, but also sheds needed light on Socrates' puzzling relationship with the Athenian polis. In other words, I shall employ the dilemma presented by the Apology and the Crito as a point of departure into an investigation of Socrates' understanding of the allegiance he owes to his polity.3
TL;DR: The authors argue that Plato is committed to self-predication in dialogues generally agreed to be earlier than the Parmenides by arguing that F-ness is characterized by F, or possesses F.
Abstract: In this paper I will argue that Plato is committed to self-predication in dialogues generally agreed to be earlier than the Parmenides By this I mean not merely that Plato is committed to statements of the form (1) F-ness is F ("S-statements") where F-ness is a Form That Plato was committed to such statements is beyond dispute' Rather I am claiming that (1) must be interpreted to mean (2) F-ness is characterized by F, or possesses F While my thesis may well be accepted by a majority of scholars, there are a number of holdouts who have proposed alternative interpretations of (1) The main contenders are the following: (3) F-ness is identical with F2 (4) F-ness makes whatever participates in it F3 (5) N [ (x)(Fx- Fx) ]4 (6) F-ness is what it is to be F' (7) F-ness is what is F (or F itself or the nature of F)6 I believe there is clear evidence in the dialogues which supports (2) as the correct interpretation of (1), but the present paper will be limited to trying
TL;DR: In this article, the modale Logik des Stagiriten bisher beharrlich dem Versuch einer modal pradikatenlogischen interpretation widersetzt.
Abstract: Waihrend die assertorische Syllogistik des Aristoteles vollstandig in die moderne Logik, genauer, in die einstellige Pradikatenlogik integriert werden konnte, hat sich die modale Logik des Stagiriten bisher beharrlich dem Versuch einer modal pradikatenlogischen Interpretation widersetzt. Beckers Arbeit aus dem Jahre 1931 kann nur als vorlaufig angesehen werden. Beckers Ansatz versagt bereits auf der elementaren Ebene der Konversionen, er ist auBerstande, die Schlusse mit zwei notwendigen Praimissen und einer notwendigen Conclusio befriedigend darzustellen, er unterstellt dem aristotelischen Text eine Reihe von Athetesen,' und er sieht sich schlieBlich bei den modal gemischten Schlussen gezwungen, "das von Aristoteles angewandte Argumentationsverfahren" als "formal fehlerhaft" zu bezeichnen.2 1963, also 32 Jahre nach Erscheinen der Beckerschen Arbeit hat McCall unter Berucksichtigung der seit Becker versuchten Formalisierungen die These aufgestellt, daB keine der auf der Basis der Pradikatenund Modallogik konstruierten Formalisierungen zur Beschreibung der modalen Syllogistik des Aristoteles geeignet sei, weil keine derartige Formalisierung eine simultane Interpretation der partikularen apodiktischen Konversion sowie der drei Barbaras aus An.pr. A 8-11 gestatte. Konsequenterweise versucht McCall dann auch, wie bereits vor ihm Lukasiewicz,4 eine Interpretation der modalen Syllogistik des Aristoteles, die bewuBt auf modal pradikatenlogische Mittel verzichtet. Erwagt man die Urteile, die sowohl Lukasiewicz als auch McCall uber Aristoteles fallen, so muB jedoch bezweifelt werden, ob man ohne pradikatenlogische Interpretation Aristoteles gerecht zu werden vermag. Lukasiewicz kommt zu dem Ergebnis: "This system looks like a logical exercise which in spite of its