Showing papers in "Phronesis in 1992"

Inside and Outside The Republic

Abstract: An engaged reader of the Republic must at some point wonder how or if it all fits together. There seems to be jumbled within that text a challenge to conventional justice, a political theory, a psychology, a metaphysics, a theory of education and a critique of art, music and poetry. A brilliant work; but is it an integrated whole? A just republic, for Plato, turns out to be a harmonious, though differentiated, unity; and so the question can be rephrased: is the Republic a just Republic? Most of the illuminating discussions of the Republic can be seen as attempts to answer this question. I would like to suggest that this problem of unity arises in a particularly acute form for modern readers, because we are disposed to see the Republic as existing in bits. For we tend to conceive of psychology as the psychology of the individual. Since Plato, in the Republic, is concerned with the constitution of the individual psyche, it is easy for us to assume that his psychology is revealed in that account.' But this omits what, I believe, is the most distinctive aspect of Plato's psychology: a dynamic account of the psychological transactions between inside and outside a person's psyche, between a person's inner life and his cultural environment, between intrapsychic and interpsychic relations?2 If we ignore these dynamic transactions, we cannot

Do Plato's philosopher‐rulers sacrifice self‐interest to justice?

Abstract: I shall argue that the answer to the title question is no, the philosopherrulers do not sacrifice self-interest to justice. In one sense of "justice", this is an uncontroversial claim. Virtually all interpreters of the Republic agree that the conclusion of the main argument of Books II-IV is that psychic justice is the foundation of one's happiness and thus psychic justice is also an integral part of one's self-interest. But in another sense of "justice", this is an extremely controversial claim. Many interpreters believe that philosophers sacrifice their self-interest by governing the model polis in accordance with the demands of social justice. However, I shall argue that social justice is as much an integral part of one's happiness and so of one's self-interest as psychic justice. In the first section of this paper I examine the key arguments of the aforementioned interpreters. In the second section I demonstrate that, contrary to the claims of these interpreters, the philosophers do not sacrifice any of their happiness by ruling the ideal polis. In the third and final section I elucidate the conception of self-interest at work in the Republic and demonstrate that Socrates' defense does not rely on any equivocation of the term "justice". Rather, his argument is that being just is essential to one's own self-interest, whether one conceives of justice as a psychic virtue, i.e., each part of the soul fulfilling its proper function for the good of the soul as a whole, or as a social virtue, i.e., each person in a society fulfilling his or her proper function for the good of society as a whole.*

In Defense of an Alternative View of the Foundation of Aristotle's Moral Theory

Abstract: In the opening chapters of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle identifies what he refers to as "the best good" or "the human good" with happiness (eudaimonia). He takes happiness to be some sort of ultimate end of human conduct, and on the basis of this idea, he proceeds to develop his moral theory. This much is uncontroversial. However, interpreters have despaired over the passages where Aristotle invokes this notion of an ultimate end. For it has been thought that in these passages Aristotle appears to ground his moral philosophy on a patently indefensible psychological generalization.' The psychological generalization, in its strongest form, is the proposition that every person does whatever he does with the aim of promoting his own happiness. This doctrine, which we may call "Strong Psychological Eudaimonism", is not only mistaken in its own right,2 it is also inconsistent with other views Aristotle espouses in the Ethics.' Conse-

Appearances and Impressions

Abstract: According to Sextus Empiricus, the Pyrrhonian sceptic adheres to the appearances (ta phainomena, PH 1.21). Without insisting that things are entirely as he says, he is willing to say how they presently appear to hm (PH 1.4). His uses of the word 'is' mean 'appears' (PH 1.135); even his philosophical slogans should be understood as referring to appearance (PH 1.15, 1. 191, 1.198-9, 1.200). Appearances are the sceptic's practical criterion and guide to action (PH 1.21-4). The purpose of this paper is to offer an interpretation of the sceptic's commitment to appearances, drawing both on the commonplace notion of appearance and on some of its philosophical uses prior to Sextus. Sextus never fully explains what he means by 'appearance'; and while we need to understand his meanings to interpret the sceptical stance, that stance sets restrictions on the form that a sceptical 'concept of appearance' might take. Sextus takes the view that it is inappropriate for the sceptic to argue about the meanings of words, and repeatedly states a preference for using them in a loose way (PH 1.191, 1.195, 1.207). Behind this view lies the general sceptical programme of opposition to dogmatic attempts to state the real nature of any phenomenon. Sextus' refusal to offer a sceptical account of appearance is not incidental, and it would be wrong to assume the existence of an implicit account awaiting our discovery. At the same time, Sextus' concern to prevent misunderstanding of scepticism makes him careful to note ambiguities and special senses in the sceptical vocabulary (e.g., PH. 1. 13, 1.21, 1.187ff.). So his reticence about the vocabulary of appearance, in conjunction with his opposition to dogmatism, suggests that Sextus means to use these terms in a straighforward, commonplace way. Moreover, the other side of the sceptic's critique of dogmatism is his positive commitment to bios 'real life', the everyday world of pre-philosophical practice and experience (e.g., PH 1.23-4, 2.102, 3.235). And the espousal of bios is bound up with the commitment to appearances: "So adhering to the appearances we live undogmatically

Aristoteles' Glücksbegriff in der Nikomachischen Ethik : Eine Interpretation von EN I,7. 1097b2-5

Abstract: Dieser Satz gehort in eine langere Passage (1097al5-b21), in der Aristoteles, anknupfend an platonische Aussagen vor allem im Philebos, I spezifizierende Eigenschaften des hochsten Gutes diskutiert. Es geht um solche Eigenschaften, durch die das hochste Gut von allen anderen Gutern unterschieden ist und an denen man folglich erkennen kann, welches von allen Gutern das hochste Gut ist. Aristoteles hat in dieser Passage nicht die Absicht, ein bestimmtes Gut als das hochste Gut zu identifizieren; er sucht nicht nach einer Aussage wie: "Das Gut A ist das hochste Gut." Er will nur bestimmen, welche Eigenschaften man einem Gut zuschreibt, wenn man sagt, es sei das hochste Gut. Indem er dies tut, zeigt er, daB dem hochsten Gut genau die Eigenschaften zukommen, die man mit dem Begriff des Glucks (EcbaLFiovL'a) verbindet, und daB es deshalb ganz in Ordnung ist, wie ublich statt vom hochsten Gut vom Gluck zu sprechen.2 Aristoteles fuhrt drei Eigenschaften an. Erstens ist das hochste Gut (oder das Gluck) das einzige Ziel menschlichen Handelns, das immer um seiner selbst willen und niemals um eines anderen willen angestrebt wird (1097a16-b6). Zweitens ist das hochste Gut (oder das Gluck) "autark", d.h. wer dieses Gut besitzt, bedarf keines weiteren Gutes, um glucklich zu sein

Vlastos's Socrates

Abstract: This is a long-awaited book, and our expectations are not disappointed*. It is also, as it turns out, the author's last work. Gregory Vlastos died in October, 1991, only a few months after the book appeared. So here we meet Vlastos for the last time, and in splendid form: the writing was never more vigorous, the reasoning never more carefully worked out. It is a dazzling performance for an author in his eighties. In this work the most influential and beloved Plato scholar of our generation brought a lifetime of learning to bear on a topic long dear to his heart, and he produced a magnificent book. It is at once a major interpretation of Plato's earlier works, and perhaps the fullest reconstruction of the philosophy of Socrates that has ever been attempted. (The closest parallel is Heinrich Maier's Sokrates, published in 1913 and now quite out of date.) The genesis of the book, as the author tells us in the Introduction, goes back to 1953, with a manuscript on Plato's Socratic dialogues which Vlastos never published, but out of which emerged his classic introduction to the Protagoras and his paper "The paradox of Socrates" (1958). Vlastos returned to Socrates in earnest in 1978 when he was invited to give the Gifford Lectures. It is these lectures on Socrates, delivered in 1981, that form the basis for the present book. The intricate argumentative structure of the book and the rich documentation that supports it bear witness to the fact that for a decade Vlastos had been trying out his theses on various audiences and was refining and reinforcing his views in response to criticism. Those parts of the book that appeared earlier in article form often bear the mark of substantial rethinking. At the time of his death Vlastos was preparing a second volume to include revised versions of two major pieces, "The Socratic Elenchus" (1983) and "Socrates' Disavowal of Knowledge" (1985), both of which are frequently referred to in the present work. The book also includes 70 pages of "Additional Notes" on detailed problems of interpretation. What Vlastos offers us is essentially his own solution to the age-old

Socrates and Plato

Abstract: Within a decade after Socrates' death his followers were already battling over the rights to his spiritual legacy. Antisthenes and Aeschines, Euclides and Aristippus suffered literary oblivion; but the works of Plato and Xenophon survived to give, if not utterly different, at least contrasting pictures of their master. In modern times Xenophon has suffered badly from the revelation that he gleaned material from other writers.' Plato offers us two quite different portraits of Socrates the philosopher, that of the early dialogues and that of the middle dialogues. Scholars almost universally recognize the Socrates of the middle dialogues as a mouthpiece for Plato. This leaves the possibility that the Socrates of the early dialogues is a faithful representation of the historical Socrates. The view that he is I shall call the Early Dialogue Theory (EDT). Beginning arguably with Aristotle and revived by Friedrich Schleiermacher,2 EDT counts among its adherents some of the leading scholars of ancient philosophy, including Paul Natorp, Wincenty Lutoslawski, Heinrich Maier, Constantin Ritter, W.D. Ross, Richard Robinson, J.E. Raven, W.K.C. Guthrie, Norman Gulley, and Gregory Vlastos.3 Much recent work on Socrates and Plato has gone on under the banner of EDT.4 There are, of course, significant differences of interpretation among adherents of this tradition; but on the exegetical principles they accept there is considerable agreement. EDT is, I believe, correct. However, it remains highly controversial, and the arguments given in its favor are often unneccessarily weak. In this paper I shall advance some

Friendship and the Comparison of Goods

Abstract: My concern in this paper is with the last sentence of VIII.1 of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (EN). The correct understanding of that sentence has, I believe, significant philosophical implications. But I want to approach the philosophical issues cautiously, through a somewhat narrow textual question, viz. Was the sentence written by Aristotle? My contention is that it was, and, in order to establish this, I will first argue, negatively, that the linguistic arguments to the contrary have little force, and then positively, that the sentence does refer to an earlier passage in EN, namely, book I chapter 6. If this thesis is correct, then the argument of book I, and especially the opening of 1.7, appears in a new light; furthermore, we are then provided with the key to understanding the nature of Aristotle's classification of friendship into three kinds. Chapter 1 of book VIII of EN serves as an introduction to Aristotle's discussion of friendship. The first half of the chapter provides a series of reasons why friendship ought to be discussed in a treatise on ethics (1 155al31); the second half briefly reviews some of the opinions of some of Aristotle's predecessors on the subject (1155a32-bl6). This brief review generates some difficulties about friendship, and, as is common in Aristotle, the ensuing discussion is motivated by these difficulties. The chapter closes with parenthetical remarks of a logical character. I translate the end of the chapter, together with the opening sentence of chapter two:

Anaximander on the Stability of the Earth

Abstract: Anaximander, so it seems on the testimony of Aristotle, suspended the Earth in the middle of the cosmos on the force of argument: it remains there because it is epi to meson hidrumenonon kai homoi6s pros ta eskhata ekhon.' This Aristotelian testimony has been called into question recently by Professor Furley in his 'The Dynamics of the Earth: Anaximander, Plato, and the Centrifocal Theory',2 and Anaximander's position has been assimilated to that of his predecessor, Thales and of his successor, Anaximenes. Furley's argument can be briefly epitomized as follows: There is a remarkable contrast between the cosmological conceptions of early Greek epic and the complex cosmological theories of later thinkers like Plato and Aristotle. This difference can be detected also in how they conceived free fall. According to early epic 'the line of fall of any body is parallel to that of any other. .' (15), whereas in the other theory'. . . 'down' means towards the centre' (15). After naming the two world views 'parallel' or 'linear' and 'centrifocal' respectively Furley draws the conclusion that on Aristotle's testimony 'we must attribute to him [Anaximanderl some kind of centrifocal dynamics too' (19). But '[it is difficult to combine a flat earth with centrifocal dynamics' (21), so Furley opts for explaining away Aristotle's testimony, suggesting that perhaps the homoiotes of the Earth meant 'that it is not heavier on one side than on another', and so 'the earth, being supported on a cushion of air, is held in

A Theophrastean Excursus on God and Nature and its Aftermath in Hellenistic Thought

Abstract: An English translation of a fuller Arabic version of Theophrastus' Metarsiology, probably by Ibn al-Khammar, has been made available by Hans Daiber, who re-edits the fragmentary Syriac version and for the first time provides an edition of the complete Arabic text, with admirable introduction and commentary.' It now is certain (as already intuited by Bergstrasser) that this text is not an epitomized fragment of the Physikai Doxai. Bergstrasser's editio princeps and German translation with some comments of the abridged Arabic version of Bar Bahlil as well as the edition, German translation and more extensive commentary by Wagner and Steinmetz of the mutilated Syriac version discovered by Drossaart Lulofs are superseded.2 Daiber argues that we now have the Metarsiology as Theophrastus

Change and Contrariety in Aristotle

Abstract: P* ... all things that come to be come to be out of, and all things that pass away pass into their contraries or (xac) intermediates [between their contraries]. And the intermediates [arise] from the contraries. For example the colors come out of white and black (XeVxoO xai ReXavog). And so all of the things which come to be by nature are contraries or things which come to be out of contraries. (Physics 1 5 188b21-26. cp Metaphysics I 1055bl6-17, De Caelo I 3, 270al4ff, Generation and Corruption I 7, 323b28-324a9)

The Freedom of the One

Abstract: Readers of Plotinus Ennead VI 8 1391 have thought the treatise to be very different from Plotinus' other works and indeed to be something of a revolution in the history of metaphysics. In this treatise Plotinus refers to the ultimate constitutive principle of all things, the One, as absolute liberty, as absolutely unrestricted self-will to be what it is. This, it seems, is quite different from what we usually hear about the One in the Enneads and is, in the history of Greek philosophy, a completely new way of thinking about first principles. Some have found here the beginnings of a 'Willensmetaphysik' whose representatives include Marius Victorinus, Augustine and Schelling. The ideas developed in Ennead VI 8 appear to have been provoked, in part at least, by the need to argue against a thesis introduced in ch. 7 that the One 'happens to be as it is and does not have the mastery of what it is' (7, 12-13). What inspired this 'daring statement', as Plotinus calls it? Where does it come from? Although much discussed in modern scholarship, these questions remain open. We do not know, it seems, why Plotinus wrote treatise VI 8, what led him to produce one of his most original philosophical works. Georges Leroux's new book' puts us in a much better position to explore such matters. He reprints the Greek text of Ennead VI 8 given by P. Henry and H.-R. Schwyzer in their editio minor (Oxford, 1982; = H-S2) and provides a facing French translation which is on the whole good. In a number of places Leroux prefers the text given in Henry-Schwyzer's earlier editio maior (Bruxelles, 1973; = H-S'), which means that his translation does not correspond sometimes to the Greek text it faces2. The translation is followed by a long commentary consisting of brief summaries of each chapter of the treatise) and