Showing papers in "Phronesis in 1993"

The virtues of Thrasymachus

Abstract: I deny that Thrasymachus' argument or position in Republic I is confused. He doesn't think that either justice or injustice is either a virtue or a vice. He thinks that justice is a DEvice.

Epicurus on the telos

Abstract: L'A. confronte deux fragments antithetiques d'Epicure sur la nature du but de l'existence, le plaisir, qui dans un cas est vu comme paix de l'âme et du corps (ataraxie), mais dans l'autre accepte le plaisir des sens et se rapproche de l'hedonisme. L'A., partisan de la seconde interpretation, explique ses convictions et commente la doctrine d'Epicure

The Stoic Division of Philosophy

Abstract: L'A. etudie la division tripartite du systeme philosophique des Stoiciens a travers la doxographie de Diogene Laerce, qui souleve le probleme de l'unite des disciplines philosophiques a l'interieur du discours philosophique ainsi divise

Rationality, Eudaimonia and Kakodaimonia in Aristotle

Abstract: I argue that Aristotle does not believe all rational action aims at securing eudaimonia (happiness) for the agent. Intrinsic goods are worth having independently of their promotion of any further ends, including eudaimonia. Aiming for such a good or avoiding evil may be rational even when eudaimonia is impossible and not the agent's goal. "Politics" 1332a7f suggests that even the happy agent may act rationally without aiming for eudaimonia. The final section argues that, given that an immoral agent secures the greatest of evils, an alleged conflict in the "Nicomachean Ethics" between the intellectualist Book X and earlier books disappears.

The Academic position of Favorinus of Arelate

Abstract: 1 In his De optima doctrina Galen attacks the philosophical position taken up by Favorinus of Arelate, who maintains that the best method of teaching is to argue pro and contra. None of Favorinus' philosophical works has been preserved, so the summary Galen makes of one of them, together with his references in others to the philosophical opinions expressed by Favorinus, provides valuable material with which to reconstruct his philosophy. Favorinus is defined as a sophist and a philosopher by Philostratus, while Aulus Gellius, his great admirer, calls him a philosopher and calls his arguments disputationes Academicae.' Lucian, too, shows no hesitation in placing him among the Academics when, with little regard for his physical disability, he describes him as "an Academic eunuch, a Celt who not long before us enjoyed great fame among the Greeks"2. Favorinus himself, in laying claim to the name of philosopher, thought of himself as a follower of the Academy3. In fact Galen in De optima doctrina considered Favorinus' philosophical position similar to that of a group of Academics, which he calles VEWTEQOL. However, in modern historiography on scepticism Favorinus has been given no exact philosophical placement, for in some instances he has been included among the Academics, in others among the Pyrrhonians'.

Mad, Drunk or Asleep?–Aristotle's Akratic

Abstract: In what follows I propose to discuss a problem about Aristotle's treatment of akratic knowledge in Book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics, especially 1146b311147b19. Put briefly the question is whether Aristotle's account of off-beat knowledge there allows the akratic to know what they are doing without clouding of intellect. I shall be discussing this question on certain non-obvious assumptions. I shall be assuming i. that in the passage from 1146b31 to 1147b19, Aristotle is treating of just one general type of weak akratic; ii. that Aristotle holds that use of one's knowledge of the universal premiss together with use of the particular premiss of the practical syllogism is sufficient for action (the most usual interpretation of 1146b35-1147a10, 1147a25-31); iii. that in akrasia something goes wrong with the agent's knowledge of the particular premiss, it is here that their knowledge is off-beat; in other words 'teleutaia protasis' refers to the particular premiss throughout. Given these assumptions, it has commonly been felt that Aristotle is committed to allowing of akrasia only by attributing some befuddlement of wits to the akratic, so that they do not really know that what they are doing is wrong. There are two main props to this conclusion: first, there is a natural way of taking the contrast between having and using knowledge, and secondly there is the analogy with those mad, drunk or asleep. I shall take these in turn and argue that given that we reject the first, the second is not enough to produce the required conclusion.

Anaximander's conception of the «apeiron»

Abstract: L'A. tente de cerner la notion delicate mais essentielle d'«apeiron» chez Anaximandre. Il puise a la source des differents ecrits antiques a ce sujet, et les analyse en passant par la notion d'«arche» pour comprendre quelle substance infinie est le principe du monde

Aristotelian Rainfall or the Lore of Averages

Abstract: David Furley has recently argued that regular rainfall in the Aristotelian world is teleological.' Furley demonstrates the failure of all attempts to exclude winter rain from the scope of Aristotle's apparently exclusive disjunction "coincidence or for the sake of something" (198b34-199a8).2 It is clear that Furley ascribes regular rain to purpose, and that that purpose is crop growth; but his further commitment to cosmic teleology in Aristotle remains obscure.3 David Sedley displays no such reticence.4 Starting from the presumption that Aristotle's teleology is "interactive" or "global",5

The structure and subject of Metaphysics Λ

Abstract: L'A. cherche a savoir quel est le sujet exact du chapitre Λ de la «Metaphysique», deconcertant car Aristote y annonce un discours sur l'ousia qui en fait se decompose en trois types: deux sensibles, et un immobile qui fait l'objet d'une theologie. A travers une etude de la structure du discours d'Aristote, l'A. recherche l'unite de la «substance»

Knowing the Theaetetus

Abstract: The brief prologue of the Theaetetus begins with the end of a search, with Terpsion having tracked down Euclides in the streets of Megara, fresh from an encounter with Theaetetus, now homeward bound to Athens and his death. Euclides recounts that this encounter has reminded him of the long-dead Socrates and his ability to discern the talents of others in this case, Theaetetus himself.' He recalls in particular Socrates' retelling of a remarkable philosophical conversation with Theaetetus (very near the time of Socrates' own death; 210d) that left Socrates with such a profound sense of the youth's impressive intellectual abilities that he prophesied they would be hearing further good things of him. But here, right at the outset and before the complex argumentation that follows, Plato also implicitly reminds us of Socrates' own considerable talents. First, and as usual (142c), Socrates has proven to be a sound prophet: Theaetetus did go on to fulfill his promise by becoming a major contributor to the field of mathematical knowledge. It also happens that Socrates' report of his conversation was significant enough for Euclides to have preserved his memory of it by creating a written account, checking and rechecking his text with Socrates because of the difficulty of remembering accurately Socrates' report. In this way we are subtly informed that Socrates is a touch-stone of philosophical memory, and intelligence as well: for once into the dialogue proper, Theaetetus' teacher, Theodorus, connects good memory with quickness of mind in praising Theaetetus (144a-b). Finally, this exchange serves to explain with biting humor why we are not to be surprised when Theodorus begs off Socrates' invitation to serve as the interlocutor in the upcoming discussion, offering up Theaetetus as a youthful substitute. For just after Theodorus makes this connection of memory with intelligence it turns out that elder thinker that he is he cannot remember the name of Theaetetus' father even though he has heard it before (144c).2 Socrates, on the other hand, when first seeing Theaete-

Aristotle's "Second Man" Argument

Abstract: L'A. denonce le vice de forme de l'argument dit du second homme qu'Aristote oppose definitivement dans le livre Z de la «Metaphysique» a l'argument du troisieme homme de Platon, selon lequel chaque chose participe de sa nature par une relation tierce entre le sujet et sa forme, impliquant une distance ontologique entre la substance et son essence, qu'Aristote s'efforce de combler par une definition de la substance comme entite qui est en vertu d'elle-meme (καθ˚'αυτο)

Presocratics and Sophists

Abstract: There are two new volumes in the Phoenix Supplementary Presocratic series, on Xenophanes by J.H. Lesher,' and Empedocles by Brad Inwood.2 Lesher's book is much the best of those so far, giving a comprehensive coverage of Xenophanes, with help on almost every aspect. After a preface and short introduction, the fragments are presented in Greek and facing English with sources and some textual apparatus appended; then, in a long Part 2 called 'Interpretation', Lesher translates the context of each fragment, adds notes on text and translation (with key words in Greek and transliterated) and gives a detailed commentary on each fragment as a whole as well as on individual lines. This is followed by a section on 'Ancient Testimonia' (i.e. a translation of the 'A' passages from Diels-Kranz) with its own introduction and further notes, a detailed list of 'Sources and Authorities', a Bibliography, and finally Indexes of names and subjects, of passages cited, and of Greek words discussed. Lesher throughout urges a positive assessment of Xenophanes as 'philosopher, outspoken critic of common opinion and the leading poets of Greece, advocate for inquiry into natural causes, proto-epistemologist, and innovator in both religion and morality'. As an aid to this end he re-orders the fragments into four sections On Men and Morals, On the Divine, On Nature and On Human Understanding and in his Interpretation gives a conclusion to each topic (also annotated) which comes to grips with the fragments and testimonia as philosophical texts in a wide-ranging context of the history of ideas. Lesher perhaps overrates his author, but his enthusiasm is infectious, and the material is clearly and candidly set out, enabling beginner and scholar alike to make an independent judgment. In contrast Inwood's Empedocles is disappointing. This has a longer In-

Aristotle and Hellenistic Philosophy

Abstract: Books on Aristotle form the biggest single group sent to Phronesis for review. Carlo Natali considers the context of Aristotle's philosophy in his life and in the activity of his school.' He warns us against assimilating Aristotle and Plato to modern scholars, or indeed to fifth-century sophists, with reputations to establish and careers to advance (cf. also N.'s 'Aristotele professore?' in this journal, 36 (1992) 61-73). For Aristotle and Plato, N. argues, philosophy was a way the best way, indeed of occupying aristocratic leisure. He cites (136) Isocrates Panathenaicus 200 in support of the idea that teachers regularly worked on the revision of their texts with their pupils. This may, as he shows, provide a context for Theophrastus' remark to Phanias (Diogenes Laertius 5.37) that "public readings produce corrections, but the present generation does not tolerate postponing everything and not attending to it." At the risk of introducing another anachronism in place of the one N. has expelled, is Theophrastus (of all people!) complaining about the ancient equivalent of "the pressure to publish"? Many have stressed the political significance in fourth-century Athens of the links between Aristotle and Macedonia; N. notes the lack of evidence for these in Aristotle's actual writings by contrast with Theophrastus' use of botanical reports from Alexander's campaign. The relation between philosophy and politics is a theme, in a different way, in Richard Bodeus' collection of nine papers, three new and six revisions,2 including two concerned with the place of political science in Aristotle's taxonomy of knowledge and the relation between philosophy and political action. B.'s account of deliberation (pp.39-40) is strange. He presents it as confirming hypotheses: if our goal is wealth, we first suppose that conquering a neighbouring state is a means to this end, and then confirm that it is indeed so by observing that conquering this state will give us control of its mines, say. But

Alexander's Sea Battle: a discussion of Alexander of Aphrodisias De Fato 10

Abstract: The tenth chapter of Alexander of Aphrodisias' De Fato' contains a treatment of fatalism and future truth which clearly harks back to Aristotle's famous 'Sea Battle' discussion in De Interpretatione (DI) 92 Alexander's discussion has not yet been satisfatorily interpreted: this paper is intended to help remedy this lack On the traditional interpretation of Aristotle's argument, he accepted the fatalist's inference from the truth of a statement about a future contingency (which I will call a future contingent statement, FCS for short) to its necessity, but sought to counter necessitarianism by denying the principle of bivalence (PB) on which the fatalist's inference rests3 This interpretation has in recent times been challenged from two quarters According to one view (the 'modern' interpretation), Aristotle does not seek to restrict PB; rather, he rebuts fatalism by distinguishing between the truth/falsity of a FCS and its necessity, allowing the former but refusing the latter, and in particular banning any inference from a necessary disjunction of FCSs (such as 'There will be a sea battle tomorrow or there will not be a sea battle tomorrow') to the several necessities of the disjuncts4 Others

A Note on Barnes' Parmenides

Abstract: In The Presocratic Philosophers Vol. I: Thales to Zeno (London, 1979, pp. 155-175) Jonathan Barnes presents a formalization of an argument he finds in Fragments B2, B3 and B6 (148, 149 and 150 in Barnes' numbering). I am sympathetic to the enterprise but I think the execution is confused. After explaining the confusion, I present an alternative which I think preserves most of Barnes' interpretation. Barnes gives a number of formulations of each of Parmenides' three roads or paths to account for diverse ways of understanding the modal terms that occur in translations of the poem. Since my interest is independent of this problem, I will work with just one set of alternatives.