Showing papers in "Phronesis in 1996"

Why aristotle needs imagination

Abstract: Etude de la conception de l'imagination developpee par Aristote dans le traite «De anima» (III, 3). S'inscrivant dans sa theorie de la sensation et de la conception (perception et pensee), l'A. montre qu'Aristote introduit la faculte de l'imagination afin de resoudre le probleme de l'erreur qui se pose dans le cadre de sa definition de l'intentionnalite

Character and Intellect in Aristotle's Ethics

Abstract: Rejetant l'interpretation intellectualiste de la conception aristotelicienne de la vertu morale, l'A. montre que la bonne finalite ethique n'est pas definie par la seule raison (intellect, phronesis, sagesse deliberative), mais qu'elle est guidee par notre rapport au beau considere dans sa relation avec le bien humain (caractere bon, kalos kagathos)

Reasonable Impressions in Stoicism

Abstract: This article offers a contribution to the understanding of the Stoic notion of the kathekon, by exploring the meaning of one of the terms in which its definition is formulated. The kathekon is that which, once done, receives a eulogos defense or justification; my purpose is to investigate what is meant here by "eulogos". The conclusion of the article is limited and negative. There are scattered bits of evidence that have led some critics to adopt one particular interpretation of "eulogos" in the definition of the kathekon; I hope to show that this evidence does not give any support to what has seemed a tempting line of interpretation. I also offer some positive support for the opposing interpretation. Here, then, is the question that I shall ask about the definition of the kathetkon: does the word "eulogos" in this context mean "reasonable" in the sense of conforming to everyday norms of sensible, prudent behavior the sort of reasonableness that we all can and do attain to with fair regularity or does it mean something more like "in accordance with right reason", i.e. conforming to some higher standard, like the rationality of the Sage? Or, to put it a different way, are the eulogoi justifications that kathekonta get, justifications that even non-Sages are capable of giving in a reliable and non-accidental way? There is no doubt that non-Sages perform kathekonta, but then they might perform them without being able to justify them in the relevant sense, or without being able to do so reliably. Is an action a kathekon so long as it can receive a justification that is reasonable by normal standards, or is some higher standard of justification required?

Propositions or Objects? A Critique of Gail Fine on Knowledge and Belief in Republic V

Abstract: According to most contemporary epistemologies, the distinction between true belief and knowledge concerns, not objects, but propositions. What we know or believe are propositions about objects, not these objects themselves.' Knowing something is thus rendered completely disanalogous to seeing something. Whether or not I see something depends on the direct relation I have to the object and on the character of the object, i. e., whether or not it is something visible (as opposed, for example, to something only audible). Knowledge, on the other hand, does not depend on any sort of direct relation to the object, but instead on the justification or explanation of propositions; furthermore, presumably anything about which we can formulate meaningful propositions can in theory though not, of course, in fact be known. Many interpreters believe that Plato's conception of knowledge does not fit this model. Plato appears to take very seriously the analogy frequently found in his writings between knowing and seeing. A locus classicus is the argument at the end of Republic V that, in apparently concluding that one can know only intelligible forms and that nothing more than belief is possible with regard to sensible objects, appears to understand knowledge and belief as direct cognitive relations to objects and as restricted to certain kinds of objects. This common reading of the argument, however, has been challenged by Gail Fine in a couple of articles, the first appearing almost two decades ago.' Fine rejects the "objects analysis" that interprets the argument as correlating knowledge with certain kinds of objects. She defends instead a "contents analysis" that interprets the argument as correlating knowledge

Material alteration and cognitive activity in Aristotle's De Anima

Abstract: Etude de la relation entre l'activite cognitive et l'alteration materielle dans la theorie psychologique developpee par Aristote dans le «De anima». L'A. mesure la role de l'alteration materielle dans le fonctionnement de la perception chez l'animal en general et dans le fonctionnement de la pensee chez l'homme en particulier

Does Epicurus Need the Swerve as an Archê of Collisions

Abstract: In De Rerum Natura, Lucretius gives two reasons for why there must be an atomic swerve: first, without the swerve, there would be no atomic collisions, and thus no macroscopic bodies, as there evidently are;' second, the swerve is supposed to "break the decrees of fate" and guarantee our freedom.2 The anti-determinist justification for the swerve is highly problematic after all, how could randomness at the atomic level be pertinent at all to the freedom of our own choices? but it has nonetheless garnered quite extensive treatment.3 The "cosmological" argument for the swerve, on the other hand, has received relatively little attention. Most treatments of Epicureanism either paraphrase Lucretius' argument in De Rerum Natura without giving any extensive analysis of whether the argument is cogent or simply dismiss it as inadequate.4

Aristotle on the sense of smell

Abstract: Etude de la conception de l'odeur et de l'odorat developpee par Aristote dans le traite «De anima» (II, 9). Definissant les sens par leur objet propre, Aristote tente de distinguer les differentes sortes d'odeurs par analogie avec les differentes sortes de saveurs propres au gout. L'A. montre que, contrairement au gout, l'odorat est un sens mediat dans la methodologie mixte d'Aristote

Aristote et la structure du De sensibus de Théophraste

Abstract: Comparaison du traitement dialectique de la perception selon les anciens chez Aristote avec le principe organisateur de l'ouvrage de Theophraste intitule «De sensibus». Au-dela de la chronologie des auteurs, l'A. montre que la structure systematique du «De sensibus» constitue un lien important entre les discussions dieretico-dialectiques d'Aristote et les structures dieretico-diaphoniques des chapitres d'Aetius

The επελευστικη δυναμις in Aristo's Psychology of Action.

Abstract: L'A. attribue la doctrine du mouvement adventice (epeleustike kinesis), a laquelle Plutarque fait reference dans son traite «De stoicorum repugnantiis» (chap. 23), non pas au stoicien Chrysippe, mais aux successeurs epicuriens d'Ariston. L'A. montre que la psychologie de l'action developpee par Ariston a partir de l'idee d'une puissance contingente (epeleustike dunamis) est une alternative opposee au stoicisme

Aristotle Metaphysics H6: a dialectic with Platonism

Abstract: My aim in this paper is to provide an interpretation of this last chapter of Metaphysics H which demonstrates where and how this question is answered. My hope is that the interpretation I shall present is able to resolve one of the disagreements about the content of this chapter, namely whether the object whose unity is primarily at issue in H6 is the form man or the composite man. H6 is a text which is frequently caught in the crossfire of competing interpretations of Aristotle's explanation of substantial unity. It thus seems important to establish how this chapter works just in itself. Before embarking on my interpretation of the chapter, let me begin by way of orientation with what I take to be uncontroversial remarks about Aristotle's project and strategy in H6.

One/Many Problems: Philebus 14c1‐15c3

Abstract: The Philebus as a whole returns to inquiry on a scale familiar from the Republic: it represents a discussion about what makes our life good, with studies of the claims of pleasure and knowledge to play a key role. For Plato this is inextricably connected with work in metaphysics. Thus, the initial discussion of pleasure finds the progress of Socrates and Protarchus blocked by disagreement over whether there really are different kinds of pleasure. This leads Socrates to announce that they have to deal with the wonderful saying that the many are one and the one many (14cl-10). Protarchus and Socrates each produce a sensible illustration presenting a one/many problem, both of which are dismissed by Socrates as being childish and no longer worth handling. He then unveils the problem in which he is interested.' And we can immediately see why this question will be an important one for Plato: its introduction of a controversy affecting entities RIi Tiv yiyvo[1vwv TE xcti toXXVU[VWV ("not among the things that come into being and are destroyed," 15al-2) indicates that the passage has to do with further developments in the theory of the objects he considers fundamental. Indeed, in light of the circumstance that the apparent theme question of the Philebus is not actually asked directly in the course of the dialogue (but only recalled), we might consider taking 15b as the locus of the real theme question.2 Unhappily, interpreters have had as little success at identifying the problem expressed in 15b as Protarchus did with 14c: it seems that there is actually a one/many problem about the One/Many Problem! Put broadly, the problems in understanding our passage are these: it is difficult to attach any sense to the question that appears to be posed in lines 15b2-4, and the straightforward bits, 15bl-2 and 15b4-8, fail to satisfy our expectation that this speech connects with the concerns of the surrounding discussion. (14c7 indicates that the problem has come up during the preliminary discussion of

Aristotle and Others

Abstract: The importance of Lynne Spellman's treatment of Aristotle's theory of substance' is far greater than its modest size would suggest. Her persuasive reading of Aristotle stresses links with Plato, arguing that for Aristotle what primarily exists are is forms of natural kinds, indistinguishable from one another within a given kind and hence knowable, not numerically distinct from the sensible individuals in which they are present (this being the Platonic separation that Aristotle rejects) but not identical with them either. Socrates-qua-member-ofnatural-kind, i.e. Socrates-in-what-he-shares-with-human-beings-generally, is primary; Socrates with all his material accidents is secondary a distinction which is put to good use in the final chapter in tackling the problem of teleological versus non-teleological explanation. Features of S.'s reading of Aristotle (though not her explanation of it in terms of a modification of Platonism) are anticipated in some of the writings attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias. The account on p.88 of the relation between species-form and individual strongly resembles that in Alexander On Providence p.89 Ruland (and, at the level of genus, in quaestio 1.1 1), with S.'s horse Secretariat replacing Achilles' horse Xanthos. S.'s recognition (p.120) that it is material, not formal factors that distinguish tokens of types is parallelled in Alexander, quaestio 1.3; and S.'s view of form leads her, like Alexander in numerous contexts, to stress the permanence of species though not of their individual members (p.121). The similarity between S.'s understanding of Aristotle and Alexander's is not conclusive for its correctness; but it reinforces its plausibility. One niggle; an index of passages discussed would have been helpful. Gad Freudenthal2 argues that Aristotle's basic four-element theory cannot explain the functioning and continued existence of living things, which must be due to vital heat (defined, 28-9, as heat carrying informing movements), a theory dating back to Aristotle's De Philosophia (84; cf. 191 on its importance for Aristotle's later thought) and subsequently supplemented not replaced by the inadequate and uncompleted doctrine of connate pneuma as the substrate of vital heat (130, 142; cf.195 on the difficulties as compared with the Stoic theory). Medieval Peripatetics filled the gap by a non-Aristotelian appeal not to vital heat but to an Neoplatonized Active Intellect (39, 196ff.). The notion that

Les Seconds Analytiques, de fond en comble

Abstract: La bibliographie des Seconds Analytiques (ci-apr6s: APo) d'Aristote vient de s'enrichir, a quelques mois d'intervalle, de deux publications d'importance majeure: d'une part, la traduction allemande, accompagnee d'un enorme commentaire, que procure Wolfgang Detel' (ci-apres: D.); d'autre part, la seconde edition de la traduction anglaise, munie d'un commentaire nettement plus laconique, que propose Jonathan Barnes2 (ci-apres: B.). Aucun des deux auteurs n'a pu prendre connaissance du travail de l'autre, bien que naturellement D. se r6fere de faqon constante a la premiere edition de l'ouvrage de B. II est clair, a premiere vue, qu'aucune etude ulterieure des APo, et plus generalement de la theorie et de la pratique aristoteliciennes de la science, ne pourra faire l'economie d'un examen approfondi de ces deux ouvrages. Aristote aurait ete certainement etonne et ravi de constater que son texte, apres tant de siecles, mobilise encore l'attention et l'intelligence exceptionnelles de deux esprits egalement penetrants et subtils, en meme temps que profondement dissemblables. On permettra a un lecteur franqais, donc superficiel, de s'amuser un instant du contraste, qui serait dej"a presque visible 'a travers la vitrine du libraire, entre l'impitoyable Grindlichkeit de l'auteur allemand et et l'1eegante secheresse de l'auteur britannique. Compte tenu de l'6paisseur des deux volumes de D., je donnerai d'abord un aperqu de leur structure generale. Le volume I contient d'abord un bref avantpropos, qui determine comme objectif majeur la lutte contre deux presupposes traditionnels, l'un philosophique, I'autre historique. Selon le premier, il existe un concept, et un seul, de la raison scientifique, qui s'est developpe sans toutefois se transformer de faqon spectaculaire, de sorte que son histoire n'aurait qu'un interet marginal; les theories modemes de la science, en ebranlant ce presuppose, en ebranlent aussi la consequence. Selon l'autre presuppose, porte

Thomizing Plotinus: A Critique of Professor Gerson

Abstract: Recent years have seen a welcome surge in Plotinian scholarship. One of the latest full-length presentations of Plotinus' philosophy is L. P. Gerson's Plotinus in the Arguments of the Philosophers series.' It is a work of impressive erudition and scholarship. However I think it is seriously flawed due to Gerson's failure to take account of the intellectual milieu of the late Roman Empire. A priori one might suppose that some light could be shed on the Enneads by trying to understand Plotinus in the context of contemporary movements of thought Gnosticism, Middle Platonism, Neopythagoreanism, Christianity but there is almost none of this in Gerson's book. Instead we have an attempt to force-fit Plotinus into the intellectual world of thirteenth century Scholasticism. Thomas Aquinas is cited more frequently than any other thinker except Plato and Aristotle. It is this ahistorical approach that I want to criticize in more detail in the pages that follow. To be sure, Gerson anticipates this sort of criticism. In the first place, he admits, "I have kept mostly silent about some very exotic topics, such as magic, astral bodies, and guardian angels, which undoubtedly do have some place in a complete picture of Plotinus as a thinker. I do not, though, think they have a place in a philosophy book, or at any rate a contemporary philosophy book." (xvii) Below, however, we will find reason to doubt that these topics can always be disassociated from ones that do have a place in a philosophy book. As for any "imputation of scholastic anachronism," Gerson argues, "it is really beside the point if that language accurately elucidates what is going on in the arguments. I claim that it does." (9) Below I hope to show that it doesn't.

Nozick's Socrates

Abstract: 1. Two of the most intriguing issues arising from the Socratic dialogues are Socrates' disclaimer of knowledge, and the nature of the elenchus. It is important to understand these issues not only because they are central to the Socratic dialogues, but also because they raise such fundamental questions about epistemology. It is therefore exciting to see that Robert Nozick who has, among other things, made significant contributions to epistemology has recently devoted his attention to them.' In this brief reply, I explore his interpretation.