Showing papers in "Phronesis in 2005"

Embryological Models in Ancient Philosophy

Abstract: Historically embryogenesis has been among the most philosophically intriguing phenomena. In this paper I focus on one aspect of biological development that was particularly perplexing to the ancients: self-organisation. For many ancients, the fact that an organism determines the important features of its own development required a special model for understanding how this was possible. This was especially true for Aristotle, Alexander, and Simplicius, who all looked to contemporary technology to supply that model. However, they did not all agree on what kind of device should be used. In this paper I explore the way these ancients made use of technology as a model for the developing embryo. I argue that their different choices of device reveal fundamental differences in the way each thinker understood the nature of biological development itself. In the final section of the paper I challenge the traditional view (dating back to Alexander's interpretation of Aristotle) that the use of automata in GA can simply be read off from their use in the de motu.

La figure d'Ulysse chez les Socratiques : Socrate polutropos

Abstract: At the end of the fifth century B.C.E., the character of Odysseus was scorned by most of the Athenians: he illustrated the archetype of the demagogic, unscrupulous and ambitious politicians that had led Athens to its doom. Against this common doxa, the most important disciples of Socrates (Antisthenes, Plato, Xenophon) rehabilitate the hero and admire his temperance and his courage. But it is most surprising to see that, in spite of Odysseus' lies and deceit, these philosophers, who condemn steadfastly the sophists' deceptions, praise his rhetorical ability, his polutropia. The word polutropia is ambiguous: for Antisthenes, it means either "diversity of styles and discourses" or "diversity of dispositions, characters, or souls". It is argued that the same distinction is implicitly at work in Plato's Hippias Minor, where Socrates defends Odysseus' polutropia against the pseudo "simplicity" of Hippias' favourite hero, Achilles. However, whereas Antisthenes tries to clarify these different meanings, Plato's Socrates exploits the ambiguity to confuse his interlocutor. Such a distinction sheds a new light on the Hippias Minor: Odysseus is polutropos in the first (positive) sense, while the simplicity of Achilles should be understood as a bad kind of poluropia. It provides an explanation for the first paradoxical thesis of the dialogue which many commentators do not admit as an expression of the true Socratic view, on the ground of its supposed immorality: that he who voluntary deceives is better than he who errs, for falsehood is, in one case, only in words, while in the other, it is falsehood in the soul itself. It is thus proposed that Odysseus' skill in adapting his logos to his hearers was probably a model for Socrates himself. The analogy between the hero and Socrates is especially clear in Plato's dialogues, which show the philosopher in an Odyssey for knowledge.

Aristotle on the Best Good: Is Nicomachean Ethics 1094a18-22 Fallacious?

Abstract: The first sentence of NE I.2 has roughly the form: "If A [there is a universal end] and B (because, if not- B , then C ), then D [this end will be the best good]". According to some commentators, Aristotle uses B to infer A ; but then the sentence is fallacious. According to other commentators, Aristotle does not use B (until later on); but then the sentence is bizarre. Contrary to both sets of commentators (but following Wedin 1981), I suggest that Aristotle uses B together with A to infer validly that there is a non-instrumental – and thus unique – universal end (hence D ). On this interpretation the above two problems disappear, but a subtler problem emerges: not- B does not entail C .

'Eκπυ´ρωσιζ and the goodness of god in Cleanthes

Abstract: The eκπυ´ρωσιζ, or world's con flagration, followed by the restoration of an identical world seems to go against the rationality of the Stoic god The aim of this paper is to show that Cleanthes, the second head of the School, can avoid this paradox According to Cleanthes, the con flagration is an inevitable side-effect of the necessary means used by god to sustain the world Given that this side-effect is contrary to god's sustaining activity, but unavoidable, god's rationality requires the restoration of an identical world once the con flagration subsides The paper also deals with the relation between Cleanthes and other early Stoics on the topic of con flagration In particular, Cleanthes' position seems to diff er from Chrysippus' For in contrast with the Cleanthean god, who causes the con flagration as a side-effect only, the Chrysippean god, according to an in fluential interpretation put forward by Jaap Mansfeld, causes the con flagration as his ultimate cosmological goal

Logic and Music in Plato's Phaedo

Abstract: This paper aims to achieve a better understanding of what Socrates means by "συμϕωνɛiν" in the sections of the Phaedo in which he uses the word, and how its use contributes both to the articulation of the hypothetical method and the proof of the soul's immortality. Section I sets out the well-known problems for the most obvious readings of the relation, while Sections II and III argue against two remedies for these problems, the first an interpretation of what the συμϕωνɛiν relation consists in, the second an interpretation of what sorts of thing the relation is meant to relate. My positive account in Section IV argues that we should take the musical connotations of the term seriously, and that Plato was thinking of a robust analogy between the way pitches form unities when related by certain intervals, and the way theoretical claims form unities when related by explanatory co-dependence. Section V surveys the work of IV from the point of view of the initial difficulties and suggests further consequences for the hypothetical method, including the logical relation between the συμϕωνɛiν and διαϕωνɛiν relations, and the need for care in ordering the results of a hypothesis. "But anyhow I proceeded in this way: on each occasion hypothesising the λoγoς which I judged to be strongest, I put down as true the things that seem to me to συμϕωνɛiν with it – both about a causal account and any of the other things that are – but those things that did not I put down as false." ( Phaedo 100a3-7). "But if someone clung to the hypothesis itself, you would bid him goodbye and wouldn't answer him until you had examined its results, whether according to you they συμϕωνɛi or διαϕωνɛi with one another." ( Phaedo 101d3-5)

Ignorance and Opinion in Stoic Epistemology

Abstract: This paper argues for a view that maximizes in the Stoics' epistemology the starkness and clarity characteristic of other parts of their philosophy. I reconsider our evidence concerning doxa (opinion/belief): should we really take the Stoics to de fine it as assent to the incognitive, so that it does not include the assent of ordinary people to their kataleptic impressions, and is thus actually inferior to agnoia (ignorance)? I argue against this, and for the simple view that in Stoicism assent is either, in the case of the fool, doxa = agnoia , or alternatively, in that of the sage, episteme (knowledge). This view, together with reflection on the appropriate sense of "between" in the relevant reports of SE and Cicero, yields a sympathetic reading of an otherwise problematic challenge Sextus reports Arcesilaus as having prepared for the Stoic claim that katalepsis , which is the criterion of truth, is between knowledge and opinion; on my view each side is proceeding in a philosophically legitimate way.

Alexander of Aphrodisias on universals: two problematic texts

Abstract: Two texts that raise problems for Alexander of Aphrodisias' theory of universals are examined. De anima 90.2-8 appears to suggest that universals are dependent on thought for their existence; this raises questions about the status both of universals and of forms. It is suggested that the passage is best interpreted as indicating that universals are dependent on thought only for their being recognised as universals. The last sentence of Quaestio 1.11 seems to assert that if the universal did not exist no individual would exist, thereby contradicting Alexander's position elsewhere. This seems to be a slip resulting from the fact that species with only one member are the exception rather than the rule.

Recollection and Philosophical Reflection in Plato's Phaedo

Abstract: Interpretations of recollection in the Phaedo are divided between ordinary interpretations, on which recollection explains a kind of learning accomplished by all, and sophisticated interpretations, which restrict recollection to philosophers. A sophisticated interpretation is supported by the prominence of philosophical understanding and reflection in the argument. Recollection is supposed to explain the advanced understanding displayed by Socrates and Simmias (74b2-4). Furthermore, it seems to be a necessary condition on recollection that one who recollects also perform a comparison of sensible particulars to Forms (74a5-7). I provide a new ordinary interpretation which explains these features of the argument. First, we must clearly distinguish the philosophical reflection which constitutes the argument for the Theory of Recollection from the ordinary learning which is its subject. The comparison of sensibles to Forms is the reasoning by which we see, as philosophers, that we must recollect. At the same time, we must also appreciate the continuity of ordinary and philosophical learning. Plato wants to explain the capacity for ordinary discourse, but with an eye to its role as the origin of philosophical reflection and learning. In the Phaedo, recollection has ordinary learning as its immediate explanandum, and philosophical learning as its ultimate explanandum.

"Creeping Spatiality": The Location of Nous in Plotinus' Universe

Abstract: There is a well-known tension in Plotinus' thought regarding the location of the intelligible region. He appears to make three mutually incompatible claims about it: (1) it is everywhere; (2) it is nowhere; and (3) it borders on the heavens, where the third claim is associated with Plotinus' affection for cosmic religion. Traditionally, although scholars have found a reasonable way to make sense of the compatibility of the first two claims, they have sought to relieve the tension generated by (3) by both downplaying the importance of cosmic religion to Plotinus and reinterpreting his spatial language metaphorically. In this paper I argue that both of these maneuvers are unsatisfactory. Rather, it is possible to reconcile Plotinus' metaphysics with the world-view of cosmic religion (CR world-view), i.e., to retain the spatial sense of Plotinus' language without making his metaphysics incoherent. In the first part of this paper, I show that cosmic religion is not just an awkward appendage to Plotinus' metaphysics. After explaining what cosmic religion involves, I argue that the CR world-view is in fact central to his natural philosophy. Then, I turn to the problem of the compatibility between cosmic religion and Plotinus' thought. By carefully considering how Aristotle's Prime Mover is present to his universe, I show how we can make claims (2) and (3) compatible for Plotinus. Then, I argue that Plotinus' own account of the omnipresence of soul and its powers' actualizations in particular locations provides a parallel to the problem of the compatibility between (1) and (3), and further that these two accounts can be combined to resolve completely the tension between the CR world-view and Plotinus' metaphysics. In the final section, I discuss the implications this has for our understanding of the soul's ascent and descent.

Melissus And His Opponents: The Argument of DK 30 B 8

Abstract: In this paper I offer a new interpretation of Melissus' argument at DK 30 B8. In this passage Melissus uses an Eleatic argument against change to challenge an opponent who appeals to the authority of perception in order to support the view that there are a plurality of items in the world. I identify an orthodox type of approach to this passage, but argue that it cannot give a charitable interpretation of Melissus' strategy. In order to assess Melissus' overall argument we have to identify the opponent at whom it is aimed. The orthodox interpretation of the argument faces a dilemma: Melissus' argument is either a poor argument against a plausible opponent or a good argument against an implausible opponent. My interpretation turns on identifying a new target for Melissus' argument. I explain the position I call Bluff Realism (contrasting it with two other views: the Pig Headed and the Fully Engaged). These are positions concerning the dialectical relation between perception on the one hand, and arguments to counter-perceptual conclusions on the other. I argue that Bluff Realism represents a serious threat from an Eleatic point of view, and is prima facie an attractive position in its own right. I then give a charitable interpretation of Melissus' argument in DK 30 B8, showing how he produces a strong and incisive argument against the Bluff Realist position I have identified. Melissus emerges as an innovative and astute philosopher.

Zeno's Cosmology and the Presumption of Innocence. Interpretations and Vindications

Abstract: The present study partly supports, partly corrects, and partly complements recent discussions of Arius Didymus fr. 23 and fr. 25 Diels, Aetius I, 20, 1 and Sextus Empiricus AM X, 3-4 = PH III, 124. It proposes a comprehensive interpretation of the first text (A.I), defends the attribution of its content to Zeno of Citium (A.II), interprets the Stoic definitions of space, place and void to be found in the other sources (B.I) and again vindicates the attribution of the core definitions to Zeno (B.II). The central methodological principle is the presumption of innocence for sources. The main conclusions of (A) are: 1. Arius Didymus' fr. 23 deals only with the coherence and the structure of the cosmos, not with its immobility; 2. The coherence of the cosmos, as that of any object, is determined by its hexis which pushes its parts towards its centre; 3. The structure of the cosmos, its stratification into the four concentric spheres of the elements, is determined by the combined effect of (a) the thrust downwards they all undergo from the cosmos' hexis; (b) their own natural weight or lightness and (c) the relative quantitative values of these weights or lightnesses; 4. The reasons adduced against Zeno's authorship are not based on the evidence but on the now prevalent disparaging sceptical approach towards Stobaeus' way of excerpting from Arius. The main conclusions of (B) are: 1. There is no deep contradiction between the various de finitions of space ascribed by our sources to Zeno, Chrysippus and the Stoics in general: what Chrysippus denied was the form of the de finition attributed to Zeno by Aetius, not the concept de fined, even though this form seems to have prevailed later in the school; 2. There is no good reason therefore to question its ascription to Zeno as some modern researchers have done; 3. Here again the error is due to a predominantly sceptical approach towards the reliability of our sources.

Perpetuity, Eternity, and Time in Proclus' Cosmos

Abstract: Proclus composed 18 arguments for the eternity of the world and they survive only because Philoponus, intending to refute Proclus' arguments one by one, quotes each; one copy of Philoponus' work – and so Proclus' arguments too – survives. Because of their odd history, these arguments have received little attention either in themselves or in relation to Proclus' other works, even though they are intrinsically interesting and reflect his larger philosophical enterprise. I first examine Argument XVIII, in which Proclus calls on "perpetuity", "eternity", and "time" to argue that the cosmos must be eternal. This argument leaves unanswered two important questions. The cosmos is caused by god and is itself a god; how can a cause and its effect both be gods? Proclus concludes that the cosmos is "a copy of the perpetuity of the eternal"; but what does this phrase – and the conclusion that it expresses – mean? To answer these questions, I turn to The Elements of Theology , a systematic progression of 211 propositions disclosing the causal structure of all reality. "Eternity" and "time", along with "being perpetual", also appear here, particularly in propositions 40-55, to which I turn in the second part of this paper. They are conjoined with what Proclus calls "the Self-Constituted". I argue that by understanding the relation of the Self-Constituted as a cause to its effect, what depends upon another, we can also understand the causal relation between god and the cosmos. The cosmos can be called divine because, via the cause/effect relation between them, god and the cosmos are both eternal; the cosmos is "a copy of the perpetuity of the eternal" because via its relation to god, the cosmos becomes what its cause is , and in this precise sense an effect "imitates" its cause.

L'authenticité de "Métaphysique 'Alpha' " ('meizon' ou 'elatton') d'Aristote, un faux problème ? Une confirmation codicologique

Abstract: La discussion sur l'authenticite du deuxieme livre de la Metaphysique d'Aristote (Petit Alpha), qui dure depuis un millenaire, a pour origine une scholie qui se trouve dans le Parisinus gr. 1853 (Xe siecle) a la jonction du premier et du deuxieme livre. Or, cette scholie a ete copiee par la meme main que celle qui a ajoute une scholie d'un contenu comparable a la fin de la Metaphysique de Theophraste. Ce fait etait passe inapercu, parce que ce scribe a utilise differentes ecritures : droite ou penchee, calligraphique ou cursive. L'ensemble des temoignages et indices deja examines par Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem, d'une part, et par Enrico Berti, d'autre part, est analyse et reinterprete a la lumiere de cette nouvelle information, qui permet d'etablir que c'est le premier livre de la Metaphysique, et non le deuxieme, qui etait attribue par certains a Pasicles de Rhodes, comme en temoignait deja Asclepios. Le contenu et la formulation tres proches des deux scholies permettent de penser qu'elles viennent d'un meme erudit : a l'aide, notamment, des commentaires d'Alexandre et d'Asclepios a la Metaphysique d'Aristote, de l'etude de Nicolas de Damas ou des catalogues d'Hermippe et d'Andronicos, il a prepare une ‘edition' d'Aristote destinee a devenir un modele de reference. Dans la tradition latine, Grand Alpha a ete accidentellement attribue a Theophraste a cause de la seconde scholie. Mais la discussion dont temoigne la premiere scholie a pu egalement etre provoquee des l'origine par celle que rapporte la seconde scholie: la Metaphysique de Theophraste avait probablement ete transmise comme un traite aristotelicien, jusqu'a ce que Nicolas de Damas en restitue la paternite a Theophraste ; par suite, l'authenticite d'autres livres du corpus aristotelicien a pu egalement etre mise en doute, mais parce qu'ils posaient des problemes d'ordre editorial, il y a deux millenaires deja.