Showing papers in "Phronesis in 2008"

Aristotle on Natural Slavery

Abstract: Aristotle's claim that natural slaves do not possess autonomous rationality (Pol. 1.5, 1254b20-23) cannot plausibly be interpreted in an unrestricted sense, since this would conflict with what Aristotle knew about non-Greek societies. Aristotle's argument requires only a lack of autonomous practical rationality. An impairment of the capacity for integrated practical deliberation, resulting from an environmentally induced excess or deficiency in thumos (Pol. 7.7, 1327b18-31), would be sufficient to make natural slaves incapable of eudaimonia without being obtrusively implausible relative to what Aristotle is likely to have believed about non-Greeks. Since Aristotle seems to have believed that the existence of people who can be enslaved without injustice is a hypothetical necessity, if those capable of eudaimonia are to achieve it, the existence of natural slaves has implications for our understanding of Aristotle's natural teleology.

Aristotle on Ontological Dependence

Abstract: Aristotle holds that individual substances are ontologically independent from non-substances and universal substances but that non-substances and universal substances are ontologically dependent on substances. There is then an asymmetry between individual substances and other kinds of beings with respect to ontological dependence. Under what could plausibly be called the standard interpretation, the ontological independence ascribed to individual substances and denied of non-substances and universal substances is a capacity for independent existence. There is, however, a tension between this interpretation and the asymmetry between individual substances and the other kinds of entities with respect to ontological independence. I will propose an alternative interpretation: to weaken the relevant notion of ontological independence from a capacity for independent existence to the independent possession of a certain ontological status.

Aristotle's 'So-Called Elements'

Abstract: Aristotle's use of the phrase τα καλουμeνα στοιχeια is usually taken as evidence that he does not really think that the things to which this phrase refers, namely, fire, air, water, and earth, are genuine elements. In this paper I question the linguistic and textual grounds for taking the phrase τα καλουμeνα στοιχeια in this way. I offer a detailed examination of the significance of the phrase, and in particular I compare Aristotle's general use of the Greek participle καλουμeνοζiot (-η, -ον) in other contexts. I conclude that his use of the phrase τα καλουμeνα στοιχeια does not carry ironical or sceptical connotations, and that it ought to be understood as a neutral report of a contemporary opinion that the elements of bodies are fire, air, water, and earth. I leave aside the question as to whether or not Aristotle himself endorses this opinion.

Individuation, particularisation et détermination selon Plotin

Abstract: Plotinus' formulation of the problem of the individual should not be reduced to the question of whether or not one can accept Forms of Individuals. First, if Plotinus does indeed posit an intelligible foundation of individuality, there are no grounds to identify this foundation with a Form: it must rather be considered a logos . Second, we must, in addition to this intelligible “principle of distinction”, allow for a sensible “principle of individuation”: the living body. Finally, we have to distinguish a third level: that of the hemeis , the individual as a person, capable of freedom and consciousness. This latter's compatibility with the other two seems problematic, so that the real difficulty may lie in this tension, in Plotinus' thought, between an ontological and an ethical concept of the individual.

The Private Parts of Animals: Aristotle on the Teleology of Sexual Difference

Abstract: In this paper I examine Aristotle's account of sexual difference in Generation of Animals , arguing that Aristotle conceives of the production of males as the result of a successful teleological process, while he sees the production of females as due to material forces that defeat the norms of nature. My suggestion is that Aristotle endorses what I call the "degrees of perfection" model. I challenge Devin Henry's attempt to argue that Aristotle explains sex determination exclusively with reference to material necessity (in particular, levels of "vital heat" in the male semen), for Aristotle's notion of "sufficient" or "deficient" vital heat is itself teleological. If, as Aristotle is aware, male and female embryos appear with approximately equal frequency in most species, how, in light of Physics II, can he conceive of the former as in accordance with nature, and the latter as somehow contrary to nature? My proposal is that Aristotle's notion of what happens usually (ως eπi τo πoλυ) is bifurcated: the usual need not be more frequent.

Porphyry and Plotinus on the Seed

Abstract: Porphyry's account of the nature of seeds can shed light on some less appreciated details of Neoplatonic psychology, in particular on the interaction between individual souls. The process of producing the seed and the conception of the seed offer a physical instantiation of procession and reversion, activities that are central to Neoplatonic metaphysics. In an act analogous to procession, the seed is produced by the father's nature, and as such it is ontologically inferior to the father's nature. Thus, the seed does not strictly speaking contain a full-fledged vegetative soul. Rather, it acquires its vegetative soul only while it is being actualized by an actual vegetative soul. This actualization takes place primarily at conception, where the seed as it were reverts back and becomes obedient to the mother's nature, but continues through the period of gestation. In this way, Porphyry can account both for maternal resemblance and for ideoplasty. He uses the Stoic language of complete blending to describe the mother's relation to the seed and embryo, and this reveals that he thinks of individuals as having their own unique individual natures (as opposed to sharing in a single universal nature). In the course of developing this theory, Porphyry makes significant revisions to his philosophical predecessors' views in both embryology and botany. He revises Aristotle's verdict on the relative importance of the female in generation as well as Theophrastus' explanation of the biological mechanics of grafting. Although Plotinus nowhere addresses embryology in the same detail as Porphyry does, we can conclude from his remarks on seeds and plants that his own views were similar to those of his student.

The Method εξ υποεσεως at Meno 86e1-87d8

Abstract: Scholars ubiquitously refer to the method eξ υποeσeως, introduced at Meno 86e1-87d8, as a method of hypothesis. In contrast, this paper argues that the method eξ υποeσeως in Meno is not a hypothetical method. On the contrary, in the Meno passage, υποeσις means “postulate”, that is, cognitively secure proposition. Furthermore, the method eξ υποeσeως is derived from the method of geometrical analysis. More precisely, it is derived from the use of geometrical analysis to achieve reduction, that is, reduction of a less tractable problem to a more tractable problem. As such, the method eξ υποeσeως does not by itself serve to solve problems.

The Place of aporia in Plato's Charmides

Abstract: The aim of the paper is twofold: to examine the argument in response to Socrates' question whether or not reflexive knowledge is, first, possible, and, second, beneficial; and by doing so, to examine the method of Plato's argument. What is distinctive of the method of argument, I want to show, is that Socrates argues on both sides of these questions (the question of possibility and the question of benefit). This, I argue, is why he describes these questions as a source of aporia . Socrates can argue, without contradiction, on both sides of these questions because the arguments against the possibility and benefit of reflexive knowledge are premised on the supposition, defended by Critias, that this knowledge is only of one's knowledge and lack of knowledge, whereas the arguments for its possibility and benefit are not committed to this supposition.

The Place of I 7 in the Argument of Physics I

Abstract: Aristotle introduces Physics I as an inquiry into principles; in this paper I ask where he argues for the position he reaches in I 7. Many hold that his definitive argument is found in the first half of I 7 itself; I argue that this view is mistaken: the considerations raised there do not form the basis of any self-standing argument for Aristotle's doctrine of principles, but rather play a subordinate role in a larger argument begun in earnest in I 5. This larger argument stalls in I 6, which ends in aporia; I argue that the problem lies in the fact that Aristotle's reasoning in I 6 thoroughly undermines his reasoning in I 5 (on which I 6 is ostensibly supposed to build). I further argue that the materials necessary for resolving this problem, and thereby allowing the argument begun in I 5 to reach its proper conclusion, are supplied by the thesis that organizes the first half of I 7. Along the way I offer some remarks about Aristotle's doctrine of principles, arguing that it is about the principles of natural substance (as opposed to coming to be or change). I also offer some remarks about the thesis which organizes the first half of I 7. I argue negatively that it is not anything like a preliminary statement of Aristotle's doctrine of principles. I argue positively that it reflects Aristotle's idea that there are two distinct kinds of effect change has upon things (one constructive, the other destructive). One of these effects lies behind Aristotle's reasoning in I 5, the other comes to the fore in I 6; the achievement of the first half of I 7 is to reconcile these seemingly competing conceptions by finding a place for them both in a unified account of coming to be and its subjects.

Substancehood and Subjecthood in Aristotle's Categories

Abstract: I attempt to answer the question of what Aristotle's criteria for 'being a substance' are in the Categories. On the basis of close textual analysis, I argue that subjecthood, conceived in a certain way, is the criterion that explains why both concrete objects and substance universals must be regarded as substances. It also explains the substantial primacy of concrete objects. But subjecthood can only function as such a criterion if both the subjecthood of concrete objects and the subjecthood of substance universals can be understood as philosophically significant phenomena. By drawing on Aristotle's essentialism, I argue that such an understanding is possible: the subjecthood of substance universals cannot simply be reduced to that of primary substances. Primary and secondary substances mutually depend on each other for exercising their capacities to function as subjects. Thus, subjecthood can be regarded as a philosophically informative criterion for substancehood in the Categories.

False Names, Demonstratives and the Refutation of Linguistic Naturalism in Plato's Cratylus 427d1-431c3

Abstract: This paper offers an interpretation of Plato's Cratylus 427d1-431c3 that supports a reading of the dialogue as a whole as concluding in favour of a conventionalist account of naming. While many previous interpretations note the value of this passage as evidence for Platonic investigations of false propositions, this paper argues that its demonstration that there can be false (or incorrect) naming in turn refutes the naturalist account of naming; that is, it shows that a natural relation between name and nominatum is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for reference. Socrates secures this outcome by using demonstratives and their concomitants to show how any putative natural imitative link between name and object may be overridden. Furthermore, Socrates' employment of demonstratives and context-dependent statements in his case-studies of false naming speaks in favour of a reading of this passage as primarily focussing on naming rather than on propositions in general.

Another Note on Zeno's Arrow

Abstract: In Physics VI.9 Aristotle addresses Zeno's four paradoxes of motion and amongst them the arrow paradox. In his brief remarks on the paradox, Aristotle suggests what he takes to be a solution to the paradox. In two famous papers, both called 'A note on Zeno's arrow', Gregory Vlastos and Jonathan Lear each suggest an interpretation of Aristotle's proposed solution to the arrow paradox. In this paper, I argue that these two interpretations are unsatisfactory, and suggest an alternative interpretation. In particular, I claim that what seems on the face of it to be Aristotle's solution to the paradox raises two puzzles to which my interpretation, as opposed to Lear's and Vlastos's, provides an adequate response.

Doctrinalia Heraclitea I et II : Âme du monde et embrasement universel (Notes de lecture)

Abstract: In this first paper dealing with Heraclitus' doctrine as such (as opposed to the texts both of our sources on him and of the surviving fragments of his book), the author examines and discusses two recent controversial articles with the content of which he sympathizes – one by Gabor Betegh (2007) on the cosmological (physical) status of Heraclitus' psyche , and the other by Aryeh Finkelberg (1998) on Heraclitus' cosmogony and the reality of a Heraclitean world conflagration. This examination is aimed, first, at fostering "marginal" opinions which the author believes to be fundamentally correct – and the rejection of which since times immemorial (by Schleiermacher and others) he considers to have greatly harmed and hampered our understanding of the Ephesian philosopher ; second, at introducing some personal corrections and additions to these opinions ; and third, at illustrating the advantages of a deliberately un prejudiced approach towards our sources, an approach based on the presumption of innocence, knowledgeability and intelligence for all our informers and on the rejection of any rejection [this is not a dittography!] of any source on ground of mere suspicion. Among the proposed novelties (or olden oblivitions) the following particularly deserve to be underscored: (1) the defense of the authenticity of "fr. B 76" DK qua three different fragments and (2) the reconstruction of Heraclitus' system of four physical exhalations – both of which are connected with the notion of a world soul; and (3) the interpretation of Plat. Soph. 242 C – 243 A [T 132] as confirming (and not as contradicting) Arist. De cael. 279 b 12 [T 170] and (4) the cosmogonical interpretation of F 31 – both of which presuppose the reality of a Heraclitean ecpyrosis . Yet, since the author's dogmatism does not extend beyond the requirement of having re course to (methodo)logically sound procedures, he is ready to give up any conclusion of which it can be proven that it is irreconcilably contradicted by a sounder one and supported by none.