Showing papers in "Polity in 2006"
TL;DR: The fact/value dichotomy in political science has been challenged by as mentioned in this paper, who argue that if political science is to matter to policymakers or citizens, as most political scientists believe it should, authors must be clear about how their subject ties into some broader telos that others might share.
Abstract: Traditionally, the scientific study of politics has been associated with a value-neutral approach to the subject. One seeks to uncover what is, not what ought to be, in the political realm. This is what distinguishes a “positive” science from opinionizing, social engineering, or political philosophy. In recent decades, one detects a growing uneasiness with the venerable fact/value dichotomy, at least as it was traditionally understood. It is not clear, however, where this leaves us. (Is the fact/value dichotomy dead?) Against this backdrop, we present the following argument. If political science is to matter to policymakers or citizens, as most political scientists believe it should, authors must be clear about how their subject ties into some broader telos that others might share. Thus, one might fruitfully distinguish three sorts of issues. First, how does a particular subject of political science affect the broader public? (What is its relevance?) Second, how can one demonstrate this relevance empirically? And finally, how might other ways of viewing this issue change the way the “goodness” of the subject is perceived? The first issue is simply a matter of clarification, the second a matter of demonstration, and the third a matter normally reserved for political philosophy. All are necessary components of a relevant and useful political science discipline.
70 citations
TL;DR: The relationship between critical theory and pragmatism has been examined in this article, where it is argued that the antifoundational and practice-oriented dimensions of pragmatic theory appear to exist in tension with the emancipatory commitments of the neo-Marxist legacy of critical theory.
Abstract: The historical relationship between pragmatism and critical theory is one in which the antifoundational and practice-oriented dimensions of pragmatism appear to exist in tension, if not outright conflict, with the emancipatory commitments of the neo-Marxist legacy of critical theory. While Deweyan pragmatism is most often understood in its deliberative, experimental, open-ended, and contextual dimensions, little attention has been paid to the critical dimensions of Dewey's thought. In what follows, I take the initial steps in recovering the critical features of Dewey's pragmatism by developing my analysis along two lines. First, I sketch the general contours of the relationship between pragmatism and critical theory in order to account for and unpack the long-standing hostility of critical theorists toward pragmatism. Second, I argue that these hostilities are unwarranted, and that they have been passed to us in the form of a persistent inability to appreciate the critical features of Dewey's pragmatism. Through an investigation of the philosophical underpinnings of Dewey's pragmatism, I hope to show that Dewey's democratic commitments to the transformatory potential of lived experience, to a reconstructed conception of individualism, and to the cultivation of reflective social intelligence might be viewed as the basis of a critical theory worthy of greater attention and appreciation. Moreover, I hope that this effort will open avenues of inquiry into what might be called a model of “critical pragmatism.”
54 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that the failure of political science to realize its naturalistic aspirations is at least partly attributable to the self-disconfirming analysis of political analysis, and demonstrate that if the agenda implied by Putnam's scientific research were to be implemented, some of the causal claims established by that research would be removed from actual operation.
Abstract: American political science has long aspired to emulate both the objective research methods of the natural sciences and their practical successes in controlling their objects of study. Regrettably, the putative tension between these two ambitions is rarely discussed. This essay seeks to touch off such a discussion by illuminating a significant problem that produces tension between objective knowledge accumulation and practical control of politics, but not of nature: self-disconfirming analysis. The problem is that in some situations, successful realization of the normative implications of political analysis may create new political patterns that are no longer consistent with the law-like regularities uncovered by that analysis. I demonstrate how this problem is manifest in the work of Robert Putnam, whose career exhibits a commitment to (naturalistic) scientific rigor as well as a passion for sociopolitical change. If the agenda implied by Putnam's scientific research were to be implemented, some of the causal claims established by that research would be removed from actual operation. I argue that the failure of political science to realize its naturalistic aspirations is at least partly attributable to this problem.
26 citations
TL;DR: This paper argued that claims regarding the disarray of political science are, at the very least, exaggerated, and pointed out that the profession ascribes near totemic status to four specific subfields: political theory, American politics, comparative politics, and international relations.
Abstract: American students of political science have repeatedly bemoaned its failure to achieve the status of a coherent intellectual discipline. This essay suggests that claims regarding the disarray of political science are, at the very least, exaggerated. For several key purposes, the profession ascribes near totemic status to four specific subfields: political theory, American politics, comparative politics, and international relations. While one might argue that these categories are innocuous administrative conveniences, that claim would be mistaken. Subfields are vehicles of power insofar as they participate in the allocation of rewards within the discipline, and, more fundamentally, insofar as they participate in structuring our understanding of the nature of politics itself. Inquiry into the emergence and consolidation of political science's basic subfields, however, has been almost entirely ignored in accounts of the discipline and its history. This essay aims to remedy that gap in our understanding.
18 citations
TL;DR: The authors examines the relationship between theory and the political in the work of Sheldon S. Wolin and concludes that Wolin's scattered remarks on Montesquieu's political theory point to a better conception of theory and political, one that resembles his original project, and also argues that instead of developing a systematic populist democratic theory, Wolin unjustifiably reduced democracy to the "fugitive" moment of revolution, developed a one-dimensional theory of postmodern state power, and unnecessarily insisted on adopting a stance of hostility toward potential allies.
Abstract: This essay examines the relationship between theory and the political in the work of Sheldon S. Wolin. It traces Wolin's initial conceptions of theory and the political in Politics and Vision and how they have changed during his “journey from liberalism to democracy.” I argue that certain aspects of these initial conceptions of theory and the political were wrong, but that others were right and that Wolin mistakenly abandoned the right ones as his conceptions of theory changed in “Political Theory as a Vocation” and, later, when they converged on democracy. I also argue that, instead of developing a systematic populist democratic theory, Wolin unjustifiably reduced democracy to the “fugitive” moment of revolution, developed a one-dimensional theory of “postmodern” state power, and unnecessarily insisted on adopting a stance of hostility toward potential allies. I conclude by arguing that Wolin's scattered remarks on Montesquieu's political theory point to a better conception of theory and the political, one that resembles his original project. Although Wolin's supporters may disagree with this interpretation, perhaps it will provoke some debate on Wolin and his considerable contribution to political theory.
14 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a theoretical framework for thinking about family as a part of the policy process that justifies policy positions, administers goods and services, and determines eligibility is provided. But the theoretical framework is not sufficient to evaluate how family is used in day-to-day politics.
Abstract: Political science has been relatively silent about family, associating it with social welfare policy, gender, or the private sphere. However, family is also an important part of day-to-day politics, and legislators use family to accomplish a wide range of policy goals. This paper provides a theoretical framework for thinking about family as a part of the policy process that justifies policy positions, administers goods and services, and determines eligibility. I test the theoretical framework by evaluating where and how family is used in the policy process with a quantitative analysis of congressional speeches, the U.S. code, and federal regulations. Finally, a brief look at tax policy in the 1990s shows how family can be incorporated into political research. Ultimately, political actors use concepts of family across a broad spectrum of policy areas, including those not traditionally thought of as “family oriented,” suggesting a number of important implications and research questions for further study.
12 citations
TL;DR: In the 1950s, the United States experienced a panic over youth crime and the government's response focused on policies of prevention and rehabilitation as discussed by the authors, which would appear to lead directly to the "get tough" approach popular today.
Abstract: In the 1950s, the United States experienced a panic over youth crime. Both the political rhetoric and cultural fears of the period would appear to lead directly to the “get tough” approach popular today. But they did not. Instead, the government's response focused on policies of prevention and rehabilitation. What accounts for this? The answer lies in a set of institutions that framed the issue and biased it in favor of progressive solutions. These institutions—the Children's Bureau, the National Institute of Mental Health, and the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency—provided friendly venues for progressive ideas while preventing other ideas from being considered.
12 citations
TL;DR: The relationship between republicanism and liberalism has emerged as a central issue for students of political thought as discussed by the authors and Neo-republican scholars in particular have advanced a stark conceptual opposition between two competing intellectual and political projects, and have claimed that liberalism decisively defeated and replaced republicanism.
Abstract: The relationship between republicanism and liberalism has emerged as a central issue for students of political thought. Neo-republican scholars in particular have advanced a stark conceptual opposition between two competing intellectual and political projects, and have claimed that liberalism decisively defeated and replaced republicanism. By contrast, in exploring the writings of Thomas Paine and James Madison, this article shows how they initiated a radical and unexpected reconfiguration within the republican tradition that fashioned a surprisingly liberal doctrine for a modern republic. Their “republic of the moderns,” we argue, altered the contours and content of classical republicanism, transmuting it into an important strand of liberal political thought and institutions.
11 citations
TL;DR: In the United States, judicial review has been understood as a form of evaluation of government action to ensure compliance with the Constitution as mentioned in this paper. But before and after Marbury, state and federal courts developed and practiced a formalized form of judicial review in which common law principles, along with or instead of a canonical document, were the foundational body of legal doctrine against which public actions were assessed.
Abstract: In the United States, judicial review is understood, since Marbury v. Madison (1803), as judicial evaluation of government action to ensure compliance with the Constitution. But before and after Marbury, state and federal courts developed and practiced a form of judicial review in which common law principles, along with or instead of a canonical document, were the foundational body of legal doctrine against which public actions were assessed. This article carefully examines the cases in which this alternative form of judicial review emerged, and corrects certain misconceptions that Marbury must be the only form of judicial review that has existed or can exist in this country. More particularly, the article clarifies a failure by certain writers to distinguish properly between common law and natural law as matters of legal theory and legal doctrine. In correcting some of these theoretical and historical errors, the article outlines an understanding of judicial review that more fully captures its developmen...
9 citations
TL;DR: The authors showed that Americans have significantly more reasonable estimations of homosexuals populations in their local communities than they do at the national level, and they argue that such findings serve as a needed corrective to the view that Americans are hopelessly ignorant about minority communities.
Abstract: Previous research on demographic innumeracy has consistently shown that Americans have grossly inflated perceptions of minority population sizes at the national level. We present data from a survey indicating that Americans have significantly more reasonable estimations of homosexuals populations in their local communities. We argue that such findings serve as a needed corrective to the view that Americans are hopelessly ignorant about minority communities, speculate on some of the reasons for the disparate results at the national and local levels, and—after examining some of the correlates of the local estimates—discuss what these findings imply about the differing types and levels of “threat” the public views on the part of different minority groups.
7 citations
TL;DR: Hume's philosophy of common life consists in two moments: philosophic agnosticism about deep irresolvable metaphysical issues and a willingness to assume the common sense of the matter so that philosophy can proceed as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Hume's philosophy of common life consists in two moments: philosophic agnosticism about deep irresolvable metaphysical issues and a willingness to assume the common sense of the matter so that philosophy can proceed. This method works so long as he maintains agnosticism in the metaphysical issues as he entertains the common sense assumptions. When Hume turns his attention to revealed religion, however, his common life philosophy breaks down as his anti-transcendent metaphysic contaminates his assumptions; his embrace of humanity as the chief virtue of the modern world illuminates this contamination, as does his suggestion that religious belief might be extinguished in the modern world.
TL;DR: In distinguishing between negative and positive freedom, Isaiah Berlin expressed a preference for negative freedom as mentioned in this paper, which is not surprising given the track record of those who in the past have advocated positive freedom.
Abstract: In distinguishing between negative and positive freedom, Isaiah Berlin expressed a preference for negative freedom. Given the track record of those who in the past have advocated positive freedom, this is not surprising. But advocates of positive freedom do not accept that tyranny necessarily results from embracing their conception of freedom, and they are convinced that a commitment to negative freedom is never enough to defend “freedom” against tyrants. They do, however, share one thing in common with those who favor negative freedom: both equate their conception of freedom with “true freedom,” and treat the other as either false or incomplete. This might suggest that Berlin's distinction is more a partisan's tool than a tool of analysis. I disagree. But rather than reducing it to a distinction between “freedom from” and “freedom to,” we need to expand it. Not only will this enable us to move beyond an important criticism of Berlin's conception of freedom, it will also provide a better explanation for why negative freedom is as likely as positive freedom to diminish “true freedom” and why positive freedom is as likely as negative freedom to increase it.
TL;DR: The authors examines the role economic and deliberative models of politics play in Hobbes's political philosophy and argues that Hobbes chose to analogize these two models rather than to treat them as competing views of politics because he saw both the economy and deliberation as sites of manipulation and not as consensus forming mechanisms.
Abstract: In the last decade, the deliberative model of democracy has been offered to counter the prevalent conservative economistic tendencies of democratic theorizing. But the ideas of deliberation and rational persuasion are not newcomers on the stage of political philosophy, for they were central to the way classical rhetoricians understood politics. Against this background, this article examines the role economic and deliberative models of politics play in Hobbes's political philosophy. It argues that Hobbes chose to analogize these two models rather than to treat them as competing views of politics because he saw both the economy and deliberation as sites of manipulation and not as “consensus forming mechanisms.”
TL;DR: In this paper, a survey of constitutional law scholars on the overall "quality" of the Court's twentieth-century appointees was conducted, and the results indicated that the recent justices are, as a whole, just as able as the average justice of earlier in the twentieth century.
Abstract: Some critics of the confirmation process for U.S. Supreme Court nominees have claimed that the contentiousness of the contemporary process has induced presidents to nominate lesser known figures of lesser merit to the High Court, rather than first-rate legal scholars of well known and likely controversial views. This dynamic has led, in the words of one commentator, to a “Court of mediocrity.” This paper tests that thesis by analyzing the results of a survey of constitutional law scholars on the overall “quality” of the Court's twentieth-century appointees. The results place none of the justices appointed since the late 1960s in the survey's highest category: “Excellent.” However, the results indicate that the recent justices are, as a whole, just as able as the average justice of earlier in the twentieth century. A majority of the recent justices score above the mean rating of their earlier twentieth-century predecessors at a statistically distinguishable level. Moreover, the discussion of the survey results shows that the conditions for the appointment of great justices are still present.
TL;DR: In this paper, it is argued that the decision to authorize spectrum auctions is best understood when viewed through the literature on policy learning and epistemic communities, and an explanation based in this body of literature posits that policy change becomes possible when a new worldview or "policy epistemology" frames the terms of debate in a manner that causes political actors to consider new alternatives.
Abstract: In 1993, Congress authorized the FCC to use competitive bid auctions for the licensing of electromagnetic spectrum. To many members of the communications policy community, this policy change was decades overdue. Why did it take Congress so long to authorize spectrum auctions? Economist Thomas Hazlett has argued that policy gridlock resulting from an enduring political bargain between Congress and the broadcast industry prevented spectrum auctions from being seriously considered for decades. In this article, however, it is argued that the decision to authorize spectrum auctions is best understood when viewed through the literature on policy learning and epistemic communities. An explanation based in this body of literature posits that policy change becomes possible when a new worldview or “policy epistemology” frames the terms of debate in a manner that causes political actors to consider new alternatives.
TL;DR: Dobson and Eckersley as discussed by the authors presented the Green States and Social Movements: Environmentalism in the U.S., U.K., Germany, and Norway. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004.
Abstract: Andrew Dobson. Citizenship and the Environment. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. John S. Dryzek, David Downes, Christian Hunold, David Schlosberg, with HansKristian Hernes. Green States and Social Movements: Environmentalism in the U.S., U.K., Germany, and Norway. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Robyn Eckersley. The Green State: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004.
TL;DR: Zquez-Arroyo argues that, in treating recognition at the level of "ontology" rather than "epistemology," Bound by Recognition misses the opportunity to grasp the historically specific relations of power, privilege, and inequality that characterize the contemporary world as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Antonio V.zquez-Arroyo argues that, in treating recognition at the level of "ontology" rather than "epistemology," Bound by Recognition misses the opportunity to grasp the historically specific relations of power, privilege, and inequality that characterize the contemporary world. He sees promising possibilities in my treatment of the politics of Jewish emancipation; but, he says, I fail to extend that chapter's line of argument to such phenomena as the "management of politicized identities" by contemporary liberal states, especially the United States, in which the official recognition of difference takes place against the background of, and often serves to reinforce, racial, imperial, and capitalist orders. This is a surprising objection, since that is just the sort of analysis I took myself to be performing-though by no means completing-in the last full chapter of the book. There, in light of what I had learned about the state in studying German-Jewish politics in the nineteenth century, I argued that the discourse of liberal multiculturalism in contemporary North America and Europe leverages gains for excluded and marginalized groups by indulging the demands of states (and their normative citizens) for recognition of their sovereignty, now understood in terms of the capacity to observe, manage, and contain difference, rather than the capacity to secure cultural homogeneity; and that in so doing it
TL;DR: The strongest objection to natural justice comes from Creon as mentioned in this paper, who argues that allowing individuals to follow the claims of natural justice subverts the state's authority, and that natural justice cannot teach merely that the strong should rule the weak.
Abstract: Is there a basis in natural justice for sometimes disobeying the edicts of the state. Antigone provides an occasion for considering this question. Ancient skeptics maintained that there is no such thing as natural justice, because laws and morals vary across cultures. Or, if there is natural justice, it is nothing other than the claim that the strong should rule the weak. Or even if there is a natural justice that is more than the rule that the strong should rule the weak, that this justice never motivates anyone to act, because individuals are motivated only by justice. The strongest objection to natural justice comes from Creon: allowing individuals to follow the claims of natural justice subverts the state's authority. Ancient defenders of natural justice replied to each of these objections. While laws and moral vary, there is also great consensus in moral convictions across cultures, and that consensus requires some explanation. Furthermore, strength fails to confer an obligation to obey so that natural justice cannot teach merely that the strong should rule the weak. Moreover, individuals are clearly motivated by more than just pleasure. Given human behavior, the only reason anyone would assume individuals are only motivated by pleasure is because one assumes this to be the case a priori rather than as a result of an evaluation of the evidence. Yet ancient defenders of natural justice never replied that the doctrine of natural justice was anything less than subversive. This is for good reason, for it is more dangerous to allow the state to have an unfettered claim upon our obedience than to allow individuals to challenge the authority of the state based on the dictates of conscience.
TL;DR: The authors argue that the conditions of this "postmetaphysical" age might instead facilitate unprecedented commitments to democracy and welcome the very conditions of contingency that contemporary citizen-subjects tend to find so frightening.
Abstract: Given recent social and political transformations as well as our cultural landscape's dominance by narratives of threat and victimization, it is understandable that fear has occupied an ever-expanding role in our lives. Although these instabilities and insecurities have inspired a resurgence of various explanatory and mollifying fundamentalisms, radical democrats suggest that the conditions of this “postmetaphysical” age might instead facilitate unprecedented commitments to democracy. As such, radical democrats welcome the very conditions of contingency that contemporary citizen-subjects tend to find so frightening. In attacking the drive towards fundamentalism that they identify in various ideologies from Islam through liberalism, radical democrats betray an inattention to the functional consolation they offer. If fundamentalisms are opiates, radical democrats offer a prescription for addiction treatment that few have any interest in taking.
TL;DR: The Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Transformation of British Imperial Ideology by Karuna Mantena as mentioned in this paper was published by Princeton University Press in 2010. But it was not published until 2011.
Abstract: Karuna Mantena is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University. Her current research focuses on empire and political theory, especially the relationship between social theory and imperial ideology in the nineteenth century. Her book, Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Transformation of British Imperial Ideology, is forthcoming from Princeton University Press. She can be reached at karuna.mantena@yale.edu
TL;DR: Democracy's animus against difference expresses a discovery about power as mentioned in this paper, and the means by which those who are less wealthy, less skillful, less experienced in ruling can redress their grievances is by bracketing actual differences.
Abstract: Democracy's animus against difference expresses a discovery about power. The [principal] means by which those who are less wealthy, less skillful, less experienced in ruling can redress their grievances is by bracketing actual differences, even though the dullest is aware that in no literal sense are human beings created equal or made equal by law or command. Like the men of Shinar, democracy knows that the weak can gain power only by discovering a commonality that is artificial, iso-nomia rather than physis. -Sheldon S. Wolin
TL;DR: The authors argue that Nietzsche is working both with and against Kant in terms of his new morality, arguing that Nietzsche's harsh rhetoric against Kant serves as a mask that, on closer examination, conceals similarities.
Abstract: According to liberals and postmodernists, Nietzsche and Kant occupy opposing places on the theoretical spectrum. I challenge this assumption and argue that Nietzsche is working both with and against Kant in terms of his new morality. Nietzsche's harsh rhetoric against Kant serves as a mask that, on closer examination, conceals similarities. Through an analysis of some of his texts, I demonstrate that Nietzsche works within a Kantian conception of moral autonomy in terms of two of his most provocative formulations: pathos of distance and law of life. Nietzsche's critique of ressentiment, moreover, illustrates his commitment to Kantian assumptions about moral conduct. Bringing Kant and Nietzsche together yields a new image of autonomy that overcomes the sovereign subjectivity central to the Kantian conception.
TL;DR: Markell as mentioned in this paper argues that the politics of recognition misrecognizes social injustice as, at root, an identity injustice that is set into motion by the refusal of some group to recognize some other group for what it really is, with its most deforming effects reserved for the psyches of those at the receiving end of that refusal.
Abstract: Patchen Markell has written a fine book—rigorous, meticulous, perceptive— with an especially elegant interplay between political theory and historical illustration in his chapter on nineteenth-century Jewish emancipation. Markell challenges the politics of recognition, not for its cry for social justice, with which he is entirely sympathetic, but rather for its starting assumptions and internal logic, which together ensnare its protagonists in a set of self-undermining errors. First, the politics of recognition misrecognizes social injustice as, at root, an identity injustice that is set into motion by the refusal of some group to recognize some other group for what it feels it really is, with its most deforming effects reserved for the psyches of those at the receiving end of that refusal. Second, the politics of recognition mistakenly presumes that identity precedes and determines action, which leads it to think that since who one is is a function of what one is, all unpredictable and unpleasant encounters between the whos can be prevented if all the whats can be persuaded to recognize and respect one another equally. Third, in its attempt to control the outcome of human interaction by enforcing the reciprocal recognition of all identities, as if those identities were fixed in advance of that interaction, the politics of recognition unwittingly recapitulates the logic of the politics of sovereignty it initially arose to challenge, both in the theory of liberal individualism and in the practice of various overweening groups. Following both Hegel and Arendt, Markell condemns the politics of sovereignty as the pursuit of self-determination, an unrealizable goal that can only be sought via the tyrannical attempt to determine everything outside the self. Dominant groups enjoy the semblance of mastery and independence by forcing
TL;DR: Many scholars now take it as a truism that identity politics has replaced the politics of class and wealth as mentioned in this paper, and the old questions of politics as who gets what, so central to political philosophy from Marx to the early Rawls, have been at least somewhat displaced.
Abstract: Many scholars now take it as a truism that identity politics has replaced the politics of class and wealth. Even political philosophy cannot miss such massive changes, and the field has had a number of new issues placed on its agenda. The old questions of politics as who gets what, so central to political philosophy from Marx to the early Rawls, have been at least somewhat displaced. A number of factors contributed to this change. New social movements, such as feminism and various raceand ethnicity-based groups, have become increasingly important over the past few decades, and not just in the West. These groups have often questioned whether the "universal" ideals, which underpin the politics of redistribution, are truly universal. The dissolution of the Iron Curtain and the Cold War unleashed a wave of nationalist conflicts. Migration has added to the already multicultural nature of societies, especially in Western Europe and North America. Hence, political life is increasingly driven by competing claims about how various groups can live together, or if they even should, since some argue for secession and desire to form their own state. While the rise of identity or recognition politics has been less violent in the West than in, say, Eastern Europe, it has still proven contentious.
TL;DR: The tension between judicial review and democratic principles remains the most significant problem in modern constitutional theory as mentioned in this paper, and this tension may be resolved in the context of political stalemate, which arises when both parties in a two-party system find it electorally advantageous to ignore a given political issue, even when majorities favor reform on that issue.
Abstract: The tension between judicial review and democratic principles remains the most significant problem in modern constitutional theory. Yet this tension may be resolved in the context of “political stalemate.” Political stalemate arises when both parties in a two-party system find it electorally advantageous to ignore a given political issue, even when majorities favor reform on that issue. This can occur when (a) majorities favor reform as only a secondary preference, and (b) a swing-voting minority exists which has intense preferences against reform. When political stalemate materializes, judicial activism toward reform serves democratic ends primarily by breaking the stalemate and encouraging open contestation on the issue. These are functions that electoral mechanisms simply cannot perform, and they point toward a democratic defense of the Supreme Court's decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut and Lawrence v. Texas.