Showing papers in "Psychological Review in 1969"

Interaction of information in word recognition.

Abstract: Quantitative predictions are made from a model for word recognition. The model has as its central feature a set of \"logogens\": devices which accept information relevant to a particular word response irrespective of the source of this information. When more than a threshold amount of information has accumulated in any logogen, that particular response becomes available for responding. The model is tested against data available on the effect of word frequency on recognition, the effect of limiting the number of response alternatives, the interaction of stimulus and context, and the interaction of successive presentations of stimuli. The implications of the underlying model are largely upheld. Other possible models for word recognition are discussed as are the implications of the Logogen Model for theories of memory.

Mental imagery in associative learning and memory

Abstract: items. Paivio and Yuille (1967) compared the two mediation set conditions with a control condition in which 5s were instructed to use rote repetition and found that the imaginal and verbal sets produced much better learning than did the repetition set, but the predicted interaction with concreteness did not occur. That is, the imagery set was no less effective than the verbal even with abstract pairs. Yuille and Paivio (1968) attempted to induce stronger mediation sets by having 5s first practice associating pairs of nouns using images or verbal links, after which they learned another PA list using the technique they had practiced. Both imaginal and verbal sets again facilitated learning relative to a repetition control condition (more so when at least one member of the pair was concrete), but the differential effects predicted for imaginal and verbal sets again failed to appear. Moreover, the effects of the set variable had disappeared by Trial 3 whereas the effects of noun concreteness persisted throughout learning. A possible explanation suggested by mediation report data (Paivio & Yuille, 1967) was that associative strategies are only partly controlled by the experimental sets and that, over trials, 5s increasingly revert to associative habits aroused by the semantic characteristics of the to-be-learned items. They may abandon the use of rote repetition generally, resorting to imagery in the case of concrete pairs and verbal mediators in the case of abstract pairs, and so on. Paivio and Yuille (1969) tested the hypothesis using a trial-by-trial probe of associative strategies as a function of instructional set and noun concreteness. Different groups were given one of four instructional sets (Imagery, Verbal, Repetition, and No Set) and subgroups within each were questioned after 1, 2, or 3 trials concerning the type of strategy they had used to learn each pair. The results confirmed and extended the previous findings in that the verbal and imaginal mediation sets facilitated learning in comparison with the No Set as well as the Repetition condition, and the effects of set had essentially disappeared by Trial 3 whereas concreteness remained highly effective throughout. Some of the expected changes in the pattern of reported mediators over trials also occurred. The 5s given the imagery and verbal mediation sets most often reported having used the corresponding type of mediator to learn the pairs, and this was true for all trials. In the case of the RepetiIMAGERY IN LEARNING AND MEMORY 251 tion set, on the other hand, rote repetition was frequently reported after one learning trial and decreased thereafter despite the fact that the twoand three-trial groups had been reminded before each trial to use repetition. The pattern of reports suggested that verbal mediators to some extent replaced repetition on the second trial whereas imagery was clearly favored at Trial 3. The effects were also qualified by the item attribute. Repetition and verbal mediation reports were relatively little affected by concreteness, although verbal mediators tended to show a greater increase over trials for pairs in which both members are abstract than for other pair types. By contrast, imagery reports were strongly affected by concreteness in a manner closely resembling its effect on learning. The parallel effects on reported imagery and recall scores as a function of concreteness and trials are shown in Figure 3. In addition to the identical ranking of the four types of pairs on both response measures, it can be seen that concreteabstract pairs show the most striking inCease over trials on each dependent variable. The findings consistently point to imagery ,TM a preferred and an effective mediation j strategy in the case of pairs in which at least ;' the stimulus is concrete and high /, whereas [ verbal mediation is less affected by concrete\\ ness. In these respects the data accord with the two-process theory of associative meaning and mediation, but the results provide only weak support for the suggestion that imagery set ,Ss resort to verbal mediators in the case of abstract pairs. Such changes could actually have occurred but were not detected by the mediation questionnaire. Alternatively, it may be that some 5\"s can make effective use of imagery even in the case of abstract pairs. Support for such an interpretation was obtained by MacDonald (1967) in a study of the retention of imaginal and verbal mediators and recall of PAs. The 5s instructed to use images frequently reported the use of a concrete image to symbolize one or both members of abstract pairs (e.g., \"boy scout\" for the pair, chance-deed) and the mnemonic effectiveness of such mediators was evidenced by high recall of the pair only when the mediator was correctly recalled 003 ec i •5

Linguistic processes in deductive reasoning.

Abstract: The present paper develops a theory to specify in part how a person stores and searches through information retained from sentences. The theory states that (a) functional relations, like the abstract subject-predicate relation which underlies sentences, are more available from memory than other, less basic kinds of information; (6) certain "positive" adjectives, like long, are stored in memory in a less complex and more accessible form than their opposites, like short; and (c) listeners can only retrieve, from memory, information which is congruent at a deep level to the information they are searching for. The present theory, unlike previous ones, correctly predicts the principal differences in the solution times of 8 types of two-term series problems and 32 types of three-term series problems (e.g., // John isn't as bad as Pete, and Dick isn't as good as Pete, then who is worst?). It also accounts for previous observations on children solving these problems and explains other phenomena in deductive reasoning. Deductive reasoning has often been studied in particular types of reasoning problems. The strategies suggested for their solution have therefore often been of limited generality : they apply in one kind of problem and that kind alone. The present paper proposes, instead, that reasoning is accomplished mainly through certain very general linguistic processes, the same mental operations

Method and theory in the study of avoidance.

Abstract: Two-factor theories of avoidance were conceived to explain responding in avoidance procedures that closely resemble the Pavlovian paradigm in superficial features, although differing in the fundamental contingency of reinforcement. Both typically involve an arbitrary conditioned stimulus and a trial-by-trial sequence of pairings between the conditioned and unconditioned stimuli. According to two-factor theory, the instrumental reinforcement of avoidance is based on the Pavlovian reinforcement of a drive state in the presence of the conditioned stimulus. It has been shown, however, that the presence of the conditioned stimulus is not necessary for the occurrence of avoidance responding. A procedure in which the sole effect of the avoidance response was a reduction in the average frequency of occurrence of an aversive electric shock proved to be fully adequate to maintain lever pressing in rats, thereby suggesting that not all avoidance requires two factors. Further experiments with various new procedures suggested that the conditioned stimulus may function as a discriminative stimulus for the avoidance response, rather than as a stimulus whose removal is inherently reinforcing, as two-factor theory requires. The conditioned reflex was to I. P. Pavlov (1928, pp. 59-60) the final answer to the problem of biological adaptation. As a mechanist, Pavlov sought a naturalistic explanation for everything an animal did, which had come to mean an explanation in terms of physical processes that could be isolated by the vivisectionist techniques of nineteenth-century physiology. But the behavior of many animals, for example, the dog, precluded any such simple machinery. Dogs clearly differed in what they did and seemed to know even though they might share virtually identical inheritances. The psyche of 1 Preparation of this paper, as well as the conduct of the previously unpublished experiments described herein, was supported by grants from the National Science Foundation to Harvard University. The author wishes to express thanks to P. N. Hineline for his generosity in allowing use of some of his as yet unpublished data and for help in formulating some of the notions here advanced. An early and much reduced version of this paper was presented at the 1966 meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Washington, D. C., as part of a symposium on Aversive Control. The author owes thanks to J. V. Brady for having organized the symposium and for inviting him to participate in it. To another of the participants, D. Anger, special thanks are owed for his vigorous and insightful criticisms of many of the author's theoretical ideas. the dog was, in other words, a sizable obstacle to the progress of a science of adapta

A modified concept of consciousness

Abstract: The long-standing assumption in the neurosciences that the subjective phenomena of conscious experiences do not exert any causal influence on the sequence of events in the physical brain process is directly challenged in this current view of the nature of mind and the mind-brain relationship. A theory of mind is suggested in which consciousness, interpreted to be a direct emergent property of cerebral activity, is conceived to be an integral component of the brain process that functions as an essential constituent of the action and exerts a directive holistic form of control over the flow pattern of cerebral excitation.

Information-processing analysis of perceptual processes in problem solving.

Abstract: A theory is proposed to explain, in information-processing terms, some common phenomena in the initial perceptual phases of problem solving, to show that some existing computer programs for heuristic search and learning already contain basic processes that will produce these phenomena, and to show how simple organizations of the processes enable the programs to parallel human behavior. The theory is particularized in a computer program to simulate the eye movements, during the first 5 seconds, of subjects choosing a move in chess. The application of the theory is illustrated by an example, and its consistency is shown with data on memory of chess positions and with existing knowledge of short-term memory parameters.