Showing papers in "Psychological Review in 1973"

On the psychology of prediction

Abstract: In this paper, we explore the rules that determine intuitive predictions and judgments of confidence and contrast these rules to the normative principles of statistical prediction. Two classes of prediction are discussed: category prediction and numerical prediction. In a categorical case, the prediction is given in nominal form, for example, the winner in an election, the diagnosis of a patient, or a person's future occupation. In a numerical case, the prediction is given in numerical form, for example, the future value of a particular stock or of a student's grade point average. In making predictions and judgments under uncertainty, people do not appear to follow the calculus of chance or the statistical theory of prediction. Instead, they rely on a limited number of heuristics which sometimes yield reasonable judgments and sometimes lead to severe and systematic errors (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972b, 3; Tversky & Kahneman, 1971, 2; 1973, 11). The present paper is concerned with the role of one of these heuristics – representativeness – in intuitive predictions. Given specific evidence (e.g., a personality sketch), the outcomes under consideration (e.g., occupations or levels of achievement) can be ordered by the degree to which they are representative of that evidence. The thesis of this paper is that people predict by representativeness, that is, they select or order outcomes by the degree to which the outcomes represent the essential features of the evidence.

Encoding specificity and retrieval processes in episodic memory.

Abstract: Recent changes in prctheorclical orientation toward problems of human memory have brought with them a concern with retrieval processes, and a number of early versions of theories of retrieval have been constructed. This paper describes and evaluates explanations offered by these theories to account for the effect of extralist cuing, facilitation of recall of list items by nonlist items. Experiments designed to test the currently most popular theory of retrieval, the generation-recognition theory, yielded results incompatible not only with generation-recognition models, but most other theories as well: under certain conditions subjects consistently failed to recognize many recallable list words. Several tentative explanations of this phenomenon of recognition failure were subsumed under the encoding specificity principle according to which the memory trace of an event and hence the properties of effective retrieval cue are determined by the specific encoding operations performed by the system on the input stimuli.

Toward a cognitive social learning reconceptualization of personality

Abstract: Diverse data challenge and undermine ihe central assumptions of the tradi tional trait approach to personality. The implications for conceptions of individual differences and situations in the study of personality are examined. The issues discussed include the nature of behavioral \"specificity,\" the acquired meaning of stimuli, the uses and misuses of traits, and the construction of personality. To move toward a more adequate theoretical approach to persons, the following cognitive social learning variables are proposed as basic units for the study of individuals: cognitive and behavioral construction competencies, encoding strategies and personal constructs, behavior-outcome and stimulus-outcome expectancies, subjective stimulus values, and selfregulatory systems and plans. The specific interactions between these person variables and psychological situations are analyzed within the framework of a cognitive social learning approach.

Situationism in psychology: an analysis and a critique '

Abstract: This article critically analyzes the current tendency to account for human behavior largely in terms of the situation in which it occurs. This trend in effect substitutes a more or less behavioristic account of personality for a severely taxed trait conception. Although it is undoubtedly true that behavior is more situation specific than trait theory acknowledged, it is herein argued that situations are more person specific than is commonly recognized. The present article details metaphysical, psychological, and methodological assumptions and biases of situationism which have rendered it inattentive to the importance of the person in personality research. Finally, an interactionisl: account of personality is forwarded as an alternative to both a trait and a situationist position. Some recent and influential accounts of personality have emphasized the importance of the situational determinants of behavior while minimizing the importance of disposi1 Work on this article was begun when I was on sabbatical at Stanford University. Grateful appreciation is extended to Ernest R. Hilgard for his generous moral and financial support throughout the year, the latter under his Grant NIH MH 03859-10 from the National Institute of Mental Health. I would like to extend my thanks to Robert

Group decision and social interaction: A theory of social decision schemes.

Abstract: This paper proposes a general theory (social decision scheme theory) for many kinds of group decision making and illustrates some special case models with a variety of data from several experimental situations. While focusing upon the traditional issue of individual-gr oup differences, the theory is aimed at accounting for the distribution of group decisions by using formal hypotheses about the effects of social interaction when the inputs to discussion are individual member preferences. The basic assumptions underlying the model are similar in several respects to proposals by Restle and Davis (1962) and Steiner (1966) in group problem-solving research, and the model itself represents the general case of earlier theoretical notions by Smoke and Zajonc (1962), Davis, Hoppe and Hornseth (1968), and Zajonc, Wolosin and Wolosin (1972) in group decision making. In addition, several nonintuitive consequences of group decision making, assuming some form of the model, are discussed. Small groups are widely used as decision- may have minimal acquaintance with each making instruments, or as information- other prior to group activity. processing devices to provide more sophis- In practice, of course, decision-making ticated input to an individual decision groups may have many purposes other than maker. Some groups are institutionalized rendering an optimal decision — collecting (juries, corporate boards, departmental information, obtaining commitment of executive committees, congressional com- members in order to better implement the mittees, etc.) in that formal provision is decision, representing decision preferences made for their existence and perhaps con- of segments of a population not present, and tinuation. Other groups are ad hoc (study so on. One important theme that runs panels, academic conferences, etc.) in that through the use of groups for decisions is their existence is temporary and members that such a process recognizes diversity among the persons involved with regard

Response latency models for signal detection.

Abstract: Describes 2 contrasting models for response latency in the yes-no signal detection situation and outlines their main characteristics. The 1st model is a generalization of the notion that latency in detection is some inverse function of distance from the criterion; the 2nd proposes that instead of a single observation on any 1 trial the S makes multiple observations and a count of these observations determines the response and its latency. Although the predictions of the models are similar in many respects, there are some points concerning the ordering of mean latencies, reaction time receiver operating characteristic curves, latency-probability relations, and the constancy of d' which differentiate them. Particularly important, the multiple observations model predicts that response bias and sensitivity are interdependent. The possibility of multiple observations in detection is briefly considered. (2 p. ref.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2006 APA, all rights reserved).

A Theory for the Induction of Mathematical Functions

Abstract: A detailed theory is presented for how humans induce mathematical functions to explain observed data. The theory is based on both solution times and verbal protocols. The theory proposes that induction is a heuristically directed generate-and-test process. The order in which hypotheses are generated is mostly independent of the data. Each hypothesis is maintained until it is negated, but a false hypothesis that matches part of the data is frequently retested. A computer simulation program, incorporating these processes, accurately predicted solution times for subjects on different sets of problems without any changes in parameters. In addition, the program's solution protocols were indistinguishable from human protocols. An individual engaged in solving a difficult problem is faced with two tasks: the surface task is simply to solve the problem, but the deeper coincident task is to derive general heuristics, algorithms, and methods of representatio n that can be applied to new problems. Obviously, this process of extracting information out of specific examples to form general rules is induction. On the surface, induction in this situation seems quite different from most concept-learning situations constructed in the laboratory. The problem solver knows only that algorithms, heuristics, and representations exist which should be employed when indicated by certain ill-defined quantitative features from a large set of features related to the problem. His goal is to learn which features are relevant, and what the functions are that map the features into the methods. Most strategies that a problem solver derives may be stated in many different equivalent forms. One such form would be a mathematical function that maps observed values of relevant stimulus variables into observed utilities of solution methods. Representing strategies as mathematical functions, however, is particularly useful if one