Showing papers in "Psychological Review in 1980"

A theory of reading: From eye fixations to comprehension.

Abstract: This article presents a model of reading comprehension that accounts for the allocation of eye fixations of college students reading scientific passages. The model deals with processing at the level of words, clauses, and text units. Readers make longer pauses at points where processing loads are greater. Greater loads occur while readers are accessing infrequent words, integrating information from important clauses, and making inferences at the ends of sentences. The model accounts forthe gaze duration on each word of text as a function of the involvement of the various levels of processing. The model is embedded in a theoretical framework capable of accommodating the flexibility of reading.

A model for Pavlovian learning: Variations in the effectiveness of conditioned but not of unconditioned stimuli.

Abstract: Several formal models of excitatory classical conditioning are reviewed. It is suggested that a central problem for all of them is the explanation of cases in which learning does not occur in spite of the fact that the conditioned stimulus is a signal for the reinforcer. We propose a new model that deals with this problem by specifying that certain procedures cause a conditioned stimulus (CS) to lose effectiveness; in particular, we argue that a CS will lose associability when its consequences are accurately predicted. In contrast to other current models, the effectiveness of the reinforcer remains constant throughout conditioning. The second part of the article presents a reformulation of the nature of the learning produced by inhibitory-conditioning procedures and a discussion of the way in which such learning can be accommodated within the model outlined for excitatory learning.

Recognizing: The judgment of previous occurrence.

Abstract: Several suggestions for a class of theories of recognition memory have been proposed during the past decade. These models address predictions about judgments of prior occurrence of an event, not the identification of what it is, The history and current status of one of these models is discussed. The model postulates the detection of familiarity and the utilization of retrieval mechanisms as additive and separate processes. The phenomenal experience of familiarity is assigned to intraevent organizational integrative processes; retrieval depends on interevent elaborative processes. Other current theoretical options are described, and relevant supportive data from the literature are reviewed. New tests of the model involving both free recall and word pair paradigms are presented. The dual process model is extended to the word frequency effect and to the recognition difficulties of amnesic patients. In general English usage the verb to recognize usually is denned as the act of perceiving something as previously known. It is an apparently clear as well as etymologically correct usage, that is, to know again. In this article the process of recognizing will be analyzed, but it will be restricted to the recognition of the prior occurrence of an event. This restriction follows psychological rather than common usage. Experimentation that addresses problems of recognition has typically required subjects to make judg. nents about prior encounters with some tar

Disinhibitory psychopathology: A new perspective and a model for research.

Abstract: The syndrome produced by lesion of the septum in animals can serve as a functional research model of human disinhibitory psychopathology. Disinhibitory psychopathology appears to span several traditionally separate psychological categories—psychopathy, hysteria, hyperactivity, antisocial and impulsive personality, and alcoholism. It is proposed that these categories are separate manifestations of the same genetic diathesis and that the "septal syndrome" may constitute a valid model of behavioral aspects of this diathesis. A program of experimentati on utilizing this animal model is outlined. The quest for a physiological explanation of syndromes of disinhibition or dyscontrol, especially psychopathy, is a current preoccupation among theoreticians of impulsive behavior (see Mawson & Mawson, 1977; Syndulko, 1978). One line of speculation in particular has focused on the limbic system as a possible site of central nervous system (CNS) dysfunction responsible for behavioral disinhibition (Gray, 1972; Hare, 1970). Evidence bearing on this hypothesis, however, is rather indirect, consisting mainly of psychophysiological anomalies open to a variety of interpretations. Among findings enumerated as possibly implicating limbic dysfunction are the electroencephalogram abnormalities discovered in psychopaths and impulsive children (Arthurs & Cahoon, 1964; Ehrlich & Keough, 1956; Knott, Platt, Ashby, & Gottlieb, 1953), including temporal lobe slow-wave activity (Bay-Rakal, 1965; Hill, 1952). Also cited are the abnormal positive spikes localized in the temporal lobe that have been observed in human syndromes of extreme violence, aggres

Lay epistemo-logic—process and contents: Another look at attribution theory.

Abstract: A theory of the lay epistemic process is outlined. According to this theory knowledge-seeking behavior is initiated by a purpose that a person has for reaching a given inference and consists of the stages of problem formulation and of problem resolution, the latter stage being governed by the principle of logical consistency. Major attributional formulations are interpreted within the lay epistemic framework. It is concluded that such formulations have typically addressed particular instances of epistemic (inferential) behavior rather than the underlying epistemic process. In this sense, the attributional formulations may be considered special cases of the present model applied to specific contents of knowledge. The present lay epistemic paradigm thus provides an integrative framework that allows us to consider diverse attributional models in common theoretical terms and to derive the necessary applicability conditions of different such models.

Models of stimulus uncertainty in motion perception.

Abstract: A model is proposed to account for the loss in visibility of moving targets that occurs when an observer is uncertain about the target's direction of motion. The model's key features are an array of directionally selective visual mechanisms and a rule governing the mechanisms from which an observer will derive sensory data. In response to uncertainty about two possible directions of motion, the observer is assumed to use a mechanism whose peak sensitivity is to a direction midway between the two possible directions. Seven experiments, using both reaction time and forced-choice data, demonstrate the predictive advantages of this midway model over competing single-band and multiple-band models. Additionally, the experiments reveal several new properties of human motion perception: (a) Direction and velocity information have orthogonal representations in the visual system; (b) although motion sensitivity does not vary with direction, the precision with which small changes in direction can be recognized does, reflecting differential breadth of tuning for directionally selective mechanisms sensitive to various directions; and (c) motion-analyzing mechanisms are broadly tuned for direction as well as speed. Human psychophysics provides extensive evidence for the existence of visual mechanisms tuned to different directions of motion. Converging on this point are data from a variety of paradigms including selective adaptation (Sekuler & Ganz, 1963), subthreshold summation (Levinson & Sekuler, 1975), and aftereffects (Keck, Palella, & Pantle, 1976). In addition, we recently used a masking procedure to define the direction sensitivity profiles of these mechanisms (Ball & Sekuler, 1979). In general, these studies tell us how much information is potentially available in motion-sensit ive visual elements under ideal conditions. But they tell us little about the use to which that information can be put under nonideal conditions outside the laboratory.

Making Decisions under the Influence of Memory.

Abstract: John FoxUniversity of Sheffield, Sheffield, EnglandTheories of decision making are reviewed, particularly those that shed light onclinical decision making. Two approaches are examined in detail, traditionalprescriptive theories (derived from probability theory) and theories based onnonprobabilistic inference processes with a supportive memory mechanism. Anexperiment using a laboratory analogue of clinical diagnosis supplied data aboutseveral aspects of the decision process including information seeking and theterminal decision. A second task interleaved with the diagnostic task was de-signed to provide some insight into the subjects' organization of the diagnostictask material in memory using the proposition confirmation/disconnrmationmethod. Systematic effects of task structure on the availability of knowledgeabout the task were obtained. In two computer simulations the traditionalprescriptive approach to decision making gave a moderately good account ofthe behavior observed in the diagnostic task, but the cognitive theory based onnonprobabilistic inference rules interacting with simple recall processes gaveequal or better quantitative predictions. It is concluded that the nonprobabil-istic approach holds considerable promise for the description of complex deci-sion processes.From an information-processing standpoint,human decision making depends on the inter-action of two main cognitive components: thevarious logical and inferential processes thatcontribute to the final decision and, at leastconceptually distinct, the processes that makethe knowledge or data available that are re-quired for the decision task at hand. Untilrecently, however, decision theorists havebeen more preoccupied with the mathematicaldescription of human decision behavior thanwith a general cognitive account of its processes(see, e.g., Slovic, Fischoff, & Lichtenstein,1977). The tide has recently begun to turn withwork like that on heuristics by Tversky andKahneman (1974), but we have not yet reachedthe point where decision processes can beMany thanks to Richard M. Young for his criticalreading of an early draft of this article, and particularthanks to Vicki Bruce, whose careful and insightfulcomments contributed so much to the final manuscript.Requests for reprints should be sent to John Fox,Medical Research Council, Social and Applied Psy-chology Unit, University of Sheffield, Sheffield S10 2TN,England.described in any detail, certainly not decisionsof natural or everyday complexity.This study looks at a more naturalistic de-cision task than is usual and examines somealternative theoretical frameworks for charac-terizing the decision process. The contrast thatemerges is that between the decision theoristswho have tried to develop algebraic and sta-tistical models that are largely fre of performa-tive elements and the thrust elsewhere incognitive psychology, which has been towardmore complete accounts. The decision theoristshave, notably, failed to suggest what sorts ofinference or problem-solving processes de-cision makers typically engage in or howknowledge influences and interacts with thoseprocesses.For illustration we focus on a task modeledon clinical decision making, a field in which theimportance of knowledge is particularly promi-nent. Several possible theoretical accounts ofclinical decision behavior are briefly reviewed,and a decision study is described, which isdesigned to shed light on some of these pro-posals. Finally, two computer simulations of

Incidental Learning and the Development of Selective Attention.

Abstract: The incidental learning paradigm has provided two well-established findings concerning the development of selective attention: (a) The difference between central and incidental task performance increases with age, and (b) the correlation between central and incidental performance decreases with age. It has generally been assumed that these results reflect a developmental increase in the ability to process information selectively. In the present article it is argued that neither of these findings constitutes unambiguous support for the view that attentional selectivity improves with age. It is suggested that recent theory and research on capacity trade-offs in dual-task performance provide a potentially valuable alternative framework for understanding the development of attentional processes.