Showing papers in "Psychological Review in 2002"
TL;DR: Evidence from varied research paradigms substantiates that consequences of perceived incongruity between the female gender role and leadership roles are more difficult for women to become leaders and to achieve success in leadership roles.
Abstract: A role congruity theory of prejudice toward female leaders proposes that perceived incongruity between the female gender role and leadership roles leads to 2 forms of prejudice: (a) perceiving women less favorably than men as potential occupants of leadership roles and (b) evaluating behavior that fulfills the prescriptions of a leader role less favorably when it is enacted by a woman. One consequence is that attitudes are less positive toward female than male leaders and potential leaders. Other consequences are that it is more difficult for women to become leaders and to achieve success in leadership roles. Evidence from varied research paradigms substantiates that these consequences occur, especially in situations that heighten perceptions of incongruity between the female gender role and leadership roles.
4,947 citations
TL;DR: This paper presented a unified account of two neural systems concerned with the development and expression of adaptive behaviors: a mesencephalic dopamine system for reinforcement learning and a generic error-processing system associated with the anterior cingulate cortex.
Abstract: The authors present a unified account of 2 neural systems concerned with the development and expression of adaptive behaviors: a mesencephalic dopamine system for reinforcement learning and a “generic” error-processing system associated with the anterior cingulate cortex The existence of the error-processing system has been inferred from the error-related negativity (ERN), a component of the event-related brain potential elicited when human participants commit errors in reaction-time tasks The authors propose that the ERN is generated when a negative reinforcement learning signal is conveyed to the anterior cingulate cortex via the mesencephalic dopamine system and that this signal is used by the anterior cingulate cortex to modify performance on the task at hand They provide support for this proposal using both computational modeling and psychophysiological experimentation
3,438 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the balanced identity design is introduced as a method to test correlational predictions of the balance theory, and data obtained with this method revealed that predicted consistency patterns were strongly apparent in the implicit (IAT) measures but not in those for parallel explicit (self-report) measures.
Abstract: This theoretical integration of social psychology's main cognitive and affective constructs was shaped by 3 influences: (a) recent widespread interest in automatic and implicit cognition, (b) development of the Implicit Association Test (IAT; A. G. Greenwald, D. E. McGhee, & J. L. K. Schwartz. 1998), and (c) social psychology's consistency theories of the 1950s, especially F. Heider's (1958) balance theory. The balanced identity design is introduced as a method to test correlational predictions of the theory. Data obtained with this method revealed that predicted consistency patterns were strongly apparent in the data for implicit (IAT) measures but not in those for parallel explicit (self-report) measures. Two additional not-yet-tested predictions of the theory are described.
1,348 citations
TL;DR: The recognition heuristic, arguably the most frugal of all heuristics, makes inferences from patterns of missing knowledge that leads to the counterintuitive less-is-more effect in which less knowledge is better than more for making accurate inferences.
Abstract: One view of heuristics is that they are imperfect versions of optimal statistical procedures considered too complicated for ordinary minds to carry out. In contrast, the authors consider heuristics to be adaptive strategies that evolved in tandem with fundamental psychological mechanisms. The recognition heuristic, arguably the most frugal of all heuristics, makes inferences from patterns of missing knowledge. This heuristic exploits a fundamental adaptation of many organisms: the vast, sensitive, and reliable capacity for recognition. The authors specify the conditions under which the recognition heuristic is successful and when it leads to the counterintuitive less-is-more effect in which less knowledge is better than more for making accurate inferences.
1,227 citations
TL;DR: An interpersonal social-cognitive theory of the self and personality, the relational self, is proposed, in which knowledge about the self is linked with knowledge about significant others, and each linkage embodies a self-other relationship.
Abstract: The authors propose an interpersonal social– cognitive theory of the self and personality, the relational self, in which knowledge about the self is linked with knowledge about significant others, and each linkage embodies a self– other relationship. Mental representations of significant others are activated and used in interpersonal encounters in the social– cognitive phenomenon of transference (S. M. Andersen & N. S. Glassman, 1996), and this evokes the relational self. Variability in relational selves depends on interpersonal contextual cues, whereas stability derives from the chronic accessibility of significant-other representations. Relational selves function in if–then terms (W. Mischel & Y. Shoda, 1995), in which ifs are situations triggering transference, and thens are relational selves. An individual’s repertoire of relational selves is a source of interpersonal patterns involving affect, motivation, self-evaluation, and self-regulation. The nature of the self has long perplexed and intrigued scholars across a broad spectrum of academic disciplines. In psychology alone, well over a century of inquiry has translated into a virtual explosion of theory and research in recent decades, especially in social psychology, all aiming to chart the contours of the self. Sharing this aim, we propose an interpersonal social– cognitive theory of the self that draws on theory and research in social cognition, personality psychology, and clinical psychology. Our central argument is that the self is relational— or even entangled— with significant others and that this has implications for selfdefinition, self-evaluation, self-regulation, and, most broadly, for personality functioning, expressed in relation to others. The theory clearly subscribes to the long-standing view that the self is fundamentally interpersonal (e.g., James, 1890). Indeed, we maintain that an individual’s overall repertoire of relational selves, stemming from all his or her relationships, is a major source of the interpersonal patterns that the individual enacts and experiences in the course of everyday interpersonal life—whether at work, at play, or in therapy. The proposed theory focuses on the ways in which the self is related to specific other individuals—namely, the significant oth
766 citations
TL;DR: In a celebrated trial, Harr as discussed by the authors elicited the following information from an expert witness about the source of a chemical pollutant trichloroethylene (TCE): If the TCE in the wells had been drawn from out of the river, then there would be TCE on the riverbed. But there was no TCE at all.
Abstract: You reason about conditional relations because much of your knowledge is conditional. If you get caught speeding, then you pay a fine. If you have an operation, then you need time to recuperate. If you have money in the bank, then you can cash a check. Conditional reasoning is a central part of thinking, yet people do not always reason correctly. The lawyer Jan Schlictmann in a celebrated trial (see Harr, 1995, pp. 361–362) elicited the following information from an expert witness about the source of a chemical pollutant trichloroethylene (TCE): If the TCE in the wells had been drawn from out of the river, then there’d be TCE in the riverbed. But there isn’t any TCE in the riverbed.
670 citations
TL;DR: The authors argued that individual differences in language comprehension do not stem from variations in a separate working memory capacity; instead they emerge from an interaction of biological factors and language experience, and provided an alternative account motivated by a connectionist approach to language comprehension.
Abstract: M. A. Just and P. A. Carpenter’s (1992) capacity theory of comprehension posits a linguistic working memory functionally separated from the representation of linguistic knowledge. G. S. Waters and D. Caplan’s (1996) critique of this approach retained the notion of a separate working memory. In this article, the authors present an alternative account motivated by a connectionist approach to language comprehension. In their view, processing capacity emerges from network architecture and experience and is not a primitive that can vary independently. Individual differences in comprehension do not stem from variations in a separate working memory capacity; instead they emerge from an interaction of biological factors and language experience. This alternative is argued to provide a superior account of comprehension results previously attributed to a separate working memory capacity. The concept of a working memory resource or capacity for temporary storage and manipulation of information has played an important role in many theories of cognition, particularly theories of language processing (e.g., Baddeley, 1986; Engle, Cantor, & Carullo, 1992; Just & Carpenter, 1992). The particular approach advocated by Just and Carpenter (1992) is one in which linguistic working memory capacity directly constrains the operation of language comprehension processes, and that variation in the capacity of linguistic working memory within the normal population is a primary source of individual differences in language comprehension. Just and Carpenter further suggest that reductions in working memory capacity in aging can explain reduced language comprehension and production abilities among normal elderly adults and that aphasic patients’ language comprehension deficits following brain injury may be explained by a deficit in working memory capacity rather than by a loss of linguistic knowledge (Miyake, Carpenter, & Just, 1994). Just and Carpenter’s work has been extremely successful in emphasizing the importance of individual differences in language research, but their approach is not without controversy. Criticisms of their claims have taken several forms. Waters and Caplan (1996) suggested that there are at least two different working memory capacities that subserve language use, and they have sharply criticized the data that Just and Carpenter interpreted in support of a single working memory capacity (see also Caplan & Waters, 1999b; cf. Just, Carpenter, & Keller, 1996). Similarly, several aphasia researchers have suggested that a reduction of working memory capacity is not an adequate description of these
668 citations
TL;DR: The authors classify the nature and content of emotion experience and propose that it depends on 3 aspects of attention: mode (analytic-synthetic; detached-immersed), direction (self-world), and focus (evaluation-action).
Abstract: Data reviewed suggest that previous theories of emotion experience are too narrow in scope and that lack of consensus is due to the fact that emotion experience takes various forms and is heterogenous. The authors treat separately the content of emotion experience, the underlying nonconscious correspondences, and processes producing emotion experience. They classify the nature and content of emotion experience and propose that it depends on 3 aspects of attention: mode (analytic-synthetic; detached-immersed), direction (self-world), and focus (evaluation-action). The account is informed by a 2-level view of consciousness in which phenomenology (1st order) is distinguished from awareness (2nd order). These distinctions enable the authors to differentiate and account for cases of "unconscious" emotion, in which there is an apparent lack of phenomenology or awareness.
581 citations
TL;DR: A theoretical framework for understanding movement preparation is proposed, which accounts for a sizable body of empirical findings on movement initiation and suggests new ways of exploring the structure of motor representations.
Abstract: A theoretical framework for understanding movement preparation is proposed. Movement parameters are represented by activation fields, distributions of activation defined over metric spaces. The fields evolve under the influence of various sources of localized input, representing information about upcoming movements. Localized patterns of activation self-stabilize through cooperative and competitive interactions within the fields. The task environment is represented by a 2nd class of fields, which preshape the movement parameter representation. The model accounts for a sizable body of empirical findings on movement initiation (continuous and graded nature of movement preparation, dependence on the metrics of the task, stimulus uncertainty effect, stimulus-response compatibility effects, Simon effect, precuing paradigm, and others) and suggests new ways of exploring the structure of motor representations.
480 citations
TL;DR: A method of selecting among mathematical models of cognition known as minimum description length is introduced, which provides an intuitive and theoretically well-grounded understanding of why one model should be chosen.
Abstract: The question of how one should decide among competing explanations of data is at the heart of the scientific enterprise. Computational models of cognition are increasingly being advanced as explanations of behavior. The success of this line of inquiry depends on the development of robust methods to guide the evaluation and selection of these models. This article introduces a method of selecting among mathematical models of cognition known as minimum description length , which provides an intuitive and theoretically well-grounded understanding of why one model should be chosen. A central but elusive concept in model selection, complexity, can also be derived with the method. The adequacy of the method is demonstrated in 3 areas of cognitive modeling: psychophysics, information integration, and categorization. How should one choose among competing theoretical explanations of data? This question is at the heart of the scientific enterprise, regardless of whether verbal models are being tested in an experimental setting or computational models are being evaluated in simulations. A number of criteria have been proposed to assist in this endeavor, summarized nicely by Jacobs and Grainger (1994). They include (a) plausibility (are the assumptions of the model biologically and psychologically plausible?); (b) explanatory adequacy (is the theoretical explanation reasonable and consistent with what is known?); (c) interpretability (do the model and its parts— e.g., parameters—make sense? are they understandable?); (d) descriptive adequacy (does the model provide a good description of the observed data?); (e) generalizability (does the model predict well the characteristics of data that will be observed in the future?); and (f) complexity (does the model capture the phenomenon in the least complex—i.e., simplest—possible manner?). The relative importance of these criteria may vary with the types of models being compared. For example, verbal models are likely
437 citations
TL;DR: The authors identify three alternative social functionalist starting points for inquiry: pragmatic politicians trying to cope with accountability demands from key constituency in their lives, principled theologians trying to protect sacred values from secular encroachments, and prudent prosecutors trying to enforce social norms.
Abstract: Research on judgment and choice has been dominated by functionalist assumptions that depict people as either intuitive scientists animated by epistemic goals or intuitive economists animated by utilitarian ones. This article identifies 3 alternative social functionalist starting points for inquiry: people as pragmatic politicians trying to cope with accountability demands from key constituencies in their lives, principled theologians trying to protect sacred values from secular encroachments, and prudent prosecutors trying to enforce social norms. Each functionalist framework stimulates middle-range theories that specify (a) cognitive-affective-behavioral strategies of coping with adaptive challenges and (b) the implications of these coping strategies for identifying empirical and normative boundary conditions on judgmental tendencies classified as errors or biases within the dominant research programs.
TL;DR: An instance theory of attention and memory (ITAM) is presented that integrates formal theories of Attention and memory phenomena by exploiting commonalities in their formal structure.
Abstract: An instance theory of attention and memory (ITAM) is presented that integrates formal theories of attention and memory phenomena by exploiting commonalities in their formal structure. The core idea in each theory is that performance depends on a choice process that can be modeled as a race between competing alternatives. Attention and categorization are viewed as different perspectives on the same race. Attention selects objects by categorizing them; objects are categorized by attending to them. ITAM incorporates each of its ancestors as a special case, so it inherits their successes.
TL;DR: The scope hypothesis is tested and the results support the view that priming is an evolved adaptation and show that dissociations between memory systems are not—and should not be—absolute: Independence exists for some tasks but not others.
Abstract: Memory evolved to supply useful, timely information to the organism’s decision-making systems. Therefore, decision rules, multiple memory systems, and the search engines that link them should have coevolved to mesh in a coadapted, functionally interlocking way. This adaptationist perspective suggested the scope hypothesis: When a generalization is retrieved from semantic memory, episodic memories that are inconsistent with it should be retrieved in tandem to place boundary conditions on the scope of the generalization. Using a priming paradigm and a decision task involving person memory, the authors tested and confirmed this hypothesis. The results support the view that priming is an evolved adaptation. They further show that dissociations between memory systems are not—and should not be—absolute: Independence exists for some tasks but not others.
TL;DR: The widely held view that people are incapable of generating or recognizing randomness is shown to lack the strong experimental support that has sometimes been claimed for it.
Abstract: This article contains a discussion of the elusive nature of the concept of randomness, a review of findings from experiments with randomness production and randomness perception tasks, and a presentation of theoretical treatments of people's randomization capabilities and limitations. The importance of task instructions and the difficulty of interpreting results when instructions are vague or ambiguous are stressed. The widely held view that people are incapable of generating or recognizing randomness is shown to lack the strong experimental support that has sometimes been claimed for it.
TL;DR: It is observed that if people differed in neural plasticity, or the ability to adapt their connections to the environment, then those highly developed in one intellectual ability would behighly developed in other intellectual abilities as well.
Abstract: The nature of the general factor of intelligence, or g, is examined. This article begins by observing that the finding of a general factor of intelligence appears to be inconsistent with current findings in neuroscience and cognitive science, where specific connections are argued to be critical for different intellectual abilities and the brain is argued to develop these connections in response to environmental stimuli. However, it is then observed that if people differed in neural plasticity, or the ability to adapt their connections to the environment, then those highly developed in one intellectual ability would be highly developed in other intellectual abilities as well. Simulations are then used to confirm that such a pattern would be obtained. Such a model is also shown to account for many other findings in the field of intelligence that are currently unexplained. A critical period for intellectual development is then emphasized.
TL;DR: Results demonstrate that the visual system uses Michelson contrast as a critical image variable to initiate percepts of transparency and to assign transmittance to transparent surfaces.
Abstract: Theories of perceptual transparency have typically been developed within the context of a physical model that generates the percept of transparency (F. Metelli's episcotister model, 1974b). Here 2 fundamental questions are investigated: (a) When does the visual system initiate the percept of one surface seen through another? (b) How does it assign surface properties to a transparent layer? Results reveal systematic deviations from the predictions of Metelli's model, both for initiating image decomposition into multiple surfaces and for assigning surface attributes. Specifically, results demonstrate that the visual system uses Michelson contrast as a critical image variable to initiate percepts of transparency and to assign transmittance to transparent surfaces. Findings are discussed in relation to previous theories of transparency, lightness, brightness, and contrast-contrast.
TL;DR: A developmental model linking the immediate consequence of gene activity to behavior through multiple molecular, cellular, and physiological levels is presented, adding specificity to the claim that neither genes nor experience act alone to shape development.
Abstract: Explaining how genes influence behavior is important to many branches of psychology, including development, behavior genetics, and evolutionary psychology. Presented here is a developmental model linking the immediate consequence of gene activity (transcription of messenger RNA molecules from DNA sequences) to behavior through multiple molecular, cellular, and physiological levels. The model provides a level of detail appropriate to theories of behavioral development that recognizes the molecular level of gene action, dispensing with the metaphorical use of such terms as blueprints, plans, or constraints that has obscured much previous discussion. Special attention is paid to the possible role of immediate-early genes in initiating developmental responses to experience, adding specificity to the claim that neither genes nor experience act alone to shape development.
TL;DR: The authors present a theoretical analysis and a single-mechanism computational model that simulates a specific experimental task and exhibits both skill learning and repetition priming, as well as a number of apparent dissociations between these measures.
Abstract: This article analyzes the relationship between skill learning and repetition priming, 2 implicit memory phenomena. A number of reports have suggested that skill learning and repetition priming can be dissociated from each other and are therefore based on different mechanisms. The authors present a theoretical analysis showing that previous results cannot be regarded as evidence of a processing dissociation between skill learning and repetition priming. The authors also present a single-mechanism computational model that simulates a specific experimental task and exhibits both skill learning and repetition priming, as well as a number of apparent dissociations between these measures. These theoretical and computational analyses provide complementary evidence that skill learning and repetition priming are aspects of a single underlying mechanism that has the characteristics of procedural memory.
TL;DR: An extension of signal detection theory (SDT) that incorporates mixtures of the underlying distributions that can be motivated by the idea that a presentation of a signal shifts the location of an underlying distribution only if the observer is attending to the signal.
Abstract: An extension of signal detection theory (SDT) that incorporates mixtures of the underlying distributions is presented. The mixtures can be motivated by the idea that a presentation of a signal shifts the location of an underlying distribution only if the observer is attending to the signal; otherwise, the distribution is not shifted or is only partially shifted. Thus, trials with a signal presentation consist of a mixture of 2 (or more) latent classes of trials. Mixture SDT provides a general theoretical framework that offers a new perspective on a number of findings. For example, mixture SDT offers an alternative to the unequal variance signal detection model; it can also account for nonlinear normal receiver operating characteristic curves, as found in recent research.
TL;DR: The authors expand Taylor et al.'s evolutionary frame and incorporate several unique aspects of human social dynamics, noting that humans are characterized by extensive paternal investment, and thus men's tending is predicted and observed in some stressful contexts.
Abstract: Taylor and colleagues proposed that women uniquely respond to stressors by tending to children and befriending other women rather than by fighting or fleeing (S. E. Taylor et al., 2000). In this article, the authors expand Taylor et al.'s evolutionary frame and incorporate several unique aspects of human social dynamics. First, humans are characterized by extensive paternal investment, and thus men's tending is predicted and observed in some stressful contexts. Second, the dynamics of women's befriending suggest an evolutionary elaboration of the mechanisms that support reciprocal altruism. Third, coalitional male-male competition indicates that men's befriending is a predicted component of their fight-or-flight response. Finally, men's tending should result in the evolution of female-female competition over this form of parental investment.
TL;DR: In the spirit of evolutionary pluralism, the author describes a different 3-stage scenario in which migration may occur without mutation or genetic recombination and selection first initiating a change in genes or gene frequencies.
Abstract: The traditional approach to evolutionary psychology relies entirely on natural selection as the cause of the evolution of adaptations. Exclusive reliance on natural selection overlooks the fact that changes in development are a necessary prerequisite for evolutionary change. These developmental changes provide the material for natural selection to work on. In the neo-Darwinian scenario, the mechanisms of evolution are mutation or genetic recombination, selection, migration, and eventual reproductive isolation. In the spirit of evolutionary pluralism, the author describes a different 3-stage scenario in which migration (the invasion of new niches or habitats) may occur without mutation or genetic recombination and selection first initiating a change in genes or gene frequencies.
TL;DR: The proportional difference model (PD) was tested with 9 data sets, including published data, and described violations of stochastic dominance, independence, and weak and strong Stochastic transitivity.
Abstract: The stochastic difference model assumes that decision makers trade normalized attribute value differences when making choices The model is stochastic, with choice probabilities depending on the normalized difference variable, d, and a decision threshold, delta The decision threshold indexes a person's sensitivity to attribute value differences and is a free estimated parameter of the model Depending on the choice context, a person may be more or less sensitive to attribute value differences, and hence delta may be used to measure context effects With proportional difference used as the normalization, the proportional difference model (PD) was tested with 9 data sets, including published data (eg, J L Myers, M M Suydam, & B Gambino, 1965; A Tversky, 1969) The model accounted for individual and group data well and described violations of stochastic dominance, independence, and weak and strong stochastic transitivity
TL;DR: In this article, the stability of learning phenotypes across species is shown to be similar to that of other biological characters, both genotypic and phenotypic (e.g., Hox genes) and vertebrate brain structure, and the integration of learning and evolution requires the development of criteria for recognizing and studying the divergence, homology, and homoplasy of learning mechanisms.
Abstract: A century after E. L. Thorndike's (1898) dissertation on the comparative psychology of learning, the field seems ready for a reassessment of its metatheoretical foundations. The stability of learning phenotypes across species is shown to be similar to that of other biological characters, both genotypic (e.g., Hox genes) and phenotypic (e.g., vertebrate brain structure). Moreover, an analysis of some current lines of comparative research indicates that researchers use similar strategies when approaching problems from either an ecological view (emphasizing adaptive significance) or a general-process view (emphasizing commonality across species). An integration of learning and evolution requires the development of criteria for recognizing and studying the divergence, homology, and homoplasy of learning mechanisms, much as it is done in other branches of biological research.
TL;DR: Key data on the speed of acquisition are used to motivate an alternative model of learning, in which animals can be interpreted as paying different amounts of attention to stimuli according to estimates of their differential reliabilities as predictors.
Abstract: C. R. Gallistel and J. Gibbon (2000) presented quantitative data on the speed with which animals acquire behavioral responses during autoshaping, together with a statistical model of learning intended to account for them. Although this model captures the form of the dependencies among critical variables, its detailed predictions are substantially at variance with the data. In the present article, further key data on the speed of acquisition are used to motivate an alternative model of learning, in which animals can be interpreted as paying different amounts of attention to stimuli according to estimates of their differential reliabilities as predictors.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors make empirically testable assumptions relating three psychophysical primitives: presentations of pairs of physical intensities (e.g., pure tones of the same frequency and phase to the 2 ears or 2 successive tones to both ears); a respondent's ordering of such signal pairs by perceived intensity; and judgments about two pairs of stimuli being related as some proportion (numerical factor, as in magnitude production).
Abstract: Empirically testable assumptions relate 3 psychophysical primitives: presentations of pairs of physical intensities (e.g., pure tones of the same frequency and phase to the 2 ears or 2 successive tones to both ears); a respondent's ordering of such signal pairs by perceived intensity (e.g., loudness); and judgments about 2 pairs of stimuli being related as some proportion (numerical factor, as in magnitude production). Explicit behavioral assumptions lead to 2 families of psychophysical functions, one corresponding to unbiased joint presentations and the other to biased ones. Under an invariance assumption, the psychophysical functions in the unbiased case are approximate power functions, and those in the biased case are exact power functions. A number of testable predictions are made. The mathematics involved draws from publications in utility theory and mathematics but with a reinterpretation of the primitives.
TL;DR: In this paper, an attention window opens 0.15 s following a cue to attend to a location, remains open (minimally) 0.2 s, and admits information simultaneously from all newly attended locations.
Abstract: In a novel choice attention-gating paradigm, observers monitor a stream of 3 3 letter arrays until a tonal cue directs them to report 1 row. Analyses of the particular arrays from which reported letters are chosen and of the joint probabilities of reporting pairs of letters are used to derive a theory of attention dynamics. An attention window opens 0.15 s following a cue to attend to a location, remains open (minimally) 0.2 s, and admits information simultaneously from all the newly attended locations. The window dynamics are independent of the distance moved. The theory accounts for about 90% of the variance from the over 400 data points obtained from each of the observers in the 3 experiments reported here. With minor elaborations, it applies to all the principal paradigms used to study the dynamics of visual spatial
TL;DR: Simulations of a view-based connectionist model of spatial attention prove that this inference that attention must be operating in an object-based frame of reference is not logically necessary: Object-based attentional effects can be obtained without object- based frames.
Abstract: Neurological patients with unilateral neglect fail to orient and respond to stimuli on one side, typically the left. A key research issue is whether neglect is exhibited with respect to the left side of the viewer or of objects. When deficits in attentional allocation depend not merely on an object's location with respect to the viewer but on the object's intrinsic extent, shape, or movement, researchers have inferred that attention must be operating in an object-based frame of reference. Simulations of a view-based connectionist model of spatial attention prove that this inference is not logically necessary: Object-based attentional effects can be obtained without object-based frames. The model thus explains away troublesome phenomena for view-based theories of object recognition.
TL;DR: Cattell et al. as mentioned in this paper proposed an extension of the behavioral prediction equation with a vector substitute for the simpler scalar quantities by which traditional Pavlovian-Skinnerian models have hitherto been represented.
Abstract: This theoretical note describes an expansion of the behavioral prediction equation, in line with the greater complexity encountered in models of structured learning theory (R. B. Cattell, 1996a). This presents learning theory with a vector substitute for the simpler scalar quantities by which traditional Pavlovian-Skinnerian models have hitherto been represented. Structured learning can be demonstrated by vector changes across a range of intrapersonal psychological variables (ability, personality, motivation, and state constructs). Its use with motivational dynamic trait measures (R. B. Cattell, 1985) should reveal new theoretical possibilities for scientifically monitoring change processes (dynamic calculus model; R. B. Cattell, 1996b), such as encountered within psycho therapeutic settings (R. B. Cattell, 1987). The enhanced behavioral prediction equation suggests that static conceptualizations of personality structure such as the Big Five model are less than optimal.
TL;DR: In this paper, a new approach to surface and volume formation is introduced in response to the question "Why do some silhouettes look 3D and others look 2D?" The central idea is that form information can propagate away from a "propagable segment" of occluding contour that could have projected onto the image from the visible portion of a cross-section of a surface.
Abstract: A new approach to surface and volume formation is introduced in response to the question, "Why do some silhouettes look 3 dimensional (3D) and others look 2D?" The central idea is that form information can propagate away from a "propagable segment" (PS) of occluding contour that could have projected onto the image from the visible portion of a cross-section of a surface. A key property of a PS is that it exhibits abrupt curvature changes where it meets the rest of the occluding contour. An algorithm is described for filling in curved surfaces from a PS: When copies of a PS are propagated into the interior, they act as cross-sectional surface contours that also exhibit abrupt curvature changes with the rest of the occluding contour. The result is a nonmetric coding of 3D-shape in terms of local ordinal surface curvature and orientation relationships that is scale, translation, and rotation invariant.