scispace - formally typeset
Search or ask a question
JournalISSN: 0048-5829

Public Choice 

Springer Science+Business Media
About: Public Choice is an academic journal published by Springer Science+Business Media. The journal publishes majorly in the area(s): Public finance & Voting. It has an ISSN identifier of 0048-5829. Over the lifetime, 4621 publications have been published receiving 156696 citations.


Papers
More filters
Journal ArticleDOI

3,253 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In the pure theory of electoral competition, citizens compare the platforms of the candidates and vote for the one whose platform is preferred as discussed by the authors. But these models have another feature that is quite as disturbing as their instability.
Abstract: In the pure theory of electoral competition, citizens compare the platforms of the candidates and vote for the one whose platform is preferred. Candidate strategies are identified with promises about future performance in office. Models of this sort have been developed in both static [McKelvey (1975)] and dynamic [Kramer (1977)I settings, and all appear to have the property that if the set of alternatives is "large enough" in some sense, equilibrium platforms rarely exist. But these models have another feature that is quite as disturbing as their instability. In the static setting discussed by McKelvey, little attention is paid to the possibility that, once in office, the politician's preferences may diverge from those of his constituents and that he may therefore choose policies at variance from his platform. Instead it is simply assumed that promises will be kept whether or not such behavior is congruent with the interest of the officeholder. It is sometimes argued that an "enforcement" mechanism may exist to discipline politicians for failing to keep promises, but without a specification of the mechanism it is not obvious that it would be in the interests of the

1,995 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors address the strengths and weaknesses of the main available measures of political regime and extend the dichotomous regime classification first introduced in Alvarez et al. (Stud. Comp. Int. Dev. 31(2):3-36, 1996).
Abstract: We address the strengths and weaknesses of the main available measures of political regime and extend the dichotomous regime classification first introduced in Alvarez et al. (Stud. Comp. Int. Dev. 31(2):3–36, 1996). This extension focuses on how incumbents are removed from office. We argue that differences across regime measures must be taken seriously and that they should be evaluated in terms of whether they (1) serve to address important research questions, (2) can be interpreted meaningfully, and (3) are reproducible. We argue that existing measures of democracy are not interchangeable and that the choice of measure should be guided by its theoretical and empirical underpinnings. We show that the choice of regime measure matters by replicating studies published in leading journals.

1,922 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, balanced budget redistribution between socioeconomic groups is modeled as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties, and a sufficient condition for existence is given, requiring that there be enough heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate.
Abstract: This paper models balanced-budget redistribution between socio-economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties. Equilibrium is unique in the present model, and a sufficient condition for existence is given, requiring that there be enough ‘stochastic heterogeneity’ with respect to party preferences in the electorate. The validity of Hotelling's ‘principle of minimum differentiation’, and of ‘Director's Law’, are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions, and voter's possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties. The policy strategy of expected-plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality. Incomes are fixed and known, so lump-sum taxation is feasible. However, constraints on tax/transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis.

1,486 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors apply economic theory to an analysis of behavior in the public sector, focusing on the division of interest between the public and its political representatives, where the public officeholder is assumed to act to advance his own interests, and these interests do not coincide automatically with those of his constituents.
Abstract: This paper applies economic theory to an analysis of behavior in the public sector. The model focuses on the division of interest between the public and its political representatives. The division of interest arises because the public officeholder is assumed to act to advance his own interests, and these interests do not coincide automatically with those of his constituents. The electoral process and some elements of the political structure are then analyzed as mechanisms which can be used to move the officeholder toward a position where the advancement of self-interest approximates the advancement of the interests of his constituents.

1,473 citations

Performance
Metrics
No. of papers from the Journal in previous years
YearPapers
202351
202294
2021153
202097
201995
201881