Showing papers in "Quarterly Journal of Economics in 1971"
TL;DR: In this article, the two-part tariffs for the monopoly pricing of amusement park rides at Disneyland in California were examined, and the effect of a monopoly on prices was discussed. And the application of the twopart tariffs was evaluated.
Abstract: Examines the two-part tariffs for the monopoly pricing of amusement park rides at Disneyland in California. Effect of a monopoly on prices; Determination of a nondiscriminatory two-part tariff; Applications of the two-part tariffs. (From Ebsco)
564 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the existence of a competitive equilibrium is proved by the "as if" argument and the Schumpeterian competition model, which is a generalization of the selection model.
Abstract: I. Introduction: Managerialism, behavioralism, and the competitive model, 237. — II. Firm decision processes and the "as if" argument, 240. — III. Selection, decision rules, and competitive outcomes, 244. — IV. A competitive industry: Orthodox analysis, 248. — V. A competitive industry: Assumptions of the selection model, 249. — VI. Proof of the theorem, 254. — VII. Extensions and generalizations, 257. — VIII. Schumpeterian competition, 259. — IX. Concluding comments, 260. — Appendix: Proof of the existence of competitive equilibrium, 261.
443 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the optimum income distribution from a voluntary theory of exchange is discussed and a complication is added to the optimal income distribution for a certain class of individuals. But it is not discussed in detail.
Abstract: I. The optimum income distribution from a voluntary theory of exchange, 329. — II. A complication, 333. — III. The mathematics, 333. — IV. Conclusions, 335.
271 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a general framework for revenue sharing in a Lindahl model and a more general framework with many clubs and majority rule, and conclude that revenue sharing differs from income redistribution.
Abstract: I. The analytic framework, 418. — II. Revenue sharing in a Lindahl model, 420. — III. Revenue sharing and majority rule, 423. — IV. Revenue sharing in a more general framework, 426. — V. When revenue sharing differs from income redistribution, 430. — VI. A system with many clubs, 432. — VII. Concluding remarks, 434. — Appendix: A general theorem, 435.
249 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the optimal investment policy under static expectations is proposed, and the model is shown to achieve the best investment performance under the assumption that the stock market is stable and stable.
Abstract: I. The model, 606. — II. Optimal investment policy under static expectations, 613. — III. Summary and extensions, 621.
188 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a framework for the model of demand uncertainty and option value, and some extensions of the model are discussed, concluding and policy implications of the policy implications.
Abstract: Introduction, 528 — The framework of the model, 530 — Demand uncertainty and option value, 533 — Some extensions of the model, 536 — Conclusions and policy implications, 537
166 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the formal statement of the model and the analysis of input equality are presented, and the case of objectively measurable outputs is discussed, as well as the case for output equality.
Abstract: I. The formal statement of the model and the analysis of input equality, 410. —H. Output equality, 411. —III. The case of objectively measurable outputs, 413. — IV. Comments, 415.
161 citations
TL;DR: This paper presents a meta-analysis of six growth models and results that show clear trends in growth over time and indicate clear bottlenecks in the ability of these models to predict future growth rates.
Abstract: I. Introduction, 391. — II. Notation and data, 392. — III. Growth models, 393. — IV. Regression results, 400.—V. Sources of growth, 402.—VI. Conclusion, 408.
145 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, an earnings model was proposed and an explanatory variable analysis was carried out to evaluate the explanatory variables of the model, and the results showed that the model outperformed other models.
Abstract: I. An earnings model, 21. —II. Analysis of the explanatory variables, 23.—III. Empirical analysis, 33.—IV. Conclusion, 38.
110 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the welfare approach was used to evaluate the performance of exchange rates and welfare measures in the context of foreign exchange production, and compared the methods and a recommended evaluation rule.
Abstract: I. Introduction, 197. — II. The welfare approach, 198. — III. Costs of producing foreign exchange, 207. — IV. Equilibrium and parity exchange rates, 213. — V. Comparisons of the methods and a recommended evaluation rule, 220.
85 citations
TL;DR: This chapter discusses the problem of contractual incentives, which is a special case of the linear profit-sharing model, and the selection of an optimal incentive function, which affects the utility functions.
Abstract: I. Introduction to the general model, 460. —II. The problem of contractual incentives, 466. — III. Factors affecting the selection of an optimal incentive function, 470. —IV. Variation in the utility functions, 477. —V. Extension of results to Case II and Case II, 480. —VI. Government incentive contracts as a special case of the linear profit-sharing model, 480.—VII. Summary and conclusions, 481.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a general model of the model and the results of the test set, and conclude that the results show that the general model is not a good fit.
Abstract: I. Introduction, 551. — II. The general model, 552. — III. Specification of the model, 555. — IV. The results, 567. — V. Conclusions, 576. — Appendix, 578.
TL;DR: In this paper, economic rationalisation for the nonlinear reduced form is discussed. But the authors do not consider the non-linear reduced forms of the reduced form of the graph.
Abstract: I. Theory, 147.—II. Empirical results, 149.—III. Summary and conclusions, 155.—Appendix: Economic rationalisation for the nonlinear reduced form, 158.
TL;DR: In this article, the model is extended to include non-reversed factor intensities, and the results of the model are shown to be consistent with the results in this paper.
Abstract: I. The model, 624. — II. Nonreversed factor intensities, 627. — III. Reversed physical factor intensities, 640. — IV. Reversed value factor intensities, 641. — V. Concluding remarks, 641. — Mathematical appendix, 643.
TL;DR: In this article, Kain's data are for geographic areas in Detroit (1957) and Chicago (1956), with ninety-eight observations for each city, and he runs regressions using the Negro percentage of total employment in the area as the dependent variable w.r.t.
Abstract: The purpose of this note is (1) to criticize Kain's methodology with regard to testing hypotheses (2) and (3), and (2) to present alternative results that conflict with hypothesis (2). Kain's data are for geographic areas in Detroit (1957) and Chicago (1956), with ninety-eight observations for each city. With these data he runs regressions using the Negro percentage of total employment in the area as the dependent variable w. The independent variables are R, the Negro percentage of (employed) residents in the areaused as a proxy for employers' propensity to discriminate, and d, the airline distance from the area to either the nearest Negro residence area (more than 2 percent Negro) or to the nearest point in the Negro ghettowith this variable used as a proxy for transportation costs and effects of such costs on job information. The regression coefficients have the expected signs and are statistically significant. Over 75 percent of the total variance is explained for Chicago, and over 35 percent for Detroit. Kain estimates the effect of housing segregation on the level of black employment by assuming that with no housing segregation the proportion of Negro workers would be the same mR for each geographical area. Consequently, for each area R=mR and d=0. Substituting these values into the regression equation (1) (1) w==aR+bd+c,
TL;DR: In this paper, the effects of uncertainty on welfare, resource allocation, and income distribution within the context of a simple competitive general equilibrium model are explored. But the model assumes that in the short run, the allocation of capital between two industries is fixed and that economic agents make their decisions with respect to production and labor input under certainty.
Abstract: Publisher Summary The chapter explores the effects of uncertainty on welfare, resource allocation, and income distribution within the context of a simple competitive general equilibrium model. The traditional static two-factor-two-good model in the presence of uncertainty in the production process has been investigated, and it has been assumed that in the short run, the allocation of capital between two industries is fixed and that economic agents make their decisions with respect to production and labor input under certainty. The chapter describes the effects of uncertainty under two alternative assumptions about the technology. In the first model, it is assumed that the basic random variable is the total supply of labor services. The supply may be random as a result of the variability in the number of workers in the labor force or, more plausibly, as a result of the variability in the efficiency of a fixed labor force.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss the difference of liability placement versus no-liability law in the context of bargaining and threat making, and the internal and external costs of such negotiations.
Abstract: Bargaining and threat making, 719. — Internal cum external costs, 720. — Indifference of liability placement versus no-liability law, 721. — Summary, 723.
TL;DR: The reduced form of the Medicare system is a model that combines extended care unit admissions, hospital insurance benefits per hospital episode, and Supplementary medical insurance into one system.
Abstract: I. An overview of the Medicare model, 4.—II. Supplementary medical insurance, 5.—III. Hospital admissions, 8.—IV. Extended care unit admissions, 11.—V. Hospital insurance benefits per hospital episode (HIBPHE), 12.—VI. Supplementary insurance benefits, 15.—VII. The reduced form of the Medicare system, 16.—VIII. Concluding remarks, 19.
TL;DR: In this paper, a neoclassical approach to labor absorption with factor price variability is presented, and a look at the models' predictions is provided, along with an estimation with Philippine manufacturing data.
Abstract: I. Introduction, 40.—II. A neoclassical approach to labor absorption with factor price variability, 42.—III. Asian history and simulation: a look at the models' predictions, 49.—IV. Estimation with Philippine manufacturing data, 54.—V. Conclusion, 64.
TL;DR: In this article, the adjustment gap model is used to compare the business of banking and adjustment gap, and empirical results show that the model is empirically proven to be effective in the real world.
Abstract: I. Recent literature, 97.—II. The business of banking and the adjustment gap, 99.—III. The model, 101.—IV. Empirical results, 109.—V. Conclusions, 117.
TL;DR: In this paper, two separate problems appear to be associated with attempts to formulate voting processes or social welfare functions that incorporate "intensity" of preference: identifying a measure for intensity of preference and incorporating the measure into a voting process.
Abstract: Two separate problems appear to be associated with attempts
to formulate voting processes or social welfare functions that incorporate
"intensity" of preference. The first is that of identifying
a measure for intensity of preference. The second problem is that
of incorporating the measure into a voting process. In this paper the
former problem is ignored. It is assumed that a measure of "relative
intensity" has been chosen and that this measure has the
properties of the positive real numbers.
TL;DR: The single-factor, variable proportions model as discussed by the authors is a two-factor fixed-proportions model with a fixed number of columns, and the fixed proportion model has two columns per column.
Abstract: I. Introduction, 225. — II. The two-factor, fixed-proportions model, 225. — III. The single-factor, variable proportions model, 227. — IV. The two-factor, variable proportions model, 228. — V. Some implications, 232.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss the relevance of contemporary urban planning in the context of the Greek festival and the magnitude of the financial burden on the Greek community, and conclude: Relevance for contemporary urban urban planning, 375.
Abstract: I. The Greek audience, 366. — II. Financing the Greek festival, 370. — III. The magnitude of the financial burden, 373. — IV. Concluding comment: Relevance for contemporary urban planning, 375.
TL;DR: In this paper, the problem of cross-section relations of labor share to capital intensity is investigated. But the authors focus on the cross-sections involving input prices and measures of technological progress.
Abstract: I. The problem, 580. — II. Characteristics of the data, 583. — III. Indications derived from time series, 587. — IV. Cross-section relations of labor share to capital intensity, 590. — V. Cross sections involving input prices and measures of technological progress, 594. — VI. Conclusions, 602.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose a growth model for a small open economy and a growth solution for a large open economy, which is based on the golden rule solution, and the terms of trade and the growth solution.
Abstract: I. Introduction, 377. — II. The rate of growth, existence, and stability of equilibrium for a small open economy, 378. — III. The terms of trade and the growth solution for a small open economy, 382. — IV. The rate of growth, existence, and stability of equilibrium in a large open economy, 384. — V. The open economy growth model and technological progress, 386. — VI. The golden rule solutions, 390.
TL;DR: The concept of seigniorage was introduced in the British case in the early 19th century as discussed by the authors, and its practical significance in British case is discussed in detail in Section 4.1.
Abstract: I. The concept of seigniorage, 495. — II. Its practical significance in the British case, 496. — III. The gross seigniorage gain from sterling, 498. — IV. The offsetting interest cost of the sterling balances, 502.