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JournalISSN: 0034-6632

Review of Metaphysics 

Philosophy Education Society Inc.
About: Review of Metaphysics is an academic journal published by Philosophy Education Society Inc.. The journal publishes majorly in the area(s): Contemporary philosophy & Metaphysics. It has an ISSN identifier of 0034-6632. Over the lifetime, 1209 publications have been published receiving 17287 citations. The journal is also known as: Review of metaphysics on cd-rom.


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Book ChapterDOI
Charles Taylor1
TL;DR: There is a sense in which interpretation is essential to explanation in the sciences of man as discussed by the authors and the view that it is, that there is an unavoidably "hermeneutical" component in the science of man, goes back to Dilthey.
Abstract: Is there a sense in which interpretation is essential to explanation in the sciences of man? The view that it is, that there is an unavoidably “hermeneutical” component in the sciences of man, goes back to Dilthey. But recently the question has come again to the fore, for instance, in the work of Gadamer,1 in Ricoeur’s interpretation of Freud,2 and in the writings of Habermas.3

1,236 citations

Book ChapterDOI
TL;DR: The authors consider the ontological problem in the sense that it does not follow that what an expression means is identical with what it denotes; for, as the example of "the morning star" and "the evening star" shows, two expressions may denote the same object without having the same meaning.
Abstract: In this paper I begin by considering some remarks of Professor W. V. Quine’s on what he calls ‘the ontological problem’.1 Professor Quine holds that from the fact that a sign has meaning it does not, in general, follow either that there is anything that it stands for, or that there is anything that it denotes. This applies, in his view, not only to words like ‘red’ which are sometimes thought to stand for properties, but also to words like ‘Pegasus’ which are commonly regarded as names; for he argues that it is always possible to convert such names into descriptions, and then analyse out the descriptions in the way that Russell has suggested. Moreover, even in the case where an expression does denote something, it does not follow that what it means is identical with what it denotes; for, as the example of ‘the morning star’ and ‘the evening star’ shows, two expressions may denote the same object without having the same meaning. Whether in such cases, or indeed in any others, Professor Quine would wish to say that an expression named, or stood for, what it denoted, is not clear to me; nor is it clear to me whether he thinks that there are any signs, such as demonstratives or pronouns, which are meaningful only if there is something which they denote.

1,176 citations

Journal Article
TL;DR: Derrida's deconstruction of the Platonic maxims can be traced back to the origins of these deconstructions as discussed by the authors, and it is possible to trace the successful moments of deconstruction back to their origins so as to leave bare the devices on which they are based.
Abstract: ALTHOUGH A GREAT VARIETY OF TOPICS are discussed in Derrida's philosophical writings, a central theme recurs in many of them: the relationship between speech and writing. Derrida consistently uses the same methods to deal with this topic, and my reading aims to expose the regulation of these methods. This essay tries to point out the blurring moments of the strategy which lead to one of Derrida's most outrageous outcomes, which is that writing precedes speech. This notion, however, is only the starting point; its consequences are the impossibility of communication and the collapse of the Platonic maxims. Such successful moments of deconstruction are traced back to their origins so as to leave bare the devices on which they are based. It will then be possible to discern a specific recurring stage during which occurs an illegitimate movement according to the Derridan rules of the game. Derrida's discussion of the Phaedrus begins at the "geographical" center of the dialogue (275c) with the deprecation of the profession of logography. The logographer, who writes orations for trials in which he himself does not appear, represents, for Derrida, the intersection of two crucial phenomena: the presence of the absence (the writer of the speech is present only by means of his own cited words, while being physically absent from the trial), and the gap between writing and truth. The logographer, he says, in the strict sense, composes speeches for use by litigants; speeches which he himself does not pronounce, which he does not attend, so to speak, in person, and which produce their effects in his absence. In writing what he does not speak, what he would never say and would never think in truth, the author of the written speech is already entrenched in the posture of the sophist: the man of non-presence and non-truth. (76; 68)(1) At this point Derrida follows Plato, who temporarily abandons the topic of writing (274b), and also leaves the problem of absence and truth for a different subject, the kidnapping of Orithyia in the middle of a game with Pharmacia (229b). Pharmacia is a link (une maille) between the kidnapping, which ends in rape and death, and the reappearance of writing in a later stage of the dialogue. Here, the connection between Pharmacia and the Greek word [unkeyable] is important: Pharmacia is also a common noun signifying the administration of the [unkeyable], the drug: the medicine and/or poison. . . . A little farther on, Socrates compares the written texts Phaedrus has brought with him to a drug [[unkeyable]]. This [unkeyable], this "medicine," this philter, both remedy and poison at the same time [a la fois], already introduces itself, with all its ambivalence, into the body of the discourse. (78; 70) For Derrida, the [unkeyable] is only an element in the chain of significantions (108; 95), whose interplay constitutes the textual phenomenon. It is impossible, however, to try to analyze each of the elements in isolation. This kind of interpretation, according to Derrida, would damage the subtle texture of the literary object in a most vulgar way. Sharp distinctions, he claims, are unacceptable in dealing with language: It is always possible to think that if Plato did not realize [n 'a pas pratique'] certain options [passages] and even actively barred them from being realized [les a meme interrompus], it is because he perceived them but left them in the domain of the potential [dans l'impraticable]. Such a formulation is possible if one avoids all reference to the difference between conscious and unconscious, voluntary and involuntary, a most vulgar means [instrument fort grossier] when one comes to deal with language. (109; 96) The borders, however, between the conscious and the unconscious, the voluntary and the involuntary, are stressed here, only to be blurred later on. It is not that the limits are important in and of themselves; their only significance stems from being targets for deconstructive assaults. …

335 citations

Performance
Metrics
No. of papers from the Journal in previous years
YearPapers
202339
202285
20211
20206
201924
201818