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Showing papers in "Review of Symbolic Logic in 2017"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: It is shown how the introduction of these new action types allows us to define a modal operator capturing an epistemic sense of agency, and how this operator can be used to express anEpistemic stit semantics, by supplementing the overall framework with an explicit treatment of action types.
Abstract: Stit semantics grows out of a modal tradition in the logic of action that concentrates on an operator representing the agency of an individual in seeing to it that some state of affairs holds, rather than on the actions the individual performs in doing so. The purpose of this paper is to enrich stit semantics, and especially epistemic stit semantics, by supplementing the overall framework with an explicit treatment of action types. We show how the introduction of these new action types allows us to define a modal operator capturing an epistemic sense of agency, and how this operator can be used to express an epistemic sense of ability.

39 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper explores a new language of neighbourhood structures where existential information can be given about what kind of worlds occur in a neighbourhood of a current world, and gives a complete axiom system for which completeness is proved by a new normal form technique.
Abstract: This paper explores a new language of neighbourhood structures where existential information can be given about what kind of worlds occur in a neighbourhood of a current world. The resulting system of ‘instantial neighbourhood logic’ INL has a nontrivial mix of features from relational semantics and from neighbourhood semantics. We explore some basic model-theoretic behavior, including a matching notion of bisimulation, and give a complete axiom system for which we prove completeness by a new normal form technique. In addition, we relate INL to other modal logics by means of translations, and determine its precise SAT complexity. Finally, we discuss proof-theoretic fine-structure of INL in terms of semantic tableaux and some expressive fine-structure in terms of fragments, while discussing concrete illustrations of the instantial neighborhood language in topological spaces, in games with powers for players construed in a new way, as well as in dynamic logics of acquiring or deleting evidence. We conclude with some coalgebraic perspectives on what is achieved in this paper. Many of these final themes suggest follow-up work of independent interest.

37 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: It will be argued that one of the reasons why CDs form a good notation is that they are highly mathematically tractable: experts can obtain valid results by ‘calculating’ with CDs.
Abstract: The aim of this article is to investigate the roles of commutative diagrams (CDs) in a specific mathematical domain, and to unveil the reasons underlying their effectiveness as a mathematical notation; this will be done through a case study It will be shown that CDs do not depict spatial relations, but represent mathematical structures CDs will be interpreted as a hybrid notation that goes beyond the traditional bipartition of mathematical representations into diagrammatic and linguistic It will be argued that one of the reasons why CDs form a good notation is that they are highly mathematically tractable: experts can obtain valid results by ‘calculating’ with CDs These calculations, take the form of ‘diagram chases’ In order to draw inferences, experts move algebraic elements around the diagrams It will be argued that these diagrams are dynamic It is thanks to their dynamicity that CDs can externalize the relevant reasoning and allow experts to draw conclusions directly by manipulating them Lastly, it will be shown that CDs play essential roles in the context of proof as well as in other phases of the mathematical enterprise, such as discovery and conjecture formation

27 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a systematic study of the prehistory of the traditional subsystems of second-order arithmetic that feature prominently in the reverse mathematics program promoted by Friedman and Simpson.
Abstract: This paper presents a systematic study of the prehistory of the traditional subsystems of second-order arithmetic that feature prominently in the reverse mathematics program promoted by Friedman and Simpson. We look in particular at: (i) the long arc from Poincare to Feferman as concerns arithmetic definability and provability, (ii) the interplay between finitism and the formalization of analysis in the lecture notes and publications of Hilbert and Bernays, (iii) the uncertainty as to the constructive status of principles equivalent to Weak Konig’s Lemma, and (iv) the large-scale intellectual backdrop to arithmetical transfinite recursion in descriptive set theory and its effectivization by Borel, Lusin, Addison, and others.

24 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Applying a version of Maehara technique modified in several ways, it is proved that bi-intuitionistic logic enjoys the classical Craig interpolation property and Maximova variable separation property; its Halldén completeness follows.
Abstract: We prove that certain natural sequent systems for bi-intuitionistic logic have the analytic cut property. In the process we show that the (global) subformula property implies the (local) analytic cut property, thereby demonstrating their equivalence. Applying a version of Maehara technique modified in several ways, we prove that bi-intuitionistic logic enjoys the classical Craig interpolation property and Maximova variable separation property; its Hallden completeness follows.

22 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The results presented generalize substantially some results obtained earlier for Jeffrey conditionalization, and it is shown that probability spaces are weakly Bayes connectable.
Abstract: We investigate the general properties of general Bayesian learning, where “general Bayesian learning” means inferring a state from another that is regarded as evidence, and where the inference is conditionalizing the evidence using the conditional expectation determined by a reference probability measure representing the background subjective degrees of belief of a Bayesian Agent performing the inference. States are linear functionals that encode probability measures by assigning expectation values to random variables via integrating them with respect to the probability measure. If a state can be learned from another this way, then it is said to be Bayes accessible from the evidence. It is shown that the Bayes accessibility relation is reflexive, antisymmetric, and nontransitive. If every state is Bayes accessible from some other defined on the same set of random variables, then the set of states is called weakly Bayes connected. It is shown that the set of states is not weakly Bayes connected if the probability space is standard. The set of states is called weakly Bayes connectable if, given any state, the probability space can be extended in such a way that the given state becomes Bayes accessible from some other state in the extended space. It is shown that probability spaces are weakly Bayes connectable. Since conditioning using the theory of conditional expectations includes both Bayes’ rule and Jeffrey conditionalization as special cases, the results presented generalize substantially some results obtained earlier for Jeffrey conditionalization.

19 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A puzzle that creates difficulties for standard answers to this question is developed, which integrates a Bayesian approach to belief with a dynamic semantics for epistemic modals and a surprising consequence: virtually all of the authors' beliefs about what might be the case provide counterexamples to the view that rational belief is closed under logical implication.
Abstract: What is it to believe something might be the case? We develop a puzzle that creates difficulties for standard answers to this question. We go on to propose our own solution, which integrates a Bayesian approach to belief with a dynamic semantics for epistemic modals. After showing how our account solves the puzzle, we explore a surprising consequence: virtually all of our beliefs about what might be the case provide counterexamples to the view that rational belief is closed under logical implication.

18 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: It is proved that every∑ n-definable ∑ n -sound theory is incomplete and every consistent theory having ∏ n+1 set of theorems has a true but unprovable∏ n sentence.
Abstract: It is well known that Godel’s incompleteness theorems hold for ∑1-definable theories containing Peano arithmetic. We generalize Godel’s incompleteness theorems for arithmetically definable theories. First, we prove that every ∑ n+1-definable ∑ n -sound theory is incomplete. Secondly, we generalize and improve Jeroslow and Hajek’s results. That is, we prove that every consistent theory having ∏ n+1 set of theorems has a true but unprovable ∏ n sentence. Lastly, we prove that no ∑ n+1-definable ∑ n -sound theory can prove its own ∑ n -soundness. These three results are generalizations of Rosser’s improvement of the first incompleteness theorem, Godel’s first incompleteness theorem, and the second incompleteness theorem, respectively.

16 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: It will be argued that the grammatical subject of this sentence, ‘the concept horse’, indeed refers to a concept, and not to an object, as Frege once held.
Abstract: I offer an analysis of the sentence ‘the concept horse is a concept’. It will be argued that the grammatical subject of this sentence, ‘the concept horse’, indeed refers to a concept, and not to an object, as Frege once held. The argument is based on a criterion of proper-namehood according to which an expression is a proper name if it is so rendered in Frege’s ideography. The predicate ‘is a concept’, on the other hand, should not be thought of as referring to a function. It will be argued that the analysis of sentences of the form ‘C is a concept’ requires the introduction of a new form of statement. Such statements are not to be thought of as having function–argument form, but rather the structure subject–copula–predicate.

16 citations



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A sound and complete proof searching technique for the binary extensions of the logic of paradox and a correspondence analysis for extensions of G. Priest’s logic of Paradox are developed.
Abstract: B. Kooi and A. Tamminga present a correspondence analysis for extensions of G. Priest’s logic of paradox. Each unary or binary extension is characterizable by a special operator and analyzable via a sound and complete natural deduction system. The present paper develops a sound and complete proof searching technique for the binary extensions of the logic of paradox.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Ibn Sīnā (11th century, greater Persia) proposed an analysis of arguments by reductio ad absurdum, which contains a workable method for handling the making and discharging of assumptions in a formal proof.
Abstract: Abstract Ibn Sīnā (11th century, greater Persia) proposed an analysis of arguments by reductio ad absurdum. His analysis contains, perhaps for the first time, a workable method for handling the making and discharging of assumptions in a formal proof. We translate the relevant text of Ibn Sīnā and put his analysis into the context of his general approach to logic.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a generalization of the generalized transfer principle for Boolean-valued models of set theory has been proposed for quantum set theory, where the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice hold in the model.
Abstract: In 1981, Takeuti introduced quantum set theory by constructing a model of set theory based on quantum logic represented by the lattice of closed linear subspaces of a Hilbert space in a manner analogous to Boolean-valued models of set theory, and showed that appropriate counterparts of the axioms of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice (ZFC) hold in the model. In this paper, we aim at unifying Takeuti’s model with Boolean-valued models by constructing models based on general complete orthomodular lattices, and generalizing the transfer principle in Boolean-valued models, which asserts that every theorem in ZFC set theory holds in the models, to a general form holding in every orthomodular-valued model. One of the central problems in this program is the well-known arbitrariness in choosing a binary operation for implication. To clarify what properties are required to obtain the generalized transfer principle, we introduce a class of binary operations extending the implication on Boolean logic, called generalized implications, including even nonpolynomially definable operations. We study the properties of those operations in detail and show that all of them admit the generalized transfer principle. Moreover, we determine all the polynomially definable operations for which the generalized transfer principle holds. This result allows us to abandon the Sasaki arrow originally assumed for Takeuti’s model and leads to a much more flexible approach to quantum set theory.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: It is argued that the paradox of Burali–Forti is first and foremost a problem about concept formation by abstraction, not about sets, and that some hundred years after its discovery the paradox is still without any fully satisfactory resolution.
Abstract: The paradox that appears under Burali–Forti’s name in many textbooks of set theory is a clever piece of reasoning leading to an unproblematic theorem. The theorem asserts that the ordinals do not form a set. For such a set would be–absurdly–an ordinal greater than any ordinal in the set of all ordinals. In this article, we argue that the paradox of Burali–Forti is first and foremost a problem about concept formation by abstraction, not about sets. We contend, furthermore, that some hundred years after its discovery the paradox is still without any fully satisfactory resolution. A survey of the current literature reveals one key assumption of the paradox that has gone unquestioned, namely the assumption that ordinals are objects. Taking the lead from Russell’s no class theory, we interpret talk of ordinals as an efficient way of conveying higher-order logical truths. The resulting theory of ordinals is formally adequate to standard intuitions about ordinals, expresses a conception of ordinal number capable of resolving Burali–Forti’s paradox, and offers a novel contribution to the longstanding program of reducing mathematics to higher-order logic.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: It is shown that each probability that is not κ-additive has conditional probabilities that fail to be conglomerable in a partition of cardinality no greater than κ.
Abstract: Let κ be an uncountable cardinal. Using the theory of conditional probability associated with de Finetti (1974) and Dubins (1975), subject to several structural assumptions for creating sufficiently many measurable sets, and assuming that κ is not a weakly inaccessible cardinal, we show that each probability that is not κ-additive has conditional probabilities that fail to be conglomerable in a partition of cardinality no greater than κ. This generalizes a result of Schervish, Seidenfeld, & Kadane (1984), which established that each finite but not countably additive probability has conditional probabilities that fail to be conglomerable in some countable partition.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors investigates the geometrical prehistory of modern model theory, eventually leading up to Hilbert's Foundations of Geometry (1899) and its mathematical roots in nineteenth-century projective geometry.
Abstract: The article investigates one of the key contributions to modern structural mathematics, namely Hilbert’s Foundations of Geometry (1899) and its mathematical roots in nineteenth-century projective geometry. A central innovation of Hilbert’s book was to provide semantically minded independence proofs for various fragments of Euclidean geometry, thereby contributing to the development of the model-theoretic point of view in logical theory. Though it is generally acknowledged that the development of model theory is intimately bound up with innovations in 19th century geometry (in particular, the development of non-Euclidean geometries), so far, little has been said about how exactly model-theoretic concepts grew out of methodological investigations within projective geometry. This article is supposed to fill this lacuna and investigates this geometrical prehistory of modern model theory, eventually leading up to Hilbert’s Foundations.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A new reflection principle is introduced based on the idea that whatever is true in all entities of some kind is also true in a set-sized collection of them, which allows it to be both consistent in all higher-order languages and remarkably strong.
Abstract: Abstract This article introduces a new reflection principle. It is based on the idea that whatever is true in all entities of some kind is also true in a set-sized collection of them. Unlike standard reflection principles, it does not re-interpret parameters or predicates. This allows it to be both consistent in all higher-order languages and remarkably strong. For example, I show that in the language of second-order set theory with predicates for a satisfaction relation, it is consistent relative to the existence of a 2-extendible cardinal (Theorem 7.12) and implies the existence of a proper class of 1-extendible cardinals (Theorem 7.9).

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a reconstruction of the logical system of the Tractatus, which differs from classical logic in two ways: it includes an account of Wittgenstein's "form-series" device, which suffices to express some effectively generated countably infinite disjunctions.
Abstract: I present a reconstruction of the logical system of the Tractatus, which differs from classical logic in two ways. It includes an account of Wittgenstein’s “form-series” device, which suffices to express some effectively generated countably infinite disjunctions. And its attendant notion of structure is relativized to the fixed underlying universe of what is named. There follow three results. First, the class of concepts definable in the system is closed under finitary induction. Second, if the universe of objects is countably infinite, then the property of being a tautology is -complete. But third, it is only granted the assumption of countability that the class of tautologies is -definable in set theory. Wittgenstein famously urges that logical relationships must show themselves in the structure of signs. He also urges that the size of the universe cannot be prejudged. The results of this paper indicate that there is no single way in which logical relationships could be held to make themselves manifest in signs, which does not prejudge the number of objects.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This work studies possible ways to make precise the relation of conceptual equivalence between notions of truth associated with collections of principles of truth and employs suitable variants of notions of equivalence of theories considered in Visser (2006) and Friedman & VISSer (2014) to show that there is a precise sense in which ramified truth does not correspond to iterations of comprehension.
Abstract: One way to study and understand the notion of truth is to examine principles that we are willing to associate with truth, often because they conform to a pre-theoretical or to a semi-formal characterization of this concept. In comparing different collections of such principles, one requires formally precise notions of inter-theoretic reduction that are also adequate to compare these conceptual aspects. In this work I study possible ways to make precise the relation of conceptual equivalence between notions of truth associated with collections of principles of truth. In doing so, I will consider refinements and strengthenings of the notion of relative truth-definability proposed by Fujimoto (2010): in particular I employ suitable variants of notions of equivalence of theories considered in Visser (2006) and Friedman & Visser (2014) to show that there are better candidates than mutual truth-definability for the role of sufficient condition for conceptual equivalence between the semantic notions associated with the theories. In the concluding part of the paper, I extend the techniques introduced in the first and show that there is a precise sense in which ramified truth (either disquotational or compositional) does not correspond to iterations of comprehension.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: It is shown that a typed compositional theory of positive truth with internal induction for total formulae (denoted by PT tot) is not semantically conservative over Peano arithmetic, and the class of models of PA expandable to models of PT tot contains every recursively saturated model of arithmetic.
Abstract: We show that a typed compositional theory of positive truth with internal induction for total formulae (denoted by PT tot ) is not semantically conservative over Peano arithmetic. In addition, we observe that the class of models of PA expandable to models of PT tot contains every recursively saturated model of arithmetic. Our results point to a gap in the philosophical project of describing the use of the truth predicate in model-theoretic contexts.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: An extended version of the Quantified Argument Calculus, capable of straightforward translation of the classical first-order predicate calculus, the translation preserving truth values as well as entailment is presented.
Abstract: This paper presents an extended version of the Quantified Argument Calculus (Quarc). Quarc is a logic comparable to the first-order predicate calculus. It employs several nonstandard syntactic and semantic devices, which bring it closer to natural language in several respects. Most notably, quantifiers in this logic are attached to one-place predicates; the resulting quantified constructions are then allowed to occupy the argument places of predicates. The version presented here is capable of straightforwardly translating natural-language sentences involving defining clauses. A three-valued, model-theoretic semantics for Quarc is presented. Interpretations in this semantics are not equipped with domains of quantification: they are just interpretation functions. This reflects the analysis of natural-language quantification on which Quarc is based. A proof system is presented, and a completeness result is obtained. The logic presented here is capable of straightforward translation of the classical first-order predicate calculus, the translation preserving truth values as well as entailment. The first-order predicate calculus and its devices of quantification can be seen as resulting from Quarc on certain semantic and syntactic restrictions, akin to simplifying assumptions. An analogous, straightforward translation of Quarc into the first-order predicate calculus is impossible.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that neither intuitionistic disjunction nor intuitionistic implication is uniformly definable in propositional dependence logic without these two connectives, and it was also shown that such a (non-compositional) translation exists.
Abstract: Both propositional dependence logic and inquisitive logic are expressively complete. As a consequence, every formula in the language of inquisitive logic with intuitionistic disjunction or intuitionistic implication can be translated equivalently into a formula in the language of propositional dependence logic without these two connectives. We show that although such a (noncompositional) translation exists, neither intuitionistic disjunction nor intuitionistic implication is uniformly definable in propositional dependence logic.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: It is shown that some (although not all) arguments for conditional excluded middle can in fact be extended to motivate this modalized version of the principle, and it is argued that these two principles are incompatible.
Abstract: This article explores the connection between two theses: the principle of conditional excluded middle for the counterfactual conditional, and the claim that it is a contingent matter which (coarse grained) propositions there are. Both theses enjoy wide support, and have been defended at length by Robert Stalnaker. We will argue that, given plausible background assumptions, these two principles are incompatible, provided that conditional excluded middle is understood in a certain modalized way. We then show that some (although not all) arguments for conditional excluded middle can in fact be extended to motivate this modalized version of the principle.

Journal ArticleDOI
Peter Hawke1
TL;DR: The key novelty of this framework is an operator for capturing coalitional ability when the cooperating agents cannot share strategic information, and significant differences in the expressive power and validities of SCL2 and CL2 are identified.
Abstract: Logics of joint strategic ability have recently received attention, with arguably the most influential being those in a family that includes Coalition Logic (CL) and Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL). Notably, both CL and ATL bypass the epistemic issues that underpin Schelling-type coordination problems , by apparently relying on the meta-level assumption of (perfectly reliable) communication between cooperating rational agents. Yet such epistemic issues arise naturally in settings relevant to ATL and CL: these logics are standardly interpreted on structures where agents move simultaneously, opening the possibility that an agent cannot foresee the concurrent choices of other agents. In this paper we introduce a variant of CL we call Two-Player Strategic Coordination Logic (SCL 2 ). The key novelty of this framework is an operator for capturing coalitional ability when the cooperating agents cannot share strategic information. We identify significant differences in the expressive power and validities of SCL 2 and CL 2 , and present a sound and complete axiomatization for SCL 2 . We briefly address conceptual challenges when shifting attention to games with more than two players and stronger notions of rationality.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A point-free system of geometry based on the notions of region, parthood, and ovality, the last one being a region-based counterpart of the notion of convex set is developed.
Abstract: In this paper we develop a point-free system of geometry based on the notions of region, parthood, and ovality, the last one being a region-based counterpart of the notion of convex set. In order to show that the system we propose is sufficient to reconstruct an affine geometry we make use of a theory of a Polish mathematician Aleksander Śniatycki from [15], in which the concept of half-plane is assumed as basic.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: It is shown that the resulting logic containing an existential quantifier is not Recursively axiomatizable, as it is recursively isomorphic to second-order logic, and a natural candidate axiom atization for the resulting reasoning is shown to be incomplete.
Abstract: Robert Stalnaker has recently advocated propositional contingentism, the claim that it is contingent what propositions there are. He has proposed a philosophical theory of contingency in what propositions there are and sketched a possible worlds model theory for it. In this paper, such models are used to interpret two propositional modal languages: one containing an existential propositional quantifier, and one containing an existential propositional operator. It is shown that the resulting logic containing an existential quantifier is not recursively axiomatizable, as it is recursively isomorphic to second-order logic, and a natural candidate axiomatization for the resulting logic containing an existential operator is shown to be incomplete.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Husserl’s interactions with logicians in the 1930s show that Husserl may have learned about the results from him, but not necessarily so, and his reading marks on Friedrich Waismann's Einführung in das mathematische Denken: die Begriffsbildung der modernen Mathematik, 1936 show that he knew about them before his death in 1938.
Abstract: The paper examines Husserl’s interactions with logicians in the 1930s in order to assess Husserl’s awareness of Godel’s incompleteness theorems. While there is no mention about the results in Husserl’s known exchanges with Hilbert, Weyl, or Zermelo, the most likely source about them for Husserl is Felix Kaufmann (1895–1949). Husserl’s interactions with Kaufmann show that Husserl may have learned about the results from him, but not necessarily so. Ultimately Husserl’s reading marks on Friedrich Waismann’s Einfuhrung in das mathematische Denken: die Begriffsbildung der modernen Mathematik, 1936, show that he knew about them before his death in 1938.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A notion of harmony is constructed that allows the inferentialist to say when a connective or concept is meaning-bearing and this conception unifies most of the prominent conceptions of harmony through category theory.
Abstract: This paper responds to recent work in the philosophy of Homotopy Type Theory by James Ladyman and Stuart Presnell. They consider one of the rules for identity, path induction, and justify it along ‘pre-mathematical’ lines. I give an alternate justification based on the philosophical framework of inferentialism. Accordingly, I construct a notion of harmony that allows the inferentialist to say when a connective or concept is meaning-bearing and this conception unifies most of the prominent conceptions of harmony through category theory. This categorical harmony is stated in terms of adjoints and says that any concept definable by iterated adjoints from general categorical operations is harmonious. Moreover, it has been shown that identity in a categorical setting is determined by an adjoint in the relevant way. Furthermore, path induction as a rule comes from this definition. Thus we arrive at an account of how path induction, as a rule of inference governing identity, can be justified on mathematically motivated grounds.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: To the memory of Prof. Grigori Mints, Stanford University.
Abstract: To the memory of Prof. Grigori Mints, Stanford UniversityBorn: June 7, 1939, St. Petersburg, RussiaDied: May 29, 2014, Palo Alto, California

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: It is shown that the strength of the strongly Millian second-order modal logics here characterised afford the means to resist an argument by Timothy Williamson for the truth of the claim that necessarily, every property necessarily exists.
Abstract: The most common first- and second-order modal logics either have as theorems every instance of the Barcan and Converse Barcan formulae and of their second-order analogues, or else fail to capture the actual truth of every theorem of classical first- and second-order logic. In this paper we characterise and motivate sound and complete first- and second-order modal logics that successfully capture the actual truth of every theorem of classical first- and second-order logic and yet do not possess controversial instances of the Barcan and Converse Barcan formulae as theorems, nor of their second-order analogues. What makes possible these results is an understanding of the individual constants and predicates of the target languages as strongly Millian expressions, where a strongly Millian expression is one that has an actually existing entity as its semantic value. For this reason these logics are called ‘strongly Millian’. It is shown that the strength of the strongly Millian second-order modal logics here characterised afford the means to resist an argument by Timothy Williamson for the truth of the claim that necessarily, every property necessarily exists.