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JournalISSN: 0272-4332

Risk Analysis 

Wiley-Blackwell
About: Risk Analysis is an academic journal published by Wiley-Blackwell. The journal publishes majorly in the area(s): Poison control & Risk assessment. It has an ISSN identifier of 0272-4332. Over the lifetime, 4943 publications have been published receiving 241970 citations.


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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose a conceptual framework that links the technical assessment of risk with psychological, sociological, and cultural perspectives of risk perception and risk-related behavior to amplify or attenuate public responses to the risk or risk event.
Abstract: One of the most perplexing problems in risk analysis is why some relatively minor risks or risk events, as assessed by technical experts, often elicit strong public concerns and result in substantial impacts upon society and economy. This article sets forth a conceptual framework that seeks to link systematically the technical assessment of risk with psychological, sociological, and cultural perspectives of risk perception and risk-related behavior. The main thesis is that hazards interact with psychological, social, institutional, and cultural processes in ways that may amplify or attenuate public responses to the risk or risk event. A structural description of the social amplification of risk is now possible. Amplification occurs at two stages: in the transfer of information about the risk, and in the response mechanisms of society. Signals about risk are processed by individual and social amplification stations, including the scientist who communicates the risk assessment, the news media, cultural groups, interpersonal networks, and others. Key steps of amplifications can be identified at each stage. The amplified risk leads to behavioral responses, which, in turn, result in secondary impacts. Models are presented that portray the elements and linkages in the proposed conceptual framework.

3,016 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: For instance, this article argued that analytic reasoning cannot be effective unless it is guided by emotion and affect, and argued that rational decision making requires proper integration of both modes of thought.
Abstract: Modern theories in cognitive psychology and neuroscience indicate that there are two fundamental ways in which human beings comprehend risk. The “analytic system” uses algorithms and normative rules, such as probability calculus, formal logic, and risk assessment. It is relatively slow, effortful, and requires conscious control. The “experiential system” is intuitive, fast, mostly automatic, and not very accessible to conscious awareness. The experiential system enabled human beings to survive during their long period of evolution and remains today the most natural and most common way to respond to risk. It relies on images and associations, linked by experience to emotion and affect (a feeling that something is good or bad). This system represents risk as a feeling that tells us whether it is safe to walk down this dark street or drink this strange-smelling water. Proponents of formal risk analysis tend to view affective responses to risk as irrational. Current wisdom disputes this view. The rational and the experiential systems operate in parallel and each seems to depend on the other for guidance. Studies have demonstrated that analytic reasoning cannot be effective unless it is guided by emotion and affect. Rational decision making requires proper integration of both modes of thought. Both systems have their advantages, biases, and limitations. Now that we are beginning to understand the complex interplay between emotion and reason that is essential to rational behavior, the challenge before us is to think creatively about what this means for managing risk. On the one hand, how do we apply reason to temper the strong emotions engendered by some risk events? On the other hand, how do we infuse needed “doses of feeling” into circumstances where lack of experience may otherwise leave us too “coldly rational”? This article addresses these important questions.

2,847 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a quantitative definition of risk is suggested in terms of the idea of a "set of triplets" and extended to include uncertainty and completeness, and the use of Bayes' theorem is described in this connection.
Abstract: A quantitative definition of risk is suggested in terms of the idea of a “set of triplets”. The definition is extended to include uncertainty and completeness, and the use of Bayes' theorem is described in this connection. The definition is used to discuss the notions of “relative risk”, “relativity of risk”, and “acceptability of risk”.

2,808 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Risk management has become increasingly politicized and contentious, and polarized views, controversy, and overt conflict have become pervasive as discussed by the authors, which is a side effect of our remarkable form of participatory democracy, amplified by powerful technological and social changes that systematically destroy trust.
Abstract: Risk management has become increasingly politicized and contentious. Polarized views, controversy, and overt conflict have become pervasive. Risk-perception research has recently begun to provide a new perspective on this problem. Distrust in risk analysis and risk management plays a central role in this perspective. According to this view, the conflicts and controversies surrounding risk management are not due to public ignorance or irrationality but, instead, are seen as a side effect of our remarkable form of participatory democracy, amplified by powerful technological and social changes that systematically destroy trust. Recognizing the importance of trust and understanding the “dynamics of the system” that destroys trust has vast implications for how we approach risk management in the future.

1,726 citations

Performance
Metrics
No. of papers from the Journal in previous years
YearPapers
2023108
2022214
2021276
2020177
2019174
2018178